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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse and clarify the rules of 
expropriation in international law as are applied to developing States. 
Special attention has been paid to the 1952 Iranian Oil Nationalizations and 
the expropriation cases in post-Revolutionary Iran. The approach is to 
consider and analyse the problem from an international law perspective.
The main thrust of the thesis is that the problem of expropriation in 
developing States presents an extraordinary difficulty which has caused 
confusion over the rules of expropriation. Emphasis has been placed on 
the causes of those difficulties which have troubled international lawyers 
for many years and created various doctrines, manifested in the divergent 
practices of States and judicial bodies. The study aims to identify the 
differences in those rules and the reasons for those differences; and to 
suggest an appropriate solution based on the principles of international 
law.
The thesis is divided into four chapters:
Chapter one, after a brief historical survey of the rules and practices, 
analyses the legal basis of the right of expropriation in international law. 
Sanctity of treaties and contracts, as a source of disputes between 
developing countries and aliens, has been discussed. Chapter two analyses 
the various doctrines on the rules of expropriation. The chapter deals 
with the conditions which developing States should fulfil in order to 
expropriate aliens' property according to international law. The role of 
international agreements in determining the differences on the rules of 
expropriation has also been indicated. Chapter three deals with the 
controversial case of the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran. After 
examining the legal character and validity of those measures, the reasons 
for all those controversies and confusions have been considered. To 
develop the argument, the legal problems surrounding the post-Revolution 
expropriations in Iran have been discussed in chapter four, and the reasons 
that the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has not reduced the chaos in this field 
of international law have been given.
The thesis concludes with some recommendations on how future 
property disputes of aliens with developing States can be avoided or 
solved.
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Introduction 1
INTRODUCTION
To raise the living standard of peoples, gain satisfactory progress in 
economic development and in pursuit of national wealth j countries usually 
admit a foreign investment flow to their societies. For similar reasons, 
they sonietimes wish to expropriate those investments. To do so. States 
are required to fulfil some conditions in order to prevent any injustice to 
the deprived individuals. Accordingly, expropriations in developed States 
have often been practiced without much controversy, and the international 
rules in this regard have been established through the practice of those 
States with similar social, ideological and economic structures. The 
controversy has mostly been where aliens' property had been 
expropriated in developihg States which have had a different approach to 
the issue of expropriation. As a result, different doctrines, such as 
'international minimum standards and 'national treatment standard', have 
grown up around the issue of exprppriatiori by developed and developing 
States. None of those theories are satisfactory and comprehensive, nor 
able to introduce a formula on expropriation acceptable to all States. In 
doctrinal terms, they present contradiction and uneasiness, and much 
confusion has attended their application to different cases. The terms used 
are imprecise, elastic and are subject to a variety of interpretations.
The practice of States in this regard is not less contradictory. It will 
be seen that even among developed States the issue of expropriation has 
sometihies been treated differently. In this thesis, an attempt will be made 
to provide an analysis of the reasons for those différences and the 
conditions surrounding the issue of expropriation in each group of States.
While developed States have had little difference of opinion in
I/;-. ' X ' : '
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dealing with aliens' property, developing States have had many 
differences in this respect. The reason for aU those differences lies in the 
varied legal characters of aliens' property and their rights in developed 
and developing States. The advantageous and preferential position of 
aliens has justified developing States in basing their responsibility towards 
aliens on their own domestic laws. On the other hand, those differences 
in legal character of aliens' property in developing States have not been 
recognized by the investors' States, and therefore any pleading of national 
treatment standard has been rejected by them.
The confusion over the doctrine is evident from the arguments of 
each group of States. The problem has been that States have tried to 
extend the rules of expropriation to other States with different legal 
relations with the aliens. This confusion is clearly indicated in the Iranian 
expropriations to which special reference will be made.
The disorder is not only in theory but includes State and judicial 
practice. Judicial decisions as one of the main sources of international law 
are diverging and inconclusive. They are sometimes contradictory in 
regard to even one single case. State practice on the settlement of 
expropriation disputes is also various. Although it seems impossible to 
introduce a single rule applicable to all States, the identification of the 
reasons for all those diversities is fundamental in order to make it possible 
to establish appropriate universal rules. For this reason, international 
authorities have to take into account some important facts in their 
considerations in order to achieve a satisfactory formula or machinery on 
the issue of expropriation. The study identifies the problems which exist 
in applying each of the rules and standards to developing States.
The main thrust of this thesis is, therefore, to clarify the reasons for 
those problems, and find the responsibility of each party to expropriation
■\rî'3y:---- ________
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disputes in developing States. Therefore, the study stresses the role and 
the behaviour of aliens in cireumstances surrounding expropriation in 
developing States. The aini of this thesis is to provide some suggestions in 
order to discourage aliens and their governments from gaining 
advantageous cpntractiial rights by supporting uhdemocratic regimes in 
developing States, infringing the right of peoples to self-deteimination 
and possibly endangering international peace. In supporting this theme, 
the consequences of such behaviour in developing States, particularly in 
Iran, have been presented.
Therefore, this thesis undertakes to contribute to the issue by 
discussing some specific problems concerning expropriation measures in 
developing States and suggests some techniques to formulate the principles 
and rules of expropriation at a universal level.
This thesis consists of four chapters: Chapter one, after a short 
survey in history of the rules on expropriation and giving a general 
picture of the phenomenon, deals with the basic issue of the right to 
expropriation. The argument is followed by consideration of the related 
United Nations’ Resolutions and their contribution to the rules of 
expropriation. The chapter also analyses the sanctity of treaties and 
contracts as one of the sources of dispiites between developing countries 
and aliens. The Confusion over the right of a sovereign State to 
expropriate, and the difference between a lawful measure of 
expropriation and an unlawful act in breach of contract is explained. The 
legal character and the validity of contracts in dispute between developed 
countries and their nationals on one hand ànd developing State on the 
other are discussed; and they are analysed in order to identify the crucial 
points which have been ignored.
Different theories on expropriation of aliens' property are discussed
—
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in chapter two. Certain features of those doctrines are criticised, 
particularly on the grounds that they have not been acceptable to some 
States and scholars.
A special emphasis is placed on the conditions which should be 
fulfilled in the event of expropriation of aliens' property by developing 
States. They are discussed together with the conditions, which had been 
asserted traditionally, to develop the argument in this respect.
International agreements relating to expropriation of aliens 
property are discussed. Those agreements indicate the ultimate solutions 
which States have chosen to settle the disputes on expropriation of aliens' 
property. They also illustrate how much the rights and property of aliens 
has been protected under international law.
The focus is on Iranian expropriations. In chapter three, 
Nationalization of Iranian Oil Industry is discussed in more detail. We 
analyse the reasons that the dispute over the measures caused many 
problems. Most importantly, the reasons that different judicial bodies 
reached different conclusions is explained. The work further explains the 
reasons that the measures could not comply with the asserted traditional 
rules. The role of aliens in the measures of expropriation and the 
consequence of their behaviour is illustrated.
In  the last chapter, a similar approach is made to the Post- 
Revolution expropriations in Iran. After a look at the background and 
procedure of the settlement of the disputes, it indicates the confusion over 
the rules governing the expropriations, and also the contradiction between 
the chambers of the Iran-United States Claims Settlement Tribunal in 
applying the rules and reaching conclusions. After introducing the defects 
of the settlements, the conclusion has been reached that they cannot be
 . -
introduction
considered as settled international practice, and they do not contribute to 
international law. It indicates that the differences over the rules of 
expropriation do not only relate to the merits of the cases or to technical 
matters such as the calculation of the amount of compensation; the 
differences are with regard to the questions which are related to the basic 
principles of international law, such as the right to self-determination. 
We explain that, where there has been less dispute over those basis 
principles (in developed States), there has also been less controversy over 
the rules of expropriation. This shows that the controversy has mostly 
been between developed and developing States where the basic rights of 
developing countries and principles of international law have been 
ignored.
All the above topics are dealt with by a reference to the existing 
asserted rules of expropriation and, at the end, it concludes that, in 
considering expropriatioh measures in developing States, many other facts 
should be kept in mind. As a special reference of this thesis, the legal 
relations between Iran and the United States and its nationals, the 
legitimacy of their conduct, property and rights, and the responsibility of 
Iran towards the American nationals has been highlighted. Suggestions 
for a more comprehensive formula are given to indicate that the existing 
problems can and should be solved by application of the norms and 
principles of international law and any future dispute be avoided.
________________ ______
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CHAPTERONE
(SECTION ONE)
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
No complete history of the expropriation of property has been
written. The subject is directly connected to the notion of ownership
which is influenced by many other branches of human thought, such as
■ Ireligion, philosophy, politics and sociology. Any attempt to outline the
historical development of expropriation wiU involve us with those subjects
and elements such as sovereignty which conceptùaUy were quite different
from those of today. The notions about "right”, "ownership", "property"
and "sovereignty" were different, and the concepts have been changing
during history. However, those concepts were usually limited to the right
2of others, of neighbours, Of the public and of the State.
The bureaucratic system, the administration, the tax law, definitive 
State budget and the public properties in 300G B.C. and earlier make it 
clear that nationalization and the public sector existed far in history which 
in turn indicates that in ancient times there was a notion of ownership. 
But it is obvious that concept of property was not quite as comprehensive 
as it is today
Under the Mesopotamia System, the individual merchant acted on
his own initiative, but like Egypt under Pharaoh, the entire territory of a
k  Marin, F. A, Outlines of a History of Expropriation, 75 L.Q.R., 1959, p, 188.
Diosdi Gyorgy, Ownership in Ancient and Pre-classic Roman Law, Budapest,
1970, pp. 150,131-132.
Log. cit., pp. 50-1.
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city State was the property of the city’s god and the ruler, i.e., the ruler
had full authority to decide about any property under his dom ination/
More than 2000 B.C., there occurred expropriations by the existing
civilizations. The most interesting expropriations were those by the King
of Akkad, in 2100 B.C., and by the King of Tello in 2400 B.C., which
nationalized large stretches of land while making full compensation.^
In addition, the kings of the shores of Aegean Sea, in Egypt and
throughout Asia had a kind of nationalized industries which supplied the
needs of the courts, armed forces and partly of the general use on the city
market; and the Crown was one of the main producers and distributors of
its own national economy (nationalization of production and distribution).
The State perhaps controlled up to 90 per cent of its economic potential.
The palaces' influence extended even to control over many banking and
other economic affairs.^
In the days of rising absolutism, both the granting of concessions
and the expropriation of property took the form of unilateral
administrative act and the individual was very much at the mercy of
State.^ It was a fundamental tenet of the prevailing political systems
that the decision of the executive, particularly the king, as positive law,
could not be questioned. The King decided what the public interest
required, and there was no court of law which would have had
Easton, Ç., The Heritage of the Past frorn the Earliest Times to 1500; New 
York, 1964, pp. 58-9; HaWkes J„ History of Mankind, Cultural and Scientific 
Development, vol. 1, Pre-history and the Beginnings of Civilization, London,
1963, p. 597, and chapter IV, part n, and pp. 597-629.
Heichelheim F. M., An Ancient Economic History, From the Palaeofithic Age 
to the Migrations of the germanic, Slavic, and Arabic Nations, vol. 1, Leyden,
1958, pp. 22-26, 173.
Loc. cit, pp. 173, 179-180, 184.
Starr, C. G, A History of the Ancient World, 3rd edition., Oxford, 1983, pp.
222, 279.
r f
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jurisdiction or power to review the reasons for and the justification of the 
king's determination.
The laws in different systems varied. In Roman law^ the right of 
the sovereign to exprppriate in the provinces; was restricted to
gexceptional cases. In English law, Magna Carta, by its 29th Chapter, 
guaranteed that "no freeman shall be .....disseized of his freeholds or 
liberties or free customs .... b u t .... by the law of the land." In addition, 
by Chapter 19, a constable or his bailiff was precluded from taking com 
or other chattels without payment^ and by Chapter 21 no sheriff or bailiff 
could take without payment horses, carts, wood or other goods necessary9 >for the King's household. The earliest English legislation specifically
dealing with expropriation was in 1541. The law was carefully drawn
provided that measures should be for public purposes. The law provided
10compensation to be paid in the case of injury to private owners.
The history of French, German, Austrian and Swiss law has
provided many similar examples, particularly since the beginning of the
11seventeenth century. And in Italy the principle that expropriation
presupposes a public interest and involves the duty of paying
compensation was well established in the statutes of the medieval cities of
12Italy and by 160Q becaine the general law of Italy, In Mediaeval times,
the theory was based on positive law; accordingly, the sovereign was the
source of, and therefore superior to all positive law, although he was
subject to and bound by the rules of natural law. Similarly, the main
Schulz F., Principle of Roman Law, Oxford, 1936, p. 161.
Mann F. A., Outlines of a History of Expropriation, op. cit., pp. 193-4.
1^- 33 Hen. VIII, c, 35. See niore in Clifford F., History of Private Bill 
Legislation, London, 1885, vol. 1, p, 9,
Clifford F., History of Private Ëill Legislation, op. cit., pp, 203-204; Grieke, 
Natural Law and the Theory of Society, dp, cit., p. 466.
Calisse C , A History of Italian Law, New York, 1969, p. 690.
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propositions which are set out as the foundation of the classical doctrine 
a re /^
1- the institution of property originated in the Jus Gentium which was a 
law that flowed from natural law without any assistance from the State 
and was common to all races of men;
2- the sovereign could bind himself and his successors to his subjects and 
to other sovereign rulers by contract, the binding force of that is from
14natural law (pacta sunt servanda). The State could interfere only in 
the cases of just cause, and in such cases compensation was due. Thus, 
private properties were protected by natural law.
However, the important point is that, if the property was privileged 
and conceded unilaterally by the State, the rights were regarded as freely 
revocable for the public welfare without the obligation to coinpensate the
15expropriated individual. At the time when the right of expropriation
was recognized, the system of personal law changed to the system of
territorial law. Consequently, aliens became subject to the local law and
their property situated in a State became liable to expropriation.
Vattel is probably the first person in the West to raise the issue in
the framework of international law. He  ^ in 1758, spoke of a nation's duty
of protecting the property of its members, properties acquired on the
basis of natural law (divine law), and not those based on positive law,
treaties, privileges and so on /^  He argued that, within the law of
Maitland J., Political Theories of the Middle Ages, Cambridge, 1900, pp. 78- 
81.
Jones has a similar point, see in Historical Introduction to the Theory of Law, 
Oxford, 1940, p. 102.
13- Loc, cit., p. 157.
1^ - Starr, C. G, A History of the Ancient World, op. cit., pp. 222, 279.
1 -^ Wheaton H., Classics of International Law, Elements of International Law,
If'
- ----------
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nations, the property of a State's nationals should be seen as belonging to
the State. Therefore, it was required that the property of those nationals
in a foreign State be given full protection. Vattel believed that the
property of an individual does not cease to belong to him on account of
his being in a foreign country; it still constitutes a part of the aggregate
wealth of his nation.
Following a big change in economic structure of the world in
fifteenth century. Western European countries engaged in trade and other
business activities in the developing countries, and international trade 
18grew rapidly. Since the Nineteenth Century, they were joined by other
19industrial States, particularly by the United States and Japan. The kind
of economic activities and political treatment of developed countries
among themselves varied from those towards other nations. Initially, the
activities were limited to tradiiig and shipping with irregular contacts with
the native population of coastal points. The desire for greater control
over the sources of supply in time led to more control of the coastlines
and interior locations. With the growth of nation-States in Western
Europe, the charters granted to the monopolies of the commercial era set
forth rights and obligations that went far beyond cominercial matters and
dealt with military, religious, political and colonization functions as well.
Those charter companies operated as extensions of the parent State and
were delegated broad powers to make war, enter into treaties, and to
20govern the overseas colonies. International investment was an essential
1866, London, 1936, p. 11.
The Problem of International Investment, A Report by a Study Group of 
Members of the Royal Institution of International Affairs, London, 1937, p. 4.
Zink D. W., The Political Risks for Multinational Enterprise in Developing 
Countries, With a Çasë Study of Peru, London, 1973, p. 3.
The East Indian Company was one of them which governed a vast area in 
South East of Asia. More in Mikesell R. F., Public International Lending for
:'XA'=r
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condition of these increasing activities. The industrialized States’
requirements for reliable sources of raw materials led to direct
investment in mine, ranch, plantation, railroad, navigation and other
infrastructure facilities to get a higher return than they could obtain at
home. These activities were followed with the businesses, trades,
21insurance, baiiking, transportation and communication facilities.
While most of the developihg countries did not exist up to the 
World War I, or lacked the power to expropriate aliens' property, the 
expropriations that took place were few, and in the case of foreign 
property even less. Such expropriations were almost entirely of an 
individual nature and for public necessity. There were no complications
emanating from, e,g., the nature of State economies, which were, at that
' ' ' ' 2 2  time, all based én laissezrfaire principles. It was in this context that
the classic rules of expropriation of private property were formed and
came to be incorporated into the sphere of international law.
In the 1920s a new form of taking of property emerged which was
totally different from the classic forms of expropriation. It stemmed
from a distinctive social and economic view and from a new notion of
property which was due to two reasons ; One was the changes in the
economic order of the world and the other factor was the appearance of
socialism and the first socialist Stàte in the world. After the
nationalizations associated with the Bolshevik revolution in Russia jurists
23subscribed to different views. They departed from the traditional
Development; New York, 1966, p. 7 et secj.
2k Mikesell R. P., Public International Leridirig for Development, op. cit., p. 9;
The Problem of International Investment, op. cit., p. 5.
22- Amerasinghe C. P., Issues of Compensation for the Taking of Alien Property
in the Light of Recent Cases and Practice, 4 1 1.C.L Q , 1992, p. 23,
23- See Wortley B. A., Expropriation in Public International Law, Cambridge,
1959, p. 35.
•■ A :'.
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rules. Since then, while the authorities of the Western Capitalist States, 
which had colonized most of the countries or lands in Asia and Africa, 
have almost invariably insisted on the international minimum standard, 
authorities and governments of the communist countries have consistently 
maintained that international law has no minimum standard, leaving the 
question to the domestic jurisdiction of States. Jurists from developing 
countries have expressed a variety of views ^ though usually of a liberal 
nature. Some of them state that, whatever the rule of international law 
has been in the past, the modem law is predicated on the premise that 
compensation is always a matter entirely within the domestic jurisdiction
25of the host State. Sortie other jurists from developing nations, 
including those from most of the Latin American countries, since the 
nineteenth century, have believed that all that international law require is 
that the host State treats aliens in the same way as its own nationals. 
Some others believe that the law has changed in accordance with social 
needs.
Meanwhile, the governments of the developed countries have played
a strong role in the promotion and dictation of capital outflow, which
took place on an immense scale, through the chartered companies. The
28role was dictated by the governments' foreign policy objectives.
24- See e.g. Makarczyk J., Principles of the New International Economic Order, 
London, 1988, pp., 232-239.
23- See e.g. Giryan N*, Expropriating the Expropriators; Compensation Criteria 
frorn a Third World Viewpoint, in Lihich R. B., The Valuation of Nationalised 
Property in International Law, vol. 3,1975, pp. 149-179.
26- Vicuna O., The IntemationalRegulation of Valuation Standards and Processes:
A Re-examination of Third World Perspectives, in Lillich R. B., The 
Valuation of Nationalised Property in International Law, vol. 3, 1975, pp. 
131-148.
22- Sornarajah M., Compensation for Expropriation: the Emergence of New 
Standards, 1979, 13 J.W.T.L., pp. 108, 123-131.
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Thus, the economic history of the world for the last 500 years show 
increasing interactions between States. Those interactions, which had 
considerable political consequences, play a big role in takings of the 
property of aliens. Therefore, the major trends can be divided into four 
historical eras
1- The commercial era; from the age of the great explorers, 1500 to 
1850, the era of the European Industrial Revolution;
2- The exploitative era; from round 1850 until the years just prior to the 
First World War;
3- The concessionary era; from the period immediately prior to the First 
World War up until the end of the Second World War;
4- The national era; from the end of the Second World War until the i 
present day.
Expropriation and nationalization in developing countries has
occurred mostly after major conflicts when big political changes occurred
in the world and there was a correspondingly weakening in the role of the
investing States. As a result of these political changes, many developing
States did not hesitate to use the opportunity against aliens’ property.
Expropriation in its highest degree began mostly in third world countries
after 1945, when the investing States either were defeated in the Wars or
had in some other way lost their ability to control their colonies.
In sum, a glance at history indicates that, although economic systems
have varied during history, at all stages the individual owner has been
liable to have his property taken from him. At no time and in no State
28- Mikesell K. F., Public International Lending for Development, op. cit., p. 9 et 
seq.
2^- Robinson adds another era that is international era, from 1970 up to the i
beginning the next century; Robinson R. D., International Business Policy, | |
New York, 1964, pp* 2-3.
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has there been any support for the proposition that property may not in 
any circumstances be taken; that it was in some sense sacrosanct and 
inviolable. Nor is there any evidence that in reality this was ever 
doubted. On the contrary, the long struggle with regard to the conditions 
of and the restrictions upon expropriation could not have occurred if the 
right to expropriation were not assumed and it was not treated as superior
30to the right of property.
31However, many of the constitutions adopted before and since/ -World War I have provided that property should not be expropriated 
except in the public interest and according to law; and that expropriation 
should be accompanied by just compensation unless otherwise provided by
32 ' ' ' 'national law. The provisions of most of those constitutions envisage 
the possibility of expropriation without adequate compensation only in 
cases of agrarian reform, And indeed, a League of Nations Conference 
on the Codification of International Law (1929-1930) failed to reach any
3 3 ’definite conclusion in this regard.
For this apparent lack of unanimity on the rules of expropriation
or, more particularly, about the determination of a taking which attracts
compensation, it may be concluded that it would not be possible to derive
particular rules from long historical evolution. The expropriation
3k Mann F. A., Outlines of a History of Expropriation, op. cit., p. 189.
3L There are more than forty-five written constitutions which support public utility 
and against payment of compensation. See the list of those constitutions in 
Mann F, A., Outlines of a History of Expropriation, op. cit., p. 208, note 8.
32- The Civil Code of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (1927),
Articles 69, 70; The Mexican Constitution (1917), Article 27; The 
Czechoslovak Constitution (1948), Section 9, Para. 2; the Yugoslav 
Constitution (1946), Article 18.
33- League of Nations' Conference for the Codification of International Law, vol.
Ill; League of Nations Document C. 75. M. 69,1929, V, 3, and Document C. 
351(c). M. 145 (c), 1930, V. 17.
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measures which were taken prior to the Second World War are certainly 
not conclusive. Equal weight must be given to the reasons given for the 
justification of the measures or for condemnation of the measure by the 
investing States. The particular historical facts, by themselves, are thus 
often of little significance since they were not established as customary 
international law.
*********
* * * * * * *
* * * * *
* * *
*
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—Right o f  Expropriation
(SECTION TWO)
THE RIGHT OF EXPROPRIATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW
16
5|i!
The State frequently encroaches upon private and foreign property 
as a consequence of the normal functioning of its public services or 
because it is called upon either to assume possession of certain property in 
order to place it at the disposal of the public services or the public at 
l a r g e /  Sometimes States by expropriation not only modify the 
economic and social structure, but also exclude private or foreign capital 
from the national economy. In discussing the legal position of 
expropriation, reference to its different aspects, which govern the 
behaviour of States on this issue, is inevitable. The reason is that the 
motives of developing and developed States are sometimes different and 
the differences are so immense that it becomes difficult to determihe the 
basic conditions of expropriation.
The complications caused by State succession and the emergence and
activities of de facto governments makes the issue even more difficult. It
becomes more complicated when it happens after a violent political
struggle for the general recognition of the novel concept of 'economic
self-determination' with all its implications. However, in its legal
essence, the act of expropriation is clearly attributable to the sovereignty
of the State, belonging to the category of acts which are known as
L Friedman S., Expropriation in International Law, London, 1953, pp. 1, 5.
Baade H. W., Indonesian Nationalisation Measures Before Foreign Courts -A 
Reply, 54 A.J.I.L., 1960, p. 806.
Verzijl J. H. W., International Law in Historical Perspective, vol. 1, Leyden,
1968, pp. 188-9.
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"supreme executive acts". It amounts to a unilateral act which does not 
require the acceptance of anyone, still less agreenient of the party 
interested or affected."* Therefore, it would be more correct to speak 
of expropriation as a unilateral sovereign act.
The concept of State sovereignty is also taken to mean that all States 
are in principle internally self-governing and externally independent.^ 
Consequently, all individuals and property within the territory of a State 
are under its dominion and rule, and foreign individuals and property fall 
under the territorial supremacy of a State when they cross its frontier.^ 
As a qualification to this principle, international law gives States a limited
7competence to regulate persons or events outside their territory. The 
concept of the sovereignty of the State allows the State to adopt in virtue 
of its own sovereign judgement, any measures which it deems appropriate 
for its own organization. This becomes evident when all changes in the 
general political structure of a State and the distribution of political forces
by which this structure is maintained results in changes in the system of
property. Accordingly, States are free to exercise their powers to the
extent of the jurisdiction given to thein by international law in whichever
Hyde C„ International Law, Boston^ 1947vvol. 1, p. 650; The Sacrosanct!ty 
of the Foreign Act of States, 59 L.Q.R., 1943, pp. 165, 167.
Staker C., Public International Law and the Property of Aliens, 58 B.Y.I.L.,
1987, p. 151.
Oppenheim L. F. L., International Law, vol. 1, 1955, p. 287; Staker C., 
Public International Law and the Property of Aliens, op. cit., p. 152.
Lotus case, P.C.I.J., 1927, Series A, No. 10, p. W, Island of Palmas case, 
(1928), 2 R.I.A.A., pp. 829, 838; see more in Akehurst M., Jurisdiction in 
International Law, 46 B.Y.I.L., 1972-3, p. 146.
The different policies of different political parties when they come to power are 
a result of a such practice; see more in Bullington J. P., Problems of 
International Law in the Mexican Constitution of 1917, 21 A.J.I.L., 1927, p.
689.
-
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way they wish. Accordingly, the municipal law in some federations
varies from state to state. For example, in the United States of America
the ownership of land by foreigners is forbidden in sixteen states and in
10the District of Colombia. The diversity in the various systems of
municipal law is too great to enable one to infer the existence of a general
rule or even a general standard of conduct. Clear and cogent evidence is
needed to establish that a legislature, sovereign in municipal law, has lost
or abandoned in her own particular sphere a right to regulate the
destination of a property otherwise than subject to conditions which it
11does not itself impose. Moreover, municipal laws, even if identical in
several systems, caimpt by themselves create international law. Equally,
any restriction imposed by domestic laws on the goyernrnents in order to
limit them in expropriation of private properties, cannot be extended into
intemational relation with other States, the limitations which are in the
nature of constitutional limitations or arrangements and can be modified
domestically without appeal to any external authority.
However, it is impossible to hold that every limitation or alienation
of property made by a State can be accepted as being expropriation, even
if it is so described.^^ It is not without importance for intemational law
to know whether the expropriation act by a given State which is a member
of the international community, is constitutional and in general, if it is
consistent with municipal law. The problem which might arise would be
Staker G., Public International Law and the Property of Aliens, op. cit., p.
152.
10_ Friedman S., Expropriation in International Law, op. cit., p. 112.
\yilliams J. F., International Law and the Property of Aliens, op. cit., pp. 16- 
17.
12_ Williams J. F., International Law and the Property of Aliens, op. cit., p. 23.
Peaslëa A. J., Constitution of Nations, revised third edition, Netherlands,
1968, passim.
y..
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that the same act might be judged by international law according to 
different and possibly contradictory criteria, depending on whether it 
concerned foreign nationals or not. The consequence might be that an act 
regarded as unlawful according to municipal and constitutional law might 
be recognized as lawful accbrdiiig to international law.
Moreover, the manner in which the question of expropriation or 
nationalization is raised in intemational law is not always logical. On the 
one hand, it is asserted that every State has the sovereign fight to 
nationalize private property, and, on the other hand, it is not clear what is 
its legal effects and privileges in variance with unlawful confiscation in 
payment of compensation.*^^
The United Nations, as the prime political and legal intemational 
institution, has raised the question of right of expropriation by States and 
developed the principle of sovereignty over natural resources so as to 
create a balance between the intèrests of developed and developing 
countries. The present-day principle emerged, in the aftermath of the 
achievement of political independence by many new States, in a series of 
the resolutions of the General Assembly on sovereignty over natural 
resources. Political independence did not necessarily bring economic 
independence for those States, and left them to stmgglé to safeguard their 
sovereignty through economic independence. The General Assembly of 
the United Nations has been the best way for developing States to raise the 
question. The rise of the principle of sovereignty over natural resources 
has not been without opposition, and some States have waged a prolonged 
battle in order to deny the principle of complete sovereignty over the 
natural resources of the peoples in the former colonies and dependent
Akinsania A. A., The Expropriation of Multinational Property in the Third
World; 1980, op. cit., pp. 16-18.
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territories. This opposition, caused by the certainty of losing some 
economic advantages, has given rise to a clash between developing
15countries and the developed States.
The United Nations declared the right of peoples and nations to
permanent sovereignty oyer their natural wealth and resources must be
exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-
16being of the people of the State concerned. The United Nations also
declared economic self-determination as one of the principles of
intemational law in the Declaration on Principles of International Law
Conceming Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. It was also
inserted in the Intemational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, by virtue of that right all people may freely dispose of their
18natural wealth and resources.
Therefore, the resolutions of the United Nations on sovereignty
over natural resources can be considered as one important source of
intemational law on expropriation which determine, on one hand, the
right of States to expropriate foreign property and eontfactual rights, and
on the Other hand, determine the obligation of the expropriating States
towards the expropriated ones.
Elian G., The Principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Netherlands 
1979, p. 23.
Article 1(1) of Resolution 1803(XVII) of 14 Decmber 1962 of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations
The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples of Declaration 
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co- 
Operation Among States m Accordance with the Charter of tlie United Nations, 
in U.N. Resolutions Series 1, G.A., vol. XIII, 1970-1, pp. 339-340,
18- Article 1(2) of Intemational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
of 16 December 1966, U.N. Resolutions, Series 1, G.A., vol. 11, 1966-68, p.
165.
, ,
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The General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted a number
of resolutions^^ on sovereignty of States over natural resources. The
main point about these resolutions at the beginning was to reaffirm the
right of States to expropriate foreign investments. Accordingly, some
developing States have taken actions for the recovery and strengthening of
20sovereignty over their natural resources. Implernenting the terms of
those resolutions would involve a great conflict of interests between the
investors which were not reudy to lose their acquired rights in developing
countries and which aimed at obtaining the highest possible profit from
their investments, and the developing countries which were looking for
revindication of their rights and were striving for the rapid growth of
their economies. The resolutions of the United Nations on this regard
were the best legal means to prevent various forms of direct and
sometimes brutal interference of the investors’ governments in the
internal affairs of the host State, when the great interests of the investors 
21have been at stake.
A new State freed from colonial power, from its links of
dependence which had kept it attached to the colonial State, could not
consider itself really free unless it could exert the prerogatives of
complete sovereignty over the natural as well as other resources of its
territory which become national riches and resources of the State.
1^ - The main resolutions are: 626 (VII) of 1952; 1314 (KHI) of 1958; 1515 (XV) 
of 1960; 1803 (XVII) of 1962; 2158 (XXI) of 1966; 2386 (XXIII) of 1968;
2692 (XXV) of 1970; 3016 (XXVII) of 1972; 3171 (XXVIII) of 1973 and 
3281 (XXIX) of 1974 of the G. A. of the United Nations.
The Latin American States were the pioneers to take action in this regard; the 
Law for Recovering Petroleum of July 24, 1971 in Venezuela, the bill on the 
nationalisation of mineral deposits in Costa Rica and Argentina, and the 
establishment of the Latin Arnerican Economic System are some examples.
Elian G., The Principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources, op. cit., p.
143.
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During the process of its development, the principle was understood
by different States in different ways. During this period, there was a
gradual shift from the notion that the concept was the corollary to the
political and legal call for decolonization and self-determination to the
notion that it was representative of the political demand for a new
22international economic order (NIEG).
A study of the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations indicates that the evolution and development of the concept of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the trends of States in
23this regard can be divided into three stages:
1 - During the first stage, from 1952 to 1962, the emphasis was on the
formulation of the rights of peoples to use and exploit their natural
resources as a right "inherent in their sovereignty". The recognition of
this right later developed through the debates connected with the draft
24covenants on Human Rights of 1966, The Special Commission on 
permanent sovereignty after Resolution 1314 (Xll) of December 12, 
1958, was established to suggest any recommendations necessary for 
strengthening the concept of permanent sovereignty of peoples over their 
national wealth and resources as a basic constituent of the right to self- 
determination.^^
Visser P., th e  Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and 
the Nationalisation of Foreign Interests, 21 Comparative International Law 
Journal of South Africa, 1988, p. 78.
Visser has divided the development into two periods and Chowdhury into four 
stages. However, the division of those development is the subject of 
controversy.
Paragraph 3 of the Resolution 626 of the G.A., U.N. Resolutions, Series 1, 
G A., vol. 4, 1952-53, p. 106; Article 1 (1) of the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights, Op. cit.; see also in 
K. Hossain, Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order, op. cit., 
p. 3.
'
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2 - During the second stage which started from 1962, the landmark 
resolution 1803 (XVll) was adopted. Its principles were reiterated and 
reaffirm ed in a number of other resolutions.^** The right of
27expropriation inserted in the resolution was not challenged and in
1972, the Trade and Development Board of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Resolution 88
(Xll) of 19 Dctober reaffirmed the sovereign right of aU countries freely
to dispose of their natural resources for the benefit of national
development and stated that:
"in the application of this principle, such measures of nationalization as states 
may adopt in order to recover their natural resources, ate the expression of a 
sovereign power, and any dispute which may arise in that connection falls 
within the sole jurisdiction of its courts, without preiudice to what is set forth 
in the General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII).
During this stage, Resolution 3171 (XXVlll) of 17 December 1973 
made a significant contribution to the development of the principle of 
sovereignty over natural resources. It stated that the application of the 
principle of nationalizatipn carried out by States is an expression of their 
sovereignty in order to safeguard their natural resoufces.^^ Resolution 
3171 (XX¥III) and the UNCTAD resplutibn purported to abolish the 
right of diplomatic protection. From| the language of the UNCTAD 
resolution and resolution 3171 (XX¥III) it is apparent that the supporters 
intended to absolve themselves froni potential intemational responsibility
Para. 2 of the Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 1962 of the U.N.General Assembly,
U N Resolutions, Series 1, G,A., vol. 9, 1962-63, p. 107.
Notably in 8 of the resolutions mentioned earlier in this section.
Alfanso Garsia R., The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, P.
A S  ID., 1975, ^ .  230-231.
28- T. D. B; Resolution 88 (13thl Sess.) UNCTAD Doc. TL/B/421. 1972,
2 -^ Para. 3 of the Résolution 3171 (XXVIII) 17 December 1973, of the General
Assembly of the U.N, U.N Resolutions, Series 1, G.A., vol. 14, 1972-74, p.
422.
- 4 _ .
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by inserting the provision that any dispute conceming a State's 
nationalization of foreign-owned property falls within the sole jurisdiction 
of the courts of that State and were to be resolved in accordance with the
30national legislation of that State. Accordingly, developing States, in 
most of the cases involving nationalization of foreign property, have
31declined to submit the dispute to international arbitration. Moreover, 
many of those States which voted for the UNCTAD resolution and 
Resolution 3171 (XXVIII), refused to ratify the World Bank Convention
32on the Settlement of Investment Disputes.
During this stage, with much greater emphasis in Resolution 2158 
(XXI) of 25 November 1966, the U.N. General Assembly tried to 
strengthen the ability of the host States to undertake the process of
33development of their natural resources.
Sovereignty as manifested in the Resolutions of the U.N. General
Assembly on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources was
sometimes used by States as evidence of proof in some cases to defend the
expropriatory measures. One of the eminent cases is that of the Iranian
nationalization of oil industry. The validity of the Iranian Nationalization
Law, enacted in 1951, was challenged in some municipal courts, on the
30. R U.N. Doc. TD/B/423, 1973, p. 1475; Resolution 3171(XXVIII), Series 1,
G.A., vol. 14, 1972-74, p. 422.
Arrierasinghe C. F., The Quantum of Compensation for Nationalised 
Property, in Lilliçh R, B., The Valuation of Nationalized Property in 
Intemational Law, vol. IB, op. cit., p. 107.
^2- Lillich R. B., The Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law, 
vol. Ill, op, cit., p. 194.
^8- In the third stage, it was reafirmed that every State has the sovereign and 
inalienable right to choose its economic system as well as its political, social 
and cultural systems in accordance with the will of its people, withCut outside 
interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever, Article 1, Resolution 
3281(XXIX) of 12 December: 1974 of G.A. of the United Nations.
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ground that the act was incompatible with the rules of international law. 
However^ some other courts upheld the validity of such law by expressly 
referring to the resolution of the U.N. General Assembly adopted in 
1952. That resolution recognized that the right to nationalize natural
* . 34resources as inherent in the State itself.
In some cases such as BP v. Libya (1974), the arbitrator did not 
touch upon the question of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 
but judged the case on the basis of the validity of contracts under
35international law. Siihilarly, in Texaco/ Calasiatic v. Libya (1977),
the arbitrator found that, according to the principle of sanctity of
contracts, the concession constituted a binding obligation under
international law and that therefore Libya was bound to respect its
contractual engagement. The arbitrator rejected Libya's claim that
formulation of permanent sovereignty confirmed rights of all States to
36nationalize foreign investments.
Later, in 1978, in L/amcc? v. Libya, a different position was taken. 
In this Case, the arbitrator, discussing whether a State can be justified in 
nationalizing petroleum concessions against its own contractual 
agreements, relied on the Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly, 
particularly Resolutions 1803 and 3281 which adopted the Charter, and 
recognized the legal effect of those resolutions as evidence of the recent 
dominant trend of intemational opinion conceming the sovereign right of 
States over their natural resources. Similarly, in the controversial case
84- Eden Court considered the case as illegal, but Japanies and Italian courts 
judged in contraiy, 20 LL.R., 1953, p. 313; 22 IL.R., 1955, p. 40; for more 
information in this regard see Chapter 3 on nationalisation of Iranian oil 
industry.
85- BP V. Libya, 53 I.L.R., 1979, pp. 327, 329, 335.
36- Texaco v. Libya, 53 I.L.R., 1979, pp. 485-491,511.
82- Liamco V. Libya (1981), 20 I.L.M., pp. 102-3.
4 : ___
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of Texaco V.  Libya (Topeo), professor Dupuy decided that:
"[t]he right of State to nationalize is unquestionable today ...... The exercise
of the national sovereignty to nationalise is regarded as the expression of the 
State's territorial sovereignty. It is an essential prerogative of sovereign for 
the constitutional authorities of the State to choose and built freely an 
economic and social system."^*
Meanwhile, the voting patterns displayed in Resolution 3281 
(XXIX) illustrate that the 1974 Charter did not enjoy the majority support 
of the developed countries. Provisions of Article 2 of the Charter were 
the main obstacle in the way of consensus/^ The developed States, 
emphasizing the provisions of General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), 
believed that the obligation of States under their agreements should be 
fulfilled in good faith, and the dispute settlement procedures contained in 
the agreements should be respected."*^ Accordingly, the arbitrators in 
Texaco and Aminoil cases opined that the resolutions adopted after 
1962, notably the Resolution 3171 (XXVIII) and Article 2 (2)(c) of the 
Charter, proclaim political rather than valid legal principles, and did not 
consider them as customary international law. Equally, there was no 
consensus on the resolution 1803 (XVII) except that, it secured the 
viewpoint of developed countries more than the resolution 3171 
(XXVni). France and South Africa had voted against it."*^
However, developed countries retreated from their traditional 
position by proposing an alternative provision to be inserted in the 
Charter which reads, "Each state has the right to nationàlize, expropriate 
38- Texaco v. Libya, 17 I.L.M., 1978, p. 20.
3 -^ Art. 2(1) of the Charter, 9 against, 3 abstaining; Art. 2(2)(a), 10 against, 4 
abstaining; Art. 2(2)(b), 4 against, 6 abstaining, and Art. 2(2)(c), 16 against, 6 
abstaining.
40. 29 U.N.G.A.O.R.C, 2 (1638th. intg), 382-3, U.N. Doc. A/C., 2/SR 1938 
(1974).
41- 29 U.N.G.A.O.R. Annexes (agenda item 48) I at 3 U.N. Doc. A/9946 (1974).
42- Texaco v. Libya, 17 I.L.M.* 1978, p. 30.
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or acquisition foreign property for a public purpose, provided that just 
compensation in the light of all relevant circumstances shall be paid."^^ 
While developing countries have not had the bargaining power 
enough to demand their asserted rights against the investor States, at all 
the meetings of the developing countries' representatives organized in the 
world since the sixth special session of the United Nations General 
Assembly (May, 1974) adopted its documents, the full and permanent 
sovereign right of each State over natural resources has been 
acknowledged and the need to set up a new intemational economic order
44has emerged as a unanimous desideratum of those States. But, the
position of developing countries in negotiations with foreign investors is
so weak that, according to the formef-Sècretary General of the United
Nations, the governments of developing countries do not always manage
45to realize their rights fully. The result does not seem much different 
even when they knew their rights, due to the type of relations which exist 
between the developing and developed countries.
Thus, the Declaration adopted in February 1975 by the Dakar 
Conference of developing countries, provided that developing countries 
could never reach full and total economic emancipation except through 
recovering and controlling their natural resources and wealth as well as 
the means for economic, development, with a view to ensuring the 
economic, social and cultural progress of their peoples."*^
Therefore, nowadays, the sovereign right to expropriation is
43- Emphasis added. Quotation from the remarks by Charles N. Brower, former 
acting legal adviser Dept, of state, in P.AiS.I.L., 1975, p. 233,
44- Elian G., The Principle of Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, op. cit., p,
27.
45- U.N. Document E/5425.
46- U.N. Document E/AC/62/6 of April 15, 1975.
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supposed to be no longer controversial. While developing countries are 
still vulnerable to exercise their right of expropriation, the controversy 
has remained, however, over the right to expropriate contractual rights of 
aliens and the obligations and conditions that are attached to this sovereign 
right. Therefore, the definition of the precise scope of the principle of 
sovereignty and its implications remain important. The reason is the 
progressive nature of the development of the principle from which rules 
can be derived to safeguard the interests of developing countries involved
47in expropriation of their natural resources and foreign investments.
**********
* * * * * * * *
* * * * *
* * **
42- Chowdhiiry S. R,, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, in 
Hossein K and Chowdhury S. R., (editors.), Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources in Intemational Law, London, 1980, pp. 33-43.
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(SECTION THREE)
SANCTITY OF TREATIES AND GONTRACTS
AND
EXPROPRIATION OF ALIENS' CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS
" 1
In an age in which the trading activities of States are increasing, and 
economic progress of underdeveloped countries has become the object of 
intemational and national concem, the rights and expectations of the alien 
investors in many countries have suffered an alarming setback which has 
raised the issue of State responsibility for losses arising out of contractual 
relations between States and aliens.^
Difficulties, for the purposes of intemational law and the world 
community, may result from the change in the political sovereignty over a 
particular territorial entity. For example, questions arise as to how far a 
new State is bound by the treaties and contracts concluded by the previous 
sovereign of the territory? What happens to the public property of the 
previous sovereign, and to what extent is the new authority liable for the 
debts and obligations arising from the contracts concluded by the old?
The importance of the issue rests, oh one hand, on the realities that 
Sanctity of treaties and contract contradicts the right of States to 
expropriate aliens' property. On the other hand, most of the bilateral 
treaties between States, particularly between developed and developing 
States, have political implications and are mostly not in the interest of the
1" Mann F. A., State Contracts and State Responsibility, AJ.LL., 1960, p. 572.
2- Shaw M. N., International Law, third edition, Cambridge, 1991, p. 604.
. ^   _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ :_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ :_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ '  ' I
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weaker States.
Accordingly, in the decolonization process a new theory of "clean 
state" emerged to excuse the new States from the obligations created hy 
the predecessor sovereign in the absence of the will ahd probably against 
the interests of those people.^ This mle was applied to Czechoslovakia, 
Finland and the other States which emerged after the First World War, 
and it still applies to intensely "personal treaties" such as treaties of 
alliance and treaties entailing membership of the international 
organizations."*
A regime may change through 3. coup d'etat or a revolution which 
involve either denying of the right of people to self-determination or 
applying that right. It is vital to clarify the situation, because different 
mles of law would apply to each of them.
Treaties create the largest part of the intemational rules on the 
intemational obligations and the rights of a sovereign. The other parts are 
either relatively straight-forward or unimportant. The real uncertainty 
concems the public policy of the new State or regime which was highly 
topical in an era of decolonization.^
While there is an argument to the effect that a newly independent 
State does not succeed to the treaties of its p r e d e c esso r ,^  most of the 
States which have become independent since the Second World War have 
accepted rights and obligations under most of the treaties made by the 
former colonial powers, but their reasons for doing so are hard to
3- Loc. ciC; see also O' connelLD. P., State Succession in Municipal Law arid 
International Law, vol. 2, Cambridge, 1967, p. 25.
4- Akehurst M., A Modern Introduction to International Law, 6th edition, 
London, 1987, p. 162.
5- Verbit G. P., State Succession in the New Nations, P.A.S.I.L., 1966, pp. 
119-124.
6- Loc. cit.
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discover. Until it becomes clear why they have accepted rights and 
obligations under such treaties, it is impossible to deduce a rule of 
customary law from their practice.^ Doing so would fail to account for 
the sizeable minority of cases in which newly independent States have 
refused to be bound by their predecessors' treaties.* There is a theory 
which argues that new States are more likely to succeed to "law-making 
treaties" than to "contract treaties".^ But the accepted principle of 
intemational law, both conventional and customary, is that a State is not 
bound without its consent (autonomy of will). This principle has been 
expressed in conventions, mentioned by the Permanent Court of 
Intemational Justice ,p racticed  and has acquired opinio juris
Consent is the accepted basis of obligations and the rules of law 
binding upon States derive from their own free will to regulate their 
relations with coexisting independent communities or with a view to 
achieving common aims.^^ Of course, consent may take various forms. 
There is little to be gained from discussion about the different methods in 
which true consent can be obtained and to what extent implied consent 
falls with in the concept of consent. But broadly speaking, everybody 
understands what consent means, and it is a common knowledge that 
people under undemocratic regimes are unable to consent.
7- Verbit G. P., State Succession in the New Nations, op. cit., PP. 124
8- O'Connell D. P., State Succeion in Municipal Law and International Law, op. 
cit., p. 223.
9- Jenks G. W., State Succession in Respect of Law-Making Treaties, 29 
B.Y.LL., 1952, pp. 105-144.
Lotus case,(192'7), P.C.I.J.V Series A, No. 10, 1927, p. 35.
11- Loc. cit.; Leo Gross and Louis B. Sohn, The Demand For Economic Justice, 
P.A.S.I.L., 1981. pp. 186, 193.
Lotus Case, P.C.I.J;, op, cit., p. 18.
13- Khorshid Salman, Justice and the New International Economic Order, Kamal 
Hossain, Legal Aspects of the New Intemational Economic Order, Oxford, 
1980, pp. 108-109.
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The general principle is that a party to a contract is bound to respect 
its consent expressed in an agreement in good faith.*^ "* When this 
principle is applied to States, the element of consent must be constituted 
by the will of the people rather than a signature of an undemocratic 
dependeiit government o f a dictator, who is not authorised by his nation to 
undertake any obligation/^ This kind of consent is basic to enable States, 
in any particular way, as Sohn states, to make fully binding treaties, accept 
responsibility and enshrine in a system of intemational co-operation. 
They can use their will to create new rules of intemational law, ratifying 
treaties which limit their powers.
Similarly, in private international law of contract, m istake, 
misrepresentation, fraud, coercion, governments interventions, legislation 
and similar defects of consent in contracts would influence the validity of 
the contracts. It has been proposed that such defects should be treated
,T Valong the same lines as a lack of full capacity.
In the past, developing countries, if not fully dependent on 
developed States, have often been at a conriderable disadvantage in 
negotiating contractual arrangements as a result of severe international
^4- Nwogugu E.I., The Legal Problems of Foreign Investment in Developihg 
Countries  ^Manchester University Press, 1965, p; 185.
5^- Article 21 (3) of Universal Declaration of Human Rights expressly states that 
''[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government, this 
will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent 
free voting procedures. " The recent referendum of Denniark and Norway on the 
Maastricht Treaty and the obligations of the Government of those countries 
toward the other members of the EG are examples; see more in Salman 
Khorshid, Justice and the New International Economic Order, op. cit.
16- Teson R.F., Interdependence, Consent, and the Basis of International 
Obligation, P.A.S.I.L.,1989, p. 562; and Leo Gross and Sohn L. B., The 
Demand for Econornic JusticeVqp. cit, pp: 193-4.
12- Wolff M., Private Intemational Law, Second edition, Oxford, 1950, p. 442.
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asymmetries in the political and economic balance of power which enabled
developed countries to impose restraints on their ability adequately to
protect their own interests. It has frequently happened that as countries
have developed politically and economically, they have found that
arrangements negotiated in the past and under very different conditions
have left a pattern of control or authorised aliens some behaviour over a
18country's land or other natural resources that is no longer acceptable.
Perhaps the largest and, in many ways, the most important nationalizations
arise from a perceived imbalance of bargaining power in mining
activities, of which recent history of the intemational oil companies in the
Middle East provides dramatic examples.
Therefore, as a fundamental right, consent which usually derives
from the idea of sovereignty, the right to self-determination or State
autonomy, becomes the proper source of international obligations.
Accordingly, only if a State is free or autonomous, or sovereign can it be
obliged through its voluntary submission, that is through agreement or
contract.^** This principle is not open to doubt and implies the existence
of a body of public intemational law which is to rule the contractual
agreements between intemational persons. No international lawyer will
21experience any difficulty on this score. Without representing the bulk
18- Rees J. and Odell P., The International Oil Industry; An Interdisciplinary 
Perspective, London, 1987, p. 142.
1^ - Edith Penrose, George Joffe, and Paul Stevens, Nationalisation of Foreign- 
owned Property for a Public Purpose: An Economic Perspective on Appropriate 
Compensation, in 55 M.L.R., 1992, p, 353.
6^- Article 51 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties deals with the special 
case where the expression of a state's consent to be bound by a treaty has been 
procured by the coercion of its representative and provides that the expression of 
consent in such a situation is without any légal effect; see more on the issue in 
SincMr LM., The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, second edition, 
Manchester University press, 1984, pp. 172-181.
______________ __ _____________________________
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of a society it is impossible to implement this principle and secure the 
interests of that s o c i e t y T h e  reality of the most of the developing 
countries is that they usually are not the representative of their nation and 
they cannot implement the consent of their nations fully in their 
intemational relations.
As far as the issue of expropriation is concemed, there have been 
numerous treaties between States and many contracts between States and 
aliens dealing with the question. For the latter, there are no intemational 
law mles of contract l a w , a n d  the legal positions of the two categories 
are different.
Such a legal position of State contracts was probably a reason that 
obliged the United Kingdom, in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, to 
emphasise alia the notion that, if the grantor State has expressly 
undertaken not to terminate the concession unilaterally, the termination of 
such a contract would be unlaw ful.^/Thus, expropriation of State 
contract is far from the general notion of breach of contract, even if a 
predecessor State or a previous govemment engage itself, by a contract 
not to do so.^^ Therefore, it is necessary to survey the legal position of 
State contracts and treaties between State in regard to the issue of 
expropriation.
Mann F. A., Studies in International Law, Oxford, 1973, p. 212.
It is a common principle of civilized nations which has been recognized as a 
source of intemational law.
^3. There are some international bodies such as ICG which have played a 
significant role in unifying the form of international contracts, but they have not 
been proceed through treaties  ^ obligatory to States; BoWett D. W., State 
Contracts with Aliens, 59 B.Y.LL., 1988, p. 51.
24- P.C.I.J., Pleadings 81, pp. 87-92.
25- De Arechaga E. J., Application of the Rules of State Responsibility to the 
Nationalisation of Foreign-owned Property, in Kamal Hossain, Legal Aspects 
of the New International Economic Order, Oxford, 1980,: p. 221.
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1 - TREATIES BETWEEN STATES
Treaties between States generally comprise a part of intemational 
law. In so far as they relate to expropriation, they could be divided into 
four groups.
1 - In the first group of treaties States are to comply with intemational 
law by providing for payment of fair compensation on expropriation, 
which payment may, in some cases, have to be made in advance. The 
position of foreigners was regulated by conventions in accordance with 
intemational law.^^ For example, the Treaty of Lausanne^^ of July 24, 
1923, between the Principle Allied Powers, Greece, Romania and 
Yugoslavia on the one hand, and Turkey on the other, as well as the 
Conventions between Turkey and Switzerland of 1930,^* Austria of 
1924;/’ Bulgaria of 1925/® Poland of 1931^^ and Sweden of 1928^^ 
provided that the property of foreigners might not be expropriated except
26- Friedman S., Expropriation in International Law, London, 1953, pp. 99-100.
27- Article 6 of the treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923, in U.K.T.S., No. 16 
(1923),P. 145.
28- Article 5, Convention of Establishment Between Switzerland and Turky of 
December 13, 1930, 129 L.N.T.S., p: 335.
29- Article 8, Convention Respecting Conditions of Residence of Austrian 
Nationals in Turky and o^Turkish Nationals in Austia of January 28,1924, No.
822, 32 L.N.T.S., p. 309.
30- Article 8, Convention respecting Condition of Residence of October 18, 1925, 
Between Bulgaria and Turky,No. 1281, 54 L.N.T.S., p. 141.
3L Article 7, Gonventioh Respecting Conditions of Residence, August 29, 1931,
No. 3339, 144 L:NT.S:, p. 373.
32- Article 6, Convention of Commerce and Navigation of February 4, 1928, No.
1994, 88 L.N.T.S., pp. 159, 161.
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for reasons of public interest recognized by law and in return for fair 
compensation to be paid in advance. Similar provisions were included in 
Article 8 of the Convention between Poland and Turkey in 1923 
respecting conditions of residence and business and in Article 1 of the 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between Germany 
and the United States of America in the same year.^^
In the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the 
United States and the Italian Republic, with reference to requirement by 
intemational law to secure and protect the nationals of each of the 
contracting parties, it was stated that the property of nationals, 
corporations and associations of either High Contracting Party should not 
be taken except in accordance with due process of law and not without the 
prompt payment of just and effective compensation.^"* The Treaty of 
Amity between Iran and the United States is one of these treaties through 
which the property of the nationals of each High Contracting Parties were 
to be treated according to intemational law.^^
In some of these treaties, without particularly invoking intemational 
law as a principle for regulating the conduct of the parties in their mutual 
relations, provided that expropriation may only carried out on payment of 
just or fair and equitable compensation. For example, the Convention 
between Albania and Italy of 1926 as well as in the Convention of 
Commerce, Navigation and Establishment between France and Greece of 
1929;?*’ provided that property of nationals of each of the contracting
33- 118, 122 B.F.S.P. (1923), p. 983, (1925), p. 807.
34- Article 5(2) of Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between U.S. 
and Italy of February 2,1948; Treaties # d  International Acts, Series 1965,
35- See the discussion on the treaty of Amity Between Iran and U.S. in the last 
chapter on "post-Revolution Expropriations in Iran'\
36- Article 21 of Convention of Commerce, Navigation and Establishment
 .
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parties in the territory of the other might only be expropriated for a 
legally recognized public purpose and on paym ent of just
37com pensation. Similarly, the contractual rights of nationals were 
secured in the Treaty of Commerce, Establishment and Navigation of
38March 2, 1959, between the United Kingdom and Iran provided in 
Article 8 for "constant and complete protection and security" for the 
persons and property of nationals and properties of the parties. Article 
8(2) provided that the parties should accord fair and equitable treatment to 
such nationals and companies and to the related property and enterprises; 
should refrain from applying unreasonable or discriminatory measures 
that might impair their rights and interests; and should ensure that their 
contractual rights are afforded effective means of enforcement in 
conformity with the applicable laws: Each Party also undertook to ensure 
equitable treatment for the nationals and companies of the other Party in 
the m atter of expropriation and to make prompt and adequate 
compensation.^^
2 - The second group of the treaties of the later date contemplates the 
possibility of expropriation being carried out regarding the particular 
activities due to the establishment of a monopoly which would affect the 
foreign trade of a particular State. In such cases, the parties were to be 
sure that the monopolized institution should grant the trade of the other 
contracting parties fair and equitable treatment, influenced solely by
Between France and Greece of March 11, 1929, 95 L.N.T.S,, 1929, p. 417.
37- See also 122 B.F.S.P, (1925), p. 16.; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation 
between Italy and the U.S.S.R. of 1924, Art. 6, 120 (B.F.ST.) (1924),:p.
659, The Agreement between Germany and the U.SÎS.R. of 1925, 122 
B.RS.P. (1925), p. 707.
38- emnd. 698, Iran, No. I (1959).
3®- Loc. cit.
   ^ :
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considerations appropriate to private commerce. As an example, the 
commercial treaty between the United States and Sweden, as well as 
treaties between the United States and numerous other countries among 
which those concluded with Canada, Ecuador, Salvador, Finland, 
Honduras, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Brazil 
deserve special mention."*®
3 - The third group of treaties simply admits the legality of past 
expropriations even without compensation. The example is the Treaty of 
Rapallo of 1922 between Germany and Russia."**^
These treaties do not deal with the question in a uniform manner. 
However, they are supposed to be binding by reason of the fact that they 
were agreed by States which were subject of intemational law. Therefore, 
subject to international law, they could include anything in which the 
contracting parties found necessary. The geographical distribution of the 
contracting parties clearly shows that provisions protecting private 
property against measures of expropriation mostly figure in treaties 
between States possessing similar institutions. Where the States' 
institutions differ, as in the case of thé Soviet Union, these protective rules 
are abandoned and the expropriatory measures have been expressly 
affirmed in the relations of the Soviet Union with certain States."*^
The important point is that, in relations between developed and 
developing countries, the mles of law were developed by the powerful 
States in order primarily to promote their own interests, while the 
developihg countries in earlier decades were mostly either colonies and
40. 2 Hackworth, Green Haywood, Digest of International law, Washington, U.S. 
Govemment Printing Office, p. 67.
41. 118 B.F.S.P. (1923 ), p. 586.
42- Friedman S., Expropriation in International Law, London, 1953, p. 101.
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dependencies of developed States or they were politically and militarily 
weak and provided important sources of raw materials and perhaps labour 
to those powers. However, when States are involved in a treaty 
prohibiting the respected States to expropriate the properties of the 
nationals of each other, they create a different kind df legal relationship 
between themselves which varies from the obligatiohs that arise from a 
contract between a State and an alien."*^
As it was mentioned earlier, developing countries are unable to 
implement their cdmplete sovereignty and exercise their free will in their 
international relations, and they do not have a strong position in all 
affairs, specially in trade and economy."*"* Therefore, when they get an 
excuse, they encroach the properties belonging to the powerful States or 
their nationals which they think that they are privileged."*^ In doing so, 
developing States are aware that, if a State limited its right to nationalize 
the property of nationals of another State by the terms of an intemational 
agreement, but, nevertheless took such property rights in a nationalization 
measure without any convincing reason, it commits an intemational illegal 
act. As it was mentioned in Chorzow Factory case, the act is illegal even 
if adequate compensation is paid for the taken property."*^ It is wrong, it 
is supposed, because the State without any duress divested itself from the
47power to exercise the right.
In the case of the Chorzow Factory the Permanent Court of
International Justice determined that compensation should be paid to
43- Jessup F.C., Non-Universal International Law, 12 Col.J.I.L., 1973, p. 419.
44- The bargaining power of developing countries.
46- Most of the nationalisations throughout the word have happened after radical 
changes in the developing countries toward more independence.
46- Chorzow Factory case, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 46.
47- White G., Nationalisation of Foreign Property, New York, 1961, p. 154.
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Germany for the injury to the property of the German nationals resulting
from Poland's breach of the Geneva Convention, and stated that the act of
Poland constituted breach of the Convention rather than expropriation
which was lawful act. It was a seizure of property, rights and interests
which were secured by a treaty between the two States and could not be
expropriated except under certain conditions fixed by Article 7 of the
Convention."** In its judgement the Court stated that reparation for an
act contrary to international law should as far as possible eradicate all the
consequences of the act and restore the status quo ante. The injured State
was entitled to restitution of the property or, if that were not possible, to
payment of a sum corresjponding to the value which such a restitution
would bear, and also to the award of damages for any loss sustained which
would not be covered by restitution in kmd or payment in place of it.M 
There are not many examples of nationalization in breach of treaties
in force between States. Still, there are some cases which have occurred
on the international scene. Turkey and Hungary signed a tr%ty on
December 20, 1926, protecting the property of their nationals in the
territory of each o t h e r . Ar t i c l e  7 of the Convention provided that such
property niight not be expropriated except for reasons of public interest
recognized by law and in return for fair compensation to be paid in
advance. In fact, none of the Hungarian nationalization decrees provided
for compensation to be paid in advance. In most cases the decrees went no
further than a recognition that some compensation would be paid in the
future in accordance with ministerial regulations.^^ Of the three treaties
entered into by Romania dealing with expropriation, two lay down a
48- Chorzpw Factory càSQy op. cit., p. 46.
49- Loc. cit., p. 47.
50- Convention Regarding Conditions of Résidence, December 20,1926, Between 
Hungary and Tùrky, 72 L.N.T.S., (1928), No. 1696, p. 245.
51- White G., Nationalisation of Foreign Property, op, cit., p. 185.
------
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Standard of national t r e a t m e n t , a n d  the third, with Switzerland,^^ 
provides that in the matter of measures of expropriation for purposes of 
public utility or of general concern nationals of the contracting parties are 
to receive no less favourable treatment than that granted to the nationals of 
any other country. The protection afforded by these treaties, with regard 
to the Eastern European nationalizations which occurred irrespective of 
the nationality of the former owner, is without effect. For, under 
communist ideology, little protection is to be given to private individuals, 
nationals or aliens. Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1947 concluded a treaty 
of commerce to protect their nationals’ property against any action 
violating the right of ownership or use of property unless it similarly 
subjects to the same restrictions the property, rights or interests of its own 
nationals.^"*
There were different conclusions in the cases of M avrom m atis  
Palestine Concessions, Some Forests in Central Rhodopia and the Case of 
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, In the first case,^^ 
Greece claimed that Britain, as the mandatory power in Palestine, was 
liable to make reparations for loss caused to its national, M. 
Mavrommatis, which loss arose from the refusal of Britain to respect the 
Palestine concessions of Mavrommatis as required by Article 9 of 
Protocol XII annexed to the Peace Treaty of Lausanne of 1923.^^ The
52- Article 3 of Greece/Romania, Convention o f Establishment of August 11,
1931, 130 L.N.T.S., 1933, No. 2982, p. 73; Article 3 of Yugoslavia/ 
Romania, Treaty of Establishment, Comnierce and Navigation of May 13,
1937, 197 L.N.T.S., 1939»; No. 4611, pp. 147, 149.
53- Article 6, Convention Regarding Conditions of Residence and Business 
Between Romania and Switzerland of July 19^  1933, 152 L.N.T.S. 1934, p.
93.
54- Article 1, 2, 3, of Treaty of Commerce 4 July 1947 Between Polish Republic 
and Czechoslovak Republic, 85 U.N.T.S., No. 1146, p. 212, 214,
Mavrommatis Case, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 5, p. 6.
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Permanent Court of international Justiee found that Protocol XU, relating 
to certain concessions granted In the Ottoman Empire, obliged Britain to 
respect and protect concessions subsisting at the conclusion of the 
protocol. Consequently, the Court held that the mere grant by Britain of a 
new concession, giving the new concessionaire a right to demand the 
expropriation of existing concessions conBicting with his own, was 
contrary to the protocol, and thus violated international law.^^
In the case of Forests in Central Rhodopia {Greece V .
Bulgaria), Greece claimed that Bulgaria violated article 181 of the Treaty 
of Neuilly,1919,-* which confirmed previous treaties conferring special 
protection on private property rights in parts of Bulgaria. The arbitrator, 
Osten Unden, held Bulgaria responsible to Greece foi failing to respect 
the acquired rights of Greek nationals as required by the treaty. He found 
that, as a reparation for this breach of international obligation, an 
indemnity was due to Greece.^^
One of the most important and oft^mentioned cases on the breach of 
a treaty is the celebrated case of Certain German Interests in the Polish 
Upper Silesia. After the First World War, as the result of some changes 
in the boundaries of Germany and Poland, the two countries concluded the 
Geneva Convention of 1922 to regulate private property or interests in 
Upper Silesia.^^ According-to the convention, each party was required 
to recognize and respect property rights acquired by private and juristic 
Loc, cit.
Loc. cit., pp. 45, 51.
Arbitration Under Article 181 of thé Treaty of NeaiUy, Preliminary Question, 
Greece Vi Bulgaria, 6 LL.R, 1931-2, p. 391; See the translated text from 
French in 28 A.J.I.L., 1934, p. 760.
59- 28 A.J.I.L., op. citi, pp. 802,807.
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 25 August, 1925, 3 I.L.R., 
1925-26, p. 426.
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persons before the transfer of sovereignty. In respect to Polish Upper
Silesia, the right was given to Poland to expropriate German-owned
property subject to special conditions. But it was prohibited from
liquidating the property rights and interests of Gerrpan nationals or
companies in Polish Upper Silesia.-^ Nonetheless, Poland by legislation
deprived some German nationals of their property in contravention of the
Treaty . The Permanent Court of International Justice in its judgement of
25 May 1926 declared Polish law to be incompatible with the regime
established by the Geneva Convention.^^ Responsibility for breach of
such a treaty was, the Court argued, that international law involves an
obligation to make reparation in an adequate form. Therefore, reparation
is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention without
the necessity of being mentioned ih the convention itself.**  ^ The latest of
this group of treaties is the Treaty of Amity between Iran and the United
States which will be discussed in more details in chapter four.
4 - The other group of treaties which ought to be mentioned are
investment treaties. There has been a question whether the repetition of
the formula in those treaties can show a kind of State practice, and
therefore, establish customary international rules on the issue of
expropriation.**"* To create international customary law, it is necessary
that the parties to such treaties, in entering into them, must actually intend
Judgement No. 7 (merits), PC.I.J., Series A, No. 7, pp. 20-1. 
hoc. cit., p. 24.
Chorzow Factory (Jurisdiction) case, P.G.I.J., Series A, No. 9 (Judgement 
No. 8), p. 21.
64- Peters P., Schrijvèr N. Ji and De Waart P. J. I. M„ Foreign Investment and 
State Practice, in Hossain K. arid Ghowdhry S. R.(editors.). Permanent 
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources in International Law, London, 1984, p.
I l l ;  Robinson D. R., Expropriation in the Restatement (revised), 78 A.J.I.L.,
1984, p. 177.
—  ^  ^ : :
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to express that particular view, and more importantly must exercise the
same elsewhere in the absence of such treaty obligations. In other words,
it must be accompanied by opinio j u r i s International practice
indicates that this is not the case with respect to investment treaties. The
vote to the U.N. General Assembly Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty
Over Natural Resources indicates that many States, which agreed to the
terms of investment treaties to extend advantageous treatment to foreign
investors, were not in fact favourable.**^
The effect of such treaties in rriaking norms of international law has
been doubted by some international l a w y e r s T h e y  have likely been the
only way to receive foreign investment arid conclusion of those treaties
seem have been inevitable rather than being legally desirable. Therefore,
there is no convincing evidence to indicate that the terms incorporated in
such treaties are declaratory of intematiorial law. Moreover, the very
existence of these treaties is a sign that the rules of expropriation of aliens'
property, particularly the question of payment of compensation, have not
been accepted as customary international law by the international
community, otherwise a mere reference to the rules of international law
would have been sufficient.
Akehurst M., Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 B.Y.I.L., 1974- 
75, pp. 4, 43; see also Parry and Grant, Encyclopaedic Dictionary of 
International Law, London, 1986, pp. 81-2.
For example, the vote to the Charter of NIEO indicates that about 120 States 
voted to the provisions which were not favourable to such investment 
guarantees.
67- Francipni F., Compensation for Nationalisation of Foreign Property: The 
Borderline Between Law and Equity, 24 I.C.L.Q., 1975, p. 264; Dolzer R.,
New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of foreign Property, 75 A.J.I.L.,
1981, p. 557, 566; Voss J., The Protection and Promotion of foreign Direct 
Investment in Developing Countries: Interests, Interdependencies, Intricacies,
31 I.C.L.Q., 1982, p. 686; Asante. S. K. B., International Law and Foreign 
Investment: A Reappraisal, 37 I.C.L.Q, 1988, p. 208.
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2 - CONTRACTS BETWEEN STATES AND ALIENS
There is no doubt that international law has the capacity to develop 
the rules of contracts between States and aliens through bilateral and 
multilateral treaties but, as was mentioned earlier, at present there are no 
international rules of contract law governing the relations of States and 
aliens.*** The reason is that, when a State enters into a contract with a 
private person who is a national of another State, if that person alleges that 
the contracting State has failed to perform its obligations under the 
contract, the national must exhaust his remedies before local courts before 
the alien's government can espouse the clàim in an international tribunal. 
The claimant State will have to allege and prove a cause of action under 
international law and carinot allege a breach of international duty, if any, 
arising under municipal law.^^
Industrialized States, emphasizing the obligations of States to fulfil 
such contracts, argue that the text of the Resolution 1803 of 1962 places 
on the same footing inter-State agreements and those concluded by a State 
with private foreign companies
Developing countries, while not denying the general duty of all
Bowett D. W., State Cbntracts with Aliens, op. cit, p. 54.
69- The rule does not apply where there is a special agreement between the party 
States or dispute is submitted to an international tribunal by way of compromise.
See the Serbian and Brazilian Loan Gases, P.C.I.J., Series A, Nos. 14, 15.
70- De Arechaga E. J., Application of the Rules of State Responsibility to the 
Nationalisation of Foreign-owned Property, op. cit., p. 228.
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States to fulfil their obligations in good faith, consider that such 
agreements are not international agreements, since they were not 
concluded between States and they do not have international status, because 
private companies are not subjects of international law, a view supported 
in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case by the International Court of 
Justice 7^
However, the question arises, if there is no firmly established
international law in this field, what is meant by references to international
law in such contracts? Similar to the Ang/c?--/ra«/a?2 Oil Company casQ,
in the case of Serbian Loans, the Permanent Court of International
Justice, dealing with the issue stated that:
"Any contract which is not a contract between States in their capacity as 
subjects of international law is based on the municipal law of some 
country."^^
In clause 28 of the Libyan concession to the Topco Company, it was 
provided that;
"This concession shall he governed by and interpreted in accordance with the 
principles of the law of libva common to the principles of international law 
and in the absence ot such common principles then by and in accordance with 
the general principles of law, including such of those principles as may have 
been applied by international tribunals.
There seems to be a contradiction in the statement, when coincidence 
between the Libyan law of contract and international law is impossible; 
Libyan law governs the contractual relations in a single society, while 
international law contains no rules about contracts. It may be argued, as
74has been forwarded by some legal commentators, that international
71- The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case will be discussed in a separate chapter; 
see I.e. J. Reports, 1952, p. 113.
Serbian Loans Case, 1929, P.G.I.J., Collection of Judgements, Series A,
Nos, 20/21, p. 41.
7 -^ Award on the Merits in Dispute between Topco/California Asiatic Oil Company 
and the Government of Libya, 17 I.L.M., 1978, p. 11; Texaco v. Libya, 53 
I.L.R., 1979, p. 404.
Sanctiîÿ of Treaties and Contracts 47
law, while containing no rules about private law contracts, does contain 
rules about treaties which can be used by analogy, including the 
fundamental rule of pacta sunt servanda^^
In the Topco case, the arbitrator Dupuy proposed that some of the 
State contracts or concessions, by virtue of their special features such as 
the length of term, governance of international law to certain aspepts of 
the agreements, provision for international arbitration therein, haying a 
State as a party and strategic importance of their subject matter, might be 
assimilated to an intematiorial agreement, and international principles such 
as the rule of pacta sunt servanda apply to fhemJ^
This kind of analogy does not seem appropriate, and many
77 .writers have rejected this idea. For, an investment contract between a 
State and a private ëritity is not a treaty and there are a lot of differences 
between an agreement under international law between two equal, 
sovereign States and a cpntract between a State and a private party 
governed by the State's own law or public policy. The difference is that a 
State cannot use its own municipal law to vary its treaty obligations 
toward another State, but with a private law contract, States comnionly 
assert that right.^* Perhaps it was sueh a différence which caused 
contradictory arbitrations in the Libyari Natiprialization Cases. In Texaco
74- Jennings R. Y., State Cpnriaets in International Law, 37 B.YJ.L,, 1961, p.
156; see also Paasivirta E., Liternationalization and Stabilization of Conti'acts 
Versus State Sovereignty, 60 B.YJ.L., 1989, p. 315.
75- Bowett D. W., State Contracts with Aliens, op. cit., p. 54,
76- Topco case, 17 I.L.M., 1978, p. 17.
77- Friedman S., Expropriation in International Law, op. cit., pp. 140-42; Higgins 
R., The Taking of Property by thé State, op. cit., p 308 White G., 
Nationalisation of Foreign Property, bp. cit., p. 90; De Aiechaga E. J., 
Applicatiofi of the Rules Of State Responsibility to the Nationalisation o f  
Foreigri-owned Property, ori* cit., pp. 190-91.
78- Bowett D. W., State Contracts with Aliens; op. cit., p. 55.
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V. case, Dupuy argued that, as a consequence of the illegality of the
act (breach of contract), restitution would be the primary remedy, and
compensation would serve as a secondary remedy if restitution were not 
79possible. This course was not exactly followed by Lagergren as
80arbitrator in BP v. L ibya , and the argument of Mahmassani as
81arbitrator in Liamco case was quite different. The latter case
based his judgement on the rules of expropriation. Consequently,
different judgements were made for those nearly siniilar cases, and less
compensation was decided to be paid for the case of Liamco v. Libya,
In the Aminoil case, the tribunal did not pay attention to such
contentions and held that concession contracts in recent years have
undergone changes to the effect that the State party can interfere with
82them without the fear of its action being branded unlawful.
Similarly in the Amco Asia Corp v. Indonesia, the Tribunal was 
hesitant about granting a remedy in restitution. The case concerned a 
claim that the Indonesian Government had unlawfully revoked an 
investment license granted to the alien corporation and the Tribunal said:
"It is obvious that this Tribunal cannot substitute itself for the Indonesian 
Government, in order to cahcel the revocation and restore the licence.......
and it is more than doubtful that this kind of restitution in integrum could be 
ordered against a sovereign state."
Similar confusion was appaferit in the case of the D em ocratic  
Republic o f the Congo v. Venne where the Supreme Court of Canada 
rejected the decision of the lower courts. Venne, an architect, claimed to 
have been retained by the Congo Government to prepare plans and
-Texaco  v. Libya, Principles of International Law with Respect to 
Restitutio in Integrum), 53 I.L.R., 1979, pp. 497- 508.
80-Loc. cit., pp. 329-330.
Liamco v. Libya, 62 I.L.R., pp. 143-4.
82- Aminoil v. Kuwait, 66 I.L.R., 1984, p. 591.
88- Amco Asia Co. EF. AL v. Indonesia, 24 I.L.M., (1985), p. 1032, para 202.
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sketches for the Congo Pavilion, but the Government had decided not to 
proceed. The Goverrirnent sought to plead sovereign immunity, but the 
lower courts dismissed this plea on the ground that the contract was a 
private commercial transaction and not an act of State. The Supreme 
Court, by majority, allowed the Governments appeal.*"*
Therefore, in situations where a State expropriates the subject of 
contract or any other commercial enterprise which has to operate within 
that State's territory, the likelihood of restitution as remedy for the
85expropriation is remote.
Therefore, the treatment of a lawful expropriation under
international law as breach of contract arid therefore, as an international
wrong, would have been both confusing and irrelevant.*^ The reason is
that a contract between an alien and a national of a State can be frustrated
by interference of the authorities of that State, but it is illegal when the
contract is between a State arid an alien. There is, after aU^  a distinction
between the breach or repudiation of a concession agreement and its
termination for purposes of nationalization. The pacta sunt servanda rule
clearly applies to breach of contract. An investor has a right to expect
normal performance of an agreement, and a host State should be
responsible if it fails to perform or repudiates its obligations.*^ But, if
the authority to nationalize private property is an attribute of sovereignty,
such principles as "good will" cannot be applied to agreements which are
88incompatible with that implied power.
84. Supreme Court of Canada, 1971, S.C.R., p. 997.
85. Bowett D. W., State Contracts with Aliens, op. cit., p. 60.
86- Mann F. A., State Contracts arid State Responsibility, 54 A.J.I.L., 1960, p.
576.
87- liillich R. B., The Valuation of Nationalised Property in International Law, op. 
cit., Vol. 3, p. 58.
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In the Shufeldfs Vi Guatemala, the Arbitrator Sir Herbert Sisnett
asked himself whether an "injustice" had been committed against an alien
subject, in which case the Government of Guatemala ought to make
compensation for the injuries.*^ Accordingly, he said:
"What does the word "right" in this question mean? It can only mean an 
equitable right of which international law takes cognizance. It can not mean 
legal right enforceable only in keeping with Guatemalan law."^
Similarly, the International Court of Justice in the Iranian Oil
Nationalizations declared that the 1933 Agreement was nothing more than
a concessionary contract between a government and an alien corporation
to which the United Kingdom was not a party and which did not iri any
way regulate the relations between the two goverhments. Iran had
promised^^ to negotiate with the company, but it was never considered as
a treaty by which Iran was bound vis-a-vis the United Kingdom.^^
Hyde holds to the more radical view that a State may, in the exercise
of its power as a sovereign, alter or destroy its contractual obligations and
so pursue a course in relation to its undertakings that is not only harmful
to the alien, but also at variance with the theory on which the arrangement
was concluded.-^ This, of course, is not a convincing assertion. For no
government would suggest that it has a legal right to breach a contract, but
the right of expropriation is considered to be in the form of nlodifying or
ending the contract for a good cause which involves the interest of the
88- Loc. cit.
89- Shufeldt Claim (U.S.A. v. Guatemala), 2 R.I.A.A., Loc. cit., p. 1095.
90-Loc cit., p. 1098.
91- Hyde believes that if the breach of contract does not require a denial of justice it 
is doubtful whether a promise by a contracting state with respect to an alien is 
generally looked upon as amounting to international illegal conduct raising 
international responsibility, in International Law, 1945, p. 988.
9 -^ Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, I.C.J. Reports of Judgements (1952), pp.
112-113.
93- Hyde, International Law, op. cit., p. 991.
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public.
Some of the contracts involving the property of aliens are more 
distinctive. For example, in the case of Suez Canal Company, importance 
was not only attached to the property of aliens but also to the violation of 
the Constantinople Treaty. The Governments of France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States were more concerned with the freedom of 
navigation with which, inter alia, that treaty was concerned. 
Management of the canal by the Company would guarantee the freedom of 
navigation. Therefore, they did not question Egypt's right under 
appropriate conditions to nationalize assets.^"* However, the Suez Canal 
Company and the Governments of France and the United Kingdom 
maintained that the Egyptian Nationalization Law of 1956 violated the 
Constantinople Convention of 1888,^^ because the Convention 
incorporated the concessions granted to the company. Although the 
income of the Company was considerable, the Governments of France, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, emphasized the right of the 
Company to prevent the effect of Egyptian political instability on the 
navigation through the Canal and the freedom of n a v i g a t i o n . ^ ^  Egypt 
believed that the Convention did not ratify the Company’s concessions and 
that the regime of free navigation established by the Firman in 1866 was 
of a unilateral nature based on tolerance and it did not impose any 
international obligation upon Egypt.^^ Huang, with a view to
discovering the intention of the parties respecting the Company and its
94- Wbrtley B.A., Expropriation in Public International Law, Cambridge, 1959, p.
71.
95- Statement to the U.N. Security Council, October 1956. U.N. Doc. S/P. V.
735.
96- White G., Nationalisation of Foreign Property, op. cit., p. 158.
97. U N. Doc. S/P. V. 736, PP. 1, et seq.
■ ■ '  I:  - v . "
Sanctity of Treaties and Contracts 5 2
concessions, has found considerable evidence in support of the Egyptian 
contention that the concessions were mehtiohed solely as a record of 
historical fact and not by way of confirming obligations on Egypt7* The 
absence of an express provision in the Convention prepared by the Sub­
commission of the Suez Canal International Commission which was set up 
for this puipose, containing an undertaking by Egypt to uphold the 
concessions, shows that the Company's rights as being Classified under 
private law were not protected by it. Egypt retained her sovereign right 
to terminate the concessions subject to the payment of adequate 
coinpensatioh.^^ In fact, the dispute between the parties was a political 
matter to secure the future freedom of navigation through the chanal 
which were not necessarily desirable by Egypt. All the subsequent 
disputes and confliets were to secure those interests, even at the cost of 
waging à war.
This distmction has been recognized in the award in Amco Asia v.
/ndonÊ Siûf in which the Tnbunal said:
"However, it [the relationship established between Arnco Asia and Indonesia] 
is not identical to a private law contract, due to the fact that the State is 
entitled to withdraw the approval it granted/<9r reasons which could not be 
invoked by a private contracting entity, and!or to decide and implement the 
wiihdrawol by utilizing procedures which are dijferent from those which can 
and have to be utilized by private entity
The Tribunal referred expressly to the State’s right to nationalize, 
recognized in international law, as typical of the exceptional powers of a
98- Huang T. T. F., Some International and Legal Aspects of the Suez Canal 
Question, 51 AJJ.L., 1957; pp. 282^283.
99- White G., Nationalisation of Foreign Property, op. cit., p. 160.
Amco Asia Co and Others v. The Republic of IndonesialCSfD of 20
November 1984, in 2 4 1.L.M., (1985), p. 1029. This award was annulled on 
16 May 1986 by an dt/ Aoc cominittee, but on the basis of an eiToneous 
valuation of Amco's investment, and not oh the point argued above, see 25 
I L M ,  (1986), p. 1439:
_ ____
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State party to terminate contracts 7*^
The consequence of this distinction is that, whereas in a contract 
between private parties the grounds for termination is limited, in a public 
contract the State party has very wide sovereign or prerogative powers to 
vary or terminate the contract in the public interest.
This view is supported by the American Law Institute in its recent
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States:
"A state party to a contract with a foreign national is liable for a repudiation or 
breach of that contract under applicable national law, but not every 
repudiation or breach by a state of a contract with a foreign national 
constitutes a violation of international law"*^ *^
In expropriation, even if the subject is a contract or concession, the 
consent of a party who is affected by the measures or prejudiced by it can 
have no legal effect on the validity of the expropriation either in 
municipal law or intemational law, and can have no influence whatever on 
its execution. That is why it is erroneous to draw Uny parallel with the 
law of contract and to think that the opposition or the attitude of the party 
who is affected by expropriation can have any legal effect on the validity 
of the act. As happened in the majority of cases, measures of 
expropriation have modified or suppressed legal relations which had 
formerly subsisted between the party affected by expropriation and the 
expropriating State,^^^
Accofdingly, the legal systems of the leading capitalist States like 
France, West Germany ; Italy, the UK and the USA show that those 
governments have the prerogative to terminate the contract unilaterally, 
when the public interest so requires. This is a widespread feature of 
6^1- Loc. cit.
Restatement of the Law, The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, vol.
2, 1987, p. 201.
Katzarov K., The Validity of the Act of Nationalisation in International Law,
22 M.L.R., 1959, p. 641.
■If-
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national systems of procurement, and is evidently considered necessary in
order to maintain the freedom of action of public authorities79"* x h e
Supreme Court of the USA went further to defend the right of the
government to terminate the contract unilatefaUy by saying that:
"the taking of private property for public use upon just compensation is so 
often necessary for tlie performance of governmental functions that the power
is deemed essential to the life of the State. It can not be surrendered, and if-105attempted to be contracted away, it may be resumed at will. "
Similarly, in the law of England where the Crown acts in an
executive capacity to vary or teminate a contract, its action is deemed to
be lawful, and not a breach of contract.
a public contract is construed as being impliedly subject to the exercise 
by thé governmental authority of its general powers and discretion in the 
public interest. Action taken by the Grown or other public authority in the 
proper performance of its function 5 and for a 'général execütive purpose' will 
accordingly not constitute a bieach of contract, even if  it impedes or frustrates
■ 1  f t . ,performance by the contractor.
As it was in the cases of Ayr Harbour Trustees v. O sw a ld  'ànd
Czarnikow  y. Rolimpex,^^^ where a contract is governed by English
L a w , S u c h  a contract is always subject to future legislation, and neither
Bowett D. W., State Contracts with Aliens, op. cit., p. 55; see also in 
International Eneyclopaedia of Compafativè Law vol. 2, Contracts in General, 
ch. 4, Public Contracts, p. 40.
Emphasis added, Georgia V. City of Chatanooga,(1924), U.S.
Supreme Court Reports, 68 Law ed.m book 68, 1925, p. 799. See generally 
McAllister, 'U.S. Constitutional Law and its Relation to a Contract between a 
State and a Foreign National', Rights and Duties of Private Invéstors Abroad 
(1965), pp. 249-51. :
106_ Guest A. G., The Common Law Library, No. 1, Chitty on Contracts, 26th 
ed., vol. 1, General Principles, para. 709.
9^7- Loc, cit.
108_ Harbour Trustees V.  Oswald S Appeal. Cases. 623 (HL);
Czarnikow v, Rolimpex, (1977), 3 W L R , 686.
It seems all contracts made by the Government of the UK; to be perfonned 
witbin the UK, will be gbvemed by English Law.
■ - -  ■
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a local authority nor central Government may by a contractual term or a
stabilization clause exclude the operation of a future statute. A government
cannot fetter its duty to act for the public good. It cannot bind itself by
contract not to perform its public duties.
In English law, not only it is impossible to insert a stabilization
clause against future legislation, but it is also impossible for any English
court to challenge the supremacy of Parliament or to assert that
110Parliament was not acting in public good.
In the recent past, the British Government has altered the terms of
its contracts with foreign corporations over the development of North Sea
oil, thus demonstrating that the idea of government power to vary
contracts with foreigners particularly in the domain of petroleum
concessions is not only asserted by developing countries. It became clear
that countries, like the UK and Norway, are no more willing than OPEC
Member Countries to stick rigidly to contracts that they deem
unreasonably disadvantageous and there is no absolute constitutional
protection in either country for the principle of pacta sunt servanda
The Petroleum and Submarine Pipe Lines Act of 1975 made
substantial changes to the terms of all existing production licenses,
introducing, without compensation, new obligations, particularly in regard
to development programmes and depletion, and much stricter limitations
on assignments. In facing predictable Parliamentary criticism that the Act
displayed a disrespect for the United Kingdom’s contractual obligations
and for the rule of law, and even constituted an illegal expropriation of
license rights in intemational law, ministers consistently professed to see
Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed;, vol. 8, para. 609; Guest A. G,, The 
Common Law, op. cit., para. 709.
Daintith and Gault, pacta sm t servanda and the Licensing and Taxation of 
North Sea Oil Production, Carhbrian Law Review, 8 (1977), pp; 28, 42.
—
Sanctity of Treaties and Contracts 5 6
no difference between what the Act was doing and the alteration of
regulatory or fiscal measures with the effect of making contracts more 
112onerous.
The UK Government formally rejected any suggestion of 
impropriety or even a duty to compensate, where the contracts concerned 
could not be considered as disadvantageous to the B r i t a i n . i n  
addressing Parliament, Anthony Wedgwood Benn, the UK Secretary of 
State for Energy, said that the change in the legal framework that is 
available to Governments and is regularly used by a whole host of 
environmental, health, tax and other measures which are taken by any 
responsible government, does not include the provision to compensate as a 
result.^ "^*
In the Khemco case before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the issue
of sanctity of contracts was raised. The claimant contended that the
Khemco Agreement was an economic development agreement and
belonged to a specific category of intemational contracts. The claimant
also contended that such contracts by their nature require to be insulated
front the dismptive effects of changing municipal law, and the law from
which they derive their binding force is intemational law. The practical
consequences of this analysis, according to the claimant, would be that the
115mle of pacta sunt servanda would govern the contract. The Tribunal
Daintith and Willoughby, A Manual of United Kingdom Oil and Gas Law, 
London, 1984, p. 29.
113- British is not in a position that can be considered as obliged to submit to the 
terms of the companies.
11A Hansard, HG Debs. (5th series), vol. 5 col. 1167 (1975), Report of Standing 
Committee D on Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Bill.
115- Amoco International Finance Corporation y . The Government of the Islamic 
Republic c f  Iran, National Irariian Oil Company, National Petrochemical 
Company, and Kharg Cheniical Company Limited, Award No. 310-56-3, 
dated 14 July, 1987, reprinted in 15 Iran-US C.T.R., para. 149,
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rejected this contention which attempts to equate the principle of respect 
for contracts which was embodied in the Claims Settlement Declaration 
between Iran and the United States, with the principle of pacta sunt 
, and held that:
'In no legal systern of law are private interests permitted to prevail over duly 
established public interest, maldng impossible actions required for the public 
gopd."“ «
Meanwhile, in the Klockner v. Cameroon case, the ICSID 
Tribunal declared that there does not even exist a special category of
117contracts called economic development agreements.
It was the weak position of such contracts which allowed the OPEC
countries to intervene in oil agreements, changing the price of oil,
reviewing the terms of the agreements, increasing the tax and changing the
conditions of the agreements. The principle of pacta sunt servanda was
breached apparently to make the agreements more equitable. In June
1968, OPEC issued a resolution in which it proposed a number of
suggestions for member States to pursue a policy which could lead them to
operate their oil industries without any help of aliens. The Resolution,
by noting the principle of permanent and inalienable right of States to use
and exploit their natural resources cited in the U.N.General Assembly
Resolution 2158, recommended that:
’T- Members should try, as far as possible, to explore and exploit their 
hydrocarbon resources by themselves.
2- If foreign capital was needed for this purpose, members could enter into 
contractual arrangements with foreign investors, the terms of which would 
insure the partnership of the State in all parts of the operations.
Khemco case, op. cit., para. 178.
117. Paulsson C., The IGSID Klockner v. Cameroun Award: The Duties of 
Partners in North-south Economic Development Agreements, 1 Journal of 
International Arbitration, 1984, p. 157.
118- Resolution No. XVI 90, adopted by OPEG on 24 and 25 June, 1968, see in 
OPEG Official Resolutions and Press Releases, 1960-1983, 2nd edition, 
Oxford, 1984, p. 61.
i
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3- As to the existing contracts which did not contain such partnership 
provisions, the State could demand modification to that effect, invoking the 
principle of changed circutnstances}^^
The member States tried to alter their contracts with international 
oil companies, or attempted to take over their oil industry, Iraqi measures 
of 1972, Libyan takihgs of 1971-73, and the Venezuelan nationalization of 
1976 are somehow the effect of the OPEC collective decisions. Moreover, 
it was confirmed that the compensation to be paid to the oil companies 
should be based on net book value o f the assets taken and refused to 
consider any other basis for compensation.^^*
No serious legal challenge has been mounted against the decision of
the OPEC members to change the contracts’ terms. As was mentioned in
the Resolution 122 of the OPEC, the changes imposed on the oil
companies resulted from the constant increase of inflation in Western
countries or devaluation of dollar which had had the effect of reducing
the purchasing power of the OPEC members. While before the
establishment of OPEC there was not such an automatic increase in the
incomes for the reasons mentioned, the changes requested by the OPEC
members seem contrary to the stability of the contracts, but it was not
considered against the principles of intemational law. The OPEC
members had agreed on the terms of those contracts on the basis of the
existing circumstances, and changing the terms of the contracts on the
basis of change of circumstances is a practice established as being
121acceptable under all major legal systems as well as intemational law.
The OPEC merhbers believed that it would not be contrary to the
^^ 9- Emphasis added, Loc. cit.
120- Resolution No. XVI 90, adopted by OPEC on 24 and 25 June, op. cit., p. 
101.
121- Aniin S. H., Remedies for Breach of Contract in Islamic and Iranian Law, 
Glasgow, 1984, p. 19.
-   ^ : :   :____________________________________
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U.N. Charter and international rules to adopt legislation by each member
State to oblige the oil companies to submit to their lawful demands; that is
to change the terms of their agreements with those companies. While the
company's countries as the consumers of OPEC oil had an interest in the
existing agreements, they didnot attempt to bring any legal action against
the OPEC countries and accordingly the companies agreed on different
occasions to change the terms of the contracts.
There is, therefore, overwhelming authority for the proposition that
agreements between States and aliens are not treaties, nor may they be
assimilated to treaties. As was discussed above, international law and the
intemational community have recognized as a fundamental right the right
of every State to expropriate the contractual rights of aliens. The reasons
behind the moves to subject a contract to intemational law or general
principles of law and to stabilize the contract are to ensure that the State's
termination of the contract can be characterized as unlawful. The I
consequence is that, if the dispute is taken out of the context of
expropriation, and simply dealt with as a case of breach of a contractual i
undertaking, the finding of breach would lead to damages for the breach, t
demanding a higher award than might be expected by way of
122compensation for a lawful expropriation. The failure to separate these 
two approaches from a solution to the various legal problems involved in
j23such cases will cause more confusion in this Held.
Thus, this is not an absolute rule which can be applied to all 
contracts. For example, it could not be asserted that the treaties between 
the USSR nationals or Govemment and the Marxist Government of i
Afghanistan, which was in reality only a puppet regime ought to be 1
122, Bowett D, W., State Contracts with Aliens, op, cit., p. 59.
123_ Verzijl H.W., International Law in Historical Perspective, vol. I, General 
Subjects, A.W. Sijthoff-Leyden 1968, p. 190,
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respected by a democratic government in Kabul, since such treaties lack 
the necessary element of free will on the part of Afghan people.
Moreover, it has been recognized internationally that a State can 
pass general legislation for the protection of public health, public safety or 
general welfare for purposes falling within the "police power" without 
involving the taking of p r o p e r t y N o  person has a vested right to insist
125that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit. However, the right is 
limited to the rightful exercise of the power when a contract is detrimental 
to the welfare or security of the State, which must be judged with 
reference to the circumstances of the momênt.
3 - SANCTITY OF TREATIES AND CONTRACTS UNDER 
ISLAMIC AND IRANIAN LAWS
The meaning of terms and the approach adopted in international
Islamic law is somewhat different. The notion of sovereignty in islamic
law is different from that which is accepted the non-islamic ones. It is not
limited to geographical boundaries, language, race, colour or historical
heritage. It is based on the teachings of Quran and the acts of the
Maasoumin (S.A.S). In Quran we read; "Verily; this nation of yours
constitutes one nation " In the Treaty between prophet Mohammed
Mann F, A., State Contracts and State Responsibility, op. cit, p. 584.
125. Loc. cit.
126-Quran, 21: 92 and 23: 52.
_________
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(S.A.S) and non-muslims of Madineh, muslims amongst the Quraysh and 
the people of Yathreb and those who may foUow and join them constituted
127as one nation. Accordingly, all muslims and non-muslims within the 
Islamic State's boundaries will be in an equal position and have equal 
rights. The islamic State moreover has a duty to protect their lives and 
properties, similar to the modem laws of most countries.
With regard to the non-muslims, islamic law has divided them into 
two groups.
1 - Those who settled within the territory of islamic State and are 
called Ahl al Zimmeh. They formerly became subjects of the islamic 
State by a contract called Aqd al Zimmeh. T raditionally, once this 
contract was concluded, the parties became fully entitled to equal and 
reciprocal rights and duties, and they were regarded as full subjects of the 
islamic State. They were protected by getting a kind of tax called 
Jeziya.^^^ The contract of Aqd al zimmeh to give non-muslims 
protection and equal rights has to be concluded only by the State and it is 
the right of the islamic State to grant this status to any non-muslim who 
apply for it. However, in modem times, non-muslims have received 
treatment equal with muslims in the new-born Islamic Republic of 
Iran.^ ^^
2 - Those who enter the islamic State for a limited time are subject 
to the regulations and conditions upon which the permission is granted. 
According to the contract, they can visit or do business even if they are
127- Declaration of Madlnah, Verse 9.
128- This equal right of protection was achieved against paying "jeziya" which was 
much less than the payrhents of the muslims as zicat, khoms, and extra taxes if 
necessary; Currently in Iran, they are living as religious minorities which have 
equal right with muslims and ih some aspects, for example representatives in 
the parliament,they are enjoying more advantages,
129- Principles 19-26 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
" ; —  " ■ ■
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subjects of a belligerent State. Thé sanctity of treaties and contracts in 
islam is of a great importance. Without making any separation between 
State and the nationals, Quran states that, "O ye who believe! fulfil your 
contracts".*^® In islamic intemational law, with its special approach, the 
contract can be between the islamic State and an alien or another State. 
Quran gives treaties and contracts full sanctity and considers them as the 
covenants of God which must be fulfilled.*^-
However, the doctrine of the sanctity of treaties is subject to some 
conditions. They must be fulfilled as long as the non-muslims are true in 
their i n t e n t i o n . T h e  islamic State is not obliged to fulfil the 
undertakings made by the non-muslim governments, except when they 
have been approved by islamic authorities. That was the approach 
towards treaties and contracts adopted by the pre-revolution regime in 
Iran.
Therefore, it could be concluded that contracts are the subject of 
intemational law when they are concluded by States in order to regulate 
relations between themselves. Nationals of such States and their properties 
may be the subject of such treaties. Exceptions should be made in the 
cases where the contracts are made between unequal States, under the 
superiority of the powerful one with different capacities in intemational 
relations especially in political and economic areas. Where the weaker 
States could not act in accordance with their own free will, the contract 
would lack the most essential element which legitimizes any contract.
Changes in the sovereignty of States raise fundamental questions as 
to the legitimacy of some intemational contracts especially in cases where
130- Quran, 5: 1.
131- Quran, 6: 152.
132-Qui ail, 9: 7.
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aliens have been an effective cause of those changes; and also where 
developing countries with many dependencies and deficiencies have 
concluded contracts with the subjects of a powerful dominant States, like 
those of colonial territories which brought the doctrine of "clean state". 
The principle has been accepted both in intemational and customary law, 
and intemational lawyers mostly have agreed on it. Lacking the requisite 
will, the capacity of such States to enter intemational obligations is 
questionable. That said, a party to a contract is bound to respect its 
consent expressed in the agreement in good faith. Nevertheless, contracts 
between unequal States are productive of different types of legal 
relationships from those to which the contract between such States and 
aliens. Some Ihtematipnal tribunals have made a similar distinction 
between such treaties, and have referred expressly to the right of the 
States to nationalize the property of aliens. There are numerous treaties 
between States dealing with the question of expropriation; Whatever their 
content, they do not show that aliens have become the subject of public 
intemational law because the contracting States can include anything 
within such treaties. General principles of law recognized in Article 38 of 
the Statute of the Intemational Court of Justice do not add anything to the 
reality that aliens are not as yet the subjects of intemational law. There 
are not many examples of nationalization in breach of treaties in force 
between States, while there are numerous nationalizations in breach of 
contracts between States and aliens. In such a case, if the State to which 
the alien belongs espouses his claim before an intemational tribunal, the 
claimant State will have to allege and prove a cause of action under 
intemational law and cannot allege a breach of duty arising under 
municipal law. Any analogy in this respect would be irrelevant.
Therefore, in expropriation of the contractual rights of individuals,
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to treat a mere breach of contract as an intemational wrong would have 
been both confusing and unnecessary. Instead; a formula should be 
introduce to define the rights of States to modify or end contracts as 
takings of property and not as breach of contracts.
Breaching the contract in force between State and aliens has become 
the practice of even some developed States, as the act of a responsible 
government toward the nation. Therefore, any plea to breach of contract 
in this regard is a deviation from the rules of the sovereign right to 
expropriation. Then again, the sanctity of contracts as a preventive 
element for nationalization of the property of aliens is becoming everyday 
less important and any attempt to internationalize their sanctity seems 
without any legal foundation. To put an end to this confusion and 
ambiguity over State contracts it is necessary to define and agree on the 
principles and mles of those contracts through a multilateral treaty.
***********
* * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * *
* * **
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CHAPTER TWO
(SECTION ONE)
THEORIES ON THE LAW OF EXPROPRIATION
1 .  THE DOCTRINE OF INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM
STANDARD
The doctrine of ''international minimum standard" developed from 
the notion of the sanctity of an individual and his property. According to 
this doctrine, aliens living or working or running a business in the 
sovereign territory of a host country must not be treated below the 
international minimum standard of justice or civilization. The doctrine 
rose in the Western countries on the classical concept of ''Laissez Faire", 
and the inviolability of the individual and his property. Therefore, it was 
necessary that the property of the nationals in the foreign State be 
protected. This principle has no application to a State's expropriation of 
its own nationals' property but is designed instead to protect foreign 
investors or property owners from oppression or ill treatment.
The theory of international minimum standard was first expressly 
formulated in 1910 by the former U.S. secretary of state, Elihu Root. 
Before that time, an international standard had de facto  played a role in 
State practice.^
According to the international minimum standard, any arbitrary act 
of a State against property of aliens is an express violation of international
L Moore J. A., A Digest of International Law, Washington, 1906, vol. VI, pp.
252, 312, 321, 700, 725, 770.
—  —
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law which leads to international responsibility of the expropriating State. 
As a consequence, when the level of national treatment falls below the 
international minimum standard, the aliens,' home State would have the 
right to intervene through diplomatic protection.
Oppenheim considers the standard as a well established principle 
that a State cannot invoke its municipal legislation as a reason for avoiding 
its international obligations and insists that there exists a minimum 
standard of civilization in this respect.^ Any failure of measuring up to 
that standard incurs international liability.
However, he admits that the rule is not absolute and is affected by 
two factors: the first is that the law of most States permits far-reaching 
interference with private property in connection with taxation, measures 
of policing, public health and public utility. The second is in the case of 
fundamental changes in the political system or economic structure of the 
State of far-reaching social reforms which entail interference on a large 
scale with private property. While the terms used are not precise and 
defined, Oppenheim does not make it clear how and to what extent these 
factors affect the international minimum standard. Nor does he 
recommend equal treatment of aliens with nationals of the expropriating 
State. Thus, he seeks the solution in granting partial compensation to 
aliens.^
Without giving a precise definition of the international minimum
standard, many writers including Fachiri'* and Hyde^ have argued that
in the event that the conduct of the authorities of a State falls below
Oppenheim L. F. L., International Law: a treatise, vol. I: Peace, 8th edition, 
London, 1955, p, 350 
Loc. cit., p. 352.
Fachin A. P., International Law and the Property of Aliens, 10 B.Y.LL,,
1929, p. 33.
Hyde, International Law, 1945, 2nd ed., p. 710.
_ _______ ______
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minimum standard, the aliens' State is entitled to intervene on their behalf 
and secure their rights by diplomatic means. This view could be 
understood when international law has grown up among communities with 
a similar civilization which share common attitudes and adhere to certain 
basic values.^ But, the Soviet Union and Mexican declarations on 
expropriation of foreign properties and the conduct of the other Latin 
American States in the first quarter of the century indicated an identical 
resistance toward an incorporation of the standard.
up to the First World War, the international minimum standard was 
considered a part of positive international law and could not be seriously 
challenged.^ But then several coincidental historical events placed the 
traditional position of the standard in jeopardy. The Hague Conference, 
composed of the countries mostly involved in capital investments, failed to 
reach an agreement on the issue, there being an almost even split over the 
doctrine.* The doctrine has been further weakened since the Second 
World War by expropriations which occurred in Eastern European 
countries, Iran, Egypt, Cuba, Libya and some other developing countries 
without payment of prompt or full compensation. Japan which supported 
the international minimum standard in the Hague Conference in 1930, 
rejected the principle in the Asian African Legal Consultative Committee 
which drafted a convention in 1961 that provides for payment of 
compensation for expropriation of foreign property in accordance with 
local laws, regulations and orders.^
Loc. cit.
Lissitzyn O, J., International Law, Today and Tomorrow, New York, 1965, 
pp. 76-7.
Hackworth G. H;, Responsibility of States for Damages Caused in Their 
Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, 24, A.LLL., 1930, pp. 5Ô0- 
516.
Asian African Legal Gonsultative Committee Reports, 3rd sess., 1960 from p.
■  ■ ' ■
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Moreover, some jurists from less developed nations in the 
International Law Commission and in literature have expressed the view 
that the international minimum standard of treatment of aliens, or at least 
the requirement of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, is not or 
should not be a general binding norm of international law.^® This was 
the general attitude of the majority of the members of the United Nations 
which represented a serious threat to the interests of foreign investors in 
this group of the countries.
The capital exporting countries have defended the legal content of 
the international minimum standard of treatment of aliens by reference to 
what are regarded today as basic human rights, while the less developed 
countries have regarded the standard as an imposition by the more 
powerful States, The latter have sometimes employed coercive measures, 
including military force, not only to enforce their interpretation of the 
international minimum standard, but also to obtain some concessions and 
other special privileges for their nationals, and to intervene in the 
domestic affairs of weaker States. The controversy over the standard has 
been so heated that a Mexican diplomat has attacked the doctrine as 
merely a "legal garb" that served to cloak and protect the imperialistic 
interests of the international oligarchy during the nineteenth and the first 
part of the twentieth century.^^
While the capital exporting countries still adhere to traditional rules 
83; 4th sess,, 1961, pp. 43, 46, 49^  141-142.
Y.I.L.C., 1957, (New York, U.N. 1958), vol. 1, pp. 155, 159-160;
Y.I L.G., 1959, vol. 1, p. 151; Y.LL.G., 1960, vol. 1, p. 264; Roy G., Is the 
Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens Part of Universal 
International Law? 55 A.J.I.L., 1961, p. 866.
Lissitzyn O J„ International Law, Today and Tornonow, op. cit., p. 79,
Castaneda J„ The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development of 
International Law, 15 International Organisation, 1961, p. 38.
i- '
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for protection of foreign property, there remains the question of the way 
to put the rules into concrete action. The difficulty is with the 
abstractriess and vagueness of the issue which can be interpreted 
differently in various societies. Éagleton suggests that the indefinitehess 
of the standard is a source of possible abuse. To counteract this 
possibility, he suggests that one should look for "a fnore precise statement 
of what is expected of the host State, and a more impartial interpretation 
and enforcement of the requirements, by the community of nations;-'^
The international rninimum standard doctrine has been developed 
when developed countries' political and economic system dominated the 
world. But, over thé years ^ it has changed gradually to take into account 
the views of communist as well as new and developing countries on the 
taking of property. Thus, the international minimum standard has had to 
give way to an emerging body of principles that at least reflect the 
common interests of the world coinmunity. This trend has been seeking 
the achievement of what Weston and Dawson have described as "a 
creative, equitable and effective balance between demands for both socio- 
economic reform and private profit."^'*
However, the international minimum standard rules would be 
valuable as international law when they, as Falk observes, achieve the 
capacity to satisfy the particular interests of participants as the community 
of nations. To become a part of international law, there has to be 
evidence that the relevant rules have been accepted by States in their 
international practice, and any plea to municipal law is irrelevant. 
Eagleton G., Responsibility of States in International Law, New York, 1970,
p. 86.
University of Chicago Law Review, 1963, pp. 63,76.
15_ There are some constitutions which reserve the legal possibility of 
expropriation of private property without any compensation. Some of them are: 
German Constitution, 1919, Art. 153; Czechoslovak Constitution, 1920; Art.
a
____
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Schwarzenberger, as a supporter of the international minimum standard 
doctrine, suggests that the development of the doctrine was assisted by the 
conclusion of treaties specially providing for the treatment of 
foreigners/** According to him, the friendly European powers, at the 
earliest stage of their economic relations, included a clause providing for 
this standard in treaties between themselves. But, he admits that later they 
found it unnecessary to include the clause in treaties with each other. He 
points out that receiving of this standard of treatment in "less civilized" 
States might be open to question and the clause would be inserted in 
treaties with them.^^ However, an examination of the fundamental laws 
of all nations which were the elder niembers of the family of nations 
indicate that, at the time when the standard was the sole contender, there 
was not uniform national legislation in force even in civilized nations. 
That is even more obvious in regard to payment of compensation by the 
expropriating States to the individuals affected by the measures.^*
109; Constitution of the Spanish Republic, 1931; Friedman also does not 
consider municipal laws as evidence of international law. See Friedman S., 
Expropriation in International Law, London, 1953, pp. 111-115.
1^ - Schwarzenberger G., The Protection of British Property Abroad, 5 Current 
Legal Problems, 1952, London, pp. 303-4.
7^- Loc. cit.
Art. 5 of Law Concerning the General Rights of Citizens, Fundamental Laws 
of 21 December, 1867 of Austria and Section 365 of Austrian Civil Code; Art.
11 of Constitution of 7 February, 1831 of Belgium; Section 17 of Constitution 
of 24 February, 1891 of Brazil; Arts. 67, 68 of Constitution of 16/18 April 
1879, with amendments of 15/27, May, 1893, and 11/24 July, 1911 of 
Bulgaria; Art. 6 of Provisional Constitution of 11 March, 1912 of china; Art.
15 of Constitution of 8 June, 1917 of Costa Rica; Arts. 10, 32, 33 of 
Constitution of 21 February, 1901 of Cuba;Art. 545 of French Civil Code; 
Article 153 of the Constitution of Germany; Art, 29 of Great Charter of 
Liberties of 11 February, 1225 of Great Britain: Art. 17 of Constitution of 1/14 
June, 1911 of Greece; Art. 28 of Constitution of 11 December, 1879 of 
Guatemala; Art. 14 of Constitution of 12 June, 1918 of Haiti; Art. 67 of 
Constitution of 14 October, 1894 of Honduras; Art. 29 of Fundamental Statute
_____ ------------- ---
—
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With such a record, it is suiprising that some eminent writers such 
as Schwarzerberger and Bellot extent the international minimum standard 
to all countries and consider it as a part of general international law, 
while at the same time they admit that only the major capital-exporting 
countries have rigidly adhered to the doctrine. There are some bases 
which show that even Western countries sometimes did not apply this 
standard in their respective societies or in their international relations^ 
Thus, the authorities cited in support o f  the rule, as Williams^^ states, 
are not conclusive and decisive enough to prove them as universal mles.
This becomes more obvious when one finds that developed
countries, as sponsors of the rules, failed to apply them. Representatives
of Sweden in the Council of Europe, rejecting the idea of full
compensation, argued that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was
successful because it was not enforceable. And the U.K. argued that the
right to own property was an economic and social right and rejected its
‘20inclusion in the convention. These arguments together with the cases
of 4 March, 1848 of Italy;Art; 27 of Constitution of 11 February, 1889 of 
Japan; Section 8 of Constitution of 26 July, 1847  ^as aiftended 7 May, 1907 of 
Liberia; Art. 16 of Constitution of 17 October, 1868 of Luxemburg; Art. 27 of 
Constitution of 1857 and Art. 27 of Constitution of 1917 of Mexico; Arts. 205,
206, 207 of Constitution of 6/19 December, 1905 of Montenegro; Art. 57 of 
Constitution of 10 November, 1911 of Nicaragua; Sec. 105 of Constitution of 
Norway; Arts. 42, 44 of Constitution of 13 February, 1904 of Panama; Arts,
6, 9, 15, 16, 17 of Supplementary Constitutional Law of 7 October, 1907 of 
Iran; Arts. 3, 23, 25 of Constitution of 21 August, 1911 of Portugal; Arts, 7,
11, 17, 19 of Constitution of 30 Jüne/12 July, 1866, as amended 13/25 
October, 1879, and 8/20 June 1884 of Romania; Art. 35 of Fundamental Laws 
of 23 April/6 May, 1906 of Russia; Art. 21 of Constitution of 23 December^
1876, as amended in 1909 of Turkey; Fifth Amendment of Constitution of 17 
SOptehnbef, 1787 of United States of AmericM.
Williams J, F., International Law and the Property of Aliens, 9 B.Y.I.L.,
1928, pp. 1-14.
British Yearbook on European Convention on Human Rights (Eur. Comm'n 
H R.), 1960, p. 394.
' i l
' ; ; -
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such as Lithgow v. United Kingdom m&Gudmundson v. Iceland are an 
indication of some uncertainties which surround the international 
minimum standard in thé W e s t . M o r e o v e r ,  in the debates on the 
European Convention on Human Rights, France and the U.K. found that a 
definition of thé fight to property corhprising in all cases the principle of 
compensation in the event of private property being acquired by the State 
was unacceptable.^^ Yet it may be noticed that Article II of the French 
Civil Code reflects discrimination in favour of French nationals. Thus, 
foreigners could enjoy the same civil rights in France only through 
treaties with the nations to which they bélong.^^
The uncertainty and doubt surrounding the international minimum 
standard was reflected in the Neer Case of 1926, in which it was stated 
that;
an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international 
standards that every reasonable and iihpartial man would readily recognize its 
insufficiency. Whether the insufficiency proceeds frcXn deficient execution of 
an intelligent law or from the fact that the laws of the country do not empower 
the authorities to measure up to international standards is immaterial.’'^ '*
In this case, the Ainerican cdmihissioner admitted that standards
differ considerably among members of the family of nations^ all of which
are equal uhder international law.^^
It is obvious that the international minimum standard cannot readily
be applied to nations which have had no role in the creation and
development of those mtemational rules. Although expressed as a
Loc. cit.
Council of Europe, Collected Edition of the Travaux Preparatories of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, No. 7, 1985, p. 250.
Borchard E. M., The Diplomatic Protection of citizens Abroad, New York,
1927, p. 36.
V. (General Claims CpnUhission), Reports of International
Arbitration Awards; (IV); 1974, pp. 61-2.
Loc. cit., p. 65.
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ :_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ : _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ :_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ : _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ :_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ' . . . . . . ■ I
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responsibility of all nation States, the intematidnal minimum standard,
which was consolidated and systematized in the 19th century, does not
reflect the will and interest of the majority of the nations which achieved
their independence in the mid-twentieth century. Its application seeks to
protect the unilateral interest of the capital exporting States. The
international minimum standard rules were established not merely without
reference to small States/ but often against their i n t e r e s t s . I n d e e d
much of the international law in this area, particularly with reference to
expropriation, developed purely in response to the requirements of the
Western business community.^^
Basically, the law of State responsibility on treatment of aliens,
according to minimum standard rules, is; not only the product of the
conscious activity of the European mind, but also, as Verzijl wrote in
1955, draws its essence from a common source of European origin/^
Consequently, many writers, without examining those European-
influenced rules to see if they stiU remain in the common interest of the
contemporary world community, have generalized their dislike of those
rules governing expropriation to the point that they refused to accept the
entire corpus of the law. As Lillich points out, they have "thrown the
baby out with the bath water.
The theory of minMum standard is concerned with the attitude of a
In this regard the statement of Dr. Padilla Nerve of Mexico is qutstanding, see 
in Summery Records of the 413th Meeting (1957), International Yearbook of 
International Law, Comm'n 155, tJ.N. Doc, A/C, No. 4, Ser. A/1957.
^7- Lissitzyn O. J., International Law in a Divided World, No, 542, International 
Conciliation, 1963, p. 58.
Verzijl, Western European Influence on the Foundation of International Law,
International Relations, No. 4, October 1955, p. 137.
Lillich R. B„ The Current Status of the Law of State Responsibility of Injuries 
to Aliens in Intehiational Law, 1939, 51, 54.
— :   :
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State towards foreign nationals rather than its own nationals/** The 
theory has looked at tlie questions of expropriation and nationalization 
from the point of view of the violation of the rights of foreign 
nationals/^ Thus, attention has come to be focused upon the concept of 
what are called fundamental rights; that is rights which everyone is 
entitled to enjoy, even outside his own country. It is in this regard 
assumed that the protection of the rights of property follows the 
individual outside his own country.
The real controversy over the minimum standard rule began after 
the First World War. Nationalizations in the Soviet Union and in Mexico 
played an important role in this regard. In the former country, 
expropriation was the basis of the Communist Revolution with the 
doctrine of taking of properties not only without compensation, but also 
as suppression of the capitalists. The United States protested on behalf of 
the fourteen Allied and Associated Powers and six neutral States on the 
basis of the international minimum standard. Those States considered the 
decrees as confiscatory, without effect and illegal.^^ They maintained 
their rights and reserved such reinedies by way of retorsion and reprisal 
as were available to theni, and passed a resolution at the Brussels 
Conference on Russia of October 1921 ' to emphasise that forcible 
expropriation and riatiqhalizations without any compensation in which 
foreigners are interested was totally at variance with the practice of 
civilized States.^^
Donan N., Postwar Nationalisation of Foreign Property in Europe, 8 Columbia
Law Review, 1948, p. 1127.
Loc. cit.; Schwarzenberger G., The Protection of British Property Abroad, op.
cit., pp. 298-9,
Wortly B. A., Expropriation in Public international Law, Cambridge, 1959, p.
61.
Me Nair A. D., International Law Opinions, 1959, vol. 1, p. 9.
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However, the sponsors of the international minimum standard did 
not continue to insist on the principles of "just, adequate and effective" 
compensation, but the Soviet Union accepted in treaties made from 1918 
to 1925 to provide compensation for expropriation of aliens’ property/"* 
Nevertheless, it was a sign that the international minimum standard was 
become increasingly problematic. The capital exporting States with 
liberal economies as the guardians of capitalist economic principles and 
free enterprise sanctity could not continue as before to construe 
restrictively the related principles of the international minimum
35standard; On the other hand, in the leading cases of expropriations, in 
Mexico and Rusia, there was a refusal to implement the minimum 
standard rules, and the claimant States, one after another, ceased to press 
their claims arising out of the Soviet socialization measures. Indeed, they 
either renounced their claims expressly, as in the case of Germany, or 
implicitly as in the cases of U.S. and France.
The sponsors of international minimum standard rules deviated 
from the international minimum standard by inserting the "national 
clause" in the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational
37Enterprises adopted by OECD Ministers in June 1976. Accordingly,
34. Wortly B. A., Expropriation in Public International Law, op. cit., p. 61; some 
of the treaties made between the U.S.S.R; and the expropriated ones are: 
Additional Convention to the Russo-German Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, March 3,
1918, Art. 16(2); Russo-German Financial Convention of August 17, 1918,
Art, i l ;  Russo-German Treaty of October 12, 1925, Art. 8; Russo-Astrian- 
Hungarian Additional Convention to the Treaty of Brest-Livosk, Art. 5; Russo- 
Italian Treaty of March 7,1924, Arts. 6(5), 10.
Schwarzenberger G., Foreign Investment and International Law, London,
1969, pp. 23-4.
Hudson M. O., The Seventeenth Year of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, 33 A.J.I.L., 1939, pp. 2-10.
7^_ The Declaration is composed of four sections: the National Treatment 
instrument; the Guidelines for multinational enterprises; an instrument on 
incentives and disincentives to national investment; and an instrument on
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the member countries^ which are mostly Western countries, agreed to 
accord to foreign-controlled enterprises operating in their territories no 
less favour than that accorded in like situations to domestic enterprises. 
The instrument provides an operative framework for notifying, 
examining, and gradually rolling back measures in OECD member 
countries which impose discriminatory restrictions on foreign-controUed 
enterprises contrary to the national treatment principle.
The national treatment instrument by the OECD is a clear departure 
from the international minimum standard by the sponsors of the theory. 
The instrument implies that the OÉCD member States had treated aliens in 
a discriminatory manner, and the member States undertook through the 
Declaration to refrain from such measures. It further means that the 
theory, to become international law, needs to be agreed between States 
through conventions or declarations. However, there is no such 
instrument to indicate that the international minimum standard has been 
agreed as such between all States, particularly between developing and 
developed countries. Even among the OECD countries, the request to 
examine ways of further strengthening the existing instrument by 
avoiding the introduction of hew measures or practices contrary to the 
national treatment principle was not fully welcomed. Most of the OECD 
members not only refused to implement the international minimum 
standard, but also declined to treat foreign investments according to their 
own national law.^*
cphflictiiig requirements; National Treatment for Foreign Controlled Enterprises 
of the 1976 Declaration on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises, and the Third Revised Decision on National Treatment adopted by 
the OECD Council in December 1991, in National Treatmerit for Foreign 
Controlled Entemhses, OECD, Paris, 1993, pp; 9, 13.
The list of those States in National Treatment for Foreign Controlled 
Enterprises, OECD, Paris, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
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A category of measures was introdueed as pressure on the member 
countries to reduce the number and scope of their restrictions upon aliens. 
These measures were decided to be impleniented according to the
39conditions governing each member State. The approach of the Revised 
Decision Council of the OECD has been to discourage the member States 
from adding to their national treatment exceptions. The positive 
conclusion arrived at by the Committee in 1991 was that the regulations 
and practices of the member States pertaining to foreign investments has 
been increasingly aligned with the principle of national treatment/** 
Therefore, the experience of the OECD indicates that the rules as hitherto 
applied by its members are contrary tO the principles of international 
minimum standard. One of the reasons is probably that the members of 
the ÔEÇD are not in an equal degree of development, and any national 
treatment (equal treatment) would tend to damage their respective
. . .  ^ 41economic interests.
Therefore, any attempt to implement the international minimum 
standard in developing countries would increasingly damage their 
economic interests, and it is obvious that those countries would resist the 
application of that standard.
Loc. cit., p. 10.
Loc. cit., p. 18.
Membership of the countries such as Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, 
Turkey in compare with Japan, United States, Germany and others could be the 
reason for some problems which the Organisation is confronting.
________ 1
Theories on Expropriation 7 8
2 .  THE DOCTRINE OF NATIONAL TREATMENT
The doctrine of international minimum standard has been 
challenged by another theory, favouring the "hatioiial treatment 
standard". This was, in factj initially at least, the prevalent theory in the 
Latin American countries under the influence of the Calvo doctrine. The 
doctrine of national treatment, in fact, was a response to the practice of 
diplomatic (and sometimes military) intervention of developed countries, 
in order to restrict or eliminate diplomatic protection by powerful 
countries. The doctrine originated as a defensive reaction to the admitted 
abuses of diplomatic protection and to the norms of international law
- ' . ■ 42which were considered as discriminatory against smaller States. 
Further, to prevent the implementation of the international minimum 
standard rules, in almost all cases involving the nationalization of foreign 
property in developing States, offers of international arbitration have 
been rejected by those States."*^
Therefore, the national treatment rules which were based on the 
Calvo doctrine comprised two principles; firstly, the principle of non­
intervention, according to which sovereign States enjoy the freedom from 
any kind of foreign intervention whether by force or diplomatic means; 
and secondly, the principle of equality of treatment between nationals and
Guha R., Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of 
Universal International Law, 55 A J.LL., 1961, p. 866; Orrego Vicuna P., The 
International Regulation of Valuation Standards and Process; A Reexamination 
of Third World Perspective; in Lillich R. B., The Valuation of Nationalised 
Property in International Law, vol. Ill, Chap. 4, p. 131; Freeman A. V., The 
International Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice, op. cit., p. 462; 
Amerasinghe C. R, The Quantum of Compensation for Nationalised Property, 
in Lillich R B., The Valuation of Nationalised Property in International Law, 
vol. Ill, Chp. IV, p. 107.
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foreigners.
According to the latter principle, no State is obliged to treat
foreigners more favourably than its own nationals. Therefore, aliens
44could bring their claims only before the local authorities. The Calvo 
doctrine, contrary to the infemational minimum standard, constituted a 
maximum standard of national treatment. Consequently, it failed to gain 
recognition in the Western countries which economically and politically 
dominated the world. By inserting provisions in their constitutions and 
by municipal law, the Latin American countries tried to implement the 
doctrine. In their concession agreements and contracts with other 
countries, they tried to maintain the doctrine through the medium of the
45so-called Calvo clause.
Mexico inserted an article in its constitution which emphasized the
equal treatment of aliens with nationals with the proviso that they could
acquire property only if they agree to renounce any protection of their
home government in property m a t t e r s . M e x i c o  invoked the Calvo
doctrine as a response to the U.S. claim that considered the expropriations
in Mexico as illegal. Mexico stated that;
"the jurisdiction of thé States within the liiiüts of the national territory is 
applicable to all the inhabitants. Nationals and foreigners w ho^ e under the 
same protection of the national legislation and authorities the foreigners cannot 
claim rights different from or nière extensive than nationals. The demand for 
unequal treatment is implicitly included in your Government’s note for while 
it is true that it does not so state clearly it does enquire the payment to its 
nationals, independently of what Mexico may decide to do with regard to its 
citizens, and as youf Government is not unaw^e that our Government finds 
itself unable immediately to pay the indemnity to all affected by the agrarian 
reform, by insisting on payment to American land holders, it demands, in
Bring O. E., TheTmpact of Developing States on International Customary
Law, 24 Scandinavian Studies in Law, 1980, p. 112.
Freeman A. V., The International Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice,
London, 1938, p. 457.
Article 27 of Mexican Constitution of 1917.
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reality a special privileged treatment which no one is receiving in Mexico.'^ 7
With the decline of the colonialist system, particularly in the post-
1945 era, the Calvo doctrine was invoked by the third world countries,
and the cardinal principle that the State may only take private property
for value was ignored in practice and disputed in theory. Moreover,
some States defended the idea of the equality of nationals and aliens at
international conferences."**
However, there was no doubt that the taking State had a right to take 
49property for public use, or that it might have an original and exclusive
title to certain kinds of property, such as mineral resources within its
territory. However, it was also accepted that, although the international
minimum standard had received wide support in legal writings and in
juridical practice, the exact content of the standard in respect of
protection of property had never been fully established,^** That this was
so was demonstrated by the failure of the Hague Codification Conference
in 1930 to reach an agreement on State responsibility.^^ In that
Conference, there was a clear distinction between the capital-exporting
and capital-importing countries. While the former sought the recognition
of the responsibility of States in the case of damages to the person or
property of aliens, the latter opposed any better treatment than the
^7- Hackworth G. H., Digest of International Law, Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1942, vol. Ill, p. 658.
League of Nations' International Conference on the Treatment of Foreigners; 
Preparatory Documents, November 5, 1929, (C.I.T.E.1C.36.M.21, 1929, II), 
and Proceedings Geneva, 1930, (C.97.M.23, 1930,11).
Mexican Note to the U.S. of August 3, 1938, A Foreign Office Paper Release.
Bring O. E., The Impact of Developing States on International Customary 
Law, op. cit., pp. 103-4.
Hackworth G.H., Responsibility of State for Damages Caused in Their 
Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, 24 A.I. I. L, 1930, pp. 515- 
516; some of the Latin American States and the Soviet Union did not participate 
in the vote in the Hague Conference.
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nationals of the country being given to foreigners on the ground that
foreigners, befoi;e going to a country, generally satisfy theniselves as to
climatic conditions and they should likewise satisfy themselves with
regard to the international conditions and treatment to be accorded to
them /^ The Mexican Government in a note to the U.S. stated that:
"There does not exist m intemational law any principle universally accepted
by countries  ..... that would render obligatory thé giying of adequate
compensation for expropriation of a general and impersonal character; that 
nevertheless an obligation to indemnify the owners of expropriated property 
did arise under Mexican law, which itself determined the time and manner of 
payment; and that social progress sought impartially as between national and 
alien, cannot be held by the impossibility of paying immediately the value of 
the properties taken.
The practice of States did not help to improve and strengthen either
of the theories. For example, in the exprôpriation dispute between
Mexico and Britain,^'* each party defended one of the theories.
Ultimately, following an agreement in 1946, the Mexican Government
paid compensation plus interest. The practice was in conformity with
traditional rule of international minimum standard, but the compe nsation
was paid on condition that the agreement was not to be regarded as m any
respect a precedent for any future dispute, claim, or arbitration arising
between the two Governments. Therefore, the Mexican expropriations
Hackworth G. H„ Responsibility of States for Damages Caused in Their 
Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, 24 A.JT.L., 1930, op. cit., 
pp. 513-14.
53_ Mexican Note to the U. S. of August 3, 1938 op. cit.; Article 27 of the 
Mexican Constitution provides that, private property shall not bè expropriated 
except for reasons of public utility and subject to indemnification. It allocated 
to thé public sector which was "inalienable" and "imprescriptible", exploitable 
only by government concession and had specified the condition that the 
concessionaire in foreigner, should not invoke the diplomatic protection of his 
government in the case of forfeiture; More details in Fawcett M, A., Some 
Foreign Effects of Nationalisation of Property, 27 B,Y.I.L., 1950, p. 355^375. 
Mexican Eagle Company Case, Cmd, 5758 of 1938.
. ;î;
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gave rise to a deep controversy with regard to the legal basis for thé duty 
of paying prompt, adequate} and effective compensation. The events in 
Mexico, according to Ambassador Robles, the permanent representative 
of Mexico to the United Nations in 1974, had shown that investors did not 
consider whether the territorial State was willing to accept international 
means other than national arrangements, or whether it claimed exclus ive 
jurisdiction of national law to be decisive. The reason, it was suggested, 
was that, although Mexico never accepted any investment guarantee 
agreement and maintained in its constitution the Calvo clause, there are so 
many transnational corporations and private investors interested in
. '-56investing there and preparing to do so.
While there is no international convention binding on States on 
treatment of aliens, the capital-exporting States have considered 
international minimum standard rule as a duty derived from a universally 
recognized rule of interriàtionaî law. On the other hand, capital- 
importing countries favoured adequate indemnification, but only in 
obedience to their own laws. The position of developing countries, as is 
reflected in the Mexican note to the U.S., is that there is no international 
rule uniyersally accepted m theory dr carried out in practice, particularly
- ->57on paying immediate or even deferred compensation.
There were a number of cases, mostly involving American arid 
British nationals; which w^r® resolved through agreements or arbitration,
" ■ 5gand resulted in the payment of full compensation. But, there are some
Cmd. 6768 of 1946; President Cardenas in his speech of September 10, 1938 
attacked the indemnity principle as capable of leading to war, New York Times, 
September 11, 1938, p. 1; more in Kuhz J. L., The Mexican Expropriation, 
Cpntempprary Law Pamphlets Series 5, No. 1, International Law Series, New 
Yoric IJmvershy, 1940 (Re. 1976), p. 25.
Remarks by Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles, P.A^S.LL., 1975, p. 231.
7^- President Cardenas’ speech of 10,1938, op. cit., p. 26.
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other cases in which payment of compensation was regarded as "an act of 
grace". Non-payment of compensation has not been only restricted to 
developing States. In the U.S., the police power in the Constitution has 
been used to suppress or control by licensing such enterprises as the 
liquor trade, pool halls and lotteries. No compensation was paid for those 
put out of business.
60Therefore, as some writers observed, there has been no
consensus on the treatment of aliens and no general customary rule of
international law on expropriation could be extracted from the existing
theories. The rules of law binding upon States emanate from the free
exercise of their sovereign will as expressed in conventions or generally
accepted usages. They are established in order to regulate the relations
between the coexisting independent conimunities with a view to the
61achievement of common aims. Accordingly, it is very doubtful that
the rules arising from these opposing theories will always reflect the free
exercise of the sovereign will of all nations, particularly those from
developing countries. Moreover, the will expressed through most of thé
developing countries, with undemocratic regimes are not much reliable to
Some of those cases dXQ\ Sicilian Sulphur Monopoly, IWiSvGeorge King,
1853; Janas King, 1853; Henry Savage, 1852; Delagoa Bay Railway 
Concession, 1903; Italian and Uruguayan Insurance Monopolies, 1911-20; 
Portuguese Religious Properties, 1913; s6e more in 10 B.Y.LL., 1929, pp.
32-55,
Fawcett J. E. S., The Legal Character of International Agreements, 27 
B.Y.I.L., 1950, p. 357.
Kunz J. L., The Mexican Expropriations, pp/pit., pp. 11-12; Hackworth G.
H., Responsibility o f States for Daniages Caused in Their Territory to the 
Person or Property of foreigners, op. cit., A.J.I.L., 1930, p. 521; Salgado R.
A., Protection of Nationals' Rights to Property Under the European 
Conventionbn Human Rights: 27 Virginia Journal of International Law, 1987; 
p. 873.
The Lotus Case, P.C.I.J., Series A. No. 10, 1927, p. 18.
-  ..
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be creative of international law.
Thus, the rules of expropriation might be derived from 
international treaties, if any, or from particular customary international 
law in force between certain States, but they are not in any way common 
to all States. Some writers agree with this view, except that they 
distinguish between isolated cases of expropriation directed against an 
alien, and general social reforms, applying to nationals and aliens 
alike.
However, to implement a rule of international law, it seems crucial 
to find an answer to the question that, if States have not the same freedom 
to deal by law with the property of aliens as with the property of their 
own nationals, by what act or omission of their own have they been 
deprived of it? For example, where property belongs to a State's subject, 
the parliament of that State would be entitled by virtue of its sovereign 
right to expropriate the propeity at any time and in whatever manner it 
pleased. By the application of minimum standard rules, if the subject of a 
State were to transfer propeity to an alien, the parliament of that State or 
the government would lose a portion of its former power. Thus, the State 
would suffer, in the language of Williams,**^ an abridgement of its 
authority by the act of a third party.
It is obvious that a State cannot legislate on all issues for her own 
nationals and aliens alike. For example, national legislation and 
regulations on exchange control cannot be applied to nationals and aliens 
equally. The reason is simply that this kind of equality of treatment 
would, in fact, be damaging aliens much more than nationals. With 
regard to most important issues such as those concerning the economic
Brownlie I., Principles of Public International Law, Fourth edition, Oxford,
1990, pp. 525, 536.
Williams J. F., International Law and the Property of Aliens, op. cit., p. 15.
 :_________________________ :_________________________:_______________  ' '' 'I
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and political affairs of a country, aliens will normally be less able to voice
their opposition to national legislation, being unable to take part in the
election process. Clearly, this makes them generally more vulnerable to
domestic legislation.^"* Accordingly, the concerns of nationals and aliens
may be different in the legislation, as European Court of Human Rights
noted, "a legitimate reason for requiring nationals to bear a greater
burden in the public interest that non-nationals" may exist.^^
This reasoning cannot be used for developing countries. For, in
some developing States, the real voice belongs to aliens rather than the
nationals of those countries. This was the position of Mexico which
accordingly argued in her note, not only that the agrarian reform should
be applied to citizens and aliens without discrimination, but also that the
doctrine of equality between nationals and foreigners stood against the so-
called privileged position of aliens. As authority, Mexico cited the
Convention of the Second Pan-American Conference 1902, and article 9
of the Montevideo Convention of the Seventh Conference (1933) and the
Calvo doctrine as a positive norm of particular inter-American
international law.****
In sum, the two main theories on expropriation of aliens' property
reflect two completely different views which are based on different
economic and political systems of States. They have been developed with
regard to the particular legal circumstances prevailing in certain States
and accordingly neither of them could be implemented universally so as to
provide a safeguard for the interests of all of the international
Salgado R, A., Protection of Nationals' Rights to Property Under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 1987, op. cit., p. 904.
Loc. cit.
See the position of Latin American States, including Mexico, on treatment of 
Aliens in Borchard E, The "Committee of Experts" at the Lima Conference,
A.J.I.L., 1939, pp. 269-282.
' y-
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community. Each of the economic systems demands varied economic 
relations with other States, determined by their economic systems. 
Therefore, any analogy of the legal relations between developing and 
developed countries in this regard is irrelevant and misleading. That is 
why treaties between particular States have been concluded in order to 
secure for aliens what they were entitled: to. However, neither of these 
theories would alone be sufficient to bring justice and prosperity to the 
international community, nor moreover has either been incorporated in 
international law so as to have direct effect on the legislative competence 
of a State within thé domestic sphere. Meanwhile, one cannot rrierely 
presunie that any State has by implication surrendered a portion of its 
legislative power. It seems unlikely that any State would ever leave its 
law at the mercy of the argument of diplomatists or the reasoning of the 
learned. Thé lack of a uniform national legislation, even among the 
civilized nations, particularly with regard to the issue of compensation,^^ 
is clear evidence of this assertion. The lack of a uriiform approach is 
further demonstrated by the fact that, in some legal systems, the inviolable 
character of private property is affirmed, while in others thé concept of 
private property is considered an undesirable one whiph ought not to be 
countenanced.***
^7- See Note 19 Supra. 
Loc. cit.
.y:.: . - _______ _________
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3 - THE THEORY OF ACQUIRED RIGHTS
The concept of acquired or vested rights deals specifically with the 
sanctity of property rights obtained undef a particular system of law 
which is threatened by à later change of lex situs. Once property rights 
have been acquired under the existing law, they cannot be arbitrarily 
revoked as a result of subsequent changes within that legal system without 
the obligation to make reparation/^ The concept of acquired rights is 
closely linked with the rule of non-retroactivity of laws, the purpose of 
which is to retain public confidence in law and social order, the rule being
70recognized in almost all legal systems.
The United Nations International Law Commission which dealt with 
this question came to the conclusion that respect for acquired rights 
constitutes one of the main principles of international law governing the 
treatment of a l i e n s . A l s o ,  the Permanent Court of International Justice 
in its judgement in the Gerrnan Interests in Polish Upper Silesia has 
said: "the principle of respect for vested rights forms part of generally
* 72accepted international law".
However, it is difficult to assert that it has still a principle of law
imposing on States international obligation in violation of their legislative
and sovereign prerogatives. According to this view, if a State's legislation
may legitimately restrict rights of nationals, it is inconceivable that aliens
might be protected against such legislation on the basis of the theory of 
73acquired rights. Moreover, revolutions and change of regimes might
KrohfolZ. A., Protection of Foreign Investment/Netherliands, 1972, p. 19.
7**- Kaeckenbeek G., The Protection of Vested Rights in International Law, 17
B.Y.LL., 1936, p. 3; see also Liamco Award, op. cit., p. 171.
71- II Y.I.L.C., 1959, (AGN.4/8ER:A/195^ADD. 1), NW  1960, p. 3.
72_ German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia Case, P. G. I. J , Series A, No. 7, 
p. 42.
'Theories on Expropriation 8 8
easily alter any such rights. The theory is based on private ownership,
and as Judge Arechaga has held:
"The very basis of this traditional doctrine................. which is predicated
on the existence of an unlawful act, is removed once it is realized that the 
acquired right to private property, in particular private ownership of the means 
of industrial production, is no longer protected by contemporary international 
law. "7^
Among the writers who have doubted the place of the theory of 
acquired rights in international law are Friedman, Garcia Amador,
77 78Foighel and Brownlie. Some of them believe that not only is the
theory obscure, ambiguous and indefinable, but it is also unsupported by
79 .the international judicial decisions. Brownlie states that there is no
evidence that the principle of acquired rights has the particular
consequences contended for, and exponents of acquire rights doctrine
commonly give it a modified form which leaves room for exercise of
80local legislative competence.
Moreover, the value of acquired rights in municipal law is
restricted to times of calm and ordinary circumstances. The new
economic orders which occur after revolutions and social disturbances
easily alter such rights to the extent they are in conflict with the public
73- Francioni F., GompensatiGn for Nationalization of Foreign Property: The 
Borderline between Law and Equity, 2 4 1.G.L.Q., 1975, p. 260.
7^- De Arechaga E. J., State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign 
Property, 11 N.Y.U.J. 1. L SI Pol, 1978, p. 181.
7 -^ Friedman S., Expropriation in Intematidnal Law, op. cit., p. 126.
7 -^ Garcia Amador F. V., The Proposed New International Economic Order: A 
New Approach to the Law Governing Nationalisation and Gompensation, 16 
Lawyer of the Americas, 1984, pp. 5-7.
77- Foighel I., Nationalization, A Study in the Protection of Alien Property in 
International Law, London, 1957, pp. 53-4.
7^-Brownlie I., Principles of Public International Law, op. cit., pp. 657-8.
79- Friedman S., Expropriation in International Law, op. cit.
Brownlie I., Principles of Public International Law, op. cit.
;>r,-
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aims of such movements. Accordingly, it is suggested that the theory
might have had some effect in this respect "when private ownership was
81the only conceivable postulate of socioreconomic organization". It 
would seem to follow that the theory cannot provide a reliable legal basis 
for the determination of the duty of States, particularly developing States, 
to compensate for their expropriated property.
4 - THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
The theory of unjust enrichment is a principle of municipal law, and
as with the theory of acquired rights, it is recognized in most legal
systems. Indeed, many writers accept that it is a general principle of 
82international lawv This theory presents the most equitable principle
which prevents enrichment of one party at the expense of the others.
Eduardo Jimenez De Arechagà, the former President of the International
Court of Justice, holds in this regard that:
"The principle which constitutes the legal foundation of the practice actually 
followed by States .......... is to be found in the doctrine of unjust
enrichment. If the nationalizing State were to grant no compensation when 
nationalizing alien property, it would enrich itself without justification at the 
expense of a foreign State - a distinct political, economic and social 
community. Through the exercise of its sovereign right, the nationalizing 
State would be depriving ah alien community of the wealth represented by the
Francioni F., Compensation for Nationalization of Foreign Property: the 
Borderland Between Law and Equity, 2 4 1.C.ÉQ., 1975, p. 262.
Schwarzenberger;G , International Law, vol. I, 3rd éd., london,T957, p. 577; 
Friedman W., The Use of ’General Principles' in the Development of 
International Law, 57 A.J.I.L., 1963, p. 295; McNair A. D., The General 
Principles of Law Recognised by Civilized Nations, 33 B.Y.LL, 1957, p. 11;
De Arechaga E, J., International Law in the Past Third of Century, 1978, p.
299 et seq.
. . . . .  . ... ...    . .  ...  ..............
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investment it has made on foreign soil. The nationalizing State would be 
taking undue advantage of the fact that economic resources originating in 
another State had penetrated its territorial domain. This prihciple signifies that 
it is not the elernents of the loss suffered by the expropriated individual 
owner, but rather the enrichment, the beneficial gain which has been obtained 
by the nationalizing State, which must be taken into accbtint. Any measure 
which results in a transfer of wealth in favour of the nationalizing State or one 
of its agents gives rise to a duty to compensate,"^^
He believes that what makes the doctrine relevant to nationalization
is its equitable foundation which requires the taking into account of all the
circumstances of each specific situation and the balancing of the claims of
the dispossessed alien with the undue advantages that he may have enjoyed
prior to nationalization. According to him:
"the principle of unjust enrichment would take into account the undue 
enrichment gained by foreign companies during a period of monopoly or of 
highly privileged economic position, as, for instance, during a period of 
colonial domination."*^
The theory has been supported by some other writers, Fatouros 
holds that in case of lawful measures the chief ground on which 
compensation is found is the general principle of law condemning unjust
85enrichment. However, the interpretation of the concept seems to have 
differed from State to State, Developed States search for its application in 
payment of compensation to their nationals by the expropriating States. 
Developing States, on the other hand, interpret it so as to prevent more 
exploitation of their natural resources. Application of the principle can 
prevent one party from becoming unjustly enriched, while at the same 
time preventing the other party being unjustly deprived. Therefore, the
*3- De Arechaga E. J,, International Law in the Past Third of Century, op. cit., p.
182.
Loc. cit., p. 193; a similalr idea was expressed by Friedman W., The Use of
"General Principles" in the Development of International Law, 57 A.J.I.L.,
1963, p. 289.
Fatouros A. A., Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors, op. cit., p.
308.
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principle tends to create a balance between the interests of the parties 
involved in expropriation of property. The equitable character of the 
principle can provide a proper legal foundation for the duty of a State to 
compensate aliens in case of a lawful expropriation. On the other hand, it 
can prevent aliens from exploitation of the resources of the host State.
5 - THE THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Human rights have been usually involved in the context of other
than specifically economic issues. However, economic and property
rights form a part of human rights and the relation of hufnan rights to the
issue of expropriation and compensation has been discussed by some
writers. Article 17(2) of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
states that, "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property".*^ The
subject is dealt with in more detail in the European and other regional
87Conventions of Human Rights.
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 the European Convention on Human
Rights states that:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law."**
United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 217 (111)^  December 10,
1948, U. N. Resolutions^ Series 1, G; A., vol. 11, 1948-49, p. 138.
Art. 1 of European Convention of Human Rights of November 4, 1950, in 213 
U.N.T.S., 1955, p; 262, Art 21 of American Convention on Human Rights, 9
I.L.M., 1970, p: 106, Art 14 of African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights, 21 I.L.M., 1982, p. 61.
**- Loc. cit.
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Garcia Amador, the special Rapporter to the International Law 
Commission, used the law of human rights to bridge the gap between the
89international minimum standard aiïd the national treatment theories. 
Lillich, like Browhlie,^^ McDougal,^^ Waldock,-? Amerasinghe,^^
'94 95Jessup, and Morphy, has tried to support the idea and defend it as a
highly promising basis for the development of the law on State
96responsibility for injuries to aliens. Using human rights as the legal 
basis for the law of State responsibility for injuries to aliens seems ideal. 
In fact, where the concept of human rights is recognized in its fnost 
complete sense, the law regarding treatment of aliens in this regard is
97theoretically superfluous.
However, human rights are directly dependent upon the very basic 
principle of self-determination on which each State has established its 
econoinic system. Any treahnent of aliens' property should also take into 
account the rights of the expropriating nation. To do that, the role of 
those properties in that society, and the degree to which the presence of 
those properties have brought about the necessity for the changes in the
*9-II Y.I;L;C., 1957, p. 112.
99- Brownlie I., Principles of Public International Law, op. cit., p. 527.
9L McDougal M. S., Lasswell H. D., Chen L., Human Rights and World Public 
Order, Yale University Press, New HaVen, 1980, p. 765.
92- Waldock H., Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the 
Significance of the European Convention, in The European Convention on 
Human Rights, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, series 
No. 5, 1965, pp. 2-3.
93- Amerasinghe C. F., State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, op. cit., pp. 
278-81.
9A Jessup P. C., A Modern Law of Nations, New York, 1948, pp. 101-3.
95- Murphy C. F., State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, 41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.,
1966, pp. 128-130.
96- Lillich R. B., International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, 
University Press of Virginia, 1983, pp. 26f2k
97- Arnerasinghe C. F., State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, op. cit., p. 5.
.
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prevailing economic system should be considered. This is particularly so 
where the foreign property belongs to multinational companies which 
have been the subject of the bitter criticism for their violations of the 
human rights by supporting undemocratic regimes in developing States. 
The application of the human rights theory can be useful if it is used to 
protect the rights of all sides involved in expropriation of property. As 
far as developing countries are concerned, taking into account the 
behaviour of the aliens in that respect creates a sound basis for the rules 
of human rights to be applied and used as a legal basis in relation to the 
taking of aliens property.
Therefore, to achieve a common approach, and a basis for lasting 
international rules, the international community needs to lay down a 
comprehensive doctrine based on the human rights principles which will 
be adopted by all members of the international community and which 
have become the legal conscience of human being.
***********
* * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * *
* * *
*
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(SECTION TWO)
THE CONDITIONS OE EXPROPRIATION OF ALIENS' 
PROPERTY ÜNDERTNTERNATIONAÉ LAW
There is little doubt today that a State has a general right to 
nationalize foreign owned property.^ This right, which is a reflection 
of the territorial sovereignty of State, has been recognized in all legal 
sy stems j and may therefore be regarded as a general principle of law. It 
follows that the right of the State to exprbptiate private property, national 
or alien, is indisputable in the present state of intematiortal law.
However, disagreement begins to arise when any attempt is rhade to 
determine the conditions under which nationalizations may be carried oiit. 
Traditionally, it has generally been accepted that, where a State has 
decided to nationalize the property of aliens, three conditions ought to be 
fulfilled:
1. There is no discrimination.
Liamcb case, 20 I.L.M. 1981, pp. 49-51; Texaco case, 17 I.L.M, at 21, 
para. 59; B P. Exploration case, 53 I.L.R. at 353; U.N. Resolution 1803 
(XVn), Art. 4.
2- Brownlie L, Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed., Oxford, 1990, 
op. cit., p. 531^2; Verwey W. D., and Schrijyer N. J., The Taking of Foreign 
Property Undei Inteinational Law: a New Legal Perspective 15 Neth.Y.I.L., 
1984, pp. 7-9; White G., Nationalization of Foreign Property, pp. cit., p. 4; 
Garcia Amador F. V., Fourth Report to the International Law Commission on 
the Subject of the Responsibility of States for Injuries Caused in its Territory to 
the Persons or Property of Aliens", 1959; XJ;N. Doc. No. A/CN. 4/Î19, 
Y.I.L.C., vol. n, 1959, p. 11; Sigmund P. E., Multinationals in Latin America, 
the PoMcs of Nationalisation, Madison, 1980, p. 50.
________________ _______________
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2. There is a public purpose.
3. There is prompt, adequate and effective compensation.^
There has however been some controversy over the application of 
these conditions, particularly in respect to developing countries. There 
some elements peculiar to these countries which make an already 
complicated situation even more so. The political and econoinic 
dependencies of developing countries to some developed States, together 
with the huge social, economical and political problems in these countries 
are the paramount fears of the foreign investors that they will lose their 
investment as a result of political changes of those States, specially if 
those investors are considered in the nationalizing country as one of the 
sources of those difficulties, while the investors are not impressed by the 
suggestions that their loss are for the common good or a just reason."^
With respect to the conditions of expropriation, attention has always 
been directed toward the actions of the nationalizing States without any 
reference to the duties and responsibilities of the aliens, and specially of 
their respective governments, towards the host States under international 
law. However, the differences in scholarly opinions and international 
awards, together with the variety of the agreements between the 
expropriating and the expropriated parties, indicate that a proper 
classification of the cases according to different conditions governing each 
group of the cases is essential. Those differences comprise some legal 
conditions which result from the economic and political relations of the 
parties, and include the behaviour of the alien investors and the changing 
economic circumstances, in particular the changes that have been brought 
about by the increasingly integrated world economy of international
3- White G., Nationalisation of Foreign Property, op, cit., pp. 5-9,
4- De Lupis I, D., Finance and Protection of Investments in Developing 
Countries, Second Edition, G. Britain, 1987, p; 67.
■ y ; ’ /  ^ -fi;., . : ' / y \  fi;
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finance and multinational corporations.
In this section, we will examine those conditions to see how they can 
be applied to different groups of the countries, in particular, to 
developing countries.
1 - THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION
Until 1939, it was generally asserted that a measure of 
expropriation which discrirninated against aliens as such was contrary to 
international law .f Taking the property of aliens for the sole reason 
that it was owned by aliens furnished a valid ground of complaint against 
the taking State, quite apart from the question of compensation.^ This 
remained the position even if the measure allegedly formed part of a 
programme of general reform and provided that the particular decree was 
directed only against foreigners.^
The rule of nori-discriminatioh was essentially based on the 
principle of the equality of treatment between nationals and foreigners, 
and was first established in order to protect foreigners against any 
decision not based on the public policy of governments of the host 
countries, gradually becoming an established rule between the Western
■ fl ' .fcountries. Although developing countries lacked equal bargaining
5- White G., Natiqnalisatiqn of Foreign Property, op. cit., p. 5.
6- Fischer-Williams, Intematiohai Law and the Property of Aliens, 9 B.Y.I.L.,
1928, p. 28.
7- Herz J. Hi, Expropriation of Foreign Property, 35 A.J I.L., 1941, p. 249.
Frahcioni F., Compensation for Nationalizàtion of Foreign Property: The 
Borderland Between Law and Equity, 2 4 1.G.L.Q., 1975, p. 269.
. . ___________________________________
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power in economic and political relations with the developed States, the 
rule was extended to them. On the other hand^ the governments in the 
developing countries, whether from pressure, ignorance, eager necessity 
or corruption, have frequently been willing to submit to agreements 
which were not in the public interest. Consequently, when the privileges 
and rights granted to foreigners come by a later generation, or jby a 
different government, to be looked on as against the public interest and as 
a means by which foreigners gained an undue profit from the depletion of 
the natural resources of the country, it is difficult to resist the demand for 
expropriation as a remedy for these unacceptable situations, even though 
it is discriminatory against the nationals of a certain country.^
Then again, it was in the interest of the sponsors of the rule of non- 
discrimination to secure the investments of their nationals which had been 
endangered as the result of political instability of the expropriating States 
resulted from the political influence of the investors' government. On the 
other hand, the investors’ governments knew that as the result of their 
behaviour in their colonies whenever those colonies get the chance, they 
would end the privileged positions of the former colonial power and its 
nationals. Naturally, the expropriation measures would be discriminatory 
against certain States, but not in a negative sense. The rule of non­
discrimination was to be applied to preVent injustice against aliens, but in 
developing States it has been used in order to end the discrimiriatory 
relations between those countries with the alien investors.^®
At the same time, it is difficult for the developing countries to put 
their economic relations with the governments of the investor countries at
9- Penrose E., Joffe G & Stevens P., Nationalisation of Foreign-owned Property 
for a Public Purpose: An Economic Perspective on Appropriate Compensation,
55 M.L.R., 1992, p. 357.
10- Nationalisation in the the new independent countries and in the countries with 
quari-colonial relations niostly are of this kind.
. ' ■; ■; ■ ■ ■■
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r isk /^  The developing countries have always been at a considerable 
disadvantage in relations with the developed countries. This political and 
economic imbalance limited the ability of the third world countries to 
adequately protect their own interests. Therefore, these countries were 
unable to declare, defend and insist on their positions until they had 
developed politically and economically and recognized that arrangements 
negotiated in past had been unjustly advantageous to the nationals of one 
or more countries and encroach those p r o p e r t y . T h i s  reality caused a 
dramatic change in the practice of the developing countries in the post- 
World War II era, when Western countries had come out of the war 
unable, economically and politically, to sustain their colonial empires. 
However, the developed countries continued to assert the rule of 
international minimum standard established between themselves.
State practice has been uncertain and there is no settled standard to
determine when and where there exists discrimination that could render
the State’s action unlawful. Among the earliest assertions of the rule in
post-war State practice, the Swiss Federal Minister, M. Petitpierre, in
1947 in protest against the Czechoslovak measures stated:
"We can take no steps against the principle of nationalisation, since 
nationalisation is a domestiGmeasure taken by a state within the framework of 
its own sovereignty, and we must accept it as long as this measure affects the 
citizens of the country as well as foreign inhabitants. We must, however, 
protest when there is discrimination against Swiss citizens/'l^
Also, the United States on September 7, 1948 protested to the
N- Generally see Penrose E., Joffe G & Stevens P., Nationalisation of Foreign- 
owned Property for â Püblic Purpose: An Economic Perspective on Appropriate 
Conipensation, op. cit.; pp; 351-367.
12- Penrose E., Joffe G & Stevens P;, Nationalisation of Foreign-owned Property 
for a Public Purpose: An Economic Perspective on Appropriate Compensation, 
op. cit., p. 353.
13- Quoted in Briggs, The Law of Nations, 2nd ed., New York, 1952, p. 568.
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Romanian Government against its discriminatory treatment, by which 
exempted Soviet-owned enterprises from expropriation, in the following 
terms:
"While the United States Government has consistently recognised the right of 
a sovereign power to exprbmiate property subject to its jurisdiction arid 
belonging to American nationals, the United States has likewise refused to 
recpgnise the validity of such expropriations in cases where they are 
discriminatory by nature and effect .
However, if expropriation were carried out in a non-discriminatory 
manner as between aliens and the nationals of the expropriating country, 
the investors would still prefer to judge it in connection with other 
conditions based on the rules of the international minimum standard. 
Minimum standard rules are more concerned with the consequence of the 
measure rather than the application o f the rules. Accordingly, it is 
irrelevant, without payment of compensation, if one asserts the rule of 
non-discrimination in  measures of expropriation. It is likely that the 
assertion of the rule of non-discriminatiori would not be encouragihg to 
States to expropriate aliens' property. As a result, aliens would benefit 
from the application of this principle. However, the rule has never been a 
strict one and has been mitigated over time. The rule of non­
discrimination helps these countries to prevent the expropriating State 
from depriving them of their highly preferred position in the country.
In other words, the rule of non-discrimination means that 
expropriation must be general in its scope and not directed only against 
foreigners.^^ However, a State cannot refrain from nationalization just 
because such a measure would affect only certain foreign-owned 
property. Cases may arise in which a measure of expropriation only
14- Dept, of State Bulletin, vol. 19,1948, pi 408.
15. De Lupis I. D., Finance and Prbtectioh of Investments in Developing 
Countries, op. cit., p. 68.
3 ..:, ÉËiMi
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affects foreign nationals, because, for example, there is only one
16enterprise of the kind in question and that is owned by foreigners. As 
Brownlie observed, the test of discrimination is the intention of the 
government. The fact that only foreigners are affected may be accidental, 
and if the taking is based on economic and social policies, it will not be 
deemed to be directed against particular groups siniply because they own
17the property involved.
While in Top co case it was stated that the m easu res were
discriminatory against the company, the tribunal in Liam co  case
rejected the claimants' contentions and regarded the Libyan motive as a
policy of nationalization which was intended to preserve the ownership Of
its oil. The tribunal also stated that motives are indifferent to
international law.^^ T ht Am in oil Award followed the same track.
While, a Japanese concern in the same sector was apparently left free to
operate, the Arbitral Tribunal in rejecting the discrimination claim held:
"It is generally known that all Middle Eastern States belonging to OPEC (as 
well as other producing countries) have always considered that their overall 
petroleum policy must; in its final phase, result in the nationalisation of the
whole local petroleum industry ...... The Tribunal does not see why a
Government that was pursuing a coherent policy of nationalisation should not 
have been entitled to do so progressively. ......... It has never for a single
moment been suggested that it was because of the American nationality of the 
Company that the Decree Law was applied to Aminoil's concession. Next and 
above all, there were adequate reasons for not nationalising Arabian Oil."^ ®
In the AnglO'Iranian Oil Company case, the International Court of
16- Argument of the United Kingdom in the Iranian Oil Nationalisation, I.C.J.
Pleadings 1952, pp. 96-8.
12- Brownlie I., Principles of Public Internatidnal Law, op. cit., p. 538, footnote 
99.
18- Topco case, 53 I.L.R., p. 390.
19- Liamco Awarcl, in 6 2 1.L.R., 1982, p. 194.
20- Arbitration between the Goyemment of Kuwait and the American Independent 
oil company (Aminoil), 21 I.L.M.j 1982, p. 1019.
Sil
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Justice held itself to have no jurisdiction to judge, and so did not decide, 
whether the Iranian Nationalization was discrirninatory or not, and 
whether such discriminatory effect Would be contrary to international 
law. In that case, the U.K. argued that the Iranian Nationalization Act of 
1 May 1951 was directed exclusively against the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
C o m p a n y . I n  fact, the Company was the only concessionaire for the 
exploration and exploitation of the Iranian oil, and the U K maintained 
that belief in spite of this fact and of the language of the Nationalization 
Act which spoke of nationalization of the oil industry throughout Iran and 
was, therefore, general in character. According to the U.K., the 
generality of the language could not be regarded as being decisive for the 
purpose of determining whether it is, in fact, discriminatory against 
f o r e i g n e r s . T h a t  being the case, if a country through contract or 
concession were to grant a sector of her economy to a foreigner, she 
would be forbidden from expropriating those properties, because it wôuld 
be discriminatory against that contractor or concessionaire. Such a rule 
would limit the sovereign right of that country to decide the options 
suitable for its development. It is obvious that a State cannot refrain from 
nationalization measures which are of Vital importance just because such a 
measure would affect only ceftain foreign-owned property. Indeed, if 
such a measure is dictated by overwhelming considerations of public 
utility and general welfare, that measure cannot be said to be directed 
against or discriminatory against foreigners. In sucb cases, the fact That23the expropriation affects foreigners is only in a sense, accidental.
Literally, the term "discrimination" is used when the action targets
21- AIOC case, LG.J. Pleadings, 1952, pp. 96-8.
22- Loc cit.
23- This fact was recognised by the United Kingdorn and was pointed to in its 
argument. AIOC case, I.G.J. Pleadings, 1952, pp. 96^8; this ease will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
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one or more among a particular group, and is directed against them. 
When there are no other entities, the application of the concept of 
discrimination is meaningless. Therefore, in the SUPOR case, the Civil
24Court of Rome held that the Iranian Law was not discriminatory, In 
the Rose Mary case before the Court of Aden it was held that the Iranian 
Law was contrary to international law, nbt because it was diserimihktory,
, 25but on the ground that there were no provisions for compensation.
Moreover, the very recent authoritative decision in the Khemco
case rejected the argument that the Iranian Government's action in
expropriating Amoco's interest in Khemco petrochemical complex was
discrirninatory since another joint venture in the same sector, namely the
Iran-Japan Petrochemical Company, was not expropriated. In line With
the decision of AmfMOf/, the Tribunal hold that:
"The Tribunal finds it difficult, in the absence of any other evidence, to draw 
the concliisibn that the expropriation of a concern was discriminatory only 
from the fact that another concern in the same economic branch was not 
expropriated. Reasons specific to the non-expropriated enterprise, or to the 
expropriated one, or both may justify such a difference of treatment.
In the case of the Indonesian nationalization of tobacco enteiprises
before the Court of Amsterdam and the Court of Bremen two different
decisions were made. It is an undisputed fact that the Nationalization Act
was directed against Dutch enterprises and not against Indonesians and
27other foreigners. Accordingly, the Court of Amsterdam held that the
24- AIOC y . SUPOR., Civil Court of Rome, 22 I.L.R., 1955, pp. 32-33.
25- Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Jajfrate (the Rose Mary), 20 I.L.R., 1953, p.
317; and see De Liipis I . D., Finance and Protection of Investments in 
Developing Countries, op. cit., pp. 95-7.
Khemco case (Amoco International Finance Corp.) v. Iran, A\y^d No. 310- 
56-3, 14 July, 1987, 15 han-U.S.C.T.R., p. 233. Factual details of the case, 
see Chapter 4 on post-Revolution Expropriations, p. 385.
22- 6 Netherlands International Law Review, 1959, pp. 140, 156 278, 285; see 
also Domke M., Indonesian Nationalisation Measures Before Foreign Courts,
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Indonesian law was discriminatory as an additional and aggravating factor
which invalidated the act of nationalization under international law. This
is a correct position if it be taken in regard to the case of individual
expropriations in the usual situation of the countries with equal bargaining
power. The Indonesian nationalizatidh, like most of those in the third
world countries, was not a usual kind of expropriation. Therefore, the
Bremen Court of Appeals found that:
"The equality concept means only that equals must be treated equally and that 
the different treatihent of unequais is admissible..... for the statement to be 
objective, it is sufficient that the attitude of the former colonial people toward 
its colonial master is of course different from that toward other 
foreigners.
Because of the privileged position of the Netherlands' companies in 
Indonesia, the Court also found that the Indonesian law was not
29discriminatory. In addition, the expropriation of the Dutch companies 
constituted at the same time a shifting of proprietary relations which was 
affected by a former colony after its independence in order to change the 
social structure. Therefore, by the nature of the matter alone, the general 
principles of the convehtibnal type are not applicable, and the same 
principles cannot prevail for such overall e xpropriations.
The principle of non-discriniination is generally accepted in 
international law to prevent any injustice against aliens. But, if the 
principle cannot provide such a result, or conversely, if applying the rule 
would cause injustice and discrimination, it would cpittravene the purpose 
of international law. Therefore, it appears unlikely that a nationalization 
would be contrary to international law if there is a patent public purpose
54 A J I L ,  196Q, p. 3D8.
28- N.V. Verenigle Deli-MaatscKapijen and N.V. SenembaK-Maatchapij v. Deutsch 
Indonesische TabaLHandelsgeSéllsçhàft ni.b.H:, 1 U. 159/1959.
29- Loc. cit.; arnong the foreign enterprises was the swiss-owned Tjinta Râdja 
Tobaco concession.
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even if the expropriating measures are exclusively directed against aliens. 
The public purpose of nationalization, specially in developing countries, is 
of paramount importance and such valid purpose together with other 
international principles, such as "national security" and "self- 
determination", appear to outweigh the necessity of non-discrimination in 
some of the cases.
In the very recent Iran-United State disputes, the Tribunal did not 
deem the discriminatory taking of the U.S. nationals' property by Iran as 
illegal. In most of those cases, the Tribunal simply ignored this principle, 
although Iran had quite openly expropriated all the property of U.S. 
nationals, while leaving the property of other nationals wholly or partially 
intact.^® Therefore, the Tribunal should have found a good cause not to 
give any weight to the non-discrimination principle.
In the developed countries there is a good cause not to discriminate 
against à particular alien or State and they should comply with the 
principle of non-discrimination. But, as in a country like Afghanistan, 
they nationalize in a manner discriminatory against the privileged 
properties and contractual rights of the Soviet Union, the expropriating 
measures should not be considered as illegal discriminatory acts against 
international law.
The rule that there must be no discrim ination and that 
nationalization laws must have a general scope to be valid under 
international law is obviously borrowed from national l a w . T h e r e ,  it 
is usually of great importance to assess whether or not the legislator had a 
particular property in mind when making a law for its expropriation. But
30- Morç see in chapter 4 on post-Revolution Expropriations.
31- De Lupis I. D., Finance and Protection of Investments in Developing 
Countries, op. cit., pp. 70-1.
_E_Z;
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in the international community, considering the pattern of foreign 
investment in other countries, it seems that, more often, natural resources 
are exploited by foreign enterprises in developing countries. Any 
nationalizing measures of such enterprises are then likely to be 
discriminatory.
Therefore, in any sector of the economy where it is more common 
for both nationals and aliens to carry on business with an equal position, 
the rule of nonrdiscrimination may be of importance. But, in the sectors 
such as natural resources, there is no such equal practice due to the lack of 
finance and equipment by nationals. Moreover, nationalization is not only 
regarded as the nationalist formula for speedy and fundamental economic 
changes, but also reflects the desire of previously dependent peoples for 
economic independence arid economic development. Thus, most 
developing countries, in expropriating alien-owned enterprises, merely 
want to ensure national control over the main sectors of the economy.
33To secure their independence and national integrity, they want national 
control over the industries vital to national security.^'* To obtain that, it 
may be necessary to expropriate property solely belonging to aliens. 
Moreover, when foreign investors are in a clearly advantageous position 
as against the nationals of the expropriating State, by reason of their 
political, military and economical privileges, the application of the rule of 
non-discrimination would itself be discriminatory agairist the nationals of 
the expropriating State.
Meanwhile, as was mentioned earlier, a person cannot assert that the 
rule of non-discrimiriation would always necessarily bring justice to both
32- The principle of the right of sovereignty of nations.
33- The principle of self-deteirnination.
34- Akinsania, A. A„ The Expropriation of Multinational Property in the Third 
World, Praeger. 1980, p. 78.
_____
' v ^ : ; 7 . - 7 4
Conditions of Expropriation 106
aliens and nationals. For example, if aliens were not be compensated for 
their deprived property, merely because the nationals were not to be 
compensated, this non-discrimination would itself be discriminatory
. ‘ 35against aliens. The reason, as was mentioned earlier is that aliens 
usually do not get any advantage from the nationalization measures while 
nationals are the beneficiaries of the measures in the society. 
Accordingly, some factors are pointed out which justified discrimination 
on compensation in the context of nationalizations. It is argued that non^ 
nationals are unable to voice their opposition to nationalization legislation, 
because they are unable to take part in the election process.^** In rnort of 
the developing countries, this reality is vice Versa, i.e., under the 
autocrats and puppet regimes it is the nationals who do not have any Voice 
and need protection against the privileged foreigners who have the real 
political influence on the host governments.
The principle of non-discrimination, as with other principles
relating to the nationalization of property, has not been adopted by all
countries, particularly where the measures taken have affected the
property rights of aliens of one nationality and not those of other
nationalities who also own property rights of the kind specified in the
measure. Thus, the rule of non-discrimination has been violated and
ignored many times by non-Westem countries. For example, a feature of
the measures taken in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania was the
express reference to property and rights belonging to the German Reich
or to German nationals, and in the case of Czechoslovakia, to the property
and rights of the Hungarian State and of Hungarian nationals as well. It is
very doubtful that the legality of the measures could be questioned. For,
36- 102 European Court on Human Rights, Ser. Aj op. cit.
36- Loc. cit., p. 48.
j:/?' a # ______________ ________________________
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although they were discriminatory, they occurred under the Article 29 of 
the Peace Treaty with Hungary to which Czechoslovakia was a party as
37one of the Allied and Associated Powers.
Apart from this discrimination against German and Hungarian 
property, the eastern European nationalization measures contained few 
examples of provisions referring specifically to alien property. To satisfy 
the rule of non-discrimination against aliens, it is enough only to apply the 
measure equally to nationals. Generally, the rule of non-discrimination 
does not establish the most important and vital facet of rules of
, _ 38expropriation.
Therefore, the application of the rule of non-discrimination 
depending as it does on the conditions, such as the nature of economic and 
political relations pertaining between the parties, may vary. Equality of 
treatment needs equality of the conditions, otherwise, it might itself be 
discriminatory.
What constitutes illegal discrimination in general is the aspect of 
expropriation that has generated much discussion in the United Nations: 
racial discrimination and human rights.
In the Preamble to the Charter of the UN, member states reaffirmed
faith in fundamental human rights, in the equal rights of men and women
and of nations, large and small. The Charter contains a significant
number of references to human rights and fundamental freedom for all
based on respect for the principle of equal rights, without distinction as to
32- Treaty of Peace Betweeb Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, U.K., U.S., 
Australia, ByeloRusiari Soviet Socialist Republic, et., and Hungary, Paris, 10 
February 1947, 41 U.N.T.S., p. 135.
38- It is possible that an expropriation measure be hon-discriminatory but still be 
considered confiscatory because of the non-payment of compensation; The 
example are the Easter European takings; the most important and vital principle 
is the rule of payment compensation.
'tn
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39race, sex, language or religion. These provisions have provided the 
background to a substantial body of multinational conventions and
40practice by the organs of the United Nations. For example, the UN 
General Assembly Declaration of Human Rights of December 19, 1948, 
even though it might not be considered legally binding on member States, 
set forth a comprehensive list of rights and that to some extent has 
affected the content of national law and has occasionally been expressly 
invoked by tribunals.
The Declaration has also frequently been invoked by the General 
Assembly as a code of conduct and as a basis for appeals urging member 
States to respect human rights. Some of the provisions of the Declaration 
constitute general principles of l a w a n d  these have inspired a number 
of important conventions such as the European Convention for the 
Protection of Hunian Rights and Fundamental Freedom with its
43protocols, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination.'*^
A ll these covenants and conventions have the legal force as treaties
39- Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations.
40- Brownlie I., Principles of Public Interriatiohal Law, op. cit., p. 578.
41- Darning Railway Offîcial c s l s q , P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 15, 1928.
42- Akinsania A. A., The Expropriation of Multinational Property in the Third 
World, Praeger, 1980, p. 24;
43- The European Convention on Human Rights Rome 4 November 1950.
44- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 
December 1966, U.N Resolutions, Series 1, G.A., vol. 11, 1966-68, op. cit., 
p. 165.
46- International Convention on Civü and Political Rights of 16 December 1966, op. 
cit.
46. Résolution 1904(XVIII) of 20 November 1963, 3 I.L.M., 1964, p. 164.
'A
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for the parties to them, and constitute a detailed codification of human 
rights. The basic principle of these codes is that these rights are to be 
exercised under a guarantee of non-discrimination. For example, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that each State 
party to that covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in that covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth, or other status,'*^ In addition, it was 
provided in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination that, the term "racial discrimination" shah mean 
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race^ colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an 
equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedom in the political,
48economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.
But, as far as developing countries are concerned, a body of law has 
emerged as a part of, and a complement to, the objectives stated in the 
Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations in order to promote social 
progress and better standards of life. In Article 1 of that Charter, it has 
been emphasized that it is the purpose of the United Nations namely , to 
achieve international cooperation in solving intemational problems of an
49economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character. A survey, as the
UN Secretary-General emphasized the increasingly compulsory nature of
47- Article 2(1) of the Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 
December 1966, op. cit.
48. Article 1(1) of Resolution 1904(XVni) of 20 November 1963; op. cit.
49- Suivey of international law prepared by the Secretary General of the UN in 
response to a request made by the UN International Law Commission. 2 
Y.I.L.C. (part 2), 1971, pp. 34-35.
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cooperation for development, viewed as a primary responsibility of the 
developed countries, it becomes a duty correlative to the right claimed by
50the developing countries to preferential treatment.
Article 17 of the NIEO Charter in this regard states that 
intemational cooperation for development is the shared goal and common 
duty of all States. Accordingly, every State should cooperate with the 
efforts of developing countries to accelerate their economic and social 
development by providing favourable external conditions and by 
extending active assistance to them, consistent with their development 
needs and o b je c t iv e s .T h e  Charter also provides that developed 
countries should grant and extend generalized non-reciprocal and non^ 
discriminatory tariff preferences to developing countries with a view to 
accelerating the economic growth of these countries and bridging the52economic gap between developed and developing countries. It was bn 
account of thèse considerations and the realities of our time that developed 
countries agreed to grant preferential treatment to developing countries in
53international trade.
In sum, the principle of the respect for and protection of human 
rights, including the principle of non-discrimination, based on the UN 
Charter, especially Articles 55 and 56, the practice of the organs of the
60- G^cia-Amador, F. V., The Proposed New International Economic Order: A 
New Approach to the Law Governing Nationalisation and Compensation, 16 
A;J.LL., 1984, pp. 16-17.
61- Resolution 3281(XXIX) oh Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 
op. cit., pp. 303-304.
62- Articles 18 & 19 of G. A. Resolution 3281, op. cit., p. 304; Preferential 
treatment of the developing countries is further recognised in Articles 8, 9, and 
11 of that resolution.
63- The waiver of reciprocity in Article XXIII. 1 of the 1965 GATT Protocol; The 
establishment of the system of tariff preferences by the Lome Convention; The 
U.S. Foreign Trade Act of 1974.
■ ____________
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United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
European Convention on Human Rights, certainly have become a 
recognized legal principle.^'* Therefore, the right of a sovereign State to 
expropriate foreign-owned property is limited by the rule of non­
discrimination as far as it does not prevent the development of States. 
However, it would not be against the rule to end the discriminatory 
presence of a group of aliens in that society. Meanwhile, the new concept 
of international cooperation for development and the claim of the 
developing countries to preferential treatment is gradually eliminating the 
traditional principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity which have 
been two essential elements of the bid most-favoured-nation clause
It has been an intemational experience that, whenever satisfactory 
compensation has been paid, all claims on the existence of discrimination 
and lack of public purpose have simply vanished. This has been 
acknowledged by the Arherican Law Institute in its recent Restatement 
that:
" ..... a program of taking that did not meet the requirements of equal
treatment and public purpose but did provide just compensation might
not in fact be successfully challenged. ..56
64- Brownlie I., Principles of Public International Law, op, cit., p. 572.
65- Garcia-Amador, F. V., The Proposed New International Economic Order: A 
New Approach to the Law Governing Nationalisation and Compensation, 16 
A.J I L , 1984, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
66- Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 
vol. 2, The American Law Institute, Washington D. C., 19S6, p. 200,
____________
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2 . THE PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC UTILITY
The task of each government is often stated to be thé engineering of 
public affairs of the country, nationalization and expropriation are 
generally recognized as the exercise of thé sovereign fight of a State to 
control natural resources and other assets located in its territory even if 
they belong to fo re ig n e rs .T h is  recognition is therefore qualified to 
the extent that the property has to be taken for a public purpose or in the 
public interest.
The purpose of taking the aliens' property is directly related to the
motives of the expropriating State. The traditional rules of
nationalization recognized the measures as legitimate only when they were
for a public purpose or public utility. Public utility seems to cover
situations in which economic necessity has obliged the government of a
State to take over private property. Expropriation by a government is
usually for public use as thé result of the performance of its duties toward
the nation. But recent cases^* reject the idea that public purpose is still
the exclusive basis for nationalization upon which a State could rely.
Public utility has been used to limit the State's sovereign right to
take the property of aliens, but as Domke noted :
"in modem times, there are few limits upon to what a state may legitimately 
consider necessary for general benefit. If there are no other reasons, the state 
can always rely on the needs of the national economy or on the requirements 
of social welfare.
There is not an exact definition of the term "public utility" in
67- White G., Nationalisation of Foreign Property, op. cit., pp. 35-38; Domke M., 
Foreign Nationalisations, 55 A.J.LL., 1961, p. 590.
68- Penrose E., Joffe G., Stevens P., Nationalisation of Foreign-owned Property 
for a Public Purpose: An Economic Perspective on Appropriate Compensation,
55 M.L.R., No. 1992, p. 358.
69-Domke M., Foreign Nationalisations, op. cit., pp. 590-91.
---
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international law, especially in distinction with private utility. The UN 
General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of December 19, 1962 asserted 
that:
"Nationalisation, expropriation or requisition shall be based on grounds or 
reasons o f public utility , security or the national interest which are recognised 
as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and 
fdreign."60
This right was also recognized to be exercised in the interest of 
their national development and for the well-being of the people.^^
The problem is that the sole judge of the situation within the 
expropriating country is the sovereign within that country and, given the 
possibility of differences in philosbphy and ideology, it may be very 
difficult to establish that an exprppriatioh lacks the necessary public 
purpose, as was established in the Walter Fletcher Smith Case, or to 
establish what was the real motive behind the expropriation carried out by 
a State. The position of the other States to assess what best serves the 
public interest of the nationalizing country is questionable. Except in a 
situation so flagrant that the procedure involves a manifest denial of 
justice, it seems very difficult to envisage a situation where an 
intemational organ would undertake to review a State's determination of 
what is a dominating public purpose
Nowadays, there is no controversy over the proposition that, when 
superior interests of a State demand, it could derogate the private 
property rights Nearly all States interfere to some extent with private
60-Article 1(4) of the Resolution 1803(XVII) December 19 1962, U.N. Reslutions, 
Series 1, G.A., vol. IX, 1962-63, p. 107.
61-Loc. cit., art., 1(1).
62- Domke M., Foreign Nationalisations, Some Aspects of Contemporary Law, 
op. cit., p. 591, n. 44; see also 6 Netherlands International Law Review, 1959, 
pp. l40, 156 278, 285; Domke M., Indonesian Nationalisation Measures 
Before Foreign Courts, 54 A.J.I.L., 1960, p. 311.
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property, whether by means of partial or entire nationalization of 
industries or through police power restrictions, or by taxation and other 
fiscal measures.**^ However it is clear that nationalization measures must 
not be arbitrary and politically motivated merely to challenge aliens' 
property without any good cause in order to become rich unjustly. 
However, it would not be iriadinissible to remove the privileged position 
of aliens to prevent more exploitation of the country resources. That 
said, the extent to which the public of the nationalizing State would benefit 
from the measures depends more on the public policies of the 
nationalizing State.
While nations are supposed to be free to choose their own way of 
economic life, insisting on a condition like "public utility" would infringe 
this basic principle of intemational law. For example, in well established 
agrarian reforms, usually not all of the land-owners would be 
expropriated, nor would everybody benefit from the nationalization 
measures. It is a measure against one group of individuals (land-owners) 
for the benefit of another group (those without land), but such a measure 
would not be considered as violating the principle of the public utility. 
There is another aspect of the issue which must be also discussed and that 
is the conditions under which the investors entered the country. Those 
conditions are very important in assessing the conditions which would 
have to be fulfilled on expropriation of the aliens' property.
One of those conditions, which was discussed earlier, is whether the
aliens entered and invested with the consent and free choice of the host
country; or whether the investors ignored the consent of the host State and
in fact imposed themselves through colonization or qpasi-colonization of
63. Akinsania A. A., Thé Expropriation of Multinational Property in the Third 
World, op. cit., p. 20.
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the expropriating States. Obviously, acquired rights under such a 
condition require different treatments from those investments which have 
been carried out in a normal condition based on the consent of the host 
State, or in a rich economically and socially well established State.-"* If 
the investment has been made under such conditions that it might be 
considered as the granting of a privilege to foreigners, the imrnediate 
purpose of the new government or regime will usually be to put an end to 
it without any consideration whether it is in the public interest or not.-^ 
However, in any circumstances, when a government expropriates the 
property or the contractual rights of aliens, the public interest is an 
important consideration in determining the proper amount of the 
cornpensation to be paid by the expropriating State to the alien. The 
public policy consideration is also of assistance in differentiating between 
nationalization as a legal act of the State or as a breach of contract which 
is illegal and requires a different approach.
After the Second World War, a large number of new States 
emerged raising the national consciousness and fierce demands for 
economic independence, which was somehow different from the public 
purpose principle. The consequent reaction in many countries against 
foreign private investment especially in the natural resources sector is 
clearly evident.
The United Nation Centre on Transnational Corporations Report
After the independence of those States, or following a big social or political 
changes, the investments and properties of the aliens were affected by 
expropriation, renegotiation or other measures. For example, Aminoil Oil 
Contracts in Kuwait; 24:2 Virg.J.LL., 1984, p. 325; the Indonesian 
Expropriations, and most of the other major expropriations in developing 
countries.
These kind of measures usually are in public interest, but it is not conditional to 
it and it is different from the public purpose principle.
 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - :  —  :   ^ '  ,  . . t
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shows that the nationalization of foreign companies reached its peak in the i
mid-1970s with the oil crises hut had declined rapidly by 1985.^ ** That
large number of expropriations did not occur only for public utility, but
some principles such as economic independence played a paramount role
in the expropriation of the aliens' properties. Although, this change in t
attitude might be temporaiy, it created a new condition which demanded
new rules. Those different conditions governing each case necessitates
that all the circumstances relevant to that particular case be considered.^^
Basically, the consideration of public utility, which might include
measures for security or national interest, is not an essential, sole and
specific basis upon which to determine the legitimacy of expropriations by
States. There is little authority in international law establishing any useful
criteria by which a State's own determination of public purpose or the
national interest can be questioned or the security reasons can be
examined. This problem becomes more acute in regard to developing
States which have more legitimate causes to expropriate aliens property.
Domke and Friedman see no place for the public utility limitation in
international law. According to Friedman, an international tribunal is not
in a position to judge a State’s motives and should accept the State's own
judgement for expropriation actions:
"As to the motives, these are a matter of indifference to international law, 
since the latter does not contain its own definition of public utility. On the 
contrary, it leaves it to each State, in thé exercise of i ts jurisdiction, to judge 
for itself what it considers useful or necessary for the public good.
Friedman cites two International decisions which confirm this view, t
66- ÜNTC Cuprent Studies, Series A; No 16, New York, ON, 1990, p. 18; 
Nationalisations reached a peak in 1975 with 83 expropriations ih 28 different 
countries but declined by 50 per cent in the following year. In 1977 there were 
only 15 instances. Between 1980 and 1985 the rate averaged three a year.
67-The Aminoil-Kuwait Arbitration, 2 1 1.L.M., 1982, P. 1033.
68- Friedman S., Expropriation in International Law, London, 1953, p. 141.
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the O.scar Chinn C a s e , a n d  the C ase^^  In the O ^ c a r
Chinn Case, the government of Belgium, by reducing the tariffs of a
govemnient owned river transport company in the Congo, had caused a
British national to be driven out of business. The Permanent Court of
International Justice, deciding on a U.K. complaint, held that:
"The Belgium Government was the sole judge of this critical situation and of 
the remedies that it called for - subject of course to its duty of respecting its 
international obligation.
Domke believes that the determination of public interest by the 
nationalizing government could hardly be challenged unless it was wholly
72beyond any reasonable limit. The question of public policy was also 
raised in the Iran-U.S Claims Tribunal in A/zcmcc case. Consequently, 
the requirement of a public purpose, as a distinct principle, has been 
weakened and has yielded to a rule that any expropriation or 
nationalization constitutes a lawful exercise of a State's sovereign rights 
provided it is in public interest.^^
69- Oscar chain case, U.K. v. Belgiuntj 1934, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 63, p. 
79.
Shufeldt Claim, U,S. v. Guatemala, 1930, 5 I.L.R., 1929-30, p. 179.
71- Oscar Chinn case op. cit.
72- Domke M., Foreign Nationalizations, Some Aspects of Contemporary Law, 55 
A.J.I.L., op. cit., p. 590.
73- Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya, 171.L.M., 1977, p. 21.
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3 - THE PRINCIPLES OTHER THAN PUBLIC UTILITY
The traditional rule on expropriation of foreign properties limited 
the expropriating States to the condition that their measures be taken only 
for public p u r p o s e B u t  in modern times, as was mentioned earlier, 
there are few limits to what a State may consider necessary for the 
general benefit. If there are no other reasons, the State can always rely 
on security reasons, police power or on the requirements of social 
w elfare/^
The motives for many of the post-war nationalization measures 
sprang from nationalistic, political, financial and social reasons. It is 
difficult to isolate a single motive in regard to any particular measure 
For example, in the East European nationalizations,^^ the dominant 
motives were political and economical ones. But, the needs for social 
reform and of reconstruction of the war damages played part. In the 
Iranian Oil nationalization of 1951, like most of the other post-war 
measures, the motives were mainly nationalistic, political arid for social 
reform.^*
74- Leading Proponents of the rules include Anzilottl, Vefdross, Borchard, 
Oppenheim, de Visscher, Scelle, Jessup md Schwarzenberger; see more in 
Schwarzenberger G., Foreign Investments and International Law, London,
1969, p. 41; Bmwnlie I., Principles of Public International Law, op. ciu, pp. 
524-5.
75- Articles 4, 9 and 10 of Harvard Draft, Convention on the International 
Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, No. 10, of May 1,1959.
76- WhiteG., Nationalisation of Foreign Property, dp. cit., p. 18.
77. Decree 50 of 1945, Czechosldv^ian Nationalisation of the Film Industry;
Decree of December 5, 1946, Yugoslavian Nationalisation of private economic 
enterprises; Poland Law 285 of 1950 (July 20, 1950); Decree 20 of 1949 
(December 28, 1949), Nationalisation of certain industrial and transport 
undertakings in Hungary; Bulgarian Ukase TS 4872 of 1947; Roumanian 
Decree 92 of 1950 for the nationalisation of certain buildings.
____ ____________ V ■ .r- . .  '
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In Amoco International Finance Corporation v Iran case, political
considerations and considerations of economic policy or general national
interest were stated as more decisive and paramount in decisions to
nationalize the company7^ In the Bolivian nationalization of the Gulf
Oil Company, measures predicated upon political considerations were not
only deemed legal but also stated to be measures taken in good wiU which
ended to an agreement with the Company.*®
The only condition that nowadays is considered illegal in
international law, as expressed by General Assembly of the United
Nations, is expropriation for purely and explicitly individual or private 
81interests. Otherwise, an international authority would hardly be 
competent to judge about the adequacy of the purpose of the nationalizing 
State. However, expropriation of private property does not necessarily 
provide for the transfer of those interests to the State. Measures such as 
land reform provide for the redistribution of the expropriated land to 
private individuals.
In the Case of Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. the Islamic Republic o f 
Iran, Ports and Shipping Organization o f Iran, the Tribunal did not 
consider the purpose of the taking and found that there had not been a 
deliberate governmental interference in the Company’s operations. 
The most radical view, expressed by a Western claims commission, was in
78- Ford A. W., The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, 1954, University of California, 
pp. 199-203.
79- Amoco v. Iran, Award 310-56^3, 15 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1987 II, Para. 225
80- Furnish D. B., Days of Revendication and National Dignity: Petroleum 
Expropriations in Peru and Bolivia, Lillich, The Valuation of Nationalized 
Property in International Law, op. cit.. Vol. H, p. 59.
8k Article 1(4) of the General Assembly Resolution 1803(XVII), 1962, op. cit., p.
107.
82- Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ports and Shipping 
Organization of Iran(X35-33rl), of 22 June 1984, in X Y.C.A., 1985, p. 249.
■:«5
: :
Conditions of Expropriation 120
the case of Dickson Car Wheel Co. v. United Mexican States. In that 
case, the Mexican-U.S. Genera!Claims Commission stated that States have 
always resorted to extraordinary measures to save themselves from 
imminent dangers and injuries to foreigners resulting from these 
measures do not generally afford a basis for claims. A foreigner residing 
in a country which, by reasons of natural, social or international 
calamities, is obliged to adopt these nieasures, must suffer the natural
83detriment to his affairs without any remedy.
4 .  THE REQUIREMENT OF COMPENSATION
The existence of an obligation of a host State to compensate a 
foreign investor for expropriation of property and its measurement has 
been one of the most important and controversial issues in international
84law. It is a rule on which States' public policies are divided or in some 
cases diametrically opposed to each other. Most of the writings oh the 
question of expropriation have been devoted to this principle, but still no 
clear single standard has found universal acceptance, according to which 
compensation can be determined for the expropriated properties of aliens. 
The reason is that an attempt has been made to apply certain rules to all 
expropriation cases. As it was stated in Banco National de Cuba y. 
Sabbatino, there are few if any issues in international law today oh Which 
opinion seems to be so divided as to the limitations on a State's power to
83. Dickson Car Wheel Co. (U.S.A.) v. Mexico, M exico/U .S. Claims 
Commission, R.LA.A., vol. 4, pp. 681-2.
84. Clagett B. M., The Expropriation Issue Before the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal: Is "Just Compensation" Required by International Law or Not?, 16 
L.P.I.B., 1984, No. 3, p. 813-14.
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expropriate the property of aliens, i.e. the conditions which should be
fulfil when a State expropriates aliens' property.
Basically, the approach to the question of compensation started in
the free economic system of the West and was based on the loss suffered
by the nationalized party. This is natural, since the problem arises as a
result of claims by the former owners for compensation for their loss,
and has been defended by the govemmeiit of the nationalized parties.*^
But, it has not been practiced and accepted universally. No single legal
system in the world would accept that any person ought to gain at the
expense of others. At the beginning, the difference of opinion concerns
not the terms themselves, but the applicability of them. For example, the
recent American Restatenient reads in this rçspect:
'A riateis responsible under international jaw for injuries resulting from: (1) a 
taking by the state of the property of a national of another state that (a) is not 
for a public puq)ose, or (b) is discriminatory, or (c) is not accofnpanied by 
provision for just compensation;'^
According to the United States, ''just compensation" does not mean
anything less that " f u l l  compensation". To developing coimtries,
however, the term has à completely different meaning. Moreover, the
majority of writers in this field do not share this view, nor is it reflected
in the majority of international decisions. At least, in the case of large-
scale nationalizations, it is commonly believed that, regardless of whether
there is a duty on a State to compensate aliens for the taking of their
Banco National de Cuba y . Sabatino, M^ch 23, 1964, 376 U.S. 398, 11 L. 
ed. 2d 804, 84 S. ct. 923, U.S. Supreirie Court Reports, (Lawyer* Edition), p.
824.
86. The; question of the prompt, adequate and effective compensation is relevant to 
this approach to the question of compensation.
87- Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 
vol. 2, the Arnerican Law Institute, Washington p . C., May 14, 1986, p. 196 
(empharis added).
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property, non-payment of compensation promptly does not render the 
measures unlawful.^*
The differences in opinions and in international awards, together 
with the variety of agreements concluded between expropriating and 
expropriated parties on the issue of compensation, indicate that a proper 
classification of expropriation cases, according to the conditions 
governing them in this respect, is inevitable. The conditions, which by 
their nature result from the economic, political and consequently the 
legal relations between the parties, which include the behaviour of the 
foreign investors and the changing econornic circumstances, in partibular 
those changes that have been brought about by the increasingly integrated 
world economy of international finance and multinational corporations. 
The issue of compensation should be approached on the grounds that the 
gain of one party must not be at the expense of the other.
The traditional position of the capital exporting countries has been 
to some extent consistent by asserting the rule of payment of prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation based on the international minimum 
standard. While, it has been asserted that the standard implies "full" 
compensation, some have stated that it does not necessarily mean that. 
The position of the third world countries is far more complex and less 
categorical and therefore a common position is not taken by them on the 
issue.
Classification of the cases according to the conditions surrounding
them would indicate the kind of legal nexus existed between the
expropriating and the expropriated parties and would help to end most of
See for example, Friedman, Expropriation in International Law, op. cit., pp. 
206-211; Dowson and Weston, Prorript, Adequate and Effective A Universal 
Standard of Compensation? 30 Forham Law Review, 1962, p. 727.
89- Opinion of Gunnar Lagergren of 15 August 1985 in INA Corp. in XI Y.C.A.,
1986, pp. 315-16.
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the arguments^® which exist in support and against the duty to 
compensate aliens and oil different compensation standards.
Although case la\y is far from being the oiily, or the most 
important, source of interhational law, it does however play a significant 
role in the development of the rules pf intematiohal law. Thus, 
expropriation cases could be generally divided into two categories:
1 - Cases in which the owner of the property or rights expropriated is in
an equal bargaining or negotiating position vis-a-vis the expropriating
country: in other words, cases in which the expropriating country is not
in desperate need of investment but is instead à relatively rich and well
developed country; or possibly, the expropriating country is
economically, politically and technologically more advanced than the
expropriated one. This category covers developed countries dealing with
the properties and rights of aliens from other developed countries or
from developing countries.^^
In developed countries, with their established political and economic
system, the government is in a position to decide freely upon the rules
governing alien property, upon the extent to which property rights may
be extehded and u^bn the contractual facilities to be granted to aliens.
The governments of these couhtries are not usually under a considerable
political influence of foreign countries to grant any concession or contract
to the nationals or agencies of the other countries. Economically, they are
in such a position that investors are not able to impose any term of
90- See for an example of such argunients between O. Schachter and Mendelson in 
79 1985, pp. 414-422.
It is rare that a developing country invest in a developed State, but some 
developing countries such as the Members of OPEC for different reasons do 
invest or buy shares in developed countries.
a
11
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contract or concession on them. If foreigners are allowed to become
involved in economic life of the host country, they are in most material
respects upon an equal footing with the nationals of that country.
Therefore, when they obtain a right to property or contract, it is not
considered as privileged against the nationals of that country. Aliens
usually are not in such an advantageous financial or technological position
as to put them in a distinct bargaining power. In other words, the
developed States have almost complete, if not total, sovereignty over all of
their affairs, and are thus fully self-determinant. The characteristic of
this group of countries is, then, the ability to make free decisions to
regulate their economic relations with foreigners and to exercise full
control over their political and economic affairs.
The most important factor is that foreigners enter and invest in
these countries in accordance with the will of the host countries freely
exercised. That is, investors cannot impose themselves on these States,
While they have finance, technology, knowledge and management ability
and political will to pursue their own economic affairs in the absence of
the foreign investors, the military might of such countries obviate the risk
that involvement of other countries in such activities might endanger
national security and independence.^^
When this group of countries decides to expropriate the property of
aliens, it is very reasonable to apply the international minimum standard
rules, especially the rule of payment of full compensation, and
demanding that other similar countries to do the same.^^ This group of
Most of the developing countries attached to one political bloc usually grant a 
considerable number of concessions of contacts to their supporting countries or 
sometimes as it was the case in Iran to their unfavourable powerful neighbours.
93- That was the norm which established the principle of international minimum 
standard among the European countries, but they have always tried to apply the
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countries is all too aware that it is not in its interests to leave the owners
of expropriated properties uncombehsated, since its own nationals have
investments abroad in other countries and might receive similar
treatment. If this were to happen, then the nationals of developed
countries, since they are the main investors in other countries, would be
the biggest losers in international investment affairs.
On the other hand, the governments of the developed countries are
rich enough to expend money on their public sectors, and are not so needy
as to be unable to pay compensation for expropriated property.
Moreover, the main element of the legitimacy of contracts and in general
economic relations, i.e, free will, between these countries and the
investors exists, and they are usually less affected by the change of the
circumstances, out of the control of the host countries, the geherally-
accepted principle arnong these countries is that, in the case of
expropriation of properties of aliens, prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation must be paid to the expropriated individuals in accordance
with the international niinimuni standard, Therefore, any non-payment of
compensation by these countries could be considered as unjust enrichment
at the expense of alien investors.^"*
The position of the capital-exporting countries which attach much
significance to the sanctity of private property is that expropriation of
alien property is lawful if it is for a public purpose, is non-
discriminatory, and is accompanied by prompt, adequate, and effective 
95compensation.
principle to all other countries.
94- Wortley B. A., Expropriation in International Law, Cambridge 1959, pp. 96-7;
Friedmann W., Some Impacts of Social Organization on International Law,
A.J.I.L., 1956, p. 505.
Clagett B. M., The Expropriation Issue Before the Iran-United States Claims
_______________
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This traditional international standard can be compared with the
practice of these countries as indicated by their own basic constitutional
laws. For example, the Fifth Amendnient of the Constitution of the
United States provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law nor shall private property be taken
for public use without just compensation. The Belgian constitution
(February 7, 1831) provides:
"no one may be deprived of his property except for a public purpose and 
according to the forms established by law, and in consideration of a just 
compensation previously determined.
The constitution of Luxembourg^^ similarly declares that no one 
shall be deprived of his property, except by reason of public utility, in the 
cases and in the manner established by the law and in consideration of a 
just and prior indemnity. And French civil code states that no one can be 
compelled to cede his property except for reasons o f public utility and 
upon previous payment of a just indemnity.^*
National courts in these countries have refused to apply any foreign 
expropriation law that fails to provide adequate compensation or is 
essentially retaliatory or confiscatory according to international minimum 
standard. For example, the civil court of Rome upheld the legality of the 
Iranian expropriation of A lO C  in  ArtglO’Trariiari Oil Co. v, SU POR, 
but gave judgement according to the international minimum standard 
holding that it would not have done so had there been a breach of 
international law, i.e. had the expropriation not been carried out for 
reasons of public interest, but for purely political, persecutory, 
discriminatory, racial and cprifiscatory ihotives, or had the expropriation
Tribunal, op. cit., p. 815.
^6-Article 11 of thé Belgiun Gonstitution of February 7^1831.
^7- Article 16 of the Constitution of Luxenibourg October 18, 1868.
^8- Article 545 of the French Civil Code.
f
.... .j
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been carried out without payment of compensation. The approach was 
based oh the loss suffered by  the private party and not determined by the 
public interest of the nationalizing State, taking into account the special 
conditions of the case created as the result of the extraordinary relations 
of the parties.^^
While the issue of duty to compensate the expropriated parties has 
been solved in these countries, there are still some disagreement as to the 
precise rule for determining what exactly is meant by full, prompt and 
adequate compensation. It is riot surprising that there have been a 
consideiable variety of approaches to the valuation of the nationalized 
assets for the purpose of the compensation to the private owner.
The terms are flexible enough to be interpreted in different ways. 
But, the main question is first the employment of the terms^®  ^ themselves 
to indicate the proper norms of the law of expropriation to regulate the 
relation of the foreign investors and the expropriating States, and the duty 
to pay or not to pay compensation.
According to the capital exporting countries. States not only have a
duty to pay compensation, but the compensation for the taken property
must be sufficient by returning the value lost. If payment is not made
promptly, interest must be added at a realistic rate, and payment must be
made in hard currency or its equivalent.^®^
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company v. SUPOR., Civil Court of Rome, 22 I.L.R.,
1955, p. 42.
Murphy Cornelius F„ Jr, Limitations upon the Power of a State to Determine 
the Amount of Compensation Payable to an Alien upon Nationalisation, in 
Lillich R B., The Valuation of Nationalised Property in International Law, op. 
cit., VoL, 3 , p. 56.
lOL There exist no general agreement on the terms "Full", "partial", "adéquate", 
"appropriate", "just", "fair" and so on to show the indemnity of the 
expropriated ones and also the responsibility of the countries in dealing with 
aliens in this respect.
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Accordingly, the measure of compensation has been defended by the 
developed countries to be fair rdarket value. For example, if the property 
taken were an ongoing business, the standard measure would be the 
going-cohcem value, including the present value of reasonably anticipated 
future profits which is normally determined by conducting a discounted- 
cash-flow technique;^®? This principle of compensation was reflected 
prior to World War IT in some awards by international arbitral tribunals, 
and in a decision by the Permanent Court of International Justice.^ ®"*
One of the celebrated cases concerning this group of States is the 
N orw egian Shipowners C l a i m s In that case, there was no 
disagreement over the duty of the United States to pay compensation, the 
dispute involving instead the manner of the valuation of the property 
taken. The United States Government had offered just compensation 
based on the Constitution of the United States, and calculated only the 
price of the ships. But, according to the Norwegian Government, the 
compensation to be paid should have taken into account not only the 
physical property taken, but also the losses under the contracts affected. 
The Tribunal, which decided according to the municipal law of the United
102. Clagett B M., The Expropriation Issue Before the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal, op, cit., p. 815.
103. White G., Nationalisation of Foreign Property, op. cit., pp. 11-17.
194. Chorzow Factory Case, P.C.I.J., 1928, ser. A, No. 17; N o rw eg ia n  
Shipowners- Claims, 1 R.I.A.A., 1922, p . 340; Germany v. Romania, 2 
RI.A.A,, 1928, p. 903; 77.5. v. Pan., 6 R.I.A.A., 1933, pp. 367-8; th e  
Oscar Chinn case, G. Britain v. Belgium, P.C.I.J., 1934, ser. A/B, No. 63, 
p . 81; G. Britain v. Poland, P.C.I.J., 1923, ser. B, No.6, p . 38; G. Britain 
V. Poland, P.C.I.J., 1926, ser. A, No. 7, p p . 22, 33, 42; Shufeldt Claim 
(U.S. V.  Gimtmala.), 2 B J .N A ., 1930, p. 1100-1101.
195. Norwegian Shipowners Claims, Permanent Court of International Arbitration,
Award of 13 October, 1992, 1 R.I.A.A., 1948, 307-346.
196. Loc. cit., p. 338.
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States to the extent that it complied with international law, found that the 
term property under U.S. municipal law could embrace contractual rights 
as well. Consequently, the Tribunal awarded an amount of about $15 
million including interest, as against the proposed U.S. offer of less than 
$3 million for the value of the property taken/®^ The tribunal declared 
that compensation was due in case o f the expropriation of foreign 
property, but did not make clear whether its decision was one restricted to 
the particular circumstances of this case or whether it represented a 
general declaration on the duty to compensate.
The position of the United States on Mexican oil nationalizations of 
1938 was that expropriation should not be at the expense of aliens. 
Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, in his letter of July 21, 1938, to the
Mexican Ambassador stated:
"The taking of property without coiiipensation is not expropriation. It is 
confiscation. It is no less confiscation because there may be an expressed 
intent to pay at sometime in future. If it were permissible for a government to 
take the private property of the citizens of other countries and pay for it as and 
when, in the judgement of that government, its economic circumstances and 
its local legislation may permit, the safeguards which the constitutions of most 
countries and established international law have sought to provide Wopld be 
illusory. Governments would be free to take property far beyond their ability 
or wiilingness to pay, and the owners thereof would be without recourse. We 
cannot question the right of a foreign government to treat its own nationals in 
this fashion if it so desires. This is a matter of domestic concern. But we 
cannot admit that a foreign government may take the property of American 
nationals ih disregard of the rule of compensation under international law. We 
are entirely sympathetic to the desires of the Mexican Government for the 
social betterrnent of its people, we cannot accept the idea, however, that those 
plans can be carried forward at the expense of our citizens"!®*
Secretary Hull in his letter of 22 August 1938, further pointed out:
The Government of the United States merely adverts to a self-evident fact 
when it notes that the applicable precedents and recognized authorities on
107. Lpc. cit., pp, 325, 331, 345,
108. Hachworth G,H., Digert of International Law, vol, 3, Washington D.C., 1942, 
p. 655.
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international law support its declaration that, under every rule of law and 
equity, no government is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever 
purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate and effective payment 
therefore.
However, the position taken by the United States as to the principle 
of national treatment in the Norwegian Shipowners Claims and in thé 
1930 Hague Codification Conference was quite contradictory/^® The 
legislation of March 1917, which affected the Shipowners had provided 
for the payment of just compensation based oh the constitution of the 
United States. The dispute arose bn the amount of compensation which 
the United States' government should pay to the owners.^^^ This type of 
contradiction should be considered in regard to the double standard 
treatment of the developed States, and not as a contradiction in the law 
applied by those States.
However, in the post-war period these contradictions became more 
evident when the principle of international minimum standard was 
attacked by the Communist and an increasing number of Third World 
States as reflected in the resolutions of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations.
There are several cases before and after the Chorzow factory  
case^^^ in which tribunals decided on the payment of full compensation.
Loc. cit.
pjQj-i^ggiafi Sfilp.owhers case, Ociohev 13, 1922, 1 R.I.A.A., 1974, p. 338; 
Hackworth G. H.(Delegate of the U.S.), Responsibility of States for Damages 
Caused in Their Teritory to the Property of Foreigners  ^The Hague Conference 
for the Codification of International Law, 24 A.J.I.L., 1930, p. 500; see more 
in Lillich R. B., International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, 
op, cit., p. 6.
Noimégian Shipowners Claims Award of October 13, 1922, R.I.A.A., 
vol. 1, 1948, p. 338.
112. The Chorzow Factory cdisp was important on the ground that regulated the 
relation between Germany and Poland. It was not an ordinary case comparable 
with the most of the other nationalisation cases; see the section ort the sanctity
: :
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However, those tribunals were in many eases concerned purely with the 
particular facts before them and were not concerned to lay down broad 
principles applicable to a wide rangé of hypothetical circumstances This 
has been regarded as the flexibility of thé general s t a n d a r d . I n  fact, 
the tribunals have been applying different rules in a variety of différent 
conditions rather than making the mles flexible.
In the West, it has been the general view that, even in the case of
lawful requisition, full cornpensation must be paid, and that the payment
of less than the market value of the property as of the date of taking
amounts to a wrongful confiscation of the non-^paid part of the
p r o p e r t y . T h i s  has been the translation of "restitution in kind" when is
not possible and corresponds to the value which restitution in kind would
bear.^^^ One of the authorities often used in this regard is the judgement
of Permanent Court of ïnternàtional Justice on Chorzow Factory case.
In that case the Court declared that:
"The action of Poland which the Court has judged to be contrary to Geneva 
Convention is not an expropriation to render which lawful only the payment 
of fair compensation would have been wanting, it is a seizure of property, 
right and interests which could not be expropriated even against 
compensation; ....... The compensation due to the Gertnan Government is
not necessarily limited to the value of the undertaking at the moment of 
dispossession, plus interest to the day of payrrient. This limitation would only 
be admissible if the polish Government had had the right to expropriate, and if 
its Wrongful act consisted merely in not having paid to the two companies the 
just price Of what was expropriated. ........ reparation must as far as possible
wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation 
which would existed if  that act had been committed. Restitution in kind or if 
this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a
of treaties and expropriation.
113- Schachter O., What Pnce Expropriation? 79 A.J.ÏE., 1985; p. 417.
114- That was in the Go/dcnfterg case, (Germany v. Roumania), 2 R.I.A.A., 1928, 
p. 909.
115- The leading case which has been oft-mentioned in support of this idea is 
Chorzow factory Case, 1928 P.C.I. J. Ser. A, No. 17, p. 47.
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restitution in kind would bear."
However, this rule failed to define adequately the amount of 
compensation actually required, and the impact of this rule weakened 
foUowing World War 11 in the face of numerous nationalizations by the
117newly independent Third World countries. Since then, the industrial 
States and Third World States have not been able to reach a consensus on 
the the rule of compensation and the proper standard for determining 
compensation.
This diversity of practice among States was commented upon in a 
general statement by International Court of Justice in the B arcelona  
Traction that States are not under an obligation to guarantee a
different treatment for the foreign property in their territory. The court 
argued that:
"When a State admits into its territoiy foreign investment or foreign nationals, 
whether natural or juristic person, it is bound to extend to them the protection 
of the law and assumes obligations concerning the treatment to be afforded 
them. These obligations, however, are neither absolute nor unqualified. In 
particular an essential distincuon should be drawn between the obligations of 
a State towards the internatiohai community as a whole, and those arising vis- 
a-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection.
The court held that the international obligation of States to treat 
aliens, in the absence o f a treaty obligation, only arises from the 
principles which have clearly been incoiporated into the body of the 
international law.^^® The court rejected the value of the arbitral
^^ 6- L o g . cit., pp. 46-47.
Bainbridge S., Nationalisations Standard of Compensation, 24:4 Virg.J.LL., 
1984, p. 998; Lillich R. B;, The Valuation of Nationalised Property in 
International Law, op. cit,. Vol., 3, pp; 183-195.
118. Thé Barcelona Traction Case (new application) 1962, Belgium v. Spain, 
I.e.I., Judgement of 5 February, 1970,1.C.J. Reports, 1970, p. 3.
119-Loc. cit., p. 32,
120- Loc. cit., p. 49; the court gave the examples such as the acts of aggression, 
genocide, slavery and racial discrimination which are by no means comparable
,:4| |
j;:S
... .. ... ... . . . .  . __________ __________________
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jurisprudence over the previous half-century and held that they cannot 
give rise to generalization going beyond the special circumstances of each 
case/^^ The court niàdè it clear that, by admitting into its territory, the 
State does not become an insurer of that part of another State's wealth 
which the investment represents. The court ruled that every investment 
carries certain risks, and questipped any guarantee by general 
international law in the absence of a treaty applicable to the particular
case. 122
The statement could be considered as reference to the obligation of 
developed countries which have committed themselves to free market 
economy and also to freedom of action for others countries which have 
chosen to manage their economy differently. Judge Riphagen, Belgium's 
ad hoc Judge and the only dissident in this case, based his opinion on the 
responsibility of States for the treatment of aliens, in international law, 
and on denial of justice* This could be construed that, if there is no 
denial of justice, a State capnot be taken as responsible for mere non­
payment of compepsation to aliens.
The agreements'^ - concluded between countries on the payment of 
compensation exhibit considerable variation with fegard to the types of 
claims covered, the form of the compensation agreed upon, the method of 
payment adopted and the procedure to be followed; and the agreenients 
concluded between the developed countries confirm this idea that différent
to thé non-payment of satisfactory compensation by a state to an alien for thé
expropriation of his property-
121- Loc. cit., p. 40.
122_ Loc. cit., p. 46.
123- Loc. cit., p. 337,
124- The compensation agreements were already discussed in a separate section o f  
this work, see pp.
_________________________
  — —
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rules should be applied to the variable conditions existed between the
different groups of countries. In some agreements with other States,
France paid compensation to foreign owners of and shareholders in
French nationalized gas and electricity concerns in 1946.^^^ In two of
these agreements between France and Belgium, France accepted to pay
compensation to the Belgium stockholders and to the direct owners in the
nationalized p r o p e r t i e s . T h e y  were granted most-favouredrnation
treatment as follow:
"In particular, if at any future date the French Government grants to another 
country, for the benefit of the nationals thereof, payment by way of 
compensation for similar stock of sums of a greater amount, or yielding a 
higher interest, or payatile in smaller number of annual installments, or 
enjoying certain transfer facilities, the Belgian Government shall be entitled to 
claim, on behalf of its nationals, the substitution of the compensation 
conditions accorded to the nationals of such other country for the procedure 
laiddpwn in thepresent agreement,''^ <
Compensation was to be calculated according to the French Law. It 
was to be paid to the shareholders on the basis of the average price of the 
shares on the French Stock Exchange between September 4, 1944 and 
February 28, 1945, or on the quotation for June 4, 1945, whichever was 
the greater amount. But, the capital obtained from redemption was not 
transferable abroad and had to be used or invested within France. While, 
in the case of the Eastern European nationalizations, entire economies
kl
125.. Gonyentibn Between the Belgian Government and the french Government for 
the compensation of Belgian Interests in the Nationalized Gas and Electricity 
Undertakings February 18, 1949, 31 U.N.T.S,, p. 175; with The United 
Kingdom on April 11, 1951,106 U.N.T.S., p. 3.
126- Convention Between thé Belgian Government and the French Government 
Concerning the Conditions for the Compensation of Belgian Interests in the 
Nationalized Gas and Elecfricity Undertakings, Paris, February 18, 1949, 31 
U.N.T.S., op. cit., p: 175; 73 U.N.T.S., pp. 261, 263.
127- Convention Between the Belgian Government and the french Government for 
the compensation of Belgian Interests in the Nationalized Gas ^ d  Electricity 
Undertakings February 18,1949, 31 U.N.T.S., op. cit., p. 175.
. rTS,:|
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were nationalized so that there no longer existed any private enterprise in 
which cornpensation paynaents could be reinvested -*
Accordingly, the traditional standard laid down by the pre-war 
cases somehow continued to be applied between certain States, requiring 
the payment of full compensation. Indeed it is not surprising that one 
finds a judgement based on the traditional rules even in recent times. 
However, this clearly does riot mean that the pririciple, as it was applied in 
pre-war cases, is applicable in eyeiy case, in all countries and in every 
condition.
Thus, it is reasonable^^® that full compensation be paid as the 
condition for the legality of expropriation in developed countries, and it is 
wrong to extend the rules which are dependent on these special conditions 
to the other groups of countries, in particular to the developing States. 
The partial compensation rule would not meet any objective test of 
reason, justice or practicality, and the concept of equivalence is inherent 
in the very notion of compensation in these group pf countries. J l .
2 - There are those cases in which the expropriating countries are not in 
an equal bargaining position with the investors. Such countries have often 
in the past been colonies or quasi-colonies and therefore are at a
White G., Nationalisation of Foreign Property, op. cit., pp. 204-5. It is 
necessary to be mentioned that even in the Case of the developed countries, they 
mostly reached agreement through negotiations.
129- One of the examples is Barcelona Traction case, the Judgement of Feb. 5 
between Belgium and Spain holding that, even in the case of a lawful taking, 
shareholders are entitled to compensation for their investment and what it 
represented on the date of the damage, I.C.J., 1970, Reports, op. cit., pp. 3, 
267,276,
139- Its reasonableness is based on the rules of unjust enrichment and consequently 
the unjust deprivation of the other party.
131- Clagett B, M , The Expropriation Issue Before the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal, op. cit., pp. 876-7.
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considerable disadvantage in negotiating contractual agreements with 
foreign countries This severe imbalance in political and economical 
power had enabled the developed countries to impose restraints on a 
government's ability adequately to protect its own i n t e r e s t s . S o m e  of 
these States not only corisider expropri of the aliens' property and 
rights for public utility, of politically and ecdnomically motivated, but 
also consider the measures as revindication of their rights and "national 
d i g n i t y I n  the case of the colonies, the conditions raised the idea of 
"clean state" for the contractual obligations undertaken by the colonial 
powers. However, controversy remains over the payment of 
compensation for the aliens' properties expropriated by the newly 
independent State. The realities and conditions of this group of countries 
even affected the position of some eminent Western writers. In 1955, 
Lauterpacht suggested that traditional rules of compensation must be 
subject to modification in cases in which fundamental changes in the 
political system and economic structure of the State or far-reaching social 
reforms entail interference, on a large scale, with private property. In 
such cases, neither the principle of absolute respect for alien private 
property nor rigid equality with the dispossessed nationals offered a 
satisfactpry solution to the difficulty. As a consequence, he sugge^ed 
partial compensation as a solution to the problem.
The Bremen Court of Appeals, obviously ignoring the traditional 
mles in this regard when stated that:
132. Penrose E., Joffe G , Stevens P., Nationalisation of Foreign-owned Property 
for a Public Purpose: An Economic Perspective on Appropriate Compensation, 
55 M L R , No. 3, May 1992, p, 353,
3^3- See examples in Furnish D. B;, Petroleum Expropriation in Peru and Bolivia, 
pp. CH., pp. 55^85.
134- Laütefpacht H., Oppehheim'sInternational Law, op. cit., vol. 1, Peace, p. 352,
X. X'"' x.k.v -X '"  ' X X f y / 'X *  X-XfX:xXXX:.;XX;'%XxX XX..XA;v-. X :X4
xïxiï,.;:
Conditions of Expropriation 137
'*The equality concept means only that equal niust be treated equally and that 
the different treatnient of unequals is admissible ...... for the statement to be
objective, it is sufficient that the attitude of the former colonial people toward 
its former Colonial master is  bfcourse different from that toward otherforeigners."^ 35
As a part of a deal by which Netherlands transferred the 
administration of West Irian to Indonesia, the parties signed a lump-sum 
agreement which provided for payment of DPI 683 million to be paid in 
2003.^^^ Accordingly, in some developed countries with a very 
conservative approach, representing the famous "Hull" doctrine, it was 
stated that it is the consensus of nations that full compensation need not be 
paid in aU circumstances. Meanwhile, the possibility that in some cases, 
full compensation would be appropriate, was excluded.
The general financial and economic position of these countries 
where the measures form part of a comprehensive programme of social 
and economic reform are indicated in the compensation agreements made 
between these countries and the countries whose nationals' property has 
been expropriated. Most of the lump-sum agreements and those
138agreements not resulting the actual payment of compensation are the 
indication of the elements which affected the international rules on 
compensation. The alien investment in these countries would not have 
been conducted according to the consent and the free will of those States. 
In fact, investment would have been as the result of the domination of the 
investors country without any consideration of the legal rights of the local
135. 1 Ü. 159/1959; see more in Domke M„ Indonesian N. Measures Before 
Foreign Courts, 54 A.J.I.L., I960, pp. 3, 5.
Smith D.N., and Wells L.T., Conflict Avoidance in Concession Agreements, 18 
Harvard International Law Journal, 1976, pp. 59-61.
Banco National de Cuba vs. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F 2d 875 (2d Cir. 
198 U p. 892. ,
138_ White G., Nationalisation of Foreign Property, op. cit., pp. 193-203; Kronfol 
Z. A., Protection of Foreign Investment, Netherlands; 1972, pp. 118-19.
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people, The direct occupation or the political and economical influence of
the investors' countries would, in fact, have deprived the natives of
control of their natural resources, or created an unjust and unequal
economic and political relations between them. Expropriation measures
by these countries ought not to be considered as expropriation, but rather
as reinstitution and revindication of their own property which, in
accordance with the principle of self-determination, they obtain the fight
to decide for their utihtyv^^^ Aiding puppet regimes to rule a country
and gaining privileged cohcessions agaihst the interest of the nation create
a similar legal situation, contrary to the mtemationa! principles of self-
determination and the principles of Human Rights on economic and
political self-determination.^"*®
It is the same where countries requesting IMF aid in times of
economic crises have been forced into compliance with the demands,
made by that organization as a condhion of such aid, that they open up to
private foreign investment. Such demands inay lead later to problems in
those countries. Finding one effect of law on the oil industry, as
Muchlinski states,^"*  ^has been to act as an instrument of power, resulted
in the largest and the most important nationalizations, of which history of
the international oil companies in the Middle East provides dramatic
examples.!"*^ Particularly when transnational companies are involved,
3^9. The actions which deprives people from the right to determine their own social, 
economical and political affairs are agaihst the basic principles of Human 
Rights.
i49_ Article 1(1) of the International Covenant on Civü and Political Rights, 11 Ü.N.
Resbîùtions, Series 1, G.A., 1966-68, op. cit., p. 1(59.
141- Muchlinski P. T., Law and the Analysis of the International Oil Industry, in 
Judith Rees and Peter Odell, Thé Intemational Oil Industry: An Interdisciplinary 
Perspective , London, 1987, p. 142.
142. Penrose E., Joffe G., and Stevens P., Nationalisation of Foreign-owned 
Property for a Public Purpose, op. cit., p. 353.
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they are heavily predominant in certain industries characterized by the 
importance o f marketing and technology and by an olipolistic 
organization of industry within the developed countries give them the 
bargaining power to extract more concessions from the host 
governments/"*^ This imbalance of bargaining power shifts control into 
the hands of the foreign companies over resources, markets and 
technology. These are a part of the elements which create a new 
condition in developing countries and should be taken into account. As 
was stated in Kuwait v. Aminoil, the determination of the amount of an 
award of appropriate compensation was considered better carried out by 
means of an inquiry into all the circumstances relevant to the particular 
concrete case rather than through abstract theoretical discussion.^"*"*
With modern knowledge and technology, agreements between 
foreign companies and govemrnents are usually made before the extent of 
the resources is fully known to developing countries. In making a 
contract the company usually takes into account inter alia, the political 
risk that the government will renege oh its bargain if exploration is much 
more successful and profitable than what has been anticipated or if 
circumstances had substantially changed.
Tbe risk that the government bears is the risk of unexpected success, 
with the consequence that the cornpany becomes excessively enriched 
relative to the country, the natural fesources of which are the basis of 
such enrichment.^"*^ This accounts, in part, for the legal complexity of 
many arrangements, for how is a government in negotiating a mining
Lall s., and Streeten P., Foreign Investment, Transnationals and Developing 
Countries, Londoti, 1977, pp. 77-8.
144- Kuwait V. Aminoil, 66 I.L.R., op. cit., p. 602, para. 144.
145_ Friedmann w.. The Changing Structure of International Law, London, 1964, 
pp. 209-210.
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agreement to protect itself against the risk of unexpectedly success? Such 
agreements are frequently disadvantageous to the less developed countries. 
These countries, by making such contracts or agreements, do not mean to 
create such imbalanced economic and probably political relations with the 
investors and their governments.^'*^
The result of these circumstances is a high degree of instability 
particularly with regard to rnining contracts made between developed and 
developing countries, particularly when the agreement is considered as 
unfair distribution of the wealth. As was mentioned in the Aminoil case, 
the division of profits regarded as equitable today will need to be 
modified in order to be regarded as equitable tomorrow.
The taking of such unfairly distributed property, the developing 
States justify expropriation of rights implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by 
their agreements and do not regard the international minimum standard as 
applicable. This argument implies that the host State, in its eagerness to 
gain the benefits of foreign investment, was somehow coerced into 
accepting that investment upon other than reasonable terms. '^**
This idea found support in the resolutions of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations on sovereignty over natural resources, in some of 
which no reference was made to international law, but in which was 
stressed the unfettered right of nations to expropriate and suggested that 
compensation should be left to the discretion of the appropriate bodies 
within the expropriating State. These resolutions reflect the position
More discussion on the international rules governing the contracts between 
governments and nationals and governments see the section "Sanctity of 
Contracts and Expropriation"
147- Kuwait V. Aminoil, 66 LL.R., 1982, p. 564, para. 20,
148- Asante, Stability of Contractual Relations in the Transnational investment 
Process, 28 I .C .W ,  # 9 ,  pp.
149- G. A. Resolution 180i(XVII), 17 U.N. Resolutions, Series 1, G.A., 1962-3,
 :  ' ■ ,  I
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of the developing Countries and represent a clear departure from the t
traditional rules. The first serious blow to the traditional rules of
expropriation occurred in 1972, when the Trade ànd Development Board
of the United Nations Conference on TTrade and DeVelopment(UNCTAD)
in Resolution 88(Xn) of 19 October stated that:
"[i]t is for each state to fix the amount of compensation and the procedure for 
those measures, and any dispute which may arise in that connection falls 
within the sole jurisdiction of its courts, withbut prejudice to what is set forth 
in the Geheral Assembly resolution 18p3(XVII).''^^  ^ i
Resolution 3171(XXVIII) of 17 December 1973 which was 
considered as the second blow against traditional rules states that the 
application of the principle of nationalization carried out by States as an 
expression of their sovereignty in order to safeguard their natural 
resources, implies that each State is entitled to determine the amount of 
possible compensation and the procédure of payment. It also implies that 
any disputes which hiight arise should be settled in accordance with the 
national legislation of each State carried out such rneasures.^^^
Resolution 3171 (XXVIII) and the UNCTAD resolution apparently |
purported to abolish the right of diplomatic protection, weakening the 
norms governing compensation. From the language of the UNCTAD i
resolution and resolution 3171 (XXVIII) it is apparent that the supporters 
intended to absolve themselves froni potential international responsibility 
by inserting the provision that any dispute concerning a State’s 
nationalization of foreign-owned property falls within the sole jurisdiction
p. i07; G.A. Resolution 3281(XXIX), 15 U.N.Resolutions, Series 1, G.A., 
197&6, p. 302; Résolution 320l(S-Vri, 14 UiN. Resolutions, Series 1, G.A., 
1972-4, p. 528; Resolution 3171(XXVIII), 14 U.N. Resolutions, Series 1, 
G.Â., 1972-4, p; 422.
150- T.D.B. Resolution 88(13th. Sess.) UNCTAD Doc. TL/B/421. 1972.
1 5 1 -Para. 3 of Resolution 3171 (XXVIII) 17 December 1973 of the General 
Assembly of the U.N., op. cit.
------------
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of the courts of that State and were to be resolved in accordance with the
national legislation of that S t a t e / A c c o r d i n g l y ,  developing States, in
most of the cases involving nationalization of foreign property, have
153declined to submit the dispute to international arbitration.
As s result of the influence of third world countries, on 1 May 
1974, Resolution 3201 of the U.N. General Assembly for the first time 
omitted entirely any reference to a corresponding duty of compensation,
154even under a "possible" compensation standard. The only reference to 
compensation found in the resolution, a reference to "fuU" compensation, 
occurred in the context of claims by developing States to be compensated 
for "the exploitation and depletion of, and damages to, the natural 
resources and all other r e s o u r c e s . . . T h e  provisions of the NIEG 
Charter explicitly stated it to be the right and duty of all states to 
eliminate colonialism, (zparf/zg/<^^racial discrimination, neo-colonialism 
and all forms of foreign domination, and the economic and social 
consequences thereof, as a prerequisite for development. States which 
practice such coercive policies are economically responsible to the 
countries, territories and peoples affected for the restitution and full 
compensation for the exploitation and depletion of, and damages to, the
152* 1, U.N. Doc. TD/B^23v 1973, p. l475; Resoluiion 3171(XXVm) of G.A. of 
the United Nations, op. cit,
153- Amerasihghe G. P., The Quantum of Compensation for Nationalised Property, 
in Lillich R. B., The Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law, 
op. cit.V Vol. 3, pi 91.
154- Para. 4(e) of tlie Resolution 3201(S-VI), Declaration on the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order, U. N. Resolutions, Series 1, G.A., vol. 
XIV, 1972-74, pi 528.
155_ Para. 4(f), in UiN. Resolutions, Series 1, G.A., op. cit; see also Girvan, 
Expropriating the Expropriators: Compensation Criteria from a Third World 
Viewpoint, in Lillich R. B., The Valuation of Nationalized Property in 
International Law, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 149-179. *
_____________________________
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natural and all other resources of those countries, territories and pepples. 
Accordinglyi any promotion or encouragement of investments that may 
constitute an obstacle to the liberation of those territories became 
forbidden/^^
However, the great nuniber of bilateral treaties entered into after 
the adoption of the resplutions of the U.N. reflects a growing State
157practice inconsistent with the standards adopted by those resolutions.
This inconsistency resulted from disagreements over the legal effect of the
provisions of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States on
nationalization of foreign property which states:
'Tach state has the right  ........
(C) to nationalize; expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property in
which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the state which
adopts such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and all
circumstances that the state considers pertinent. In any ease where the
question of compensation gives nse to a controversy, it shall be settled under
the domestic law of the nationalizing state and by its tribunals, unless it is
freely and mutually agreed by all states concerned that other peacefulmeans
be sought on the basis of the sovereignty equality of states and in accordance
158with the practice of free choice of means."
The voting patterns displayed in Resolution 3281 (XXIX) illustrate 
that the 1974 Charter did not enjoy the majority support of the developed
159countries. The Western States either voted against that resolution or
abstained The Charter was adopted by a vote of 120 in favour. Six
156- Article 16, Resolutio 3281(XXK) of the G.A. 15 U.N. Resplutions Series 1,
G.A., 1974-6, op: cit., p: 303:
157_ In a relatively shod period of rime 93 treaties were concluded. They
express the.ciassic compensation formula, see the list of those treaties in 24 
Scandinavian Study Law, 1980, p. 123.
158. Article 2 para. 2(c), U.N.G.A. Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 Dec. 1974, U. 
N. Resolutions, Series 1, G. A., vol. XV, 1974-76, p. 302.
159_ Art. 2(1) of the Charter, 9 against, 3 abstaining; Art. 2(2)(â), 10 against, 4 
abstaining; Art. 2(2) (b), 4 against, 6 abstaining, and Art. 2(2) (c), 16 against, 6 
abstaining,
160- The States which voted against the ResdliitiOn 3281 (XXIX) on Sovereignty
---- -yr
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industrial countries and capital-exporters voted against it with 10
abstentions. Provisions of Article 2 of the Charter were the main obstacle
in the way of consensus/**^ It is not difficult to identify the contending
parties and their battle lines. The developed States, emphasizing the
provisions of General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), believed that the
obligation of States under their agreements should be fulfilled in good
faith, and the dispute settlement procedures contained in the agreements
l62should be respected. As far as these countries are concerned, the 
Charter is not binding. It would be acceptable for them only if it were 
declaratory of the existed customary international law. But, according to 
those who voted in favour of the Charter, it has the same legal effect as 
any treaty has. Baxter is of the second opinion, except that he 
differentiates the resolution on the ground that the question of a treaty on
163this particular subject had never arisen. Otherwise, it would serve as a 
way-station on the road to the conclusion of a treaty. However, when a 
substantial number of States asserted the Charter, it created a momentum 
of increased defection in the pre-existing rules in order to result a new
rule. 164
Accordingly, the 1962 Resolution requirement of appropriateness 
came out with a compromise between the two main international legal
Over Natural Resources were Belgium, Denm^k, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Luxembourg, thé United Kingdom, and the United States, The 
Countries which abstained were Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, 
Japan, The Netherlands, Norway and Spain, 15 U.N. Resolutions, Series 1, 
G A., 1974-6, p. I l l ,  the footnote.
29 Ù.N.G.A.O.R.C. 2 (1638th. intg), 382-3, U.N. Doc. A /C , 2/SR 1938 
(1974).
162- 29 U.N.G. A.O.R. Annexes (agenda item 48) I at 3 U.N. Doc. A/9946 (1974). 
Baxter R. Ri^  International Law in "Her infinite Variety", in 29 I C.L.Q., 1980  ^
p. 564.
Brownlie I., Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, 1990, p. 11,
____________________________________________________________________
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doctrines on the measure of compensation. The compromise came in the
face of the traditional test of prompt, adequate and effective
compensation. But, there still remained very important issues to be
solved. For example, the term ’appropriate', compensation was not
defined and no effort was made to formulate sophisticated valuation
t e c h n i q u e s . T h e  United States, which originally considered Resolution
1803 (XVII) less than satisfactory, unilaterally tried to correct the defect
by interpreting 'appropriate' compensation to mean "prompt, adequate
and effective" compensation. This, however, was challenged by some
166Other States which could not be simply dismissed. The standard, as far 
as applies against the interests of developing countries, has not been 
acceptable to those eouhtries that have to resort to expropriation as a 
means of reasserting national control over their basic domestic resources. 
Such claims for compensation may be so staggering as to jeopardize vital 
national goals of the expropriating State.
Therefore, the term "appropriate" in the Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations was adopted as a compromise 
between the norms and principles of different members of the 
international community. It can be interpreted as implying full to partial 
compensation depending on its application in the developed or less 
developed countries. However, the standard of "appropriate" 
compensation was left undefined by Resolution 1803 (XVII), and any 
reference to its determination "in accordance with international law"
Lillich R. B., The Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law, op. 
cit., vol. 3, p. 184.
Goldman R. K, & Paxman J. M., Real Property Valuations in Argentina, Chile, 
and Mexico, in Lillich R. B , The Valuation of Nationalized Property in 
International Law, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 164-5.
Loc. cit.
______
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surely makes it more controversial. This is particularly so when a 
majority of States in the United Nations, including nearly all of the 
developing States, has launched a frontal assault on the system itself.
The interpretations, such as'  ^of Nawaz,^^^ that the payment of 
compensation ought to be reasonable in the circumstances of each case, 
are not less vague and cbhtroyersial, except that they indicate that some 
elements and circumstanees should be taken into account and a relative 
weight should be attributed to them. At least, there is no consensus on 
what àmount of compensation would be reasonable nor on what should be 
the criteria for its measurernent. The only undertaking of States in 
Resolution 1803(XyiI) of the General Assembly of the United Nation was 
the rules in force in the State taking such rneasures in the exercise of its 
sovereignty and in accordance with mtemational law.
Therefore, the fundamental changes of approach introduced by the 
General Assembly of the UvN have significant consequences for the 
application of the rules of State responsibility towards aliens. Its effect is 
specially on the duty of States to compensate aliens affected by the 
expropriatory measures. The new approach of the General Assembly of 
the U.N. is quite different from the asserted traditional rules which 
provided that, since the act of nationalization or expropriation is in 
violation of acquired rights, it is the duty of the State to eliminate aU the 
damaging consequence of its "unlav^ful" act.
Although the arbitrators in Texaco and Ammo// cases opined that 
the resolutions adopted after 1962, notably the Resolution 3171 (XXVIII) 
and Article 2 (2)(c) of the Charter, proclaim political rather than valid
Lillich R. Bj, The Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law, op. 
cit., vol. 3, pp. 186-7.
Nawaz M. K., Nationalisation of Foreign Oil Companies, Libyan Decree of 1 
Sept., 1973, 14 Indian Journal of International Law, 1974, p. 74.
_______ __________
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legal principles, and did not consider them as customary international 
law.^ *^* However, there was not an constant approach towards the libyan 
expropriations. In TopcolCalasiatic Arbitration, the arbitrator Dupuy 
first raised and then dismissed any possible justification for Libya's 
breach of the concession, finding support from the Judge Jessup's expert 
opinion and from A ram co  and Saphire awards and declared libya
171responsible on the basis of the rule of pacta sunt servanda. Similarly, 
in B P  case, libya was considered liable for damages, and was
172entitled to restitutio in integrum. In each Libyan arbitration^, there
was the conclusion that Libya had violated its duties under the deeds of
concession and had breached its contractual obligations. However, in
Liamco case identically, it was held that the action was lawful, even so
compensation was due or being prescribed by Libyan law. In the course
of his judgement, Mahmassani said that:
"The classical doctrine required the payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation fpr the nationalized property of an alien, which include the loss 
of future profits from property such as invested capital or a concessionary 
right grant# for W specific huntber of years....."
Referring to Detagpa 2æûShitfeldt added that:
"The classical doctrine was not always accepted neither in the ifiter-war period 
nor after 2nd World war. Adequate compensation as including Ibss of profit 
....... was no more acceptable as an imperative general rule. It retains only the
value of a technical rule for assessment o f eonipensation, and a useful guide 
in reaching settlement agreement as was well and justly asserted.
Libya paid the plaintiffs a 'net book' value rather than 'going 
concern' value of their physical assets. No compensation was paid for loss 
of unextracted oil, future profits or good will.^ "^*
170- T e m o  V. Libya, 17 I.L.M., 1978, p, 30.
171. Topco/Ca/aridriT, Award on the mérita, Para. 3, 17 I.L.M., 1978, p. 3; Para. 
51, Jessup opinion pp. 7-10, and para. 59-62.
BP V. Libya, 53 I.L.R., 1979, p. 358.
173-Lmwcp V. Libia, I.L.R., 1977, (1982), pp. 206-7.
— ;,v,
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Despite all these diversities iir practice and rules of expropriation, 
the achievements through the resolutions of the United Nations are 
considerable, one might well conclude that it might be difficult to identify 
clear cut rules in this area of international law. Milch more development 
is needed to make the related concepts and rules clear and defined. It is 
not possible, except that through the United Nations, for all States to reach 
agreement on common concepts, and to establish the basis for the further 
developments on the exact conditions which State must fulfil when they 
expropriate foreign investments. This in turn will not be possible unless 
the various kinds of economic and political relations which exist between 
investors and the host States, particularly those of developing countries 
are studied carefully, and the related elements taken into account. 
Otherwise, the traditional rules would cause gross injustice to developing 
States and application of domestic laws would become less helpful.
To achieve unanimity in the United Nations, these new rules should
J75be based on the very basic principles of international law which have
been accepted by all States. To implement them, it is necessary to change
the existing relations between developed and developing States.
Accordingly, the circumstances in which foreign investment was
originally made is probably one of the most important factors in
determining the responsibility of an expropriating State. If, for example,
the investment occurred during a colonial, immediate post-colonial or
quasi-colonial period, in assessing the responsibility of States for payment
176of eonipensation, different rules would be appropriate. That has
174. It I L M ,  # 2 ,  pp. 36-7.
7^5- The principles mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations, in Declaration on 
Prihciples of International Law in Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States, and in International Covenants on Hümàn Rights.
^76. Lillich and Amerasinghe are of the same view, see in Lillich R. B., The
v ; V '
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caused some division of views and standards in the international 
community on the question of compensation which has inspired some 
commentators to argue that the traditional international rule on 
compensation for expropriation never existed, or that it has already 
changed, or is in the process of changing, or should be changed to permit 
host States to pay partial rather than full compensation to expropriate
177foreign investors.
As a result, the rules of international minimum standard on 
compensation ha# been challenged as being not applicable to this group of 
countries on the ground that, if the nationalizing country is too poor to 
pay full compensation or if the nationalization is pursuant to a fundamental 
change in the political or economic structure of the State, only partial
178compensation is applicable.
With regard to the developing countries, the lack of free will may be 
as the result of special conditions; the lack of finance, technology, experts 
and so on, without any direct pressure, which make them obliged to accept 
special terms of contracts or agreements. In these countries, great 
inequality in bargaining power may have existed between the investor and
Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 
198, 199; Amerasighe C. P., The Quantum of Compensation for Nationalised 
Property, in Lillich R. B., The Valuation of Nationalized Property in 
International Law, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 91.
177- Glagett B. M .i The Expropriation Issue Before the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal: Is / Just Compensation" Required by InternMonal Law or Not?, 16 
L.P.I.B., 1984, No, 3, p. 876; Dolzer R , New Foundations Uf the Law of 
Expropriation of Alien Property, 75 A.JUL., 1981, pp. 553-557; Schachter 
O., Compensation for Expropriation, 78 A.J.I.L., 1984, p. 121;_Lauterpaeht
H., Oppenheim, International Law, 8th ed. 1955  ^pp. 352-54; Somarajah M., 
Compensation for Expropriation: The Emergence of New Standards, 13 
J.W.T.L., 1979, p. 108.
178- Girvan N,, Expropriating the Expropriators: Compensation Criteria from a Third
World Viewpoint, in Lillich R. B., Thé Valuation of Nationalised Property in 
International Law, vol. 3, op. cit., pp* 149,172-3.
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the host State at the time that they entered into an economic agreement. 
Therefore, it would be unconscionable to hold the host nation to the terms
179of its agreement.
The other possibility in regard to the developing countries, as was 
mentioned earlier, is that by dint of lack of enough knowledge, they may 
often be short-changed by multinational companies. In both cases, when 
the expropriating countries find themselves in a suitable condition, they 
carry out expropriation to adjust the balance between the profit of the 
company and the interest of the country , that is to shift the balance in their 
own favour.
The approach adopted in the cases of Kuwait v Aminoil ixnà
Amoco International Finance Corporation v Iran in some ways reflect the
conditions governing the rules of expropriation in this group of the
countries. The Tribunal m Aminoil case emphasized the importance of a
"balanced indemnification" and of an award based on a "reasonable rate of
180return," as contrasted to "speculative profits."
The evident characteristic of this group of natipnalization cases, as 
was mentioned in the Aminoil case, is the condition of the determination 
of the amount of appropriate compensation on the inquiry into all the 
circumstances relevant to the case. What are those determinant 
circumstances affecting the relevant rules? Have they become the 
international rules applicable to determine the lim itation of the 
compensation? What was the norm according to which the award allowed 
nothing for the loss of profit during the remaining thirty years of the 
concession? The sole compensation for an annual reasonable rate of
179- Asante S, K. B., Stability of Contractual Relations in the Transnational 
Investment Process, 28 I.G.L.Q., 1979, pp. 401,408.
Kuwait V. Aminoil, 66 I.L.R., op. cit., p. 602, para. 144.
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return on the remaining investment was set by the tribunal amounted to 
$10 million which was to be calculated for the period up to the date of 
expropriation on 19 September 1977. The Tribunal accepted neither 
Kuwait's position that compensation should be based on net book value nor 
Aminoil's belief that anticipated lost profit should be compensated, but it 
accepted a moderate line Which clearly bridges the gap between the public 
and thé private iriterést.^*^
In the case nî Amoco International Finance Corporation v Iran^^^ 
the question of the public interest was considered as the cause for partial 
award as the appropriate compensation. The Tribunal held that a 
nationalization cannot be equated to a normal business investment or to a 
transaction in a free market, not only because the expropriating owner is a 
reluctant seller, but also because the expropriating State acts for a public 
purpose.
The elements affecting the amount of compensation payable to the 
Company, according to the Tribunal^ were political considerations and 
considerations of economic policy or of general national interest which 
were taken into account by the Tribunal in order to award compensation 
equitably and prevent any unjust enrichment or deprivation of either 
p a r t y . I n  other words, the Tribunal took into account the economic 
position of both parties as a condition for assessment of the amount of the 
compensation to be paid. This type of approach to appropriate 
compensation is far removed froni that of the international minimum 
standard, according to which appropriaté compensation is equal to full
181- Penrose E., Joffe G., Stevens P., Nationalisation of Foreign-owned Property 
for a Public Purpose: Ail Economic Perspieetive on Appropriate Compensation, 
55 M.L.R., 1992, op. cit., p, 358.
182- Khemco case, (Amoco International Finance Corporation) v. Iran, op. cit. 
Kuwait V. Aminoil, 66 LL.R:, op. cit., pp. 604-6, 609-10.
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compensation which must be paid to the property owners. Nevertheless, 
there need be no contradiction between the two approaches if the norms of 
human rights and unjust enrichment are accepted as general principles of 
international law^?'* and applied for the evaluation of expropriated 
properties, having regard to the particular circumstances of each case. 
Indeed, this would be a inore rational and economically equitable to 
consider the broader issues and long term gains and losses of both parties. 
Such considerations become particularly important when the major 
purpose of a nationalization is to remove what the government claims is an 
unreasonable monopolistic position.^*^ Compensation in this group of 
cases usually relates to foreign contractual claims on the exhaustible 
natural resources of a developing country over which there had long been 
economic and political conflict, which probably was partly responsible for 
a major social and political revolution. The application of the principles 
enunciated makes it possible to take realistic account of a larger number of 
economic considerations affecting both private companies and 
governments where, from the economic point of view, there is a legitimate 
conflict between the interests of property owners and those of a wider 
public. This, in turn, would lead to a deeper consideration of legal aspects 
of the problem and perhaps to a different framework for analysing not 
only the respective positions of the parties, but also the methods of 
valuation from the point of view of appropriate or just compensation.^^^ 
Similar to the Egyptian, Indonesian, Mexican and Iranian expropriations,
184_ Friedmann has expressed thé view that the principle of unjust enrichment should 
now be held to a general principle of law recognised among civilised nations, 
Friedman W., Some hnpacfs of Sbcial Organization on Ihtefnational Law, 50 
A I I L ,  1956, p 505.
185_ Penrose E., Joffe G., Stevens P., NatioriaUsation of Foreign-owned Property 
for a Public Purpose: An Economic Perspective on Appropriate Compensation, 
55 M.L.R., op. cit., pp. 358-9.
186_ Loc. cit., p. 359.
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Cuban expropriation measures targeted a particular State. Article 24 of
Cuban fu n d ^en ta l law of Febmary 7, 1959 provided:
"Confiscation of property is prohibited, but it is authorised for the property of 
the Tyrant deposed on December 31, 1958 and his collaborators, of natural 
law Or juridical persons responsible for crimes against the national economy 
or the public treasury, and those who are enri#ed or have been enriched 
unlawfully under the protection of the public order. No other natiaal or judical 
person can be deprived of his property except by competent juridical authority 
and for a justifiable reason of public benefit or social intèrest and always after 
payment of appropriate compensation in cash fixed by c o u r t  a c t i o n  ......"^*7
These considerations have caused not only developing countries to 
depart from their position in regard to compensation from the 
international minimum standard, but also this attitude has been reflected 
in the position of some developed States. For example, the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Sabbatino decision recognized as early as in 1964 that 
international law was unclear in the area of compensation.
In reply to the United States position on international minimum
standard, Mexican Foreign Affairs Minister on August 3, 1938 stated:
"My Government maintains that there is in international law, no rule
universally accepted in theory nor carried out in practice, which makes 
obligatory the payment of immediate compensation nor even of deferred 
compensation, for expropriation of a general and impersonal character like
those which Mexico has carried o u t   Nevertheless, Mexico admits, in
obedience to own her laws, that she is indeed under obligation to indemnify in 
an adequate manner, but the doctrine which she maintains on the subject, 
which is based on the most authoritative opinions of writers of treaties on 
international law, is that the time and manner of such payment must be 
determined by her own law."^*^
In this category, there is also an argument that partial compensation 
is justified because fufi is impossible as the result of the host
187- Domke M., Foreign Nationalizations, 55 A. JIL ., 1961, p. 587.
188- Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376, U.S. 1964, pp 398, 428, 11 L. 
ed. 2d 804, 84 S. ct. 923, U.S Supreme Court Reports, op, cit, p. 824. 
Hackworth G.H., Digest of International Law, op. cit., p. 655.
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nation's impoverished circumstances/^^ This argument may represent a 
view that the applicability of the international law principle of full 
compensation should depend on the likelihood of its effective 
enforcement. Therefore, the argument needs to have force from an 
equitable perspective. If it is not equitable to take foreign investments 
because the foreign investors suffer loss, it is equally inequitable if the 
host States abandon their social and economic reform and developments 
because they cannot afford to pay full compensation/^^
Further evidence in support of the above argument is that, in many 
international decisions, the reasons for the obligation of States to 
compensate aliens were not discussed in explicit terms. This is, as pointed 
out by some writers, due to the fact that the terms of reference of the 
tribunals examining the disputes concern, explicitly or implicitly, the 
determination of the amount of compensation, rather than the very duty
192of compensation.
Another example of this category of cases is the Peruvian
nationalization of IPC in 1968. After the unsuccessful attempts of
President Belaunde to repossess La Brea y Parinas oilfields, as the result
of the pressure by the United States Embassy and the State Department, on
October 9, 1968, the revolutionary Government of Peru took possession
of the oilfields and the Talara industrial complex held and operated by
IPC up to that time.^^^ The action was characterized as the initiation of a
constitutional expropriation which was carried out as revindication, or
190_ Girvan N., Expropriating the Expropriators: Compensation Criteria from a 
Third World Viewpoint, see in Lillich B. R„ The Valuation of Nationalised 
Property in International Law, vol. 3, op, cit., pp. 149,172-3.
191- International Convention on Human Rights, op. cit.
192- Piran H., Natiohalisatiph of Foreign Property in International Law and Iran- 
U,S. Claims Tribunal, op. cit., p. 317; Fatouros A. A., Government 
Guarantees to Foreign Investors, New York, 1962, op. cit., p. 302.
193- Furnish, D. B., Petroleum Expropriation in Peru and Bolivia, op. cit., p. 63.
_______________________
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recovery by the rightful owner of property held by another. The 
revindication measure meant that the government claimed a right to 
recoup the oil reserves as they existed in 1924. For the part of those 
reserves which was extracted and could not be replaced, the government 
asked $690,524,283 by way of restitution.^^'*
Although Socialist countries were not in such a position, but their 
ideological approach was similar. Their position was that there was no 
obligation on the part of the expropriating State to provide compensation 
because nationalization entails a restoration of the property to its rightful 
and lawful owners, namely the people. Like Mexico, they maintained that 
there is no obligation on the part of the taking State to make reparation. 
Nevertheless, they generally agreed to compensate for property so 
expropriated, although it may have been expressed to be ex gratia, in 
which case the payment is generally far from being adequate.
The Egyptian nationalizations of British and French owned 
properties and the Indonesian nationalization of Dutch-owned properties 
were presented as struggles against the domination of those countries. 
Expropriation of the properties under such conditions was not only to 
improve the public sectors of the society, but it was the public interests in 
general which would determine the conditions of the expropriations in 
this group of the countries. Demand for political and economic self- 
determination, national control and security, and so on are the elements 
involved in these group of expropriations.
Developing States have attempted to strike a balance, if possible 
between the interest of the public and foreign investments. For example
194- Loc. cit.
195- Akinsania A. A., The Expropriation of Multinational Property in the Third 
World, op. cit., p. 29.
_______
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in Peru, upon expropriating the International Petroleum Company in i
January and February 1969, the Government of Peru announced that it 
would pay full compensation to the company once the latter had paid the 
value of the petroleum "illegally" ex:traeted since 1924. This was fixed by i
the Government at $690 million. The Company received a lump-sum i
amount of $23,1 million in 1974 as compensation agreed between Peru 
and the United States. The compensation payable to ITT as a result of its 
property expropriated in Peru, was to be reinvested in Peru, The 
agreement between Peru and the United States on the compensation for 
the taking of Marcona Iron Mining Company was to be financed by 
foreign loan.^ ^** Such practices as those, adopted by of the developing i
countries reflect the realities of their relations with foreign investors. i
In their establishnient, the position of the Eastern European 
countries on expropriation of foreign property was as revindication of the 
public rights. However, later they provided guarantees to foreign 
investors. For exanlple, Article 106 of the Bulgarian Decree No. 56 
provides that investmentsmade by foreign persons shall not be subject to 
confiscation or expropriation through adm inistrative procedure. 
Expropriation should be ntade by agreement, and in the case of non­
agreement, the amount of compensation should be determined by the 
district court.
Similarly according to the law of Czechoslovakia expropriation 
should be carried out on the basis of law, and the foreign participant i
196- On Peruvian expropriations see Sigmund P. E., Multinationals in Latin America, 
the Politics of Nationalization, University of Wisconsin ftess,.M  1980,
pp. 180-224; Furnish D. B., Petroleurn Expropriation in Peru and Bolivia, op. 
cit., pp. 55-85.
197^  Burzynski A., The Concept df n Joint Venture and the Legal Context for Joint 
Ventures in CMEA Countries, 5 Florida International Law Journal 1990, Spr., 
pp. 189-90.
- - ■ ' :
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should receive a prompt compensation corresponding to the actual value 
of its property at the time when the property was affected by the
iqameasure.
Although the legal systems of these countries are not prepared to 
serve foreign investments, and until recently the only major ecOnornic 
entities in these countries, State enterprises, were created by 
administrative decisions, and in consequence of their confiscatory acts, the 
gesture of these countries illustrated in their laws to show their 
commitments based on their free will, confirms our classification of the 
cases according to the conditions which investments enter to the recipients 
countries. However, with regard to the Eastern European expropriations, 
which were carried out, ostensibly at least, in accordance with Marxist 
Ideology, any element which directly affect the basic rights and national 
interest of a country would comprise the condition for expropriation.
In general, there is the need for a comprehensive rule that will 
provide for the distribution of burdehs and damages suffered by the 
parties. Where damage has been suffered by a member of the community 
in the interests of the latter it would be unjust that that member alone 
should bear the fuU burden of the sacrifice.
The same principle should apply in the case of nationalization of 
enterprises already established. If the interests of the community are 
invoked in order to justify payment of less than full compensation, 
contrary to the practice adopted in the case of expropriation, it should 
nevertheless be recognized that such a justification can not be put forward 
as applying to foreigners who, by the very fact of nationalization, have 
been cast from the national community in whose favour nationalization 
has been carried out.
198- Section 22 of the Czechoslovakian Act No. 173, Para. 1&2.
.:;V 5
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In total, the formula of expropriation in third world countries has 
different framework, particularly when aliens belong to a politically 
dominating State, As expropriation measures in developing countries 
usually does not comply with the traditional rules, it is necessary to divide 
States into two groups; and implement rules appropriate to each group of 
those States. On this basis, the rules expressed in the various resolutions 
of the United Nations on sovereignty over natural resources would end 
the controversy over the rules of expropriation. Accordingly, the term 
"appropriate compensation" would comprise different amounts when 
implemented in relation tp different groups of States, and would satisfy 
their needs and interests in this regard without dbing any injustice to
199either interested parties. It is the time to recognize those elements
which differentiate the developed and developing States as legal means,
and account them in assessment of expropriation measures of developing
201States to bring the demanding justice to the parties. That has been the
reason for some writers having suggested that it is hot possible to establish
a single standard or principle for the valuation of nationalized foreign
202property as a universal rule of ihtemational law.
Developing States need development and protection against exploitation by 
foreign companies; On the other hand, the position of foreign investors in 
developing countries is so advantageous that in any condition of expropriation 
they would rarely be treated unjustly; see the elements suggested in this regard 
in the general conclusion of this work.
200_ ggg the elements suggested in the general conclusion of this work.
Lissitzyn O. J;, The Meaning of the Term Denial of Justice in International Law, 
30 A.J.I.L., 1936, p. 632; Lillich R. B., The Valuation of Nationalized 
Property in International Law, vol. Ill, op. cit., pp. 196-7.
202_ Vicuna O., The International Regulation of Valuation Standards and Processes: 
A Re-examination of Third World Perspectives^ Chapter V, in Lillich R. B., 
The Valuation of Nationalized Property in Ihtemational Law, vol. Ill, op. cit., 
p. 131.
________ ________________
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(SECTION THREE)
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Numerous and varied mtemational agreements have been concluded, 
especially since the Second World War* in relation to the investments of 
aliens. They could be classified in two main groups :
1 -  agreements concluded to secure aliens' properties before being 
affected by any measure of expropriation, i.e, investment guarantee 
agreements.
2- agreements which are related to the payment of compensation, 
i.e. tjfe claim settlement agreements.
The first group of agreements are not much related to this work and 
should be discussed in a separate work. In this section, the latter group 
will be discussed. Although, the common subject of these agreements is 
payment of compensation, they demonstrate considerable variation with 
regard to the types of claims covered, the form of compensation agreed 
upon, the method of payment adopted and the procedure fo be followed.
These agreements could be divided into three main groups each of 
which will be considered in turn. Group 1 consists of the individual 
agreeitients concluded between a State and an individual claimant. Group 
2 comprises the agreements between States, which did not result in 
payment of compensation. Group 3 comprises the agreements between 
States and resulted in payment of compensation in various forms.
International Agreements 160
1 - INDIVIDUAL AGREEMENTS
Occasionally, individual agreements for the payment of compensation
for the expropriated property of aliens have been concluded directly
between the aliens concerned and the government of the expropriating
State. Direct recourse by private persons has always existed within the
realm of domestic adjudication. Yet, there is no denying that the process
of decision through which most of these private claims have been and
continue to be resolved - what is called the law of international claims -
has reflected mainly inter-State dealings. In the absence of diplomatic
initiative on the part of the private claimants' government, these claims
1have generally gone begging. The reason is that individuals are not 
subjects of public international law and the agreements concluded between 
them and other States have not been supported by international law. 
However, with the recent developments in the Iran-US claim 
settlements, they may receive more international attention.
One of the earliest agreements is the 1940 Agreement between the
American corporation of Sinclair Oil Corporation and the Mexican
Government for compensation for its expropriated Oil properties. The
company accepted compensation of $8.5 million payable over a period of
three years. A similar agreement was reached between Whitehall
Securities Corporation Ltd., a British company, and the Mexican
L Lillich R. B. and Wetson B. H., International Claims: Their Settlement by 
Lump-Sum Agreements, part I, the commentary, The Virginia University Press,
1975, p. 10.
2- The latest of this kind of the agreements is the agreement between Iran and two 
American companies (ARGO & SUN) which after long-term negotiations the 
two Companies were compensated for $260 milion, they had claimed for $1.3 
billion, (not published yet), in Joumhoori lslami, No. 3826, 22nd Aug. 1992, p.
2; The agreement was approved by the Iranian Parliament, Joumhoori Islami,
No. 3884, 29th Oct. 1992, p. 13.
Internationa! Agreements 161
Government.
Other important individual agreements relate to the claims of the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Suez Canal Company. The 
agreement of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company is of considerable length 
and complexity."*
The compensation agreement between Egypt and the Suez Canal 
Company, as well as other individual agreements were achieved initially 
through diplomatic agreements and then through lump-sum agreements 
with regard to the conditions surrounding each case. Moreover, the 
limited practice of the individual agreements is insufficient to conclude a 
new rule of customary international law, particularly when some of those 
expropriating States; while paying compensation for their expropriation 
measures, expressly maintained their legal position.
2 - AGREEMENTS BETWEEN STATES Ï
2 - 1 - Agreements not Resulting in the Actual Payment of 
Compensation:
In this group of the cases, the parties to the agreements did not
decide not to pay or not to receive compensation for the expropriated
property. It comprises either those agreements which contain an
undertaking on the part of the nationalizing State to pay compensation or
3- Gnid. 7275, 1947: Ratification by Mexican Congress, September 11, 1947; see 
more in Friedman S., Expropriation in International Law, London 1953, p. 29.
It will be discussed in chapter three on ''Laman Qil Nationalization*'.
5- Mexico was a country that maintained her legal position not being responsible 
for payment of compensation to aliens; Hyde, Compensation for Expropriation,
33 Â.J.I.L., 1939, PP; 109, 111-112.
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which establish a procedure for dealing with claims, but which 
nevertheless, do not result to the paynibnt of compensation or, the cases 
which the parties did not reach an ultimate agreement for the payment of 
compensation and no compensation was paid. This group of agreements 
could be subdivided into two groups. First, agreements which set up 
Mixed Commissions** composed of representatives of the contracting 
States and entrusted with various functions concerned with, for example, 
the interpretation of the agreement or assessment and determination of the 
compensation to be paid by the nationalizing State, and second, 
agreements which settled the individual claims according to the municipal 
law of the nationalizing State.
The agreement between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia of Septerhber 
4, 1947^, the agreement concluded between the United Kingdom and 
Poland in 1948 , the Danish-Poland agreement concluded on May 5, 
1949,^ and the agreement of May 23, 1949 between Italy and
IÔYugoslavia are among this group of agreements.
White considers this type of agreements^ as "not rernàrkablè, see in 
Nationalisation of Foreign Property, London 1961, p. 193 Note 22; Huston 
states their creation exceptional procedure which is not the normal feature of the 
conduct p f inter-state relations, see in International Tribunals; Past and Future, 
Washington, 1944, p. 196.
Agreement Concerning Czechoslovak Assets Se(juestrated apd Nationalized in 
Yugoslavia on 4 September 1947, 112 U.N.T.S., 1951, p. 91.
Exchange of Notek Constituting an Agreement Concerning Compensation for 
British Interests Affected by thé Polish NtiOnalization Law of 3 January 1948,
87 U.N.T.S., p. 3.
Protocol No. 1 on Danish Interests and Assets in Poland, Warsaw 12 May 
1949, U.N.T.S., op. cit., p. 179; This agreement was also supefseded by the 
agreement of February 26, 1953. 186 U.N.T.S., p. 301.
Agreement Concerning Italian Property, Rights and Interests in Yugoslavia, 
Belgrade, 23 May 1949, 150 U.N.T.S., 1952, p. 179. This agreement was 
also superseded by the agreement of December 18, 1954, but did not enter into 
force until February 10, 1956. 284 U.N.T.S., 1957-58, p. 239.
_____
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The other group of agreements comprises individual claims settled in
accordance with the municipal law of the nationalizing State.
One of those agreements was concluded between Czechoslovakia and
Belgium on March 19, 1947.^^ Under its terms, the Czechoslovakia
agreed to give the claims of Belgian holders of shares no less favourable
treatm ent than Czech nationals in determining the amount of
compensation due. However, the Belgians did not in fact receive any
eonipensation and the issue was later resolved through a later lump-sum
compensation agreement concluded between Belgium and Luxembourg on
12the one hand and the Czechoslovakia oh the other.
A similar agreement between Czechoslovakia and France also failed 
to settle the question of compensation with regard to French property 
rights and interests. According to White, Czechoslovakia agreed to 
pay compensation, determined by the Czech Government, to individual 
French claimants who were able to establish the legitimacy of their 
claims. However, the Parties did hot reach an agreement because the 
Czech authorities persistently contested the legitimacy of the clairnants’ 
rights and the amount of the compensation due/^
The only agreement which was not superseded by a lump-sum 
agreement and worked through an individual procedure was the 
agreement between the Czechoslovakia and the Netherlands signed on 
November 4, 1949.^^
H- Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement Concerning Belgian Property 
Nationalized, Confiscated or Transferred by the Czechoslovak National 
Administration, Brussels 19 March 1947, 23 U.N.T.S., 1948-49, p. 35.
12- Fpighel L, Nationalisation, London, 1957, p. 132, (n. 1). ?
13- No english text of the agreement was found.
14- White G., Nationalisation of Foreign Property, op. cit., p. 199.
13- Loc. cit
16- 155 B.F.S.P, 1949, III, p. 292.
------- _________________ ---- ______ ____
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This type of agreement/f, under which the compensation is either left 
to the discretion of the authorities of the nationalizing State, or is 
governed by the municipal law of that State, is not favoured by States 
whose nationals' property has been taken. In practice, they have not been 
successful, but rather have been superseded by agreements providing 
international settlements. The contradiction between the terms and the 
result of these agreements shows that the terms of the agreements did not 
carry with them the recognition of the rules they contain and has made it 
difficult to derive from them a clear international customary rule on the 
law of expropriation.
2 - 2 - Agreements Resulting in the Payment of Compensation
This group of agreements encompass the majority of expropriation 
cases. They include many different kinds of agreements which may be 
classified as follows:
2 - 2 - 1 - Agreements concluded between Developed 
Countries:
Following the nationalization of gas and electricity undertakings in 
April, 1946, France concluded compensation agreements with five States
17to deal with individual claims arising from those expropriations. The
Convention Between the Belgian Government and the French Govvernment 
Concerning the Conditions for the Compensation of Belgian Interests in the 
Nationalized Gas and Electricity Undertakings, 18 February 1949, 31 
U.N.T.S., 1949, p. 173; And April 12, 1950, 73 U.N.T.S , 1950, p. 257; 
Agreement (with Annexes and Exchange of Notes) Relating to the Terms of 
Compensation of British Interests in Ntionalized Gas and Electricity
.
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agreement between France arid Belgium of February 18, 1949, was
limited to the claims of Belgian stockholders which by later agreement
extended to Belgian hationais who were direct owners of the natipnalized 
18undertakings. The rule of nori^discririiination was applied which 
granted the Belgian nationals most-fàvouredmation treatment.
While the compensation to be paid might be considered adequate, it 
was not prompt; The municipal law of France was to determine the
19amount of the compensation to be paid. It was redeemable in 
installments, the first redemption to occur within six months of the 
ratification of the agreement. The payment procedure varied and the 
amount of compensation was not effective in the sense that the capital 
obtained from redemption was not transferable abroad, but had to be 
reinvested in France, All the agreements with France followed a common 
pattern, coritaining an arbitration clause regarding any difficulties which 
might arise in regard to the iuteipretation or application of the pro vis lops 
which were not settled by direct negotiatibh.
These agreements represent a departure from the international 
minimum standard rules which should be considered in the light of the 
post-World War situation in France.
Undertakings^ Paris 11 April 1951,106 U.N.TS., 1951, p. 3; The other states 
are: Switzerland, Canada, and Luxembourg.
The agreements with Belgium oh February 18, 1949 and on April 12, 1950, 
op. cit.
19" Articles 10, 11, 12 and 14 of the French Law of April 8, 1946 was to be the 
basis of calculation of the compensation.
. . .  . . . . . ./ . -  :
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2 - 2 - 2 - Lump-sum Agreements:
Compensation settlements after World War II were marked by the
20phenomenon of lump-sum agreements. A majority of these lump-sum 
agreements provided for the payment of compensation in installments 
over a period of years. In pnly a few of them was payment to be made in 
one transaction.^^
The lump-sum agreements were the result of the non-payment of 
compensation through other means such as remedies under municipal law 
or under national or international arbitration. Lump-sum agreements 
were the result of diplomatic intervention. But in their intervention, 
States consider what might be the impact on the relations with the 
expropriating States, and on foreign policy generally. Therefore, the 
determination to espouse a claim against a foreign State becomes an act of 
national policy
Countries may have different political, social, economical and other
motives in deciding how to pursue national policy. It is difficult to find
the reasons for pursuing the different policies in all of the agreements and
determine their exact effect on the international rules on expropriation of
foreign properties. Soine believe that lump-surn agreements are no more
Lillich R. B., International Claims: Postwar British Practice, Syracuse 
University Press, 1967; Lillich R. B., Lump Sum Agreements, op. cit.; Lillich 
R, B. and Weston B. H„ International Claims: Their Settlerhetit by Lump Sum 
Agreements, University of Virginia Press, 1975; Weston B. H., Intematipnal 
Claims: Postwar French ftactice, Symcuse University Press, 1971; Garcia- 
Amador, F. V., The Proposed New International Economic Order, p. 22; 
Fatouros A. A., Goyemment Guarantees to Foreign Investors, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1962, p. 303.
Foighel I., Nationalisation, op. cit., p. 98; White G., Nationalisation of 
Foreign Property, op. cit., p. 206; Kronfol Z. A., Protection of Foreign 
Investment, op. cit., p; 120.
22. Kronfol Z. A., Protection of Foreign Investment, op. cit., p. 127.
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than a lex specialis, and have no legal effect beyond the unique
23circumstances giving rise to them. If this is correct, how then can they 
be dignified as "sources" of general international law from which 
guidance can be secured in regulation of international behaviour and 
responsibilities? While they represent merely a conipromise between the 
polar positions held on this question, lump-sum agreenients also represent 
voluntary concessions to socio-economic and political^ extra-legal 
expediencies such as demands for the release of frozen assets, the 
remission of outstanding debts, the promise of commercial trade and 
purchase of goods and such other rewards which can strengthen a
; ’ 24particular bargaining hand. But if one is to seek absolute equality of 
bargaining power and the complete absence of pressures, very few 
settlements of international disputes or arrangements of inatters of mutual 
concern could be taken as evidence of customary international law. 
However, it cannot be true that all of the lump-sum agreements carry with 
them the recognition or creation of new law, particularly when the 
compensation agreements as part of international settlements present* and 
obtain recognition for counter claims and have reciprocal impact.^^
Lillich and Weston, International Claims, op. cit., p. 11.
24. Mintz N. N., Economic Observations on Lump-sum Agreements, 43 Indian 
Law Journal, 1968, p. 885; The revised version of the easy see in Lillich and 
Weston, International Claims, op. cit., p, 264.
25. Foighel I., Nationalisation, op. cit., pp. 122-23; Fatouros A., Government 
Guarantees to Foreign Investors, 1962, pp. 305-6; See also Lillich and 
Weston, International Claims, op. c it , p 17.
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2 - 2 - 3 - Agreements Between Developed and Less 
Developed Countries:
A relatively large number of the expropriations of alien property 
occurred in the Eastern European countries. Although the measures taken 
by these States were based on Communist ideology, the realities of 
international relations induced them to conclude compensation agreements 
with the governments of the expropriated nationals.
One of the earliest lump-sum agreements was concluded between the 
Soviet Union and the U.K. in 1929. As a result of a new economic policy 
in the Soviet Union which caused the interference in the conduct of 
businesses, the Lena Gold Fields Ltd,, a British company claimed against 
that country. As a result of an awafd^ ** made in London in favour of the 
company, £13m was to be paid to the company by the Soviet Union. 
After long negotiations with the U.K. government, the Soviet government 
agreed in 1934 to pay the company transferable notes for £3 million, 
payable six-monthly over a period of twenty years. This agreement was 
honoured until 1940.
Under the agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia of 
July 19, 1948, the Government of Yugoslavia agreed to pay the sum of 
$17m to the Government of the United States in full settlement of all 
claims of the nationals of the United States on property rights and 
interests which was nationalized or taken by the Yugoslav Government 
between September 1, 1939 and the date of the agreerhent.^^ 
Correspondingly, the United States Government was to unblock Yugoslav
26- Lena Gold Fields ArbitxQtion, I.L.R., 1929-30, pp. 426-7.
27- Article 1 of the United States and Yugoslav agreement Regarding Pecunary 
Claims of the United States and Its Nationals (with a ido -mémoire and 
Exchange of Notes) of July 19, 1948, 89 U.N.T.S., 1951, p. 44.
________________________ __
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public and private assets and enable that Government to use or export the
gold which amounted to $46,800,000 and other assets on deposit in its
28name in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The agreement 
covered only the claims of direct owners of nationalized undertakings or 
shares in such undertakings or the claims of mortgagees of real property 
and of stock, without waiving or releasing any claims of the Yugoslav
29nationals against any nationals of the United States. The provisions of 
Article 5 of the agreement were violated and the American nationals’ 
property was expropriated and later became the subject of the agreement 
of November 5, 1946.^®
The agreement also contains contradictory provisions when it states 
that, in accordance with the Convention of Commerce and Navigation 
between the United States and Serbia, signed in October 2-14, 1881, the 
Government of Yugoslavia agreed to accord to nationals of the United 
States lawfully continuing to hold or acquiring assets in Yugoslavia, and 
also the rights and privileges of using and administering those assets, on 
conditions not more favourable than the rights and privileges accorded to
31nationals of Yugoslavia or of any other country. The Yugoslav 
Government based these promises on the Convention that existed before 
the expropriation measures and granted the rights which had been denied
28- The Aide-Memoire from the Department of State Gonceming the Issuance of 
Licenses Unblocking Yugoslav Assets in the United States, 89 U.N.T.S.,
1951, p. 46
29- Articles 2(A, B, C) and 4 of the agreenient of 1948; creditors and bondholders 
were not included, 89 U.N.T.S., op. cit.
The amount of $3,500,000 was paid in five annual instalments; U.S. and 
Yugoslav Agreement Regarding Claims of U.S. Nationals, Belgrade, 5 
November 1964,550 U.N.T.S., 1965, p. 3L
31- Article 5 of the agreement Between the Government of the U.S. and 
Yugoslavia Regarding Pecunary Claims of the U.S. and its nationals, July 19,
1948, in 89 U.N.T.S., op. cit., pp. 45-6.
. . .  . .
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in practice. The nationalization measures, as in all other Eastern 
European countries, had ideological motives, i,e. they were not for 
public utility alone, but for deprivation of private property. However,32the rule of non-discrimination was inserted in the agreement.
The claims of creditors against nationalized enterprises were not
33included in the agreement. The exclusion of such claims has not 
however been a common feature of these agreements. Indeed, such claims 
were covered in the agreements concluded between Switzerland and
34 ' 3 5  3^ 6Hungary, between Poland and Yugoslavia, between Sweden and
37 38H ungary  and Czechoslovakia between the United States and
Poland^^ and between the United Kingdom and U.S.S.R.^^
On the other hand, the agreement between the United States and the
41Yugoslavia, together with the agreements between Norway and Poland,
32- Loc. cit.
33- It was excluded similarly in the agreement of March 16, 1967, (Art. 5), 
between France and Cuba Concerning the Indemnification of french Property, 
Rights and Interests A ffected by the Laws and Measures Promulgated by Cuba 
since 1 January 1959, English text see in Lillich And Weston, International 
Claims, op. cit., p. 345.
34- Article 1(1), 1950 RQLF 736; (1950) AS 712; English text see in Lillich and 
Weston, International Claims, op. cit., p. 49.
35- Article 1(3), 1949 ROLF 839; (1949) AS 817, English text see in Lillich and 
Weston, International Clairiis, op. cit., pi 21.
36- Article 4(2), 1948 RQLF^95; (1948) AS 1007; English text see in Lillich and 
Weston, International Clairps, op. cit., p. 16.
37- Article 1(1), 1951 S.O. No. 16; English text see in Lillich and Weston, 
International Claims, op. cit., p. 57.
38- Article 1, Para 2, 1967 S O No. 52; English text see in Lillich and Weston, 
International Claims, opr cit., p, 144.
39- Article 2(c), Agreement Between U.S. and Poland Regarding Claims of 
Nationals of the U.S., Washington, 16 July 1960, 384 U.N.T.S,, p. 172.
40- Article 1(a), U.K. and Soviet Union Agreement Concerning the Settlement o f  
Mutual Financial and Property Claims, London, 5 January 1968, 638 
U.N.T.S., 1968, p. 42; B.T.S. 1968, No. 12.
   :
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Sweden-Czechoslovakia,'*^ Netherlands-the U.S.S.R./^ United States- 
Canada,'*^ the Federal Republic of Germany-Italy Austria-Japan;^^
47and Great Britain-the Federal Republic of Germany provided that 
compensation was to be paid in a single transaction.
Against the payment of Poland's debt, and release of blocked Polish 
assets by the Norwegian Government by the agreement of December 23,
481955, Poland agreed to pay compensation for Norwegian nationalized 
property.
In a similar agreement between Sweden and Czechoslovakia on 
December 22, 1956, the lump-sum agreed was five million Swedish
41- The Agreement of December 23, 1955 Between Norway and Poland Relating 
to the Liquidation of Mutual Financial Aaim (1955) St, prp, nr, 103; English 
text in Lillich and Weston, International Claims, op. cit., p. 123.
42- Thb Agreement of December 22, 1956 Between Sweden and Czechoslovakia 
Concerning the Settlement of Certain Claims and Debts, (1957) S.O. No 52; 
English text in Lillich and Weston, International Claims, op. cit., p. 143.
43- The compensation payable to either party by the other party was equally 
3,400,000 Dutch guilders was considered to have been paid and received on the 
day of the agreement entered into force without an exchange of money; 656 
U.N.T.S., p. 45.
44- The Agreement of November 18, 1968 Between U.S. and canada, 6 U.S.T.,
7863; T.I.A.S., No. 6624.
45- The Agreement of October 19, 1967 Between Germany and Italy Concerning 
the Settlehient of Property, Gohomic and Financial Matters to the Second World 
War, (1969) BG B1. IÏ353; English text in Lillich and Weston, International 
Claims, pp. cit., p. 352.
46- The Agreement of Nbyernber 29, 1966 Between Austria and Japan, English 
text see in Lillich and Weston, International Claims, op. cit., p. 335.
47. U.K. and German Agreement concefhing cdtnpensatibn for U.K. Nationals 
Who Were Victims of National-^Sbcialist Measures of Persecution, Bonn, June 
9, 1964, U K.T.S., 1964, No. 42; 539 U;N.T'S., 1965, p. 187.
48- Article 1, Agreement to the Liquidation of Mutual Financial Claims, (1955) St. 
prp. hr. 103, English text in Lillich and Weston, International Claims, op. cit., 
p. 123; compensation for the damage and suffering caused during the Second 
World War.
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Kronor as indemnification for Swedish property, rights and interests 
affected by the Czechoslovak measures of nationalization and by all other 
measures, whether consequent upon modifications in the Czechoslovak 
economy or due to the war, as well as for the Swedish claims concerning 
property confiscated during the occupation,^^
The agreenient between Sweden and Czechoslovakia was the outcome 
of long negotiations and ihvblvement of numerous factors. The 
compensation was set off in its entirely against the sum of five million 
Kronor allocated to Czechoslovakia as part of the Swedish Gbvemment's 
contribution under the Washington Accord of July 18* 1946 to certain
50signatories of the Paris Agreement reparation. The agreem ent 
abrogated the earlier exchange of notes between the two States by which 
Czechoslovakia undertook to grant most favoured nation treatnient to 
Swedish interested parties with regard to the application of Decrees 100, 
101,102 and 103 of 1945, as well as the rules and measures relating to 
confiscations,^^
The bulk of the lump-sum agreements comprises those under which 
compensation was paid in installments over a period of years. In sonie of 
them* payment of compensation was conditional upon and tied to some 
counter measures to be carried out by the other parties which were to 
receive the compensatibn.
Seven such agreements were concluded between the United Kingdom 
and Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rpumania 
and the Soviet Union.^^ The first of these agreements with Yugoslavia
49- Article 1 of the Agreement Between Sweden and Czechoslovakia December 22*
1956, (1957) S.O. No* 52; English text in Lillich and Weston, International 
Claims, op. cit., pp. 143-4.
50- White G., Nationalisation of Foreign Property, op. cit., p. 209.
5L Article 9 of the Agreement Between S weden and Czechoslovakia December 22,
1956, op. cit., p. 145.
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which was related to the terms and conditions of payment of the amount 
agreed on, was signed on December 23, 1948, and was completed by the
53Exchange of Notes on December 26, 1949. The payment of 
compensation was conditional upon the conclusion of a long-term trade 
agreement between the contracting parties. Apart from £450,000 which 
was to be paid not later than one year after the signature of the first 
agreement, it was agreed later that the rest of the compensation, which 
amounted £4,050,000, to be paid in fifteen half-yearly installments over a 
period of seven years.^'* The agreement on the amount and the 
procedure of payment indicates that it was neither prompt nor adequate 
and effective. It was not full and adequate in the sense that what the
52- With some of these countries more th ^  one agreement was concluded; The 
U K and Yugoslav Agreement Concerning Compensation for British Property, 
Rights and Interests Affected by Yugoslav Measures of Nationalization, 
Expropriation, Dispossession and Liquidation (with Exchange of Notes), 
London, 23 Decerriber, 1948, 81 U.N.T.S., 1951, p. 121, U.K. and Yugoslav 
Trade Agfeemeht (with Schedules, Exchange of Notes and Appendixes), 
Belgrade, 26 December, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S., 1951, pp. 71, 402 (two 
a^eements); U.K.T.S. 1949, No. 60 and U.K. and Czechoslovak Trade and 
Financial Agreement, London, 28 September, 1949, 86 U.N.T.S., 1951, pp.
141, 161, 176 (three agreements); U.K.T.S. 1954, No. 77, and Agreement 
Between U.K. and Poland Regarding to the Settlement of Financial Matters, 
Warsaw, 11 November, 1954, 204 U.N.T.S., 1955, p. 137; U.K.T.S. 1955,
No. 79 and 222 U.N*T.S. p. 349; U.KT.S. 1956, No. 30, and 249 
U.N.T.S., p. 19; U.K.T.S. 1960, No. 82, and Agreement Between U.K. and 
Romania Relating to the Settlement of Financial Matters, London, 10 
November, 1960, 385 UvN.T.S., 1961, p. 113; U.K.T.S. 1968, No. 12, and 
U.K; and Soviet Union Agieement Concerning the Settlement of Mutual 
Financial and Property Claims, London, 5 January 1968, 638 U.N.T.S. 1968, 
p. 41.
53- Agreement Between U.K. and Yugoslavia Regarding Compensation for British 
Property, Rights and Interests Affected by Yugoslav Measures of 
Nationalization, Expropriation, Dispossession and Liquidation, London, 23 
December 1948, 87 U.N.T.S., 1951, p. 402.
54- U.K. and Yugoslav Trade Agreement of 26 December 1949, 87 U.N.T.S,,
1951, p. 71.
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British government paid her own nationals for the claim raised in respect 
of the Yugoslav measures was five times more than that paid by the 
Yugoslav government as compensation/^ Moreover, it imposed a long­
term trade agreement on the government of the claimants.
The compensation agreement of September 28, 1949, between the 
United Kingdom and Czechoslovakia did not secure a better condition. 
Again the compensation agreement^^ was closely connected to a trade 
and financial ag reem en t,an d  also to an agreement for the settlement of
58certain inter-governmental debts. Similarly, the compensation was in 
regard to all claims of British nationals affected by the measures of 
nationalization, expropriation, disposition, or other restrictive measures, 
irrespective of their legality or illegality. The amount of £8m was agreed 
to be paid in eighteen half-yearly installments,^^ which would equal 7 
per cent of the sterling proceeds of Czech exports to U.K.*^  ^The Report
55- The amount paid by Yugoslav Govemment was £4,500,000, but the amount 
paid by the Foreign Compensation Commission was £25,120,582; Sith Anual 
Report of Foreign Compensation Commission for the Financial Year Ended the 
31st of March, 1956, Cmd. 9849, (1956), No. 9, p. 4,
56- Preamble of U.K. and Czechoslovak Agreement Regarding Compensation for 
British Property, Rights and Interests Affected by Czechoslovak Measures of 
Nationalization, Expropriation amd dispossession, 28 September, 1949, 86 
U.N.T.S., 195 Ip. 161.
57- U.K. and Czechoslovak Trade and Financial Agreement, London, 28 
September, 1949, 86 U.N.T.S., op. cit., p. 141.
U.K. and Czechoslovak Agreement Regarding to the Settlement of Certain 
Intergovernmental Debts, London, 28 Septemver, 1949, 86 U.N.T.S., op. 
cit., p. 175.
59- Article 3(a), Agreement Between U.K. and Czecholovakia Regarding 
Compensation for British Property, Rights and Interests Affected by 
Czecholovak Measures of Nationalization, Expropriation and Dispossession, 
London, 28 September 1949, 86 U.N.T.S., op. cit., p. 164;
60- The Exchange of Notes Between the Government of U.K. and the Government 
of Czecholovakia, 1956, U.K.T.S. 1957, No. 5,
_________ _______________
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of the Foreign Compensation Commission ^  indicates that the Czech 
Government was to pay the amount of eight million pounds compensation 
which comparing to the amount of £89,768,175 paid by U.K to the 
claimants, was inadequate, The other assertèd international norms such as 
the principle of "public utility" had not been applied equally.
In the agreement between Poland and U.K., it was clearly admitted 
that 65 per cent of the value of the property claimed by the U.K. be the 
basis for the establishment of compensation. But, in the agreement with 
Bulgaria it was agreed that all sums due to the U.K. Government or to 
British nationals from the Bulgarian Government or her nationals from 
commercial and banking transactions, shipping and transport services 
where the obligation arose on or before 28th October 1944 be paid,^^
It is difficult to assess the adequacy of the lump-sum compensation, 
but payrnent of £400,000 compensation over along period of time for all 
the obligations certainly does not appear to constitute adequate 
compensation. The payment of compensation by installments which 
established a small percentage of the sterling proceedings of imports of 
the expropriated party is far from being prompt and adequate. The 
criteria by which the government of the claimant would distribute the 
compensation was to be determined by the receiving government and the
63related domestic law of that State. According to the agreements, the 
government of the claimants became forbidden to pursue further any of 
the settled claims on behalf of the claimants. Thus, it has been the usual 
practice in lump-sum agreements to provide the claimants with no 
alternative but to accept the amount received and distributed through the 
Loc. pit
62- Article 1(a) to (d) of the Agreement op. cit..
63- Halsbury's Laws of England, op. cit., para. 609; Guest A. G., The Crown 
Law, op. cit., para. 7G9.
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agreements. The only exception was the agreement between Italy and 
Tunisia of August 29, 1967, in which it was provided that, in the case of 
refusal on the part of the claimants to accept the amount of the 
compensation granted by Italian authorities, calculated according to the 
Italian legislation, they were admitted to present their claims before the 
Tunisian Government in accordance with the legislation in force in 
Tunisia.**"*
In many cases, the success of the aliens’ government to secure 
pecuinary compensation for its nationals had depended on the extent of the 
assets of the nationalizing State located on its territory and its ability to 
offer advantageous financial or trading terms to that State. For example, 
the United Kingdom's government signed trade agreements with 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia through which it was intended that both 
countries might earn the sterling needed to discharge their obligations 
under their compensation agreements, while Yugoslavia was advanced a 
substantial sterling credit to enable it tp buy goods scheduled in the trade
65agreement. By the Litvinov assignment of 1933, the U.S. government 
obtained title to the Soviet assets in the United States and used the 
proceeds to discharge the Russian obligations to U.S. nationals whose 
assets were nationalized by that government after 1917. Under the U.S- 
Yugoslav Compensation Agreement, Yugoslavia agreed to the release of 
$ 17m (out of $47 million of blocked Yugoslav gold in the United States) 
for disposal upon the free gold market, the proceeds going to 
compensation.66
64- Article 1, Agreement Between Italy and Tunisia Relating to Indemnification and 
to Economic and Financial Cooperation of August 29, 1967, (1968) Rev. Gen. 
D.I.P. 545; English text see in Lillich and Weston, International Claims, op. 
cit., p. 346.
65- Akinsanya A. A., The Expropriation of Multinational Property in the Third 
World, op. cit., p. 30.
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In the agreement between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union 
of January 5, 1968, both countries kept what was in their hands. The 
United Kingdom agreed not to claim for the assets nationalized, 
expropriated or affected by other measures by U.S.S.R including 
property, rights and banking , commercial and financial interests of the 
British nationals in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the Western Regions of 
the Ukraine, Moldayia and Byelofussia. The British assets also included 
bonds owned by nationals of the United Kingdom and shipping services
67provided under the agreement of 22 June, 1942.
These assets were taken for similar claims and properties, including 
bank accounts, ships detained by the British authorities, and banking, 
comnlercial interests belonged to the Soviet Republics, and also the gold 
of the central banks of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia held in the Bank of 
England.
It seems that among the Western European States which have made 
compensation agreements with Eastern European States, Switzerland has 
achieved the most satisfactory results in the matter of compensation and
the terms of payment.**  ^ While the compensation received by ^ w iss was
not prompt, considering them to be satisfactory implies that, if the
66- Fawcett J. E. S., Some Foreign effects of Nationalisation of Property, 27 
B.YJ.L., 1950, pp. 371-75:
67- Article 1, in 638 U.N.T.S., p. 41.
68- Article 2, U.K. and Soviet Union Agreement Concerning the Settlement of 
Mutual Financial and Property Claims, London, 5 January 1968, 638 
U.N.T.S. op. cit.; The piesident of Lithuania in his first visit to London after 
independence demanded the return of the golds belonged to that country.
69- This success had various causes including small number of Swiss nationals 
who had property and investments in the Eastern European States, White G., 
Nationalization; of Foreign Property, op. cit., pp. 48* 63, 117, 197-8, 205-6, 
208,213,217,223-5..
2 -^ For example the corripensation to be paid by Yugoslavia, Poland and Roumania 
to Switzerland were by instalments.
______________________________________
■ :
International Agreem ents  178
Switzerland^ achievements are considered to be in conformity with 
international law, the agreement of other Western European States with 
Eastern Europe fall short of the necessary standards of international law.
The behaviour of this group of countries can be evaluated according
to the background of the measures they took. In the West, it is believed
that the rise of communist regimes were the motives and backgrounds that
resulted to the expropriation of the aliens' property, and those regimes
were responsible for the taking of the property of aliens. Having a quick
look at the principles, the rules and philosophy of those States indicate that
in fact* the behaviour of the capital investors, internal and external* were
recognized as being responsible for all those upheavals in the socialist
countries. This belief created a trend in these regimes not to pay
compensation for the properties taken. The evidence of such an attitude is
provided by the agreements made by these countries with the the countries
whose property was nationalized, which contained only a general
recognition of liability to pay compensation, but did not result, at least for
71a long time, in the payment of compensation. However, the theory of 
co-existence raised by their "Political Ideology", and the reality of the 
international relations forced those communist States to reach agreement 
with the investors' governments.
The content of the agreements concluded by Eastern European
71- The examples are the pxchange of Notes Between the United States and Poland 
on April 24, 1946, 4 U.NiT S., p. 155, agreements between Sweden and 
Czechoslovakia of March 15,1947, between Sweden and Hungary Of July 26,
1946, Between Denmark and Poland of December 5, 1947, and Between 
Norway and Poland of February 4,1948, Exchange of Notes between U.S.A. 
and Czechoslovakia of November 14, 1946,7 U.N.T.S., p. 119; Exchange of 
Notes between U.K. and Hungary of August 19, 1954, 199 U.N.T.S., p. 149 
which was finalised by the agreement of June 27, 1956 between U.K. and 
Hungary relating to the settlement of financial matters, Cmd. 9820.
__ _________
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countries is a direct reflection of their economic and political bargaining
power. The conditions contained in these agreements represent a midline
between the agreements concluded between the developed countries and
those between the developed and developing countries. Through these
agreements, in fact, they established a balance between the liability for
payment of compensation by installment, and the opportunity for
development offered by the inclusion of trade agreements.
The provisions of the agreements between the developed countries
are different from the agreements between those of developed and the less
developed countries. In the agreement between United States and Canada
72 'of November 18, 1968, for example, the Government of Canada
agreed to pay a lump-sum of $350,000 in full and final satisfaction of all
claims due by the United States. The compensation was to be paid for
damage or detriment attributable in whole or in part to the construction
and maintenance of Gut Dam, and not as the result of any direct
73expropriation measures taken by Canada, The settlement was made 
without prejudice to the legal and factual positions maintained by the
74parties and was not to be regarded as a precedent for future cases. The
compensation was paid in a lump sum. Although payment was not
"prompt" in the sense of the date the damage was actually sustained,
however, with respect to the nature of the dispute and the position of the
72. The agreement reached following the suggestion of the tribunal established on 
March 25, 1965 that a compromise settlement might be negotiated, 6 U.S.T.,
1968, 7863.
73- Although Canada accepted to pay for the damage sustained by the United 
States, but by using the terms "allegedly attributable" and "allegedly caused", 
Canada did not admit liability for the damage; Para. 2, 5 of the Exchange of 
Notés Between Canada and United States of November 18,1968, 6 U.S.T.,
1968; 7863.
74- Para. C of the Agreement Between Canada and United States of November 18,
1968, 6 U.S.T., op. cit.
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Dam in the international section of the St. Lawrence River, the delay in 
payment seems was inevitable.
The French agreements with Belgium, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
75Canada and Luxembourg following the nationalization of gas and
electricity undertakings in April 1946, were exceptions in which
compensation was to be paid in instalhnents, and capital obtained from
redemption was not transferable abroad In other luihp^surn agreements
between developed countries such limitations have rarely been imposed
upon the property of aliens. But, in most of them, agreed compensation
76was to be paid within few days or months.
2 - 2 - 4 - Agreements concluded between Developed and 
Developing States:
The position of third world countries on the issue of payment of 
compensation is far more complex and less straightforward. All 
developing countries have indicated their attitude toward nationalization 
in their investment laws/codes, policy statements* or constitutions, and 
many accord protection to private foreign property in commercial 
treaties. Those countries providing nationalization clauses in their 
constitutions have also given legal guarantees of compensation, the terms 
"just", "appropriate", "equitable" and "fair" compensation being used 
interchangeably.^^
25- 31 U.N.T.S., p. 173; Vol. 106, p. 3; Vol. 73, p. 257.
26. For example in the agreements between France and Germany of July 27,1961 
(1963) J O., 3367; between Japan and Canada of Sept. 5, 1961 (1961) Can,
T.S. No. 8; 451 U.N.T.S., p. 47; between United States and Canada of Nov.
18, 1968, 6 U.S. T., 7863.
22- Akinsanya A. A., The Expropriation of Multinational property in the Third
— — ---- — /  ' V-:';  . -
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However, the agreements between developing and developed 
countries usually contain conditions less favourable to the countries whose 
nationals' property have been expropriated. The reasons for the 
differences on the conditions of expropriations will be discussed in the
78following section. Here we will discuss the provisions of some of the 
lump-sum agreements concluded between developing and developed 
countries.
On September 10, 1946, Egypt and Italy reached an agreement 
relating to measures taken by the Egyptian Government with regard to 
Italian property, rights and interests in Egypt, and also with regard to the 
damages suffered by Egypt as a result of military operations on its
79territory. The Government of Italy agreed to pay the Government of
Egypt the sum of 4,500,000 Egyptian pounds as the indemnification for 
80war damages and took the amount of 2,172,735 Egyptian pounds for
81other expenses of the Italian nationals and institutions. T h e
Government of Egypt was to maintain under sequestration a portion of
Italian property in Egypt equal in value to the amount of damages
82suffered by Egypt. The Egyptian nationals whose property was 
damaged in Italy were to be indemnified and all the restrictive measures 
against them nullified. As an advantage to Egypt, the provisions 
included in the agreement provided that Italy would renounce in its name
World, op. cit., p. 30.
28- See the section on The Conditions of Expropriation of Aliens' Property under 
International Law, pp.
29- English text of the agreement in Lillich and Weston, International Claims, op. 
c it, p. 1.
Loc; cit., article 1.
81- Lp. cit., article 2.
82-Loc. c it, article 5.
83- Loc. cit., articles 6 and ?.
'6:
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and in that of its nationals* all claims resulting from special war measures 
taken by Egypt including those niehtioned in article 2 of the agreement 
related to Italian property* rights and interests in Egypt. To help the 
economic rehabilitation of Italy, Egypt also agreed riot raise any new 
claim against Italy.*"*
A similar agreement, concerning financial and commercial relations 
and British property in Egypt, was signed between the United Kingdom
85and Egypt on February 28, 1959. In terriis of this agreement, the
Government of Egypt undertook to lift the sequestration measures
imposed on British property since July 26, 1956 and return such property
86or the proceeds thereof to the persons entitled. Properties belonging 
to British nationals, sold by the Government of Egypt between October 
30, 1956 and August 2, 1958 were excluded from those undertakings, and 
all exchange control restrictions on Egyptian accourits and restrictions on
87Egyptian transactions were removed. The agreed amount of 
£27,500,000 in instalhnerits,** is nearly half of the estimated sum of 
£45,000,000 in regard to the nationalized properties of the British 
nationals and the claims for injury or damage to property during
^ 89sequestration.
^4-Lo. cit, articles 2, 3 and 8,
85- Agreement Between U.K. and Egypt concerning Financial and Commercial 
Relations and British Property in Egypt, February 28, 1959, U.K.T.S., 1959, 
No. 35, Crrirtd. 723.
86- Article 3 (a and b) of the Agreement Agreement Between UiK. arid Egypt 
coricerning Financial and Commercial Relations and British Property in Egypt, 
February 28, 1959, op. cit., p. 3.
^2. Article 2 of the Agreement Agreement Between U.K. and Egypt concerning 
Financial and Commercial Relations and British Property in Egypt, February 
28, 1959, op. cit.
Article 4 of the Agreernent Agreement Between U.K. and Egypt concerning 
Financial and Commercial Relations arid British Property in Egypt, February 
28, 1959, op. cit.
__ ________________________________________
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The lump-sum agreement between Netherlands and Indonesia of
90September 7, 1966 provides another example of this group of the 
agreements. While the parties to the agreement emphasized that the 
agreement should be based on principles of justice, humanity and equity, 
they agreed not to itemize their respective claims or evaluate them, and 
the compensations which Indonesia was to pay arranged in long
91installments.
In this connection, the agreement between Switzerland and Cuba of
92March 2, 1967 is also remarkable. The compensation agreed was to be 
paid in installments and on the condition that, the Swiss parties buy 40,000 
metric tons of sugar or equivalent green coffee or molasses at the market
93price. If after the expiration of the eight years fixed in the agreement 
the indemnity had not been completely paid, the obligations of the 
contracting States would be considered extended until their complete
94satisfaction. It was implicit in the agreement that the compensation
paid by Cuban Government was not adequate and might give rise to
further clairns by the Swiss nationals. However, the Swiss Government
89- Parliamentary Debates (Commons), March 16,1959, col. 36,149.
Netherlans and Indonesia, Agreenient Concerning the Financial Problems Still 
Outstanding Between the Two Countries, Haugue, 7 September, 1966, 686 
U.N.T.S., 1969, p. 121.
Article 2* Netherlans and Indonesia, Agreement Concerning the Financial 
Problems Still Outstanding Between the Two Countries, Haugue, 7 September,
1966, op. cit., p. 124.
Agreement Between Switzerland and Cuba Concerning the Indemnification of 
Swiss Property, Rights and Interests Affected by the Laws Promulgated by 
Cuba Begining 1 Januaiy 1959, Havana, March 2,1967, English text in Lillich 
and Weston, International Claims, op. cit., p. 339.
Loc. cit., article 3(a).
94- Loc. cit., article 3(d); the obligation of Swiss towards the payment of 
compensation by Cuba was financing Cuba by purchasing sugar or coffee from 
that country.
*
___________
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95was barred from supporting any more such claims against Cuba.
The clear expression of the question raised in respect to developing 
countries was stated in the agreement of August 29, 1967 between Italy 
and Tunisia.^** There, in addition to the conditions mentioned in regard 
to the other agreements, Italy agreed to grant long-term loans to Tunisia 
in payment of compensation, and also by way of contribution to the
97success of the Plan of Development of Tunisia. The Italian 
Government also granted a quota of 150,000 hectoliters of Tunisian wine 
to be imported and sold at the internal Italian market price, and furnish
98the necessary authorization for that.
In sum, the international agreements on the issue of compensation 
illustrate varied practice of the different groups of countries. The 
agreements between aliens and States have not yet reached the scale 
necessary to establish an international custom. Moreover, from the 
international point of view, they are not yet remarkable enough to 
conclude certain rules of international law from them. The agreements 
which have not resulted in the actual payment of compensation were 
either solved by later lump-sum agreements which were balanced with 
many economical and non-economical factors.
95- Article 5, p^a. 3, Agreement Between Switzerland and Cuba Concerning the 
Indemnification of Swiss Property, Rights arid Interests Affected by the Laws 
Promulgated by Cuba Begining 1 January 1959, Havana, March 2, 1967, op. 
cit.
^6- Agreement Between Italy and Tunisia Relative to Indemnification and to 
Economic and Financial Cooperation, Rome, August 29, 1967, (1968) Rev,
Gen. D.I.P. 545; English text see in Lillich and Weston, International Claims, 
op. cit., p. 346.
2^- Loc. cit., article 2(2) and 3.
98- Article 5, Agreement Between Italy and Tunisia Relative to Indemnification and 
to Economic and Financial Cooperation, Rome, August 29, 1967, op. cit., p.
348,
1:
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Many agreements resulted in the actual payment of compensation. 
Although such agreements provided for the payment of compensation, 
there was considerable variation with regard to the types of claims 
covered, the forms of compensation agreed upon, the methods of payment 
adopted and the procedures to be followed, Accordingly, it is not possible 
to deduce common clear-cut international rules applicable to all States.
The measures taken by communist countries indicate an unsuccessful 
struggle by these countries on the basis of their political ideology. They 
paid compensation for the taken properties. However, the conditions they 
fulfilled in payment of compensation encouraged developing countries to 
expropriate aliens' property.
The group of agreements which form the central focus for this study 
are the compensation agreements concluded between developed and 
developing countries. The agreements made with developing countries 
tend to be of some complexity; arid not infrequently include collateral 
conditions or agreements entirely unrelated to the question of 
compensation. Those conditions were in fact excuses for developing 
countries to refrain from paymerit of compensation to the aliens, or 
sometimes enabled them to pay due corripensations. Various advantages 
have been given to these countries, and by conclusion of such agreements 
the traditional rules of international minimum standard have regularly 
been violated.
The provisions of agreements concluded between developed and 
developing countries with regard to the amount of compensation are 
inconsistent with those p f  agreerrients concluded between the developed 
countries. In some cases the compensation paid to aliens by their own 
government has been five-fold the amount paid by the expropriatirig State. 
The reason is probably that lump sum settlements have not necessarily
________
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been considered to involve the assignment or admission of liability under
international l a w A m o n g  more than 130 such agreements concluded
since the Second World War, only six contain an express admission of
responsibility, and these were all made by Japan to settle war claims
against her/®® In the other settlements, no mehtiori of international
liability is made, save that it may be expressly excluded/®^
Moreover, the International Court of Justice in the B arcelona
Traction  case took the view that lump sum agreements are not to be
regarded as creative of customary international law, and the arbitrator in
Aminoil adopted a similar view/®^ Nevertheless, it is possible to derive
some conclusion according to the divisions introduced above.
A further evidence to this argument is the preferential treatment of
developing countries in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). The issue of the differences between the developed and
developing countries are well indicated in the provisions of GATT. The
99. Gray Ç. D., Judicial Remedies in International Law, Oxford 1987, p. 179.
100_ Agreement Between Greece and Japan Relating Settlement of Certain Greek 
Claims, Tokyo, 20 September 1966, 609 U.N.T.S., p. 103; Agreement 
Between the Government of Japan arid the Government of G. Britain Relating 
Settlement of Certain British Clairns, Tokyo, 7 October 1960,384 U.N.T.S., 
p. 94; Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Between the Government 
of Japan and the Government of Spain Relating the Settlement of the Problem 
Concerning Certain Types of Spanish Claims, Madrid, 8 January, 1957, 318 
U.N.T.S., p. 221; Agreement Between the Government of Japan atid the 
Government of Sweden Regarding Settlement of Certain Sewedish Claims 
Settlement, 20 Septembér 1957, 325 U.N.T.S., p. 29; Agreernent Between 
Switzerland and Japan Concerning the Settlement of Certain swiss Claims 
Against Japan, ROLF 357,1955, AS 344, English text see in Lillich R. B. and 
Weston B. H., International Clairns: Their Settlement by Lump sum 
Agreements* op. cit., p. 115.
Gray C. D., Judicial Rerriedies in Interriational Law, op. cit.
102. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power, Limited, Bc/g/wm 
V. Spain, I.C.j.R., 1970 pp. 49-50; Ammo// case, I.L.M., 1982, p. 976.
■S':" ____
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differences manifested by trade disjputes, together with the particular 
needs of developing countries, have come increasingly to preoccupy 
GATT throughout the past two decades. Developing country GATT 
members have for many years been able to apply certain of its rules with 
considerable flexibility.^®^ Additional provisions were added to the 
General Agreement specifically dealing with trade and development. 
Promotion of the trade interests of developing countries was an important 
element in the Tokyo Rppnd of trade negotiations.^®^ Some provisions 
were added in 1965 to deal with the special needs of the developing 
countries and to set out GATT's principles and objectives in meeting these 
needs. The member States undertook conimitments to take joint action to 
assist the developing countries "as a matter of conscious and purposeful 
effort".^®^ The developed countries gave concessions and contributed to 
help the developing country members by reducing import duties and other 
trade barriers facing export from developing countries, while the 
developing countries were allowed to impose import restrictions or 
suspend tariff concessions on imported products from other countries.^®^ 
As the result of the Tokyo Round, a permanent legal basis was established 
within the GATT for preferential trade treatment on behalf of* and 
between, developing countries. One of the elements taken into account 
was the uncertain financial and economic conditions of such developing
countries. 107
Article XVIE of GATT, GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 
vol. IV, 1969, p. 28.
GATT, what it is, what it does, pp. 13-15.
105. Part IV, articles XXXVI, XXXVII, XXXVIII of GATT, GATT, Basic 
Instruments and Selected Documents, vol. ly , op. cit., p. 53.
106. Article XIX of GATT, g ATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 
vol. IV, op. cit., p; 36.
107. GATT, what it is, what it does, op. cit., p. 12; Garcia-Amador F. V., The 
Emerging International Law of Development, London, 1990, pp* 95-103.
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However, the difficulty remains now to agree upon the elements 
involved in those agreements and identify the exact responsibility of States 
towards expropriated aliens. This is particularly so when one bears in 
mind that some agreements were concluded simply to help the 
expropriating States to unblock assets. It follows that many of those 
agreements were not concluded as a result of some strongly held 
conviction on the part of the expropriating States. Indeed, Eastern 
European States even suggested that they had made the payments in an ex 
gratia mmriQv and not under a legal obligation.^®* Therefore, as it was 
stated in Amoco International Finance Corp. case, State practice as 
manifested in settlement agreements cannot be considered as customary 
rules of international law, unless it presents specific features which 
demonstrate the conviction of the State parties that they were acting in 
application of what they considered to be settled law.^ ®® But, as evidence 
of this argument, they indicate that a universal rule cannot be extracted 
from them. Thus, it is necessary to classify the rules in regard to 
expropriations of aliens' property in accordance with the conditions of 
each group of States.
*********
* * * * * * *
* * * * *
* * *
Seidl Hohenveldern I., Communist Theories on Confiscation and 
Expropriation, Critical Comments* 7 A.J.C.L., 1958, p. 547.
1 9^- Khemco case (Amoco International Finance Corp.) v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. C. 
T. R., p. 266.
______________
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CHAPITER THREE 
IRANIAN OIL NATIONALIZATION
Background:
Before any discussion on the question of nationalization of the oil 
industry in Iran* we will survey briefly the background to the granting of 
the Oil Concessions in Iran, and then the terms and conditions they 
comprised.
The competition between Britain and Russia for concessions to 
exploit Iranian oil resources continued for more than half a century. 
Russian effort was concentrated in the north and that of the British in the 
south. The competition for concessions in Iran was so intense that, by the 
end of the nineteenth and early in the twentieth century, all of the 
country's resources and techiiical projects were granted to foreigners, 
predoihinantly the British and Russians. The concessions to foreign 
commercial and industrial investments, together with the iriefficiency and 
corruption of the ruling class and some other elements, brought Iran to a 
political and financial crisis.^ Those foreign investors used their 
influence in the country to secure the appointment or dismissal of
k  One o f the elements of the inefficiency of the Ruler of the time was the 
continual borrowing of the shah for his personal affairs; Lenczowski G., Russia 
and the West in Iran; A Study in Big-Power Rivalry, Ithaca, I918rl948, 
(1949), p. 5; see in general in Shuster W. M., The Strangling of Persia; Record 
of European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue, London, 1913, chap. II; The 
Middle East, a Political and Economic Survey 1950; published by the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, pp. 219-235.
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officials, in some cases, even directly dismissing the disliked officials?
During this period of quasi-colonial domination, a number of 
concessions were taken from Iran of which the most notable, in terms of 
its political significance, was the D’Arcy Concession of 1901?
The political influence of Britain secured the economic interests of 
Britain in Iran in such a way that the concession granted to the Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Company was the manifestation of that influence which 
continued as a link between the two countries. But, like the other foreign 
held concessions in Third World Countries, such as Mexico, Chile, 
Bolivia^ Peru, Indonesia and Egypt, it contained seeds of disagreement 
between the host nation arid the concessionaire which ended in a violent 
changes in the existing situations.
Reza Shah was moved and sent to exile by direct intervention of Britain; Ford
A. W., The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, op. cit., p. 6; Shuster M., The 
Strangling of Persia, op. cit., chaps. II, III.
Before this concession, in 1872  ^Baron Julius de Reuter, a British subject, was 
granted an exclusive concession to exploit all the natural resources of Iran, 
except precious stpnes and metals, and to build railways and telegraph systems, 
but as the result of the Russian protest thëy were forced to cancel the plan; See 
in Ford A. W., Tlie Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, op. cit., pp. 3-15.
■i
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(SECTION ONE)
THE IRANIAN OIL CONCESSIONS 
Their Establishment
William Knox D’ Arcy an Australian"* national, living in Britain, 
obtained an oil concession of 1901 in Iran. D' Arcy had obtained a sixty 
year oil concession on May 28, 1901 which had given him access to the 
whole of Iran except the northern provinces of Astarabad, Khorasan, 
Azarbaijan, Gilan and Mazanderan, the traditional areas of Russian 
influence? The concession gave D’ Arcy the exclusive right to explore, 
exploit, refine and sell natural gas, oil and bitumen in all these areas? 
He also obtained the right to construct pipe lines and installations, and to 
use all state-owned non-cultivated lands necessary for the purposes of 
prospecting. Through the concession, he was protected against the 
necessity for paying inflated prices for private land that might be 
necessaty for the operation.^ He was relieved from all kind of taxes 
and tariffs throughout the period of the concession, and the Government 
guaranteed all necessary measures to secure the performance of the 
concession relative activities.^
Some writers for example, Walden has mentioned ^ him as British, and his 
address mentioned in the concession is: 42 Gros^venor, Lpndon.
Chapter 1 and 6 of the Concession, in Makkey H., Ketabe Siyah (Persian), 
second edition, YoL 1, Teheran 1980, p. 21-22; Makkey at that time was a 
member of parliament and reporter to the Special Committee on Oil and the 
special envoy of the government in oil affairs.
Chapter 1 of the Concession, in Makkey H., Ketabe Siyah, op. cit., p. 21. 
Chapters 2 and 3 of the Concession, in Makkey H., Ketabe Siyah, op. cit., p. 
21.
Chapters 7 and 14 of the Concession, in Makkey H., Ketabe Siyah, op. cit., 
pp. 22-23.
  _ _ __
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In return, D' Arcy agreed to establish one or more companies to 
exploit oil within two years, and make an initial payment to the Crown of 
£20,000 sterling and £20,000 in shares of the company. He was to pay 16 
per cent of the annual net profits to the Iranian government. The 
concessionaire was also to pay 2,000 tommans for the acquisition of the 
mines in operation of Naftshahr, Qasre shirin and Daleki in Bushehr.^ 
No provision was made for the renegotiation on any of the agreement's 
provisions in order to make allowance for changing circumstances.
The concession was originally granted to a private individual by 
the government of Iran. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had transferred 
companies' stocks to the British government in 1914 which equalled to 
indirect transfer of the concession. This transfer was later claimed by the 
Iranians to have been contrary to provisions of the concession and against 
the consent and the wishes of the government of I r a n , a n d  was used as 
the evidence that the concession had become null and void. A provisibnal 
agreement was reached on December 22  ^ 1920 but was not ratified by the 
Majlis. Royalties continued to be small, based on net p r o f i t s . I r a n ’s 
difficulties increased when Britain went off the gold standard on
Chapters 4 and 10 of the Concession, in Makkey H., Ketabe Siyah, op, cit., 
ppv2l-22.
On this basis, later on March 14, 1951(Esfand 18, 1329), the British 
Ambassador in Teheran wrote to Iranian Prinié Minister, Mr. Ala, that British 
gbyernment cannot be indifferent on the issue of the Anglo Iranian Oil 
Company, which is an "English'' and even International" company; reprinted 
in iMakkey H., Ketabe Siyah(Persian), Vol. 2, pp. 122-124; Iran never 
accepted that the agreement was transferred and in the agreement of April 29,
1933 in the definition o f the terms, and in Article 26 of the that agreement, it 
was clarified that "The Company" means the Anglo-Iranian Company or any 
other legal entity which with ratification of the government of Iran the 
concession be transferred to it.
See the report on the royalties, profits and gross sale figures in Persian Oil,
The Econornist, Vol. 115; December 3,1932, pp. 1019-1020.
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September 21, 1931, and her sterling balance reduced. This tremendous 
political and economical pressure brought about a further deterioration in 
relations between Iran and the company until finally the Iranian 
government, on November 27, 1932, nbtified the company that the 
concession was terminated?^ Declaring the D' Arcy concession void, 
the Iranian finance ministry challenged the company on the grounds that 
the concession had been granted at the time of dictatorship and ignorance 
and through illegal channels. Moreover, it was stated that the company 
did not fulfil the terms of the concession,-^
During the oil dispute of 1932-1933, the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company made serious and direct threats against Iran, and Britain 
threatened to use force which was then common when powers were 
allegedly acting to protect their hationals* lives and property abroad. In a 
letter to the British Ambassador in Teheran it had already been declared 
that:
"His Majesty's Government will not hesitate, if the necessity arises, to take all
legitimate measures to protect their just and indisputable interests.  His
Majesty's Government will not tolerate any damage to the Company's 
interests or interference with their premises or business activities in 
Persia,"^"*
British warships appeared in the Persian Gulf, and a series of notes 
were exchanged between the two governments, Britain brought the 
dispute before the Council of the League of Nations and tried to submit
Britain and Persia, The Economist, Vok 115, December 17, 1932, pp. 1125- 
1126. See also Note 6 in Ford A. W., The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, op. cit.,
p. 286.
Etelaat (Iranian newspaper), November 27, 1931; see also Musaddiq M., 
Musaddiq's MernOirs (Persian), p. 199; Ï. G. J. Pleadings, pp. 685, 690; See 
more bn dependencies of the regirpe m Iran to Britain in Memoirs of Geneial
H. Fardbust, Raise and Fall of Pahlavi Dynasty (Persian)  ^ vol. 1, Teheran, 
1369(1991), passim.
*4- M OC Case, I. C. J. Pleadings, 1952, p. 237.
____ ________
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the case to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Subsequently, a 
new agreement was reached between the Aiiglo-Iranian Oil Company and 
the Iranian Government on April 29, 1933?^ Contrary to the opinion of 
some writers,^** and to the contention of Britain and the Company, the 
new concession was not more content to Iran than the former one, for it 
extended the concession for 30 more years, so that even the Shah 
regretted its renewal in the time of his father.
As a result of the Second World War, Iran as well as the other countries, 
experienced a very rapid and severe growth in inflation. The cost of 
living multiplied almost sevenfold between March 21, 1941, and March 
21, 1945.^^ With the distincf upward trend in prices during 1949, the 
Iranian government demanded increased royalties from the AIOC. There 
had already been pressure, since 1940, for the revision of the AIOCs 
royalty formula which was caused in part by the disparity between the 
royalty formula agreed in respect of Latin America (especially 
Venezuela) and those provided for the 1933 concession. Accordingly, 
they resolved upon a n e #  agreement to increase the royalty rate by about 
2 shillings per ton of oil sold in Iran or exported subject to the 
fluctuations in the price of gold, by virtue of which agreement, the 
cornpany's title under the 1933 concession was affirrned.^^ This small 
increase of the profit for Iran occurred when the company had already
The text of the Agreemeht see in Ford A W.f The Ariglp-Iranian Oil Dispute, 
op. cit., appendix I p. 233.
Ford A. W., The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, op. cit., p. 18.
Pahlavi M. R., Mission for My Country, Chapter 12; see also Musaddiq's 
Memoirs, op. eit, p. 205
The Indexes of money in circulation, Wholesale prices, cost of living, and 
import prices see table 1 of the Appendix II in Ford A,; W ; The Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Dispute, op. cit., p. 248.
Articles 1 and 3(A)of the Supplementary Agreement.
____________________________ _____ _ _________
v'Vï ' I-’-' -
Iranian Oil Nationalisation  19  5
offered a fifty-fifty profit-sharing formula in its negotiations with the 
Iranian government. BUt the Iranian representatives had refused the offer 
in the hope that a more favourable arrangement might be reached. Public 
opinion within Iran, as well as that of the United States Embassy, had 
crystallized in such a way that the Supplementary Agreement was 
regarded as inadequate and was rejected by the Majlis. The company 
subsequently refused to concede to a demand of the new Iranian 
Government that they reduce the price of the oil products in Iran and to 
increase the number of the Iranians employed and trained by the 
company?**
The British foreign office, ignoring the warning of the American 
embassy in Teheran, insisted that the company was a commercial 
enterprise, and that the Iranians would ratify the Supplementary 
Agreement when their need for money was great enough.^^ The Oil 
Special Committee of the Majlis reported that it was not in favour of the 
agreement, on the grounds that it did not safeguard Iranian rights and 
interests?^ The report of the Special Committee was approved by the 
Parliament, which in turn requested that the committee might make 
suggestions on the course the government should take action in the issue 
of oil.^^ This event coincided with the Arabian-American Oil 
Company's fifty-fifty profit-sharing agreement. The company urged 
Razmara to reopen negotiations for a similar agreement, but it was too 
late. A formal resolution was presented to the special committee for the
This issue was argued by the Iranians in all oil discussions, at least since 1932.
It was repeated by Dr. Musaddiq in many occasions, including in the Security 
Council of the United Nations on October 15, 1951; U.N.S.C., Official 
Records, 560th Meeting, p. 19.
Ford A. W., The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, op. cit., p. 50.
The Parliamentary Debates of December 17, 19, 21, 24,1950.
Loc. cit.
I:::#
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nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, and a mass demonstration of 
people supported the action?"* Thus, the Supplementary Agreement was 
never ratified, and eight days later, on March 15, 1951, the Majlis passed 
a bill nationalizing the Iranian oil industry?^
(SECTION TWO)
THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE ANGLO-IRANIAN
OIL CONCESSIONS
There is a presumption that States, in concluding an agreement, do 
not always intend to create legal relations, and that this intention would 
need to be clearly manifested before a legal character is attributed to the 
agreement?^ For example, Iran under occupation, basically lacked the 
intention to contract legal obligations under the agreements because it has 
not been common, especially at the time when the oil concessions were 
granted by Iran, to compromise the sovereignty of a country in favour of 
a private party, particularly as they did not conform to the rules of law 
with regard to the formation of contracts and were renounced by the later 
statements and legislation. The sovereignty and interests of the 
government was submitted to the mercy of the private concessionaire 
through the concession agreement, inconsistent with the aims and
24- Makkey H., Ketabe Siyah,op, cit.. Vol. I, pp. 483-685.
25- See the Article to nationalizing the oil industry and the law regulating the 
nationalization in appendix I.
26  ^ Fawsett J. E. S., The Legal Character of International Agreements, 30
B.Y.I.L., 1953, p. 385.
__________
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principles of international law?^
The concept of a concession granted to the aliens in Iran was taken
from the French law to be applied in a different legal and political and
administrative system. In France, Getmahy or Switzerland a concession
is under the direct control of government which consist of regulatory
28rules which can be changed unilaterally by the government. It retains 
inherent power to control the terms of the agreement and to adjust them 
to the changing needs of the public service. For this purpose it can, 
without any default of the contractor, suspend, vary or rescind the 
contract, transfer it to another party or take it over itself, and the 
application of the rules governing the modification of administrative 
contracts can not be excluded by a g r e e m e n t . T h i s  legal concept was 
used in the AIOG concession while the government of Itan had no control 
over the concession and the company. Rather, it was the company which 
in fact influenced the goyerriment and dictated the terms and the 
conditions of the concession. However the term 'concession' was not 
unfamiliar to Iranians, and it did not have the meaning equal to contract, 
but it has always meant a privilege granted as the result of the special 
relation of the parties with the background of political and economic
30dominance of the foreigners on the country. The term has been
2k Preamble to and Article 1(2,3) of the Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 
1946; preamible to the declaration bn Principles of International Law 
Cbhceming Friendly Relations and Co-operation ainong States, Resolution 
2625(XXV) of 24 October 1970, U.N, Resolutions, Series 1, G.A., vol. 
XIII, 1970-71, p. 338.
2k The Arbitration between Saudi Arabia and Arainco, 27 I.L.R., 1963, pp. 157- 
9.
2 -^ Greiger R., The Unilateral Change of Economic Development Agreements, 23 
I.C.L.Q., 1974, pp. 96, 99.
Speech of Shah in the oil engineers union in  Abadan, March 3,1966; Debates 
of the Majlis on the nationalization of the oil industry, the Black Book, 2
_   ___________
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replaced by ’Economic Development Agreements'. The change of name
reflects the changed power relatibhships between capital-exporting and 
3iimporting States.
Oil and oil installations were regarded as immovable property, and
the Iranian Civil Code of June 6, 1931 did not recognize any rights of
aliens in immovable properties. Therefore, those aliens who owned such
properties were required to transfer them to Iranian nationals or to the
governm ent. Without reference to that law, the District Court of
Tokyo declared that, the land over which the appellants exercised their
rights under the said agreement cannot be treated as so-called 'concession
land' under international law, nor can such rights be called a
' c o n c e s s i o n ' A  similar judgement was delivered in A /0C  v. SUPOR
Company, in which the court rejected the right of the company to the 
34concession. The Civil Court of Rome held that the 1933 concession
was contrary to the Iranian Constitution^^ and therefore contrary to
Vol. s, passim; Moyahed M A , Our Petroleum and Its Legal Problems, third 
edition, Teheran, 1979, pp 242-3.
Greiger R., The Unilateral Change of Econoniic Development Agreements, p.
74.
^2- The Law Collection of 1931, (Persian), p. 67 onward and the regulations on 
the ownership of aliens of Nov. 26, 1948 (Persian), p. 206 onward; 
regulations of Oct. 5, 1963, the Law Collection of 1963, pp. 131-2; 1965, p.
13 onward. There have been some exceptions to those rules, excluding the 
countries which mutually agreed Iranian nationals could have the same amount 
of property in that country or those aliens who reside permanently in Iran. The 
Iranian law of property researched to be use recently in the Iran-U. S disputes 
by the Iranian Lawyers. The result was published in 11 B.I.L.S.L.R., 
Autumn-Winter 1989-9^, pp. 73-96.
AIOC V, Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, Distnct court of Tokyo, 20
I.L.R., 1953, 308.
3k  AIOC V. S.UP.O.R. Company, Civil Court of Venice, 22 I.L.R., 1955, p p .  
32-33.
35- Article XVI of the Constitutional Law of October 7, 1907; it imposed an
kilii
a
H
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Italian public order and not applicable in Italy, as it had created an
expropriation without prescribing the procedure and criteria of
compensation in favour of the owners of the land covered by the
concession and not belonging to the Iranian government?** The terms
for paynient of compensation were later inserted in the 1954 agreernent
between the Iranian government and the Consortium?^ If it was
acceptable under the Iranian civil code that aliens could possess
immovable properties, under the same law and as it was contended by the
company against SUPOR, under the Constitution, it would be illegal to
dispossess the company of its property^ especially since it was explicitly
stated in the law regulating nationalization of the oil industry that the
company was in control of that industry. Therefore, the acquisition,
occupation and possession of such properties was grahtèd by the Iranian
government to the aliens in contravention of the Civil Code of Iran?^
The principle of ownership laid down by Article 38 of the Iranian
Civil Code that the owner of the soil is also the owner of what is under
the soil and is entitled to benefit thereby subject to the restrictions
prescribed by the law then in force. Furthermore, Article 161 of that
Code prescribed that the mines belong to the owner of the soil under
which they are situated. Therefore, at the time when the concession was
obligation to grant compensation only in favour of parties who had been 
deprived of ownership, and Article 29 of the haniah Civil Code distinguishes 
ownership froin the fight of utilization.
3^- Article 4 of the 1933 Concession; AIOC v. SJJP .O Ri, Civil Court of 
Rome, 22 I.L.R., 1955, p. 32.
32. Articles 7(D) and 9 of the 1954 Agreement.
3 -^ Articles 36 and 37 of the Iranian civil code, and para. 2 of the law regulating 
nationalization of the oil industry.
3 -^ Article 161 of the Civil Code of Iran; see also I.C.J. Pleadings, 1952; op. cit.,
R 182.
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granted, the owner of the soil was fully entitled, in the absence of any 
special restriction, to exploit any mines below the soil of his own property 
and was also entitled to benefit from such mines after they had been
40discovered. The owner was also entitled to prevent any other parties 
and even the government from exploiting the mines in his subsoil and 
benefitting from any mines which may have been discovered there. Thus, 
the concession agreement of April 29, 1933, in fact, partially 
expropriated the right of the owner of the soil by preventing hirn from 
exploiting mines under his land. The concession not only expropriated 
the right of the owner to the deposits discovered on his land for, such land 
was contained within the boundaries of the concession which the 
government granted to the company, but also indirectly confiscated the 
lands of private parties by imposing a fixed price in the case of 
disagreement and disregard to the purpose for which the land was 
purchased."*^ No provision for payment of compensation was made in 
the agreement, nor even for a right of appeal against the decision of the 
government. The company which was protesting against the 
nationalization measures by the government, never admitted that under 
the Iranian Civil Law, the exclusive right of the company granted through 
the concession was a partial expropriation of the rights of ownership to
' 42the private lands. There was no other law which gave such exceptional 
rights to the aliens and the Iranian Constitution Law laid down that the 
protection of the rights of foreigners was subordinate to the laws of the 
Iranian State.^^
40- Article 161 of the Iranian civil code; this law later became conditional to a 
special regulatory rule.
4L Article 3(d) of the 1933 agreement.
42- Article 3 of the Law of February 6, 1939 had granted the exclusive right of 
utilization of oil wells to the Government.
43- Article VI of the 1907 Constitutional Law.
44- MovahedM. A., Gur Petroleum and its Legal problems, op. cit., pp. 209-210.
45- State Responsibility, Arabia v. Aramco, 2 7 1.L.R., 1963, pp. 163-4. 
"^^-Anglo-Iranian Oil Company v. S.Ü.P.O.R., Civil Court of Rome, 22 I.L.R.,
1955; pp. 37, 39.
42- Article 190 of the Iranian civil code.
4 -^ The Court of Venice considered the concession against the civil code of Iran 
and rejected any right of ownership to the AlOC. See generally in Makkey H.,
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The uncertainty surrounding the ownership of subsoil mines by 
the concessionaire was not unique to Iranian legal system, but exists 
generally in islamic law which consequently has been reflected in the laws
44of some of the islamic countries. Accordingly, in the Aramco
Arbitration  the arbitrator concluded that in islamic law there is no
45agreed concept on mineral concessions including oil mines.
All these elements together with the historical, political, social and 
economic conditions stated in SUPOR  case,"*  ^ put the AIO C  case in a 
special category different from the other groups of the private and public 
contracts.
Moreover, it is doubtful whether concessionary contracts have been 
recognized by the contract law of Iran at all. Accuracy and legitimacy of 
contracts has been conditioned in that law to:
1- Intention and consent of the parties to the contract;
2- Competence of the parties to the contract;
3- Agreement upon a determinate subject;
474- Legitimate cause of the contract.
It is very doubtful whether the oil concessions conform to these 
conditions, as the parties agreed upon an uncertain venture. Therefore, 
under the Iranian civil code they would have been null and void. That 
was one of the reasons that the concession and its predecessors were 
undesirable and rejected by Iranians.'** All these defects in the
.it
.
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Concession Agreements with the Anglo-Iranian Gil Company became the 
motive to introduce the nationalization law of the oil industry. It made 
the provisions on payment of compensation ambiguous and uncertain, 
conditioned upon the legitimacy of the claims of the company which must 
have bbeh approved by the Iranian Houses of Parlianient and Senate.
In fact, the Concession of 1933 was a law according to which the 
lands of the private owners were expropriated but its legality depended 
upon the payment of compensation under the constitution. The civil code 
of Iran describes the claims of the owners as 'rights' and those of the 
concession holders as 'interests' which would be evaluated under different 
rules. No compensation is due in respect of such interests under the
49Iranian legal system.
The reason, as it was stated earlier, is that the concept of concession
granted to the aliens in Iran was taken from other legal systems and that it
was a concept largely incornpaübiè and inconsistent with the Iranian legal
system. However, the concession to the Attglo^Iranian Oil Company was
approved by the Iranian Parliament according to the provisions of the
Constitution on procedures to enter into contracts with aliens^** but, it
was in contradiction with some other Iranian Civil Code. Under the
Iranian Civil Code, the concession could be ended according to the
discretion of the grantor without any right to the concessionaire to claim
for corhpensation for the acquired rights and, if the removal of the
Ketabe Siyah, op. cit., 2 Vol s, passim, the existence of the Concessions has 
been counted as one of the effective elements of the Gonsututional Revolutibn, 
see Movahed M. Al, Our Oil And Its Legal Problems, op. cit., p. 218.
49- Article 15 of the Law of 1939; this concept has been accepted in the Italian legal 
system. Article 40 of the Italian Constitution; see also 22 LL.R., 1955, pp. 
34-35.
5k Article 24 of the Iranian Constitution of 1907.
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installations was productive of damage to the subjects of the concession, 
he could not claim for the installations planted according to the
51concession.
Iranians on different occasions declared that their measures of 
nationalization were in fact simply a revindication of the nation's rights to 
their natural resources?^ Therefore, they regarded themselves as 
having a basic right to nationalize the AIOC. They believed that the only 
issue which had hitherto delayed the revindication of that right was the 
control and influence of the company over the political and economic 
affairs of Iran.
However, it does not follow from this that the measures were
outside the scope of the general principles of international law. The rules,
such as 'equity' and 'intention of the parties', strike a balance between the
principles of international law designed to create legal rights and duties
binding on a country and create a relationship between States, recognizing
and practicing among the legal systems and civilized nations, especially
53when a mineral contract is involved. That was the position of the 
contracts which allowed the 0PEC and other countries to intervene in oil 
agreements, changing the price of oil, reviewing the terms, and changing 
the conditions of such agreements and increasing the tax burden.^'* If the 
Iranian nationalization measures are evaluated on this basis, a different 
conclusion will be reached.
5L See the provirions of the Iranian civil Code on 'Haghe Entafa’, Articles 40-54.
52- This idea was also expressed by some of the British officials. The Chancellor,
Richard Stocks in the election campaigns of October 1951 in Cheshire had 
criticised the company as "looter"; reported from The United Press in Makkey
H., Ketabe Siyah, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 25.
53- Geiger R., The Unilateral Change of Economic Development Agreements, p.
100.
54- Movahed M. A., Onr Oil and Its Legal Problems, op. cit., pp. 160, 164-6,
175-6.
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- : : I
Iranian Oii Nationaiisation  2 0 4  i
The principle of pacta sunt servanda was breached, apparently to 
make the agreements more equitable and no serious legal challenge was 
mounted against the later decisions of the OPEG members, including Iran, i
to change the contracts terms. As the Resolution 122 of the OPEC 
mentioned, constant increase of inflation in the Western Countries and the i
devaluation of dollar, both of which had the consequence of reducing the i
purchasing power of the OPEC members, were the legitimate reasons to 
alter the terms of the c o n tra c ts .P r io r  to the establishment of OPEC, 
there had not been any such automatic increase in the incomes, for the 
reasons already mentioned. The changes requested by the OPEC 
members might be seen as violating the sanctity of the contracts, but they 
did not contravene either the member’s duties towards the oil companies, 
or the above mentioned principles of international law. Those contracts 
had been concluded under different circumstances, and changing the terms 
of those contracts on the basis of the change of the circumstances has been 
accepted under international rules. The OPEC members believed that it i
would not be contrary to the U.N. Charter and international rules to pass 
legislation in each member State obliging the oil companies to submit to t
their lawful demands for a change in the terms of the agreements?^
While the companies' countries as the consumers of the OPEC oil had an 
interest in the maintenance of the existing agreements, they did not 
institute any legal action against the OPEC countries, and the companies 
agreed to change the terms of the contracts?^ The reason was simply i
that the changed circumstances appeared to make the performance of the 
agreements inconsistent with the initial intention of the host States.
55- Loc> cit., p. 166.
56_Lpc:K pp:i% 6: .
52- Loc. cit., pp. 181-3.
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(SECTION THREE)
THE IRANIAN OIL CONCESSIONS AND
in t e r n a t io n a l  l a w
As it was explained earlier, the Iranian oil concessions had no 
strong basis within the Iranian Civil Code. However, it was a 
transnational contract and it was accordingly of international concern. If 
the Iranian oil concessions were concluded directly between the two States 
they would become of international law concern, the parties to the 
agreements would be international subjects, and having the characteristic 
of being governed inter alia, by the terms of the concession as a part of 
international law. Under international law, the agreements would be 
concluded with the intention of the parties being expressed in written 
form by representatives of the States with full powers.'* But, contracts 
need not only concluded between States. They are enough to beconie, 
directly or indirectly the subject of an agreement between States. This 
was the argument of the UK to bring the case before the International 
Court of Justice.
There is no uniform international practice on the issue of
expropriation and the case law in this field is not sufficiently developed to 
59be fully reliable. There are many cases similar to the AIOC, but the 
procedures and conclusions are relatively varied. For example, in 
Shufe lfs  V. Guatemala^ the arbitrator declared that the case was 
governed by international law and it was referred to an international 
tribunal which did not of course administer municipal law.^ ** In the
5^ - Articles 1,2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
59- Geiger R., The Unilateral Change of Economic Development Agreements, 23 
I.C.L.Q., 1974, p. 80.
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Amco Asia v, Indonesia it was claimed that the State was entitled to
withdraw the approval it had granted for reasons which could not be
invoked by a private contracting party as an exceptional powers of a State
61to terminate contracts. The Supreme Court of the USA called the 
expropriation power essential to the life of the S t a t e . A n d  in England, 
all of the contracts which would be performed within UK would be 
governed by English Law. But, in the Mavrommatis case, because the 
case was taken by the Greek Government, it was considered in the doinain 
of international law.^'* The most identical cases, which indicate the 
diversity of State practices in this field of international law, are the 
Libyan expropriation cases in which the arbitrators reached different 
conclusion in similar cases.
Despite differences in the procedures, it seems to be generally 
accepted in international law that an equitable right should be protected 
regardless of whether the measures would be in breach of contract or 
not.
It is necessary to distinguish between measures which establish an 
unjust relation and those which change such a relation to a just relation 
and strengthen international co-operation and peace and minimizing 
violation of the agreements in developing countries and prevent any
Shufeldt Claim, U S A . v. Guatemala, 2 RXA.A., p. 1098.
Amco Asia v. Indonesia, 24 I.L.M., 1985, p. 1029,
^2- McAllister, U.S. Gonstitutional Law and its relation to a ConUact between a 
State and a Foreign National', Rights and Duties of private Investors Abroad,
1965, pp. 249-251.
^3- Bowett D. W., State Contracts With Aliens: Contemporary Developments on 
Compensation for Termination or Breach, B.Y.I.L., 1988, p. 58. 
the Mavrommatis case, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 12.
^5- Hyde C., International Law, op. cit., p. 988.
Iranian Oii Nationalisation  2 0 7
danger to international peace and co-operation. International law, without
a strong basis and superiority, cannot be presumed to reduce the right of
the sovereign to establish a just balance between the interests of a society
and aliens, nor to effectively overcome the basic rights of the
sovereign.^^ However, after World War II, international society was
faced with reviewing the international norm to provide workable solution
to the international problems that were created by nationalizations
specially by the developing countfies. This change of the norms followed
with the United Nations General Asserhbly Resolution of December 21,
1952 which stated that, 'the right of peoples freely to use and exploit their
natural wealth and resources is inherent in their sovereignty,'^^ This
Resolution was invoked in the SUPOR Case by the Civil Court of 
68Rome and unanimously recognized during the preceding debate in the
69Second Committee, However, in practice, the opposite attitude of 
States is illustrated in the rival claims, both being based on sovereignty. 
Iran's right, as it was asserted on different occasions, was derived from its 
territorial sovereignty over all persons and things within its borders, and 
Britain's right of diplomatic protection was derived from its sovereignty 
over its citizens. So far as the other States are concerned, diplomatic 
protection would limit the discretion of the expropriating State. But, 
there arises the question of whether these States and their nationals are 
reciprocally responsible for the actions of each other or not? By virtue of 
this a nationalization cannot be a purely internal function of the
Harris D. J., Gases and Materials on International Law, second edition, 1979, 
p. 176.
62- UN.G.A. Resolution 626 (VII), U.N. Resolutions, Series. 1, G.A., vol. IV, 
1952-3, p. 106.
6^- Anglo-Iranian Oil Co, v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki, 20 I.L.R., 1953, p. 
309.
69- U. N. Yearbook of International Law, 1952, p. 387.
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expropriating State.
It should be noted that Iran was not free to make agreements with 
every company or every country.^** For example, when the Parliament, 
on November 22, 1921, authorised the government to grant a fifty years 
concession to the Standard G il Company, both the British and the Soviets 
objected. Moreover, as the result of the support of the United States in 
the action of the Iranian government and because of the AIOCs monopoly 
of transportation facilities within Iran, the Standard Oil Company was still 
forced to agree to share the concession with AIOC on a fifty-fifty basis. 
In the end, not because of the Iranians decision, but as the result of a 
storm of Russian protest, no agreenient was reached between the 
parties.
Until the end of the Second World War, Parlianient in Iran did not 
emerge as a real force in government, and Iranian authorities themselves 
acknowledged that the agreements were made under duress, and that the 
concessions were imposed upon them.^^ Therefore, the agreements were 
concluded not with the consent of both parties, necessary for international 
agreements and as the proper source to create international obligations. 
The norm which is derived from the idea of sovereignty or State 
autonomy, without it agreements could not be considered as legally valid, 
and binding upon the contracting parties.
2k Memoirs of General H. Fardoust, Raise and Fall of Pahlavi Dynasty, op. cit.
2L Ford A. W., The Ahglo-Irartian Oil Dispute, op, cit., p. 21.
22_ It xvas also mentioned in the Declaration of the Ambassador of Britain in 
Teheran oh April 26, 1951, that it is generally blamed that "treaty has been 
made under duress , the text reprinted in Makkey H., Ketabe Siyah, op. 
ch.. Vol. H; p p ll26  127.
23- Debates of the Parliament on December 3,1950, statement of Dr. Mosadiq; the 
Iranian representative in the agreement of 1933 Taghizadeh, had declared on 
January 27, 1948, in the Parliameht Round 15 that he had signed the 
agreement without his consent and under duress.
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The repeated changes made to the provisions of the concession in 
order to make it a more equitable and acceptable indicates the weakness of 
the foundations of the concession. Part of the reason for this was the 
change of circumstances following international events and the new 
economic difficulties created as the result of a miscalculation of the 
profitability of the oil fields which eased the disclosure of inequitablity of 
the agreements.^"*
Still the terms of the concessions were so overtly favoured the 
foreigners and put the company in such a very advantageous position that 
the Iranian Parliament adopted a bill according to which the grahtirig of 
an oil concession by a  cabinet minister without the prior approval of 
Parliament constituted a crime.^^
For example, in a note delivered by the British Ambassador in 
Teheran to the prime minister of Iran, the British Government 
emphasized its full understanding of the situation and sympathy with the 
desire of the Iranian Government to strengthen the economic structure of 
the country and to provide for the general welfare of its people. 
However, he questioned the legitimacy of the exercise by Iran of the 
sovereign rights in regard to the nationalization measures on the basis that 
the Iranian Government had undertook not to exercise this right. Britain 
considered the Iranian nationalization measures as wrong, and breaking a
contract which Iran has deliberately made.76
24- During the Second W. War, Iran experienced a severe inflation of almost 
sevenfold. The other countries were not in a better situation; see appendix II in 
Ford A. W„ The Anglo-Iranian oil Dispute, op cit., pp. 248-250.
25- Parliamentary debates of December 2, 1944.,specially the statements of Dr.
Mosadiq; when the members of the Majlis were also mostly corrupted, their 
approval would not increase the validity of such agreements.
2 -^ Note of the British Ambassador to the Iranian Prime Minister of 19th May, 
1952, reprinted in I.C.J. Pleadings, 1952, op cit., pp. 41-42.
i
Ik'-"
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This was not the only reason that Britain believed that Iran was 
obliged to refrain from the expropriation of the company; according to 
Britain, the 1933 concession was an international agreement as it had 
resulted from the settlement of the dispute between the two countries 
arising out of the cancellation of the D’Arcy concession which had been 
solved under the auspices of the League of Nations and ratified by the 
Iranian Parliament so as to become the law of the country. There is no 
doubt that States are bound by the terms of the international treaties which 
they freely conclude with other States, and violation of such treaties 
brings international responsibility. Accordingly, Britain was justified in 
its challenge to the nationalization measures and in its demand for 
restitution of the concession as the remedy for the measures which were
77regarded as breach of the contract and wrong against the AIOC.
The reality, however, was that Britain was not a party to the
contract and had only exercised its diplomatic protection through the
mediation of an international organization. Therefore, the argument was
rejected by the International Court of Justice on the ground that the
submission of the dispute to the League Council was only the exercise of
the right of diplomatic protection in favour of one of the British 
78nationals. Otherwise if the company was guilty of a wrong, the 
Iranian government must according to the provisions of the concession
79demand a remedy through arbitration. In this case it would prevent 
any allegation to suppress the property of aliens.
The Court of Rome held the opposite view, namely that the nature 
of the nationalization law as expropriation cannot be disputed by reducing
AIOC Case, I C.J. Pleadings, 1952, op. cit.; pp. 12, 46, 70, 74-75.
28- A70C Case, United Kingdom v. Iran, I.G.J., Judgemént, p. 112.
29- AIOC Case, l,CJ. Pleadings, 1952, op. cit., p. 72.
I .
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80it to a mere revocation of a concession. Iran always followed this view 
and contended that the concession was granted under private and domestic 
law similar to the concessions which States grant to their nationals or to 
aliens for the purpose of the operation of certain sources of wealth, and 
were thus, commercial matters exclusively within its domestic jurisdiction 
with reference to the exception contained in the Iranian Declaration of 
2nd October 1930.*^ With regard to the sovereign rights over the 
natural resources, recognized in international law, such provisions could 
not restrict the legislative right of the Iranian Parliament. Although, the 
Parliament in die previous period had ratified the agreement, limiting the 
Iranian government's right to alter the provisions of the agreement or 
annul it, it was declared by the International Court of Justice that neither 
the 1933 concession nor pther concessions were international treaties 
capable of limiting the sovereignty of Iran. But equally, it was declared 
that an alien must be protected against any denial of justice. When the 
concession was governed by the municipal law of Iran, it could not 
restrict the right of the Parliament to alter the agreement or ratify or 
change a law contrary to the previous laws of the country, or to annul a
83law. There are similar cases in which the arbitrators declared that it is 
possible that the contract be the subject of the law of not a specific 
State,*'* while there is no specific agreed rule of international law in this 
regard, and the award of the courts are varied.
The reality was essentially far from the arguments in international 
law. It was not the case that the company as a private person was being
80- AIOC v, S.U.P OR,, The I.L.R., 1955, p. 38.
81- AIOC Case, I.C.J. Pleadings, 1952, op. cit., pp. 131, 156.
82- See the Judgement of the I.C .Jop . cit.
83- AIOC V. S.U.P.O R., The Civil Court of Rome, 22 LL.R. 1955, p. 41.
84- Trésor public v. Galaxis, cited in 23 I.C.L.Q., 1974, p. 82.
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oppressed at the hand of a powerful government which in so doing was 
ignoring the rights of a powerless person and depriving him tinjustly of 
his property. On the contrary, it was Iranian officials who complained 
that the company had always tried to impose a weak and incompétent 
government on Iran. Therefore, the Government of Iran declared that, to 
put Iranian oil at the disposal of the Iranian people "they would fight to
85death to recover their rights"
This was not enough to be presented as a legal argument against
Britain which rejected it on the ground that there were certain treaties and
conventions by which Iran was obliged to accord to British nationals the
same treatment as that accorded to nationals of the most favoured 
86nation. The treaties betWeen Iran and other States were invoked as 
evidence according which Iran was obliged to treat the nationals of other
8 7States in accordance with the principles of international law.
Moreover, the United Kingdom claimed that the 1933 concession itself
was an implied convention between Iran and the United Kingdom
government and breach of that was contrary to international law and
88brought international responsibility for Iranian government.
If possible, as Dr. Mussadiq claimed in his message to the President 
of the United States, Iran might challenge the company and Britain for
85- AIOC Case, I.C.J. Pleadings, 1952, op. cit., p. 61.
8k The Established Treaties of 1857 and 1903 between the United Kingdom and 
Persia; I.C.J. Pleadings, 1952, op. cit., p. 14.
82- The Treaties which were given as evidence were the Treaty between Persia and 
Egypt of November 28,1928, Persia and Belgium of May 9,1929, Persia and 
Czechoslovakia of October 29, 1930, Persia and Denmark of February 2Ô, 
193%, Persia and Switzerland of April 25, 1934, Persia and Germany of 
February 17, 1929, Persia and Turkey of March 14, 1937, Exchange of Notes 
between Persia and the United States of May 14, 1928, Persia and the 
Netherlands of June 20, 1928, Persia and Italy of June 2511928.
88-A/(9C Case, I.C.J. Pleadings, 1952, op; cit., pp. 18-19.
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their interference in the domestic affairs of Iran in disregarding national 
legislation and intemational law by resisting the application of the Iranian 
Petroleum Industry Nationalization Act, and thus preventing the nation 
from pursuing its own interests.
Therefore, the United Kingdom had to allege and prove a cause of 
action under intemational law and practices acceptable to the Intemational 
Community. It could not allege a breach of duty arising under municipal 
law with analogy to intemational treaties. The main difference is that Iran 
could not use its own law to vary its treaty obligations towards Britain, 
but in private law contract, Iran did assert that right.*^
-
89- Bowett D. W„ State Contracts with Aliens, op. c it, p. 55.
'.A
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(SECTION FOUR)
THE LAW OF NATIONALIZATION OF THE OIL 
INDUSTRIES IN IRAN
On March 15 of 1951 the Parliament of Iran passed a "Single 
Article" bill nationalizing the oil industry throughput the country. The
Article reads as:
'Tor the happiness and prosperity of the Iranian Nation arid for the puipose of 
securing world peace; it is hereby resolved that the oil industry throughout all 
parts of the country, without exception' be nationalised; that is to say, all 
operations of exploration; extraction and exploitation shall be carried out by 
the Government. "9Q
This article in accordance with the established legislative procedure 
of Iran was confirmed by the Senate on March 20. Later in April of that 
year, a more detailed biU of nine articles was prepared and passed by both 
the Houses of Parliament and Senate and the bill received the assent of the 
shah on May 1 and 2.^^ In fact, the nationalization law of the oil 
industry in Iran first had passed during the 15th session of the Parliament, 
on October 21, 1947, riiaking null the Ghavani-Sadchikove Agreement, 
advocated exploration and exploitation of oil throughout Iran to Iranian 
government. This law had passed despite the agreement of the company 
on 50-50 share of the parties to the profit.**  ^ But, for the reasons 
mentioned above, the law was ignored and the previous agreement was 
substituted by the agreement of 1933.^^
9 -^ See appendix I.
9L See the text of the Single Article Law and the Detailed Bill in Appendix I.
92- Debates of the Parliament on December 3,1950; statement of Dr. Mosadiq, op.
cit.
93- The Writer has been unable to have access to any documents relating to this
agreement and the legislation of the Parliament in that period.
____________
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The Iranian  hationalization  law coincided w ith the 
recommendations of December 22, 1952 of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations concerning the exploitation of natural resources which was 
followed with many other U.N.G.A. Resolutions defending the right of 
the developing countries to economic development and permanent 
sovereignty oyer their natural r e s o u r c e s . T h e  coincidence of the oil 
nationalization in Iran with Resolutibn 626 (VII) of the General Assembly 
was considered by the Civil Courts of Venice and Rome in the case of 
AIOC V. SUP OR as an evidence that it constituted a clear recognition of 
the legality, in terms of international law, of the Iranian Nationalization
95Law . The legality of the nationalization measures was confirmed in 
AIOC V.  Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha by stating that the idea of the 
nationalization law coincided with the resolutions adopted by the General
96‘ ' .Assembly of the United Nations. The Court took its own incompetence 
to pass judgement upon the validity or invalidity of the nationalization law 
as further evidence of the legality of the nationalization measures by an 
independent sovereign.^^
Therefore, the right of nationalization was asserted by the Foreign 
Affairs Minister of Iran as an internal matter, related solely to the
This resolution was innoduction to thé U.N.G.A. Resolutions 1314 (XIII), 12 
December 1958^1515 (XV), 15 Decern (XŸII), 14 December
1962, 2158 (XXI), 28 November 1966, 3281 (XXIX), 1974. See generally 
Hyde J. N., Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, op. cit., pp. 
854-67; Gess K. N., Pernlanent Sovereignty Over Natural resources, 13 
I.C.L.Q., 1964, pp. 398-449; Brownlie L, Principles of Public International 
Law, 1979, pp. 531-51.
95. A/OC y. S.U.P.O.R., 22 I L.R., 1955, pp. 40-41.
^^-AIO C  V. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, 20 I.L.R., 1953, pp.
309, 313 
9 -^ Loc. cit., p. 313.
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national sovereignty of Iran and not related to the British Government
98and not the subject of complaint. Mr Saleh, the Iranian representative 
to the Security Council, also contended that the oil resources of Iran, like 
its soil and its rivers, were the property of the people and, accordingly, 
they had the authority to decide what should be done with them. It was 
also contended that they had never agreed to share that authority with 
anybody else or to divide their ownership of all or any part of that 
p r o p e r t y T h e r e f o r e ,  according to Iranians, the authority over oil had 
never been surrendered and the concession had no international effect. 
This idea seems contrary to the provisions of the 1933 Concession, 
through which it was guaranteed not to annul or change the terms of the 
concession by any m e a n s . H o w e v e r ,  after the War, the idea became 
established that nationalization and expropriation were part of the 
foundations of national sovereignty and based on the equality admitted 
among members of the United N a t i o n s . A r t i c l e s  1(2), and 2(7) of the 
United Nations Charter were given as further evidence that it was a settled 
principle of international law that, in matters of domestic concern, to 
which this question clearly relates, the exercise of sovereign rights can 
neither be abridged nor interfered with by any foreign sovereign or 
international body.^®^ However, if through the concession Iran had 
limited its sovereign right permanently, even if it was a domestic issue, 
the measures would be wrong under international law. Defending the 
right to nationalize the oil industries, Mr. Saleh said further that the 1933 
AIOC concession was a private agreement which could in no Way limit or
AIOC Case, LCJ. Pleadings, 1952, op. cit., p. 384, 679-680,
99- By the concessions Iranians apparently had agreed to submit the right, but the 
statement indirectly refers to the invalidity of the concessions.
9^0- ^ i e l e  21 of the 1933 Concession.
U.N.S.C., Official Records, Meeting 560th, p. 6.
^92- Log. cit., p. 7.
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abridge the sovereign right of Iran to dispose of its resources as it saw
In a letter of May 20, 1951, Minister of Finance wrote to the 
company that:
"the nationalisation of industries derives from the right of sovereignty of 
nations, and other governments, among them the British Government and the 
Mexican Government, have in various instances availed themselves of this 
same right ....... which is founded on the indisputable principles of
international law ........is not referable to arbitration j and no international
authority has thé competence to deal with this mattér"^^
It has frequently been mentioned that in the absence of treaty 
obligations, international law recognizes the right of a sovereign State to 
nationalize or expropriate foreign-owned property within its territory in 
the public's interest.^^^ Iran passed the Single Ariiclc on the ground that 
it had no contrary treaty obligations, a contention which was rejected by 
Britain. While both parties asserted thàt expropriation ineasures should 
not be contrary to international law. Britain believed that Iran was
limited by the terms of the contract by which Iran expressly undertook
not to terminate the concession unilaterally. Altematively, it was argued, 
even if the taking were not unlawful on that ground, the Iranian measures 
would amount to an unlawful confiscation, because there had been no 
payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Accordingly, 
Britain demanded restitution on the basis of the judgement of the 
Permanent Court of Iritemational Justice in the Chorzow Factory^^^ or 
payment of pecuinary compensation consisting of a sum corresponding to
Loc. cit.
104. The text of the letter see in I.C. J. Pleadings, 1952, op. cit., pMO.
Hackworth G. H., Digest of International Law, op. cit.. Vol. Ill, p. 662; 
ppighel I., NatioMization, pp. c it , pp 72-3; White G,, Nationalizatipn pf 
Foreign Property, op. cit., pp. 32-8 are the examples.
106. Chorzow Factory , Claim for indèmnivy, Merits, A, No. 17.
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107the value which a restitution in kind would bear. It meant that Iran
and other developing countries would not be able to expropriate aliens
property at any time, for they would not be able to pay such a
compensation, and even if they could, the taking would place an
immediate burden on the public which would be contrary to the aims of
the expropriation.
Britain attempted to raise the issue of the obligation of Iran under
the 1933 concession and the legal position of the company, in particular
the obligation not to void the concession and the right to take the case to
arbitration,^®* arid, if rejected by the Iranian government, to the
International Court of Justice
The British Government considered the difference between
concessions which contained a clause by which the grantors expressly
divested themselves of the right of unilateral termination with those
concessions containing no such clause as a matter of degree which in both
cases according to the British Government constitute a breach of contract.
Accordingly, in every contract there is an implied undertaking against
breaking it. However, the difference was considered as having substantial
and decisive character in the realm of international law and it was
admitted that such a breach was not necessarily unlawful under
110international law if certain conditions were fulfilled. Any unilateral 
modification or abrogation of agreements has been considered relevant to 
the cases which the relations of the contracting parties reach an impasse
legal submissions, I.C.J. Pleadings, 1952, pp. cit., pp. 81-82.
AIOC Case, I.G.J. Pleadings, 1952, op. cit., p. 12.
^^ 9- Statement of Morrison before the House of Commons on May 29, 1951. BIS,
Legal Aspects of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Question, ID 1063, New York, June,
1951, p. 6.
AIOC Case, LC.J. Pleadings, 1952, op. cit., pp. 88-89.
 : :  - - ■ ■■ ■ '
'Iranian Oil Nationalisation 2 1 9
and consensual arrangements are no longer possible, particularly when; the
undertaking is highly successful and the interests of the foreign investor
and the host governrnent clash because of the increasing gap between the 
111profits each gain. In such a situation, modifications have become
admissible; the situation which is not as the result of clear breach of
contract or /brce mq/ewre which are unilateral actions of the government
taken for a public purpose. It is also different from a fundamental change
of circumstances which renders the performance of the agreement,
although not technically impossible, unduly onerous or fruitless and 
112unacceptable. Long-term contracts such as the 1933 Concession were 
not adjusted to changing circumstances and interests in order to make 
them acceptable to the parties and their continuation possible.
The C o n s o r t i u m  C o n t r a c t  o f  1 9 5 4  was modified in 1 9 6 5 ,  1 9 6 7  and
1971 as the result of the decisions of the OPEC Members which was
113indirectly imposed upon the o il companies in the Member States. This 
kind of modification has not been considered as a violation of the 
principle of pacta servanda,nor contra^ to the international law.
However, controversy mostly centred on the existence of a binding 
treaty between Iran and Britain providing that Iran should not nationalize 
property of the British nationals; Treaties between Iran and third 
countries concluded on most-favoured nation basis were adduced against 
the measures, although, this was rejected by the International Court of 
Justice.^ "^*
i l l .  Geiger R., The Unilateral Change of Economic Development Agreements^ 23 
1.CL.Q., 1974, pp 73, 75.
Geiger R , The Unilateral Change of Economic Development Agreements, op. 
cit., pp. 78-9.
113_ Movahed M. A;, Ôür Gil and Its Legal Problems, op. cit., p. 89.
Co. Case, United Kingdom V. /mh, contention of Britain, I.C.J., 
1952, No. 16, pp. 99-101.
'R#
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According to the terms o f the concession, Iran was barred from 
enforcing the law of nationalization of oil industry. The provisions of the 
agreement with the AlOG expressed that the concession came to an end 
only when the company surrendered the concessidh^^^ or in the event of 
the Arbitration Court declaring the concession annulled as a consequence 
of default of the company in the performance of the agreement. The 
agreement of 1933 also restricted the Iranian right to modify the 
agreement or declare it null and void. Any change or termination of the 
agreement must be determined and decided by the Arbitrators.^^^
Therefore, the dispute between Iran and the AIOC was over the 
competence and territoriality, /. e. whether the concession was governed 
by public law or it was exclusively in jurisdiction of private law, a
117question that still has not been answered properly. If the contract was 
between two private persons, except in the event oî force majeur, any 
non-Compliance with the terms of the contract would be considered as an 
illegal breach of the contract which would have made payment of 
compensation obligatory. However, when a contract is between a private 
person and a government, different procedures have been pursued by 
municipal courts of different countries. For example, the United States 
courts, although they recognize certain distinctions based on certain 
inexact constructions of foreign legislation, have also accepted the concept 
of territoriality o f public law. English courts, in applying the 
principle of territoriality, have made some tentative attempts at
Article 25 of the 1933 Agreement.
Article 26 of the 1933 Agreement.
Arbitrations on the Libyan cases are the best examples in which the judgements 
were contradictory in regard to similar cases in one country.
O’Gonneli). P., A Critiqué of the Iranian Oil Litigation, 4 I.C.L.Q.; 1955, p.
267.
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distinguishing between expropriations which are valid and invalid in 
international law according to the law of the forum, French, German and 
Swiss courts have employed their own municipal law to refuse recognition 
to any foreign legislation which offends against public policy or natural
. 119justice.
The Anglo-Iranian oil dispute made the problems arising out of
expropriation of contracts more complex and increased the ambiguity of
the courts in their choice of criteria . The reason was that there was no
direct decisive international rule delimiting the right of expropriation and
the contractual obligations of States. This point was made in the different
arguments presented by the parties to the dispute.^^^
The argument of breach of contract by the company was overruled
by the District Court of Tokyo which stated that the concession agreement
was, in substance, a private agreement, governed by municipal law and
that the company's right and interest thereunder could be expropriated by
the nationalization law which was the municipal law of Iran; and that the
validity of the nationalization law could not be affected by the fact that
Iran might be guilty of a breach of contract or possibly of a tort. Bÿ this
argument, the court separated the legal position of the nationalization
measures from that of the breach of contract. However, the conclusion of
121the court was the same as that reached by the Italian courts.
This distinction has been recognized by other international 
authorities. In the award of Amco Asia v. Indonesia, the Tribunal made 
it clear that the State is entitled to withdraw the approval it granted for
^^ 9- Loc. cit., pp. 267-8.
See the contentions of the Parties in AIOC Case, I.C.J., op. c it , No. 16; the 
contention of the company in the courts of Venice, Tokyo and Aden; see also 
O'Connel D. P., A Critique of the Iranian Gil Litigation, op. cit., p. 268;
121- AIOC V. Kaisha, 20 I.L.R., 1953, pp. 310, 312.
____ __
-------
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reasons which could not be invoked by a private party. The Court said 
that as a typical example of the exceptional powers accorded to a State as 
opposed to a private person, a State has the right, recognized in 
international law, to terminate contracts through nationalization 
m e a s u r e s . T h e  principle of sanctity of contracts was later challenged 
by Britain in attempting to alter the terms of its contracts with foreign 
corporations during a dispute over the development of North Sea oil.^^^ 
Two important arguments were put forward by the United Kingdom 
Government in support of its right to alter the contracts. The first was to 
the effect that the UK was no longer willing to stick rigidly to contracts 
that were unreasonably disadvantageous to the country; and, secondly, that 
there was no absolute cohstitutipnal protection in either country for the 
principle pacta sunt servanda}^^ MoTtowcT, as was mentioned earlier, in 
some cases the UK Government rejected any suggestion of impropriety or 
even a duty to compensation. Holding such a viewv Britain could not 
challenge the Iranian's right to nationalize the AIOC and the contention of 
that country against Iran was inadmissible. The U.S. Government, an ally 
to Britain, through its ambassador, L. B. Morris, announced that it 
recognized and supported thé right of the Iranian government to refuse 
the granting of oil concessions to all f o r e i g n e r s . I n  other words it 
recognized the Iranian right to nationalize thé oil industry.
The International Court of Justice also held in the proceedings 
between the company and Iran on this question that a concession was
122. ICSID Award of 21 November 1984, 2 4 1:L;M., 1985, p. 1029.
123- Brown R., Thé Relationship Between the State and the Multinational
Corporation in the Exploitation of Resources, 33 I.C.L.Q., 1984, p. 221.
124- Dpntith and Gault,pûcrfl SM/i/ servfl«<i4 and thé licensing and taxation of North
Sea Oil Production, 8 Camberian Law Review, 1977, pp. 28, 42,
125. Reported by Lehczowski G., Russia and the West in Iran, op. cit., p. 221.
________ _______
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never analogous to a treaty, and refused to accept the view that the
contract signed between the Iranian government and the AIOC had a 
126double character. This was confirmed by the later practice of the 
United Kingdom through the Treaty of Commerce, Establishment and
127Navigation of March 2, 1959 with Iran which provided protection and
security for the persons and property of the nationals and properties of 
128the parties.
The sanctity of the concession agreements as defended by Britain in 
the Anglo-Iranian Case has been supported neither by the traditional 
international law of co-existence between sovereign States nor by the 
emerging international law of economic co-operation based on general
129principles recognized by the representative legal systems of the world. 
Therefore, a question arises as to why the company should have been 
entitled to preferential treatment which it could have obtained neither 
under his own nor any other developed legal system?
The practice of the civilized nations and courts did not provide a 
straight-forward rule on State c o n t r a c t s . S o m e ,  such as the Supreme 
Court of Aden, declared the measures a breach of contract which 
demanded restitution. But, not every judicial entity made the same
126. A/OÇ f /é n Wfcdo/%), ludgement of July 22, 1952, I C.J Reports, op.
cit., p. 112.
127. Cmnd. 698, Iran, No. 1 (1959).
128. Article 8 of the Treaty in Cmnd, op. cit
129- Geiger R., The Unilateral Change of Economic Development Agreements, pp.
cit., p. 99.
130- Examples are Topco, BP eases in Libya; Amco Asia Corp v. Indonesia; Congo
V. Venne; Shufeldt's v. Guatemala; Egyptian nationalization cases; Gorgia v. 
City of Chatanopga, (1924, Supreme Court of the USA); Ayr Harbour 
Trustees v. Oswal; Czarrtikow v. Rlimpex; Oil nationalizations in Mexico, 
Peru; Decisions of the OPEC in relation to the oil companies; The UK 
decisions on the North sea oil and so bn. ,
: î .
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judgement to restrict States to expropriate the contracts with payment of 
compensation/^^ For example, in England where a contract is governed 
by English law, such a contract is always subject to future legislation, and 
neither a local authority nor the central Government may by a contractual 
term or a stabilization clause exclude the operation of a future statute/^^ 
Thus, it is impossible in English law to insert a stabilization clause against 
the future legislation, and no English court could challenge the 
Parliamentary supremacy/^"* In other countries, such as France, the law 
clearly distinguishes the position of sovereign State from that of private 
persons and confers on administrative authorities special prerogatives
which are related to the interests of the host country in the promotion and
135direction of its economic development. This overriding power of 
administration is used in the other industrial countries like Germany and 
the United States, and in the common law system, public law is not yet
136regarded as a separate branch of law. In the United States, for 
example, the measure of compensation not only does not correspond to 
the measure of damages for breach of contract but also, according to the
■ 137Renegotiation Act of 1951 excessive profits should be renegotiated;
It would be somewhat disingenuous to condemn such legislation in a 
developing coiiiitry like Iran which was in desperate need of social,
Texaco v. 53I.L.R., 1974, pp. 497-508; Amco Asia Corp v.
Indonesia, 24 I.L.M., 1985, p. 1D%2\ Thé Rose Mary Case, 20 I.L.R.,
1953, pp. 316-328; Norwegian Claims Case, m d so on.
See the section on 'Sanctity of Contracts and Expropriation', for more 
discussion on this type of the contracts, pp.
- A yr Hdihour trustees v. 8 App, gas. 623 (HL); Gzarw/kow v.
Ro/f?M ?^e;r,ri&77,33 W.L.R., 686.
Bowett 0 . W., State Contracts with Aliens, op. cit., p. 58.
135. Trésor Public v. Galaxis  ^ 23 I.C;L.Q., 1974, pp. 83-84.
136. Loc. cit., pp. 85-99.
137- Loc. cit., pp. 90-91.
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political and economical reforms. The practice of States became 
international with the Resolutions of the OPEC Organization which caused 
the alteration of the contractual terms of the Member States with the oil 
companies. It asked and encouraged, for example, Libya, Saudi Arabia 
and Venzuela to révisé their contracts with the companies, and Iran 
applied it to the Consoftiurn Members three times.^^*
All these elements together with the historical, political, social and
139economic conditions, as was stated in casé, placed tho AIOC
case in a special category different from the other groups of private and 
public contracts, and put the claims of the company in a somewhat 
precarious position. This became more evident when the Tokyo District 
Court announced that there is no rule of international law empowering the 
court to deny the validity of the nationalization law of Iran, and found 
itself bound to recognize its validity. What was recognized by the 
District Court of Tokyo and the other courts as wrongful act under 
international law was confiscation without compensation. Otherwise, in 
so far as the taking was designed to promote the public welfare, and did 
not violate the public policy of the country, with regard to the 
requirements of intematiorial comity and the mutual réspect for sovereign 
power between nations, it would be a legal act which was to be respected.
To distinguish a lawful nationalization from an illegal confiscatory 
act, different courts reached various conclusions. The Tokyo Court found 
that it was enough that the measures were undertaken pursuant to a law 
regularly enacted in accordance with the established legislative proceduré
138. The Resolution of ÔPËG in its 10th Conference of 1965, see in Movahed M.
A ., Our Petroleum and Its Legal Problems, op. cit., pp. 124-5.
139. AI0C V. 8;Uæ è.R ., Civil Court o  ^ 22 LL Ri, 1955lp. 23.
1^ 11- Loc. cit., p. 109.
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of Iran which was regarded as a valid law in Iran. Meanwhile, the 
Supreme Court of Aden held the measures illegal, on the grounds that no 
compensation was paid and that it was discriminatory/'*^ The Court of 
Aden was correct in its judgement and any other court could have reached 
the same conclusion if it put the basis of its argument as the court of Aden 
did. The court based its contention on the cases in dispute between 
Western countries. The conditions surrounding the AIOC  expropriation 
was fundamentally different from those cases, and any analogy between
the A/OC arid those cases was irrelevant and incorrect.
Rose Mary Case, The Weekly Law Report, 1953, vol. i, pp. 252, 253, 259. 
142_ The different categories of the cases was already explained in the sections on 
'The Conditions of Expropriations of the Aliens Property', and 
'Compensation Agreements',
_______________ _
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(SECTION FIVE)
CONFISCATORY FEATURE OF THE IRANIAN 
OIL NATIONALIZATION
On various occasions, the AIOC and the British Government raised
questions as to the legality of Iranian nationalization measures by which
an alien's interest had been confiscated without compensation/"*^ Similar
arguments were presented by W estern Countries against the
nationalization measures adopted in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and
Mexico, but it was not accepted by any of those countries that such
measures were or might be illegal.
The British Government contended that the accusations made against
the company by Iran and the Nationalization Act indicated that the
measures were not dictated by imperative requirements of the Iranian
economy and the measures were confiscation disguised by nationalization.
Moreover, they pointed to the fact that, since the adoption of the 1933
concession, Iran had never requested an arbitration in order to test the
validity of any grievances against the company. '^*'* Thus, they contended,
the nationalization measures, far from being necessary for the protection
of the vital interests of Iran, were, in fapt, primarily motivated by anti-
145foreign prejudice on the part ôf the Iranian Government,
The Iranian Government challenged this contention, declaring that it 
had for some time been dissatisfied with the activities of the company and
CmsHa Case, 2 0 1 9 5 3 ,  pp. 309m ; Jtffi'ate Ca^g,1952; The Weekly 
Law Report, op. cit, p. 253>
144. AIOC Case, I.C.J. Pleadings, op. cit., pp. 97-99.
145-Loc. cit., pp. 100-101.
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offering to produce irrefutable documentary evidence in this regard. 
Despite that, the Iranian Government emphasized that it in no way 
intended to confiscate the properties of the company.
The grounds on which Iran might justify such action were 
numerous. For example, the direct and indirect intervention of the 
company in the internal affairs of Iran and the default and misconduct by 
the company were advanced as some reason for taking expropriation
147m easures. In fact, the company was taking such actions, and Iran 
always was complaining that the company was acting as a government 
inside the government of I r a n . E v e n  those who were pro-company did 
not hesitate to express the view that the actings of the company were 
illegal and its interests illegitimate. In general, the dominant position of 
the company in Iran was à sign of the domination of foreigners over the
 ^ 149political and economical destiny of the country.
This was the reasoning adopted by the Special Committee on Oil in 
its report to the Parliament, in which it was stated that the 1933 
Agreement could be declared void for the reason that it has been 
concluded under a dictator government assisted and established by 
B r i t a i n . T h e  signatory to the agreement on the part of Iran had also 
confessed that the agreement was imposed upon Iran and it had not been 
the wish of the Shah to ^ te n d  the agreement. Tlie reason given for the
146_ Message of the prime minister of Iran to the president of the United States of 
America, 11th June, 1951,1.C.J. Pleadings, op. cit., pp. 685, 690.
4^7- AIOC Case, I.C.J. Pleadings, 1952, op. cit., p. 83.
4^8_ See generally on this argument the debates of Majlis in Makkey H., Ketabe 
Siyah, op. cit, passim,
4^9- Speech of Shah in the union of the oil engineers in Abadan in March 1966, 
reprinted in Movahed M. A., Our Oil and Its Legal Problems, op. cit., p.
243, note 2.
See more in Raise and Fall of Pahlavi Dynasty, op. cit., two volumes.
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ratification of the concession was that Members of the Parliament were 
elected under a corrupted system by the direct influence of the British 
government and the company. Thus, when the 1933 concession, which 
was prepared by the company, replaced the DVArcy concession, the 
members of the Parliament approved it unanimously in one day without 
any challenge to the concession.^^^ The company, it was contended; had 
not been a merely commercial concern but had exercised arid profound 
influence within the political and economic sphere and by eticouraging 
corruption and bribery had endeavoured to preverit essential reforms.^^^ 
The Company had never permitted the Iranian government to 
inspect or audit its books, which were alleged to be fictitiously prepared 
in order to conceal real profit of the company and therefore reduce the 
amount of the royalties due. Thus, the company had refused to pay the 
royalties on its profits fully, and such payments were due.^^^
In a note to the British embassy in Teheran, the Iranian Government 
indicated that Iran had used the right of nationalization in response to the 
illegal and unjust measures taken by the company in I r a n . T h u s ,  the 
nationalization measures represented a reaction to the company’s 
behaviour in Iran. While penal confiscation of property of aliens has not
151_ Musaddiq's Memoirs(Persian), op. cit., p. 201. Criticizing the Shah, 
Musaddiq says that, nobody expected Reza Shah to do independently for, he 
had come to power by the direct help of the foreigners and was unable to 
disobey them. He expected the shah act more independently.
1^ -^ The Third ad hoc Committee's Report presented to the Majlis by the prime 
minister Ghavam, reprinted in Makkey H., Ketabe Siyah, op. cit.. Vol. H, p.
329; see also "Mission for my country", chapter 5, written by shah; see also
I.C.J. Pleadings, 1952, op. cit., p. 59.
153_ Royalties paid to Iran during the years 1901-1932 amounted to £11 million, 
while the normal taxes, from which the company was exempt amounted to 
£22 million.
154_ The Note of the August 6th 1952; reprinted in Makkey H., The Years of the 
National Movement, Vol. 6, Teheran, 1990, pp. 59-61.
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been rejected in international law, if it were to be considered as a penal 
confiscatory measures, the consequence should vary in comparison with 
natiohaiizatipn. The measures taken for the purposes mentioned iii the 
Single Article Law, for the purpose of international law, constituted a 
legal exercise of sovereign power, provided the nationalization of the 
property had been accompanied with payment of compensation. 
Otherwise, it would simply be a confiscatory measure, which was not easy 
for Iran to justify and practice under the governing law of the concession.
In a more severe situation, in 1937, Bolivia had confiscated the 
assets of the Standard Oil Gpnipany which was accused of taking a hand in 
the war for personal interests. The company was also accused of fraiid 
and npn-complianc e with the contract and the contract had been declared 
annulled. The company received little compensation for its assets.^^^
The Iranians did not declare the measures confiscatory and 
officially rejected any argument that the aim of the law was to confiscate 
the company's property mostly for practical reasons rather than legal 
ones. However, the Supreme Court of Aden refused to recognize the 
legality of the nationalization measures. The court held that the measures 
were discriminatory and, since no compensation had been paid, were in
157the nature of a confiscation. The apprbach taken by the Court was 
completely different from that of the Iranian Government. Meanwhile, it 
was clear to the court that payment of prompt compensation was not a
universally recognized law. 158
155_ Parry and Grant, Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law, under the 
term Nationalization, p. 252.
Kunz J. I., The Mexican Expropriations, op. cit., pp. 42-47; the company was 
, paid:3 million dollars againstreceivmg a loan pf cppsideraMe amount.
Rose Mary case, the Weekly Law Reports, 1953, pp. 252-3.
Loc. cit., p. 253.
Iranian Oil Nationalisation 2 3 1
The District Court of Tokyo did not accept the argument that the
nationalization measures were confiscatory on the basis that the applicants
did not dispute the fact that the Iranian nationalization law was a law
regularly enacted in accordance with the established legislative procedure
of that country. Consequently, the Law must be regarded as a valid
nationalization law within Iran.^^^ Similarly, the Court in Venice
rejected any suggestion that the taking was illegal confiscation of AIOC's
property, and attached little weight to the argument that legality of the
160measures require prompt compensation.
The question of confiscation of aliens' property has been raised 
mostly in respect to the rights of aliens as an illegal measure unacceptable 
in international law. The other aspect of the issue, i.e, the duty of aliens 
towards the host States, has usually been ignored. In this regard, as was 
mentioned in the Bolivian takings, confiscation might be a penalty for the 
behaviour of aliens. In the case of the Iranian nationalization of the oil 
industry, although the Iranian Government accused the company of 
various wrong doings, it would have proved difficult, if not impossible, to 
carry on a penal confiscatory measure against the company, without, at 
the same time, further provoking the British Government. Surely, if Iran 
had taken a stronger position against the company and Britain, the legal 
and economic consequences would be different. Iran indirectly claimed 
that some of the company's rights and claims were illegitimate. The Law
Regulating Nationalization of the Oil Industry stated that:
" the Government is charged to investigate the lawful and rightful claims
of the Government as well as those of the Company, to report its views 
therein to the two Houses of Parliament and upon ratification to give effect 
thereto.
^39-X/OC V. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, 211 I L.R., 1953, op. cit., p. 
309.
160-A/OC V. S.U.P.OM., (Court of Venice), 22 I.L.R., 1955, p. 22
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In the debates on the issne of oil nationalization in the Parliament
and the contentions put forward before the International Court of Justice
there were niany accusations against the company which, if they were
considered as a motive for the takings, the measufes would be confiscation
rather than natidhalization. The provisions of the Law Regulating
Nationalization of the Oil Industry had not made it clear how the
Government was to distinguish rightful claims from wrongful ones.
There was another obstacle to the payment of compensation to the
company, namely ratification of the two Houses of Parliament. There was
no guarantee that the two Houses would have ratified the amount
demanded by the company or even that suggested by the government.
Iran chose juridical procedure; because if had not the bargaining
power to challenge Britain neither economically, politically or militarily.
This is also the reality for nearly all of the expropriations in the other
developing countries, both before and after the Iranian nationalizations.
That this is so is apparent from their position at the time of the
expropriations and from the fact that they ultim ately paid 
162compensation.
Therefore, the Iranian Government, as a sovereign power, was not 
limited to the applicable law of the contract, and had the right to vary or 
terminate the concession in the public intefest.^^^
As it was indicated, in accordance with the statements of Taghi 
Zadeh, the signatory to the 1933 concession, and as restated by Dr. 
Musaddiq, "the agreement was signed under duress and consequently not
6^1- Para. 3 of the Law Regulating Nationalization of the Oh Industry  ^Appendix I,
162_ Thig is at least correct in the Mexican and Bolivian expropriations.
163_ See more on this issue in section on Contracts between states and the Aliens 
pp. 24-25.
-.,v
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valid but null and v o i d T h i s  duress continued even after
nationalization and consisted in threats to the Iranian Government, In fact,
Britain was ready to dispatch military forces to Iran to prevent the
nationalization measures or the dismantling of important parts of the oil 
165installations. Therefore, it is open to question whether the concession 
was concluded according to the principles of international law, 
particularly the principles of free will and self-determination. For those 
reasons, the agreement lacked the sentiment of shared responsibility for 
the conduct of the Iraiiian government as a necessary force behind it. 
While there is a direct relation between the strength of a legal relation and 
the sentiment behind it, the AI0C concession lacked such an elerrtent. 
That was the reason that, the Iranian Government challenged the legality 
of the concession and was not ready to refer the dispute to arbitration in 
accordance with the provisions of the 1933 concession/**^
In respect to the validity of the agreement asserted by Britain, its 
provisions clearly precluded any kind of transfer of the concession to 
another party without the consent of the Iranian govemment.^^^ But the 
company had effectively done so by selling more than 50 per cent of the 
shares in the company to the British government, which was a further 
cause for the Iranian government's confiscation of the concession. 
However, putting the argument on a solid basis. Dr. Musaddiq regularly 
declared that nationalization of the oil industry had been undertaken by
164_ The Speech of Dr. Musad#q to the Foreign Press Representatives on May 
28th, 1951; See also P#iamehtary Debates of October 19, 1950.
165_ Note Delivered by British ÀnibaSsador in Teheran to the Iranian prime minister 
of 19th May, 1951, reprinted in I.G.J. Pleadings, 1952, op. cit., p. 42-43, 
683.684.
166_ Makkey H., The Years of National Movement, Vol. 5, Teheran, 1990, pp. 
431-2.
^67. Article 26 of the 1933 Agreement, in Ford A. W., The Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Dispute, op. cit.. Appendix I, p. 246.
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virtue of the Iranian Nation’s sovereign rights. In an interview with 
foreign press representatives, he stated that "no agreement can deprive us 
of this right. All legal authorities agree on this p o in t ." D e c la r in g  the 
agreement to have been signed under duress, and therefore invalid and 
void, he stated that the nationalization measures had been taken without 
prejudice to the validity of the agreement. The statement was to prevent 
the oil company and the British Goverhmeht referring the matter to 
arbitration. He emphasized that neither the Parliament nor the Iranian 
Government has raised any point regarding the agreement, consequently 
the oil company cannot invoke the arbitration clause,-
A similar statement was made by the Iranian representative to the 
Security Council of the United Nations: Iran did not contest the validity of 
the 1933 concession, at least for the purpose of the proceedings in the 
Security Council. Notwithstanding the fact that Iran was coerced into 
concluding the 1933 concession, which according to universally 
established legal principles would be null and void, in order to avoid 
futile debate and prevent any confusion, it was contended that "the Iranian 
government does not wish to enter into any discussion regarding the 
nullity of the agreement imposed upon us."^ *^*
Therefore, the only rernedy for the private company which 
sustained loss was to claim compensation from the expropriating 
government. When such a clause is provided for in the Iranian 
nationalization law, there is no basis on which to challenge that law by 
circumventing the provisions of the 1933 concession. Particularly, when
6^8- Speech of Dr. Musaddiq, op. cit.
6^9- Loc. cit.
U, N. S C. Official Records, op. cit., p. 18.
7^1- Articles 2 and 3 of tlie Law Regulating Nationalization of the Oil Industry. See 
Appendix I.
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the governing law is the law of the country which enacted the change, the 
clause will usually be abortive. It does not mean that the contract of the 
private parties of that of the private and a State is of "a lower order" than 
those between States. The point is that each of the contracts belong to 
different orders. The "order" is determined by the position of the parties 
and cannot be changed merely because the expectation of one of them is 
disappointed. According to the established order which cherishes 
certainty, equitable treatment and sound results, it is possible to judge the 
existence or non-existence of a  breach of contract.^^^
However, there will remain the question whether Iran had rightfully 
used its sovereignty to expropriate the property necessary for public use, 
or whether it was merely a misuse of power to deprive the alien unjustly. 
As happened in the AIOC case, it is vital to the parties of an agreement to 
determine by the contract that the contracting State apparently waived 
rather than reserved its power and the right to change its law to the 
detriment of the alien with whom it contracts.
Contrary to thp Arameo Arbitmtion case of 1958,^ "^* the Iranian 
concession, which was in fact the revised version of the D’ Arcy 
concession, did not constitute the governing law of the contract; rather it 
was to be deteimined by the third or single arbitrator appointed under the 
1933 concession. Therefore, the rejection of the Iranian Government
U2_ According to each legal order, the cases of discrimination, denial of justice, and 
so forth could be determined.
173_ The merits of each case would determine the intention of the contracting parties; 
See generally Mitchell J. D. B., The Contracts of Public Authorities, 1954; 
Mann F. A., State Contracts and State Responsibility, pp. 582-3 
^74- Ararnco Arbitration (1958), 27 I.L.R., P. 117; in that arbitration, it was 
mentioned that, "The Tribunal holds that the concession has the nature of a 
concession which has the effect of conferring acquired rights on the 
Contracting Parties."
___ ____________________
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of settlement of the dispute according to the terms of the concession was 
not an innovation as an illegal measure of the taking of property.
Similar to the Iranian position. Chief Justice Waite in Stone v. 
Mississippi had expressed the view that even legislature cannot bargain 
away the police power of a State, and irrevocable grants of property and 
franchises may be made if they do not impair the supreme authority or 
make laws for the proper government of the State. But no legislature can 
curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they deem proper 
in matters of police/^**
The Iranian representative to the Security Council of the United 
Nations, discussing Iran's exercise of the prerogatives of national
sovereignty in nationalizing the oil industry , said:
"The fact that thé imposed agreement was made with a foreign national does 
not alter the case. No evidence can be deduced to show that international law 
puts aliens in a favoured position over the nationals of the country, which 
nationals are unquestionably subject to its general legislation. If governments 
have sovereignty in internal affairs only in respect of their nationals but not in 
respect of foreigners who have the support of powerful governments, the 
latter would enjoy special rights and privileges incompatible with the equality 
of rights. Such a doctrine would spbvert the law arid could only ensue in a 
modern revival of the system of capitulatory privileges. No independent state
would willingly subject itself to such degradation a n d  s l a v e r y . "^ 7?
As is clear from the language of this statement, the Iranian 
representative was not asserting Iran’s position under international law, 
but complaining about subversion of law by a powerful State against a 
weaker one.
While he believed that international law was weak and inefficient to 
protect the right of small nations, he did not explain what would be the 
7^5- Article 22(d) of the Concession.
7^6_ Mann F. A., State Contracts and State Responsibility, op. cit., p. 585.
7^7_ The idea was notbased bn international minimum standard doctrine; U.N.S.C, 
Official Records, bp. cit., p. 8.
7.:
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result were the foreigners to belong to a weaker or to an equal State, nor 
whether the national law of the State is the proper law to establish a just 
relation between the interests of the public and the aliens or not. 
However, he pledged that Iran would continue to observe every legal 
limitation on its sovereignty which flowed from Iranian participation and 
co-operation in the affairs of the family of nations, and contended that the 
law which they practiced was not contrary to any legal limitation which 
was recognized among nations^ Defending the Iranian right to nationalize 
the oil industries, he said that the great and powerful are still dominating 
the world, and the protection of the fundamental rights of the weak 
requires them to be most jealous of their independence and sovereign 
rights. He recognized the limitations on sovereignty imposed by 
international law and intemational agreements, Still he denied any 
obligation on Iran to limit herself toward the AIOC, as the absolute right 
to manage internal affairs without any limitations other than those 
contained in  the principles and laws established in the c o u n t r y  i t s e l f . ^^ 8 
Accordingly, he rejected the competence of the I.C.J. and the 
Security Council to consider and decide on the case. The contention of 
the United Kingdom was not based on whether Iran had the right to 
nationalize the AIOC or not; neither, was claimed that this act constituted 
a breach of the conventions between the two countries and ought to be 
considered in thé I.C.J., or as a measure which had created a situation 
which had constituted a potential threat to intemational p e a c e . ^^ 9 The 
United Kingdom sought to preserve the status gwn and solve the dispute 
Loe. cit, p. 10.
7^9- Loc. cit., pp. 10-11; U.N.S.G. Official Records, 559th Meeting, 1 October,
1951, p. 21; In regarding to danger to peace, the Iranian representative argüed 
that a nation like Iran economically and militarily is unable to endanger 
international peace and security. He said, whatever danger there may be to 
international peace and security, lies in the actions of the United Kingdom.
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through negotiation. That was the reason why the members of the 
Security Council were diyided in their opinions on the question whether 
there was a dispute between the United Kingdom and Iran or instead 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of Iran/*** Before the 
Security Council adjourned its discussion, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the UK 
representative declared that the United Kingdom was willing to resume 
negotiations on the basis of recognition of the principle of nationalization. 
When the parties did not reach a solution, the British government and the 
AIOC again announced that they did not recognize Iran's right to the 
property or to sell the oil.^*^
The conditions fulfilled by Iran in nationalizing the oil industries 
was confusing. Was it a measure taken according to the general policy of 
the Iranian Government for public utility or an unjust confiscation against 
a foreigner to exclude him from that section of the economy? To answer 
this question and other related questions, the conditions governing the 
Iranian oil nationalizations now have to be considered.
180- U.N.S.G. Official Records, 560th Meeting, p, 28.
181- U.N.S.G. Official Records, 565th Meeting October 19, 1951, pp. 8-9; Ford
A, W., The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, op. cit., p. 156.
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(SECTION SIX)
THE CONDITIONS FULFILLED BY IRAN IN THE 
NATIONALIZATION OF THE OIL INDUSTRY
The question as to the conditions which must be fulfilled under 
intemational law when a country nationalizes or expropriates aliens' 
property were discussed in the previous chapter. Here we will try to find 
out how much the Iranian oil nationalization conformed to these 
conditions.
1 - The Principle of Non-discrimination:
Discrimination literally means an act which makes an unwarranted 
distinction between two or more persons or groups of persons. In the 
context of intemational law of expropriation and nationalization, it is 
apparently used in a similar connotation. Some academic writers have 
supported the literal meaning of discrimination.^
To prevent any unjust treatment of the aliens, it has generally been 
accepted that measures of expropriation must not be discriminatory 
against aliens or any group of them, and that any such treatment would be 
contrary to intemational law. Any discrimination in the manner and 
circumstances in which the measures are taken against all or a group of 
them would make a measure an illegal act, even if that measure were to 
form part of a programme of general reform; nationalization measures
L Friedman S., Expropriation in International Law, op. cit., pp. 189-193; 
Foighel I ,  Nationalization, op. cit., 1957, p. 47; Herz J. H., Expropriation 
of Foreign Property, 1941, 35 A.J.I.L., p. 249.
: ê '
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must apply to all properties in an ordinary situation? As was 
mentioned earlier, this rule applies generally when some or all the 
properties affected have not been privileged? except when, as the 
general policy of the government to attract foreign investments, 
reasonable privileges have been granted to them. Otherwise, if the
consequence of the measures were to end the discriminatory position in
;
favour of some of the aliens who had gained their properties 
advantageously, it could not be condemned as an illegal action. 
Therefore, we should consider whether the Iranian nationalization of the 
oil industry discriminatorily suppressed the company, or whether the 
measures were non-discriminatory and therefore acceptable under 
international law.
■'The Single Article Law of March 20, 1951 nationalizing the oil 
industry of Iran does not express any discrimination against Iranian
nationals or aliens. It stated that:
"......  The oil industry throughout all parts of the country, w ith ou t
exception, (italic added) be nationalized; that is to say, all operations of 
exploration, extraction and exploitation shall be carried out by the 
Government."'*
The single Article was expressed in general terms, and did not 
expressly mention who would be affected. However, the only person and 
company whose property was affected by the law was the AIOC, and the 
detailed law regulating nationalization of the oil industry, which 
authorised the actual transfer of the assets of the AIOC to the Iranian 
Government, referred to the company by name and did not mention any 
other undertaking.^
•'I
Herz J. H., Expropriation of Foreign Property, op. cit. p. 249; White G., 
Nationalization of Foreign Property, op. cit., p. 5; Kronfol Z. A., Protection 
of Foreign Investment, Netherlands, 1972, p. 24.
Principle of non-discrimination, Section on the Condition of Expropriation, p. 
Appendix I.
1
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The United Kingdom Government took the view that, quite apart 
from other considerations such as the breach of the 1933 Concession and 
the inadequacy of the compensation offered under the Nationalization 
Laws, the Iranian measure was internationally unlawful in that it was 
directed exclusively against a foreign national. The United Kingdom 
Government stated that, although the law purported to be of a general 
character, it was in fact directed exclusively against a particular foreign 
company. The United Kingdom's reason was that, apart from the Anglo- 
Iranian Concession, there was another oil concession in Iran, namely a 
concession operated by the Kavir-i-Khurian Company and owned jointly 
by the Soviet Union and an Iranian group.
It is necessary to mention that the concession granted to the Kavir-i- 
Khurian Company by the Government to the Soviet Union did not receive 
the approval of the Majlis as a part of the nationalizations that occurred 
later and the effect of the nationalization was to forbid the granting of any 
such concessions in future. The Iranians rejected the concession because it 
had never been ratified by the Majlis and because the supervening Soviet- 
Persian Treaty of 1921 had annulled all previous concessions granted to 
the Tsarist government or to Russian subjects. Therefore, there existed 
no other concession clearly giving rise to industrial operations except that 
granted to the AIOC.^
Similarly, the Egyptian Law No. 285 of 1956 refers specially to the 
Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company. There too, it could not refer to 
any other undertaking since the company, by virtue of its nineteenth
The name of the company was mentioned in Articles 2 , 3 , 4  and 7 of that Law,
However, there was no other company to be mentioned.
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co, Case, I.C.J. Pleadings, op. cit., pp. 93-4.
AIOC Case, I.C.J. Pleadings, op. cit., p. 497; see also in Ford A. W., The 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, op. cit., pp. 20-21.
Î
I
Î,-ï;y#
United Kingdom interpretation of the international rule was that a State 
incurs international responsibility if it passes a measure which is directed
AIOC Case, LCJ. Pleadings, op. cit., p. 97.
Loc. cit.
Brownlie L, Principles of Public International Law, op. cit., p. 524 
^^-Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Ltd. V.S.U.P.O.R. Company, Court of Venice, 
op. cit., 22 International Law Reports, p. 40.
I
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century concessions, had the sole right to maintain, operate and develop
the Suez Canal and the collect the Canal dues. But the United Kingdom
Government believed that a measure of expropriation which affects only
«foreign nationals may be contrary to international law. It clearly 
might be if it was considered, as it was mentioned in the Indonesian 
expropriations of the Dutch properties by the Bremen Court, that9unequals are not necessarily to be treated equally.
The argument of the UK Government has not been supported by 
eminent writers. Brownlie observes that the test of discrimination is the 
intention of the government. The fact that only aliens are affected may be 
accidental and, if the taking is based on economic or social policies, it is 
not directed against particular groups simply because they and they alone 
own the property involved.^^
The Civil Court of Rome did not recognized the legality of those 
discriminatory laws which enacted out of hatred against aliens or against 
persons of any particular race or category or against persons belonging to 
special social or political groups, for they run counter to the 
internationally-accepted principle of the equality of individuals before the 
law.^^
. Accordingly, the Iranian nationalization law could not be illegal on 
the ground that it was discriminatory, since there was no enterprise other
than the Anglo-Iranian oil company which fell within its scope. The
■ 1
I
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solely against aliens, unless this measure is dictated by such overwhelming
considerations of public utility and general welfare that the measure
cannot be said to be directed against or discriminatory against 
12foreigners. The United Kingdom accepted the view that a State can 
take a measure which is of vital importance even though the persons 
affected are foreigners. The implication of this statement is that, in the 
absence of reasons of vital importance to the legislating State, the measure 
would violate international law.^^ Therefore, the contention of the 
British Government was that there were no such considerations of public 
utility and general welfare present in this case, and that the measure was 
deliberate attempt at confiscation actuated by anti-foreign prejudice.^'* 
The term 'vital importance' was not defined and it is not clear who has the 
authority to determine the appropriate degree of importance necessary to 
justify such measures.
Meanwhile, there is as yet no rule of international law which 
provides that a State will be guilty of illegal discrimination should it 
nationalize alien property in a field where there are no national interests
»
capable of being affected. Indeed, it was declared in the Oscar Chinn 
Case:
"The form of discrimination which is forbidden is, therefore, discrimination 
based upon nationality and involving differential treatment by reason of their
nationality as between persons belonging to different national groups.
AIOC Case, I.C.J. Pleadings, op. cit., p. 97.
Loc. cit; the United Kingdom cited the decision of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in The Administration of Posts and telegraphs o f the Republic of 
Czechoslovakia v. The Radio Corporation of America, 1932, see in 30 
A.J.I.L., 1936, p. 523; If the expropriating state is to judge the importance of 
the action, it would be difficult to challenge the measures. Surely, definition 
has been introduced in this regard.
AIOC Case, I.C.J. Pleadings, op. cit., p. 98.
P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 63, p. 87; Lauterpacht, The Development of
__
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It is said that the rule is based on the principle that no one might be 
deprived of his rights merely by reason of his nationality?^ On the 
other hand, no one might be exempted from the taking of the property on 
the basis of nationality. The Iranian measure apparently conformed to 
these rules, but the approach of the Iranians had a different basis.
The example given for illegality of discriminatory practice is the 
Romanian nationalization which exempted expressly soviet-owned 
enterprises from other alien-owned p r o p e r t y . B u t ,  as was indicated in 
the previous chapter, it cannot be concluded that there is a positive rule of 
international (universal) law prohibiting the expropriation of alien 
property on grounds of discrimination in cases such as the Iranian, 
Egyptian, Indonesian, Mexican or other similar countries in which some 
groups of aliens had established monopolies, not with the free 
concurrence of the governments of those countries, but as the result of the 
influence of the investor countries. The properties were usually unique 
and the owner of those properties were mostly privileged individual 
aliens.
The AIOC was the single monopoly carrying out the operations of 
exploration, exploitation and marketing of the Iranian oil. Thus, any 
decision of the Iranian authorities relating to the oil industries would, of 
necessity, only affect that company. There is no doubt that Iranians had
International Law by the International Court, London, 1958, pp. 262-3.
White G., Nationalization of Foreign Property, op. cit., p. 137.
Reprinted in White White G., Nationalization of Foreign Property, op. cit., p.
. 120, and in Akinsanya A. A., The Expropriation of Multinational Property in 
the Third World, op. cit., p. 21.
Iraq nationalizing the Karkuk oil industries exempted the French company 
which owned 23/75 per cent of the shares. The other companies involved did 
not protest to the Iraqi measure; Movahed M. A., Our Oil and Its Legal 
Problems, op. cit., pp. 188-9.
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been in dispute with the company for a long time. One of the reasons for 
this had been that the company, among other things, had prevented the 
Iranian government from granting any concessions to other companies 
with different nationalities?^ Therefore, the Iranians sought a way to 
exclude the company from the Iranian economic sphere, so as to end the 
monopoly position and political influence of the company.
If the law was directed against the AIOC company in favour of 
others, the balance would have been changed unjustly against the 
company, and the action would have constituted an unequal treatment 
which would have meant illegal discrimination?^ However, as with the 
nationalization of Dutch property in Indonesia, the change was designed to 
bring an end to the privileged position of the company, rather than to 
create an advantageous situation for Iran or other companies.
Therefore, it is impossible to prove that the Iranian nationalization 
of the oil industry were discriminatory. For, the company operated all of 
that section of the economy, and the only section of the oil industry 
affected was the company's concession.
Therefore raising the principles of the international minimum 
standard in this case would be unreasonable and unjust. For, at a period 
of struggle against colonialism which was carried out by the 
underdeveloped countries, Iran could not be blamed for renouncing the 
capitulatory terms of the concession and trying to establish equal relations 
with others by concluding treaties and contracts based on the principles of 
equality and self-determination.^^ The only application of the rule of
Parliamentary debates in Makkey H., Ketabe Siyah, op. cit.
Loc. cit., p. 135.
International Court of Justice believed it unlikely that Iran have been willing to 
agree any dispute relating to such treaties be internationalized; Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Co. Case, Judgement of the Court P. 16.
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non-discrimination in the Iranian nationalizations was to protect the 
company from disadvantages that might suffer as a foreigner under the 
national law, or to determine whether the decision had been on the public 
policy of the government or not. Otherwise, as was stated earlier, the 
concession was granted under pressure, by a corrupted government which 
was ignorant about the advantages of the concession, and in desperate 
economic need.^^ It was after the Second World War, the situation 
having changed, that Iran felt expropriation to be an appropriate remedy 
for this unacceptable concession, even though that remedy might be 
discriminatory against the company. Therefore, it is not enough to 
preach to the developing countries like Iran, which were bending under 
the burden of economic and other difficulties, the principle of the sanctity 
of contracts nor the rule of non-discrimination.^^ The new situation 
after the Second World War developed the international law in such a way 
that third world countries like Iran could take some discriminatory 
measures against certain group of the investors.
Therefore, there were many arguments which Iran could have 
relied upon in order to justify ending the company's operation in Iran, 
whether as an act of nationalization, struggle for self-determination, 
sovereignty over and revindication of the natural resources or security 
measure against intervention and threat against the national sovereignty. 
Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the British representative to the United Nations, 
referred significantly to "old imagined wrongs", and he urged Iran to 
forget them.^'* Therefore, it was not necessary for a country like Iran to
About the degree of the corruption of the regime of Pahlavi see Memoirs of 
General H. Fardoust, Raise and Fall of Pahlavi Dynasty, op. cit.
Brown R., The Relationship Between the State and the Multinational 
Corporation in the Exploitation of Resources, op. cit., p. 222.
U.N.S.C. Official Records, op. cit., p. 3.
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examine carefully to see whether the nationalization measures would be 
discriminatory against the company or not. In a telegram from Iranian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary General of the United
Nations it was contented that:
"Relying on paramount national considerations and in conformity with Article 
1, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations, which proclaims the 
right of people to self-determination, and with a view to liberating themselves 
from the clutches of a usurping company which for many years has served as 
an instrument of interference in the economic, social and political affairs of 
Iran, the People and Government of Iran have, without any distinction as 
between nationals and aliens, proclaimed the nationalisation of the petroleum 
industries throughout Iranian territory.
However, the question of non-discrimination must be evaluated in 
connection with the other conditions of a nationalization. It must be 
considered in relation to the other principles, such as public utility or 
public policy, payment of compensation and so on. Considering the 
Iranian measures in relation to these principles, the idea of discrimination 
fades in the Iranian nationalization of the oil industries.
Judge Cameiro supported the view that the two Nationalization Acts 
did not contain a single word indicating discrimination between nationals 
and foreigners. What was involved was nationalization and not State 
acquisition, which is often designated by the same word, and that must 
mean the exclusion of f o r e i g n e r s Ho we v e r ,  he concluded that the 
Government of Iran had violated the principles and practice of ordinary 
international law which it had undertaken to observe in relation to British 
nationals.
Judge Cameiro referred to the undertakings contained in the treaties 
of 1934 and 1937, which operated in conjunction with the Article 9 of the 
Treaty of 1857 and Article 2 of the Treaty of 1903 between the United
AIOC Case, I.C.J. Pleadings, op. cit., pp. 130-131.
Dissenting opinion of Judge Levi Cameiro, I.C.J. Reports, 1952, p. 159.
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Kingdom and Iran, containing a most-favoured-nation c l a u s e T h e s e  
were considered by Iran as capitulatory treaties and had been denounced 
by Iran on May 10th 1927. Moreover, they were claimed to be replaced 
by new treaties based on the principle of equality.^* The United 
Kingdom referred to Article II of the Commercial Convention of 1903 
which had established the regime of the most-favoured-nation, the Treaty 
of Friendship, Establishment and Commerce concluded between Iran and 
Denmark on February 20th 1934, the Establishment Convention 
concluded between Iran and Switzerland on April 25th 1934 and the 
Establishment Convention concluded between Iran and Turkey on March 
14th 1937 as evidences to its argument. Therefore, any discriminatory 
treatment between those foreign nationals and Britons constituted a breach 
of those conventions which were recognized by international law.^^
The Conventions between Iran and Denmark, Switzerland and
Turkey similarly contained the provision that;
"the nationals of each of the high contracting parties shall, in the territory of 
the other, be received and treated, as regards their persons and property, in 
accordance with the principles and practice of ordinary international law.
They shall enjoy therein the most constant protection of the laws and 
authorities of the territory for their persons, property, rights and 
interests."^®
However, reference to those treaties is relevant when the nationals
of the other parties are involved. Even if the United Kingdom was right
in its contention based on these treaties, still there was no indication that 
■
Iran acted in a discriminatory manner against a British national and left 
the nationals of the other countries untouched. iStatement on behalf of the United Kingdom before the Court, 6 (i), in Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Co. Case, I.C.J. Pleadings, op. cit., p. 10.
AIOC Case, I.C.J. Pleadings, op. cit., p. 16.
Loc. cit., pp. 18-20.
Loc. cit., p. 19.
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The Supreme Court of Aden in the Jajfrate case concluded, 
correctly, that the main aim of the law was to nationalize the company. It 
is not clear however why the court considered the unapproved concession 
to the Soviet Union as valid and in force and compared the treatment 
towards the AIOC company with that company which was practically and 
theoretically nationalized and reached the question that the law was 
passed to exclude the plaintiff company only.^^ The Court in its 
arguments entirely relied on the Western cases decided on the basis of 
international minimum s t a nda r ds . Wi t h  reference to that category of 
the cases, no other conclusion could be expected, but application of those 
cases to the Iranian measures was not a reasonable approach. Indeed, the 
municipal courts of Italy and Japan did not reach the same conclusions as 
the Court of Aden.
The Court of Venice did not find, underlying the Iranian 
nationalizing legislation, the such sort of predominantly political and 
persecutory purpose which characterizes the political, racial, expulsory 
laws which have been met with elsewhere. The court argued that the 
intention of the oil nationalization law was to protect the interests of Iran, 
not to attack the interests of foreign nationals as such.^^ This conclusion 
was derived by the Court from the provisions of the Nationalization Act 
of November 26, 1953, whose aim was expressed as being to safeguard 
national prosperity and not the persecution of aliens. '^*
The statement of the District and High Court of Tokyo in this 
respect was more general. The Court explained that the Nationalization 
Law cannot simply be regarded as a law by which the rights of foreign
AIOC V. Jajfrate, 1 The Weekly Law Report, 1953, pp. 251-2.
Loc. cit., pp. 258-9.
AIOC V. S.U.P.O.R. Company, Court of Rome, op. cit., p. 40.
Loc. cit.
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nationals are confiscated. The Court failed to find any established rules of
international law governing the matter.^^ This ambiguity in the
governing rules was also reflected in the 1954 Agreement between Iran
and the Consortium which referred to varied legal sources to fill the 
36gap.
2 - The Principle of Payment of Compensation:
To find out whether nationalization measures are legal or not, the 
issue of payment of compensation plays a controversial role. As is 
common between the parties to such disputes, each side tries to gain the 
maximum benefit from the opposite party. After nationalizing the oil 
industries, the Iranian government's attempts to obtain recognition for the 
Iranian nationalization by the United Kingdom were designed to prevent 
any claim for future profit, good will and so on, and to reduce any 
possible claims of compensation for the assets.^^ On the other hand, 
Britain and the company insisted on breach of contract in order to secure 
the flow of oil, and obtain reparation for the damage sustained as a result 
of the breach of the contract - a higher award than might have been 
expected by way of compensation for a lawful expropriation. However, 
the Government of Iran was to pay compensation only for the physical 
assets of AIOC and its subsidiary, the Kermanshah Petroleum Company. 
This amount of compensation was later suggested to Iranians through 
negotiations by the c o m p a n y B u t  the company was anxious to obtain
AIOC V. Idemitso Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, 20 Ï.L.R., op. cit., p. 316,
Article 46 of Part one of the 1954 Agreement, op. cit.
Musaddiq's Memoirs, op. cit., p. 232.
The suggestions reprinted and quoted by Ford A. W., The Anglo-Iranian Oil
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compensation for the good will of the business or for the future profit, 
indirectly by way of a fifty-fifty profit-sharing provision in the long-term 
purchasing contract. The good will was not adduced in the pleadings; 
what was actually claimed was the value of the property at the time of 
dispossession plus interest to the day of judgement, to be paid immediately 
so as to enable the owner to use it to set up a new enterprise to replace the
 ^1 39taken one.
The Oil Nationalization Act did not provide a fixed amount to be 
paid for certain claims, but it was left to the two Houses to determine the 
amount giving consideration to the claims of the both sides in the dispute. 
This fell short of the requirements of the above mentioned conditions 
which are based on the international minimum standard rules.
The reply of the Iranian delegation to the Security Council to the 
British suggestion of 15th October on renegotiation for a new agreement 
indicates that the payment of compensation was not the priority of either 
party. Iran suggested that, in respect of the claims of the AIOC regarding 
compensation payments, the Iranian Government was prepared to settle 
that question in any of the three following ways: (1) on the basis of the 
quoted value of the shares of the company prior to the passage of the Oil 
Nationalization Law; (2) on the basis of the procedures followed by other 
countries where industries had been nationalized; (3) on any basis which 
might be mutually satisfactory to both parties, having due regard to the 
counter-claims of the Iranian Government.'*® The Iranian Prime 
Minister while renouncing any intention on the part of Iran to confiscate 
the properties of the company, suggested that the ’just claims’ of the
Dispute, op. cit., p. 110.
AIOC Case, I.C.J. Pleadings, op. cit., pp. 104-106.
U.N.S.C., Official Records, 560th Meeting (October 1951), pp. 24-25.
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company be settled equitably on the basis of quoted value of shares of the 
company at prevailing quotations prior to the passage of the oil 
nationalization law, or on the basis of the rules and regulations relative to 
the nationalization in general which have been followed in democratic 
countries, or any other method adopted by mutual consent of the two
X- 41parties.
In the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, it is obvious that Iran had not afforded 
prompt compensation. If it was to be evaluated according to the 
traditional international rule of minimum standard, it would be a prima 
facie illegal confiscation for which Iran was internationally responsible. 
But, from the suggestion of the Iranian Prime Minister, it becomes clear 
that they did not recognize the international minimum standard rules as 
accepted international law.
Up to the Iranian Nationalizations, the international minimum 
standard had been affirmed and upheld by the practice of Western States 
against the Soviet Union, the Eastern European agrarian reforms, at the 
League of Nations and in the negotiations of the United States with 
M exico.'*^ It was also reaffirmed by some treaties'*^ and some 
writers.'*'* But immediate payment has been less practiced by the
^^-ÀIOC Case, LCJ. Pleadings, op. cit., p. 141.
Kunz J. L., the Mexican Expropriations, op. cit., p. 13.
Treaty of Establishment annexed to the Treaty of Laussanne, 1923, Art. 2; 
German-American Treaty of Commerce, Dec. 8,1923, Art. 1; Polish-Turkish 
Treaty of Establishment, July 23,1923, Art. 1; German-Soviet Treaty of Oct.
12, 1925, Art. 8; Italo-Albanian Treaty of Establishment, Jan. 21, 1926; 
German-France Treaty of Commerce, Oct. 10,1925, Art. 6; Gemian-Turkish 
Treaty of Establishment, Jan. 12, 1927, Art. 2; American-Polish Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, June 15, 1931, Art. 1; They 
contented the clause that their property shall not be taken without due process 
of law and witliout payment of just compensation.
Schwarzenberger G., Foreign Investment and International Law, london,
1969, p. 10; Ch. Dupuis, Some Opinions Bearing Upon the Claims of the
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underdeveloped countries, and deferred payment in installments has been 
widely accepted in practice by these countries. Expropriation measures 
by developing countries prior to the Iranian oil nationalization are few. 
They paid, or accepted to pay, compensation, mostly for economic, 
political and other non-legal reasons.'*^ Mexico, which initially rejected 
any obligation to pay compensation, compromised and paid lump-sum 
compensation in annual installments over varying periods.'*^ A similar 
procedure was adopted after the Mexican Agrarian Reform. The Claims 
Commission set up in 1924 proved unable to dispose of the many United 
States claims, and an Exchange of Notes of November, 1938, provided for 
the valuation of the properties by a mixed commission of experts, and for 
the Mexican Government to pay one million dollars on or before May 31, 
1939, and subsequent annual payments of not less than that amount.'*^ 
Even in the Chorzow Factory case which was regularly referred to by 
Britain as a norm-making case, it was stated that the full compensation 
was due as a result of the illegal act of Poland which was prohibited from
expropriating even against payment of compensation. Otherwise, the
48payment of fair compensation would have been sufficient. Without 
defining the precise meaning of the term, payment of 'reasonable
Hungarian Nations with Regard to Their Land in Tranvylvania, London, pp. 
77-92; Kunz J. L., the Mexican Expropriations, op. cit., pp. 123-142; 
Borchard E. M., The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, op. cit., Vol. 
II, pp. 23-44; A. P. Fachiri G., Nationalization of Foreign Property, op. cit., 
pp. 229-242.
45- White G., Nationalization of Foreign Property, op. cit., p. 14.
46- Schwarzenberger G., The Protection of British Property Abroad, 1952, 5
Current Legal Problems, p. 295; compensation paid was estimated at about 
one-third of the real value of the oil properties, see also Cmnd. 7275, 1947, 
p. 7.
4'7- Hyde C. C., Compensation for Expropriations, 33 A.J.I.L., 1939, p. 108.
48- Quoted in A/OC Case, I.C.J. Pleadings, op. cit., pp. 110-111.
■'■l'ïr;
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compensation' has always been considered necessary. Without it the
* 49measure would be contrary to the principle of international law. The
Court of Venice rejected the principle of the necessity of payment of
prompt, adequate and effective compensation, but declared that
compensation should be evaluated in relation with other elements,
50proportionate to the nature and importance of the property in question. 
The Civil Court of Rome considered the nationalization measures valid on 
the ground that some compensation was provided for. The Court 
declared that the power of expropriation is provided even if the 
Administration has undertaken not to expropriate, and, in the case of 
personal rights of use which come to an end as the result of expropriation,
51no compensation whatsoever is due under the Italian legal system. The 
concept of fair, reasonable and just compensation which has been used by 
these courts might be interpreted differently and evaluated in regard to, 
among other things, excess profit of the property. The Court declared 
that it is not required by international law that the quantum  of the 
compensation must be equivalent to the value of the property. It is 
enough that there is some compensation for the expropriation to be
lawful. The Court continued:
"Dissentient opinions among writers who endeavour to maintain tlie necessity 
of payment of compensation equivalent to the value of the property, have not 
found much support, so that only in cases where the compensation is purely 
fictitious, illusory and non-existent can the expropriation be deemed to be 
unlawful.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of Aden did not hesitate to declare 
that, because compensation had not been paid, the measures were
49- AIOC V. Kaisha, 20 I.L.R., 1953, p. 306.
5 0 - AIOC V. S.U.P.O.R., 22 I.L.R., 1955, p p . 22-23. 
Loc. cit., p. 25.
Loc. cit., p. 36.
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53confiscation.
However, the Iranian suggestion that they were ready to pay 
compensation on the basis of procedures followed by other countries 
wotild not have been acceptable to the company. Mexico had rejected in 
theory any payment of compensation in international law, the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern European countries had already refrained from 
paying compensation according to the traditional international rules.
Mexico, while admitting the rule that expropriations must be accompanied 'by prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, contended that it was 
not a universal rule applicable to all expropriations,^'* particularly when 
there had been a clear and meaningful distinction between the developed 
and developing countries, with a separate legal relations between them. In 
a case where the expropriation had been carried out by a developing 
country like Iran or Mexico especially where it had been of a general and 
impersonal character for the purposes of social reform, there was no 
universally-accepted international norm that imposed a binding obligation 
on the expropriating State to pay prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation.^^ Mexico was successful in this matter and agreed to pay 
only relatively small amount of compensation.^^
In fact, the contention put forward by the Mexican government 
made an indirect distinction between the different groups of the countries 
according to the kinds of economic relations that existed between them.
The economic situations of developing countries has made different
Rose Mary Case, Supreme Court of Aden, The Weekly Law Reports, 1953, 
p. 253.
4^- Mexican foreign minister to United states secretary of state, August 3, 1938, 
■ Hackworth G. H., Digest of International Law, op. cit., vol. Ill, p. 657; he 
renounced obligatory as international rule even deferred compensation.
Loc. cit.
^6. Kunz, J. L. The Mexican Expropriations, 1976, p. 23.
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compensation inevitable. Therefore, the Iranian nationalization of the oil 
industry was more than a simple nationalization, in that it included 
considerations of self-determination, development, and consequently 
revindication. Iran was not able to pay compensation promptly, and 
appeal to the standard of "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation 
was not only unrealistic, but would have effectively frustrated any effort 
by Iran to nationalize that vital section of its economy.^^
If Iran had been in a stronger position, it would never have allowed 
itself to be in a situation in which it might find itself unable to pay 
compensation. However, if Iran were powerful no such an agreement 
would have been signed. If such an agreement had been concluded, no 
compensation would have been offered to the company; Iran would 
simply have confiscated it as a penal measure against the company. This 
suggestion would be neither contrary to the principles of international law 
nor to the general norms of the law of expropriation, which prevent states 
from pleading financial embarrassment in order either to relieve them of 
their legal obligations or to infringe international law with impunity. For 
these reasons, the principles of international minimum standard can 
neither be acceptable by aU States in theory nor carried out in practice,^® 
and international judiciary bodies could not adopt a uniform position.
Therefore, the Iranian nationalization measures were not taken on 
the basis of international minimum standard principles, but were of a 
special character which makes it doubtful whether even a deferred full 
compensation was obligatory under international law,^^ One of the
57- Dawson F. G., Weston B. H., Prompt, Adequate and Effective: A Universal 
Standard of Compensation?, 30 Forham Law Review, 1962, p. 749.
^8- Hackworth G. H., Digest of International Law, op. cit., vol. Ill, p. 657.
^9- By "Natural International Law" here it means the norms which have become 
. international conscious eventhough they may not be practiced by States.
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reasons is that Britain was still a second power after the Second World 
War, and the offer of payment of compensation was as the result of the 
weakness of Iran rather than fulfilling its obligation under international 
law. The minimum demanded by Britain was still unacceptable to Iran 
which had to avoid any pressure and threat from a powerful country not 
keen to loose its interests. Iran was aware of the rule of prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation but the fact was that Iran did not feel any 
obligation and was unable to pay it promptly.
Iran was not the only State which in payment of compensation did 
not comply with the international minimum standard rules. Many states 
expropriated the property of aliens on a large scale in the period 
immediately after the Second World War, and most of them have been 
unable and unwilling to pay compensation, while the political atmosphere 
of the post-war world prevented any attempt at restitution.^® Ford notes 
this trend by "underdeveloped" countries which have been traditionally 
"debtor" countries.**^ Otherwise, it would deprive the underdeveloped 
countries from their basic right to pursue development.^^ Therefore, 
any condemnation of the developing countries like Iran is unnecessary and 
improper.
The political relationships of the nineteenth century that had made
69- Doman, N. R., "Compensation for Nationalized property in Eastern Europe" 
and Hornsey, G., Foreign Investment and International Law, 3 I.L.Q., pp. 
323-342 and 552-561; Gutteridge J., Expropriation and Nationalization in 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Roumania, 1 1.C.L.Q., 1952, pp. 14-28; Rado A. R., 
Czechoslovak Nationalization Decrees: Some International Aspects, 41 
A.J.I.L., 1947, pp. 795-806.
61- Ford A. W., The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, op. cit., pp. 202-3.
6^- The suggestion would be contrary to the determination, puiposes and 
principles of the United Nations, see the preamble to and Aiticle 1 of the 
Charter of the United Nations; See Hyde, Compensation for Expropriations,
p. 112.
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for the efficient and effective functioning of the international minimum 
standard changed dramatically after the War, with the creation of a new 
political and economic system which reshaped the traditional patterns of 
international trade and investment?^ The change in the system affected 
the pattern of the traditional rules and encouraged the developing 
countries like Iran to nationalize foreign property. But it was not enough 
to let the countries decide freely on their economy or commit a wrong 
against aliens. The French solution is to consider all circumstances 
specific to the case, excess profits in the past as well as reasonable 
expectations in the future.**"*
It was clear from the arguments of the parties to the dispute that 
AIOC  had become a battlefield over the reference and applicability of 
the traditional rules which were being challenged by Iran, and the new 
emerging rules which were being challenged by the United Kingdom. 
Therefore, they had to compromise by granting minimum concessions to 
the other party.
There was the danger of the use of force against Iran. Therefore, 
one of the signs of that compromise was that Iran declared that it was 
ready to pay compensation in any way satisfactory to the parties. 
Compensation was to be paid from the future sell of oil which was not 
prbmpt.^^ With economic sanctions by British and the oil companies, 
there was no hope that Iran could make sizeable profits to enable it to pay 
a considerable amount of compensation.
63- Jessup, P. C., A Modem Law of Nations, 1949, p. 97.
64- Geiger R., The Unilateral Change of Economic Development Agreements, op.
cit., p. 103.
65- The Iranians had offered compensation paid in an undetermined amount
installments different from those, for example, of Bolivia and Mexico (10 per 
cent and 25 per cent respectively as compensation).
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One of the suggestions made by the AIOC was to settle the dispute 
according to the conditions fulfilled by the Mexicans in the nationalization 
of the oil industry in Mexico. There, the concessionaire was also a British 
company which had exploited four million tons of petroleum per year. 
The Mexican government paid eighty millions US dollars and settled the 
dispute?^ AIOC was exploiting eight time that amount in Iran at the 
time of the nationalization, i.e. thirty two millions ton per year. In line 
with the Mexican procedure, Iran had to pay $640 million for the 
investments and $160 million as interest to the company. The Iranian 
government refused to agree to this suggestion,^^ although it had already 
suggested a willingness to make payment in accordance with the practice 
of other states, This apparent contradiction is further evidence for the 
present argument that Iran followed the policy of revindication rather 
than expropriation in the sense of the international minimum standard. 
The only other reason that could explain the new situation is that the 
amount of compensation demanded had created a new condition different 
from that in Mexico, and that Iran was unable to pay this amount of 
compensation. Moreover, the later tripartite agreement between Iran - 
AIOC - the Consortium supports this view.
The question of compensation ultimately was solved through a 
unique dual function agreement which was signed in 1954 by the 
government of Iran and the National Iranian Oil Company on the one 
hand and a consortium of eight American oil companies^® on the other.
66. Musaddiq's Memoirs, op. cit., p. 268.
67- Log. cit.
68- Forty per cent of the shares were allocated to the AIOC and another forty per
cent to five US companies. The rest twenty per cent was divided as fourteen 
peer cent to the Shell Company and six per cent to the France oil company, 
the agreement was amended three times in 1965, 1967 and 1971; for more 
information see Movahed M. A., Our Oil and Its Legal Problems, op. cit.,
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The Agreement was a mixture of provisions relating to restitution, 
indemnification and sale of the good will of the company. Part one of the 
Agreement established an alternative system of operation for the Iranian 
oil industry, and part two settled the dispute between the Iranian 
Government and the AIOC arising out of the 1951 nationalization. Under 
the provisions of the agreement, Iran agreed to pay the sum of twenty- 
five million pounds to the AIOC in addition to the sum of fifty-one 
million pounds revenue which would have accrued to Iran under the 
Supplementary Agreement of 1949.^^ The companies were discharged 
from liability for any claim which might have been made against them, 
and Iran agreed to indemnify those companies for any claims and 
demands which might be made against them by any person arising out of
70oil operations prior to the events of 1951. The liability of fifty-one
million pounds was set off against the amount payable to the company
after the examination of the claims and counterclaims of the two parties.
The payment of the compensation was not prompt-it was to be paid in ten
71equal annual installments of £2,500,000 beginning on January 1, 1957. 
Agreements under which compensation was paid in installments over a 
period of years were not unusual, and the United Kingdom made similar 
agreements with countries like Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Bulgaria and Hunguary.^^ Moreover, the Iranian government and the
pp. 88-106.
69- The 1954 Iranian Oil Consortium Agreement, Article 1(A) of Part II,
79- Article 40B(1, 2(a, b)) of part I and Article 2(C) of part II of the 1954 
Agreement.
71- Article 1(B&C) of part II of the 1954 Agreement.
72- U.K. and Yugoslavia, Agreement Regarding Compensation for British
Property, Rights and Interests Affected by Yugoslav Measures of 
Nationalization, Expropriation, Dispossession and Liquidation(with exchange 
of notes), London, 23 December 1948, 81 U.N.T.S., p. 121, U.K. and
à .—
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National Iranian Oil Company agreed to pay the AIOC compensation in 
respect of certain claims which might be made against the company by 
third parties concerning any matter arising out of the company's oil 
operations in Iran?^ The AIOC also received the amount of £67 million 
for the installations in use. The new government of Iran was ready to pay 
as much as was necessary to satisfy the company. The compensation 
agreement with the new Iranian government was offered to Britain for its 
role in the coup d'etat which overthrown the Mussadiq's government and 
brought the Shah back to power.
The AIOC received payment from the other consortium members
for the right to the other 60 per cent share which they acquired in 1954.
The payment amounted to £214 million to be paid over a period of 25
y e a r s . I t  was to be paid ultimately by Iran. Moreover, the company
retained a 40 per cent interest in the operation of the oil industry
Yugoslav, Trade Agreement(with schedules, exchange of notes and 
appendices), Belgrade, 26 Decmber 1949, 87 U.N.T.S., pp. 71, 402; U.K. 
and Czechoslovakia, Trade and Financial Agreement, Lodon, 28 September,
1949, 86 U.N.T.S., p. 141; U.K. and Czechoslovakia, Agreement Relating 
to the Settlement of Certain Intergovernmental Debts, London, 28 September,
1949, 86 U.N.T.S., p. 175; Exchange of Note Between U.K. and 
Czechoslovakia Concerning the Agreement on Compensation for British 
Property, Rights and Interests Affected by Czechoslovak Measures of 
Nationalization, Expropriation and dispossession, London, September 28,
1949, U.K.T.S., 1957, No. 5, Cmnd 56; U.K. and Poland, Agreement(with 
exchange of notes) relating to a Settlement of Financial Matters, Warsaw 11 
November 1954, 204 U.N.T.S., p. 137; Agreement Between U.K. and 
Bulgaria Relating to the Statement of Financial Matters, London, September 
22, 1955, U.K.T.S., 1955, No. 79, Cmd. 9625; Agreement Between U.K. 
and Hungary Relating to the Settlement of Financial Matters, London, June 
27, 1956, U.K.T.S., No. 30, 1956, Cmd. 9820.
73- Article 2(c) of the Agreement; This payment was more likely compensation 
. against breach of the contract.
74- Longhurst, Adventure in Oil, London, 1959, p. 159.
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.Neither the compensation offered by the Musaddiq's Government 
nor the new offer seems prompt in the sense of the principles of the
76international minimum standards. But, it was more than adequate. 
Moreover, it included loss of profit which had not previously been a 
standard part of compensation for expropriation and was only payable for 
breach of contract. The compensation was so unusual that it actually 
boosted the company's shares. The price of the shares of the company, 
which was five pounds per share in 1951, increased to eighteen pounds 
and in 1954 enabled the company to offer the shareholders for every 
share four new shares free of charge.^^
After three years, the practical result of the nationalization of the 
oil industry in Iran was a new agreement without gaining any 
considerable benefit for the country. Iran, which was unable to transport 
and market the oil internationally, had to submit to the oil cartels^® 
which were enjoying substantial privileges in the developing countries like 
Iran.
Therefore, payment or non-payment of compensation by countries 
like Iran could not be evaluated under the traditional principles accepted 
by developed countries. Rather, it should have been assessed having 
regard to other considerations and principles, such as the way the 
property was obtained, the behaviour of the aliens, self-determination, the 
bargaining power of the host State and the need for development. Since 
the Iranian nationalization, these issues have been discussed in the General
75- Movahed M. A., Our Oil and Its Legal Problems, op. cit., pp. 90-1,
76- The suggested valuation of the Abadan refinery alone was £350 million. If the
loss of future profit under the 1933 concession was to be added to this 
amount would made it much higher than that amount.
77- Movahed M. A., Our Oil and Its Legal Problems, op. cit., p. 91.
78- About 90 per cent of the oil produced outside of the North America and the
Communist countries in 1952 was in the hand of those oil cartels.
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Assembly of the United Nation and have many times been emphasized in 
different resolutions. United Nations resolutions constantly emphasized 
that a developing country must benefit more from the foreign 
investments.^^ All these legal mstruments improved the legal position of 
developing countries and, in some cases, might allow them not to pay the 
amount of compensation expected by the investor companies in order to 
put an end to their underdevelopment. Investor countries have always 
refused to recognize this fact as a legal term essentially to prevent 
developing countries confiscating the alien investments and properties.
What Iran achieved, through the International Court of Justice and 
the Security Council of the United Nations, was not on the basis of the 
interpretation of the law by those international organs, but from their 
silence on the issue. Few resolutions had been adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on the sovereignty right to the natural 
resources and new international economic order. The earlier examples, 
such as the Mexican oil nationalization, did not help practically. This 
ambiguity still exists, particularly when contracts or concessions are the 
subject of the expropriations.
It is more likely that Iranians tried to balance any overestimate of 
the property value as happened in the Bolivian expropriation of the 
Standard Oil Company. There, the company claimed its properties were 
worth $17 million, while it was agreed compensation of $1.5 million with 
3 per cent interest, and Bolivia received a development assistance loan of 
$25 million.*® On the other hand, as payment of compensation was
79- Resolutions 1240(XIII), 1521(XV), 1803(XVII), 2029(XX), 2626(XXV) of 
U.N.G.A. are among those resolutions.
89- Ingrm G. M., Expropriation of U. S. Property in South America, Second ed.
U.S., 1975, pp. 119-120; there was dispute between the the U.S. 
government and Bolivians whether the measures was expropriation or
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conditional on the approval of the two Houses of Parliament, if one of 
those Houses was to refrain from ratifying, the company might be totally 
deprived of compensation and the measures might have constituted an act 
of confiscation. That was a further reason which forced Britain to 
emphasise the international minimum standard rules. This was important 
especially when it became clear from the contents of a note to British 
ambassador in Teheran that the Iranian government had used the right of 
nationalization as the result of the illegal and unjust measures of the 
company in Iran.*^ If the nationalization measures were as the result of 
the illegal actings of the company, the taking of the property of the 
company would be a penal confiscation, not nationalization or 
expropriation, and would deserve no compensation. The company and 
Britain never admitted any illegal involvement in the internal affairs of 
the country and considered the non-payment of compensation by Iranian 
government as illegal and confiscatory, obliging Iran to restore the 
situation and indemnify for the damage caused by nationalization 
measures.*^ If Britain was sure that adequate compensation would have 
been paid, as it was admitted in the pleadings and practiced in the later 
agreement with the government and the Consortium, deferred payment 
would be satisfactory if (1) the total amount to be paid was fixed 
promptly; (2) allowance for interest for late payment was made; (3) the 
guarantees that the future payments would in fact be made were 
confiscation.
8k The approach was similar to that of Bolivian's; see the Note of the August 6th
1952, reprinted in Makkey H., the Years of National Movement (Persian),
Vol. 6, Tehran, 1990, pp. 59-61.
82- Anglo-Iranian Oil Company V. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, I.L.M.,
1953, pp. 305-6; Anglo-Iranian Oil co. Ld, V. Jajfrate (the Rose Mary), the 
weekly law report, 1953, Vol. 1, p. 248; Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Ltd.
V. S.U.P.O.R. Company, I.L.R., 1955, Vol. 22, p. 22.
1
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satisfactory, so that the person to be compensated might, if he so desired, 
raise the full sum at once on the security of the future payments.
However, it had already become the general practice of the 
developing countries like Iran to expropriate either without payment of 
compensation or paying compensation in installments only after years of 
negotiations,*'^ Expropriations in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, and many other underdeveloped countries provide 
examples of cases where, although liability to pay compensation is 
recognized, the general financial and economic position has prevented
osprompt payment.
3 - Security Reasons:
As a motive to nationalize the oil industry there is nothing more 
ridiculous than speaking about the issue of security in Iran. The oil 
industry by itself was not a threat to the security of the country. 
Concessions were granted when a large part of Iran was under the control 
of Britain and Russia. Therefore, there was no complete independence
'which could be threatened by the existence of the company in Iran. But, 
it was the nationalization measures which had put increasingly the security 
of the country at risk. That threat became evident when Dr, Musaddiq, in
AIOC Case, LCJ. Pleadings, op. cit., p. 106.
Ingram G. M., Expropriation of U.S. Property in South America, op. cit., p.
359.
U.S. and Poland, exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Relating to 
Economic and Financial Cooperation, Washington, 24 April 1946, 4 
U.N.T.S., p. 155;U.S. and Czechoslovakia, Exchange of Notes Constituting 
an Agreement Relating to Commercial Policy, Washington, 14 November 
1946, 7 U.N.T.S., p. 119; see also the monographs by Foighel and White, 
op. cit.
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reply to the call of Mr. Morrison for negotiation, reaffirmed his intention 
to implement the nationalization laws. The United Kingdom government 
gave warning that a refusal to negotiation or any attempt to proceed with 
the’ implementation of the legislation would have the most serious 
consequences.*^ Britain had acquired 53 per cent of the shares in the 
company and brought a detachment of Sikhs from India to protect the 
installations. An open threat against the country arose after the 
nationalization measures when Britain warned Iran that forces might be 
sent to the region.
On May 15, it was announced that a brigade of paratroopers was 
being held in readiness, and then moved to Cyprus to protect the lives of 
British nationals and prevent seizure of the property of AIOC. The 
Iranian Embassy in London also issued a statement to the press protesting 
the presence of a British warship off the Iranian coast. There was also the 
report that additional British naval units, including an aircraft carrier, 
three destroyers, and several troopships, were present in the Kuwait area 
of the Persian Gulf.*^ Britain threatened both directly and indirectly the 
use of force against Iran, the British navy started maneuvering near the 
coasts of Abadan, and her airforce violated the Iranian airspace.**
The elections in the southern province of Khuzestan were suspended 
for the security reason and, on June 21, 1951, the Iranian government 
presented the Majlis with a "double urgency"*^ sabotage bill, the text of
The U.N.S.C., Official Records, 559th Meeting.(October 1, 1951), p. 16.
Makkey H., Expropriation, (Persian), Vol. I, Tehran, 1982, p. 280; Ford A.
W., The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, op. cit., p. 95.
Loc. cit., pp. 531, 560, 571.
A double urgency bill is one that can be debated and passed at one sitting of the 
Majlis. The ordinary bill must have three readings on three separate days; see 
Ford A. W., The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, op. cit., p. 157-8.
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which is reported as follows;
"For a year from the date of approval of this law, any persons engaging 
treacherously or with ill-intent in activities in connection with the operation of 
the Persian National Oil Industry, resulting in cutting oil pipelines or 
rendering unserviceable refineries or facilities for transport of oil, or causing 
fire in oil wells or oil storage tanks or causing destruction of railway lines, 
railway tunnels, railway bridges or rolling-stock, shall be condemned to 
penalties ranging from temporary imprisonment with hard labour to 
execution. This same penalties will be applied to instigators and accomplices 
as to those actually committing the crime."^
However, the Act did not remove the danger, but it became a source 
for new danger of British direct interference. A statement issued by the 
British government indirectly rejected any Iranian sovereignty right to
nationalize the oil industries. The statement said:
"The action of the Persian Government in arbitrarily ordering the expulsion of 
some 350 British technicians is contrary to the elementary principles of 
international usage, and has created a situation which might well be thought to 
justify the use of force in order to preserve the British rights and interests 
involved.
President Truman urged the British government not to use armed 
force to prevent the expulsion of the British staff at Abadan, and indicated 
that the United States would not support the use of force by the British. 
The situation had become so tense that President Tmman also appealed to 
Iran to cancel the operation, saying that execution of the order would 
aggravate the situation and make settlement much more difficult.^^
There is no comparable case in which a developed country, having 
nationalized some properties, other countries have threatened to use force 
against the nationalizing State. To the contrary, security, as a legitimate 
reason to expropriate aliens’ property, has been taken to mean where 
foreign property is a threat against security of the country or is vital to
90- The translation reprinted in Ford A. W., The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, op.
cit., pp. 70-71.
9L The Times, 29 September 1951.
9 -^ The San Francisco Chronicle, September 28,1951, p. 1.
_____
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93national security. Foreign investments in telecommunications, public 
utilities, radio and television in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Venzuela, 
Elsalvador, Guatemala, Barazil, Syria, Malagasy Republic and Mexico 
were nationalized primarily because of the desire to establish national 
controls over some areas considered vital to national security. The 
accepted important sectors for national security are banking, insurance, 
agriculture, mineral resources projects and petroleum exploration and 
distribution. Other countries like Congo, Afganestan, Bangladesh, Kenya, 
Colombia, Nigeria, Qatar, India, Moritania, Moroco, Sudan and Burma 
also nationalized more than 51 per cent of similar industries on the
94ground of security. The incidents after the nationalization in Iran 
illustrated that the existence of the company was a potential threat to the 
Iranian national security and seem to have provided authority for the 
Iranian government to nationalize the company. In a note to the British 
ambassador, Prime Minister Musaddiq charged British officials with 
"open interference" in the internal affairs of Iran. Musaddiq asked them 
to leave the country and contended that the decision was a necessary 
measure to remove the danger to the country and an obstacle to the 
nationalization process.^^
At the same time, oil was very important for the British navy. That 
said, Iran had guaranteed the supply of oil to previous customers of the 
AIOC, which included Britain.^^ Therefore, there was no ground for 
the view that the nationalization measures had endangered international 
peace and security. There was no basis for such a danger while Iran had
93- Akinsanya A. A., The Expropriation of Multinational Property in the Third 
World, op. cit., p. 101.
9 -^ Loc. cit.
95- Musaddiq's Memoirs, op. cit., pp. 234-5.
9 -^ Iranian Oil Nationalization Act, op. cit.
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committed itself to settle the international dispute by peaceful means, and 
not to endanger international peace, security and justice.^^
Iran was not going to nor was it able to, use force against Britain; 
rather, it was Britain which threatened use of force against Iran as was 
asserted in the statement to the Security Council of the United Nations.
The Iranian government did not use this contention to defend the 
act against the company, but it used this language to persuade the Iranian 
people and the other Members of the Houses of Parliaments to approve 
the nationalizing Bill presented to them.^* It might be argued that it was 
natural for Britain to try to use its international position to protect its 
interests. However, Iran had the right to try to defy any potential danger 
to the security of the country.
4 - Political Reasons:
It is not acceptable internationally to expropriate property of aliens 
for political reason as a pressure against the investor’s government. 
Using the property of the nationals of a country as an instrument to 
influence the policy of that country has not been acceptable in 
international law. But, when the investment itself becomes a political 
instrument, that principle would no longer apply.
From the investor's standpoint a commercial enterprise has two 
elements - profit and control. For the host countries, those elements are 
also of importance, although in a different order.^^ To secure their 
9 -^ Article 2(3,4) of the U.N. Charter
98- Makkey H., Ketabe Siyah, op. cit, passim; The National Front Members of 
Parliament which established the government and undertook the oil 
nationalization were 8 Members of Majlis and were in minority in the Majlis.
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benefit, the investors must be sure that they would have enough control
over their enterprise. In other words, they want to be sure that they
would have enough freedom to benefit from their investments as much as
possible. In the developed countries’ system, it has become a common
practice and tradition to practice the accepted degree of freedom and the
political system of the country is rarely affected by foreign investments.
The difficulty arises in respect to the developing countries with political
and economical instability. Investors like the AIOC and the East Indian
Company secured their interests in the shape of concessions like the Oil
Concession of 1933 in Iran and prevented these countries from pursuing
an independent p o l i c y . T o  secure this freedom and assurance, the
investors usually got the benefit of the political and economic influence of
their governments, in such a way that sometimes they interfered in the
internal affairs of the country through their govemments.^^^ On the
other side, the developing host states, jealous of their independence,
sovereignty and economic rights, were unable to challenge these
investments and establish equal and equitable economic relations.
Consequently, the political friction between the host countries and the
investors was manifested in some practices adopted by these countries
with little influence on the international scene. The fear of Britain and
the company was that political considerations affected the nationalization
measures in such a way that compensation would either not be paid or be
102paid inadequately and with delay.
99- Nelson R. W., Avoidance and Settlement of International Disputes, 
Proceedings of the A.J.I.L., (1983-84), April 12-14, 1984, pp. 38-39.
100_ return for the investments in the developing countries is so high that the 
investors accept the risks including political risk of the investment.
101_ This principle would be also considered from the point of view of the 
investors' behaviour.
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One of the main motives for the nationalization measures taken by 
the Iranian government was to take the control of the oil industry in Iran. 
The continuing desperate situation of the economy had deteriorated and 
the low living standards had brought the country to a political crisis. It 
became a matter of some urgency to adopt effective means for the 
improvement of the general living standards of the country and to bring 
an end to the country's economic subordination. On the other hand, oil
103was of very great strategic importance to both parties. This 
importance, together with some other considerations, prevented the 
parties from reaching a just agreement in the AIOC d i s p u t e . U n d e r  
international minimum standards principles, political motivation has not 
been admissible in order to prevent suppression of the foreign investments 
unjustly. In countries like Iran, the measures taken were politically 
motivated in order to end the political suppression of the country by 
aliens. While some countries like Libya and Indonesia have been accused 
of acting for political reasons forbidden under international law, the 
majority of practices of developing States have been to end political 
suppression of their people. Therefore, according to the principles and 
the trend of international law developing countries like Iran have not been 
forbidden from taking such measures of a political character.
Accordingly, the Iranian government avoided any more dealings 
with the company, refused to sell any of its oil production to AIOC, and 
instead made individual contracts with AIOC's former customers and 
permitted them, if they wished, to hire AIOC as their carrying agent. 
Iran had offered to deliver any amount of oil bought by the UK to any
102_ ^ iQ c  Case, LCJ. Pleadings, op. cit., p. 108.
103- Mussadiq's Memoirs, op. cit., p. 268.
104- See the parliamentary debates in Makkey H., Ketabe Siyah, op. cit., passim.
: ï
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company which produced a receipt from the UK government.
However, one of the main reasons for nationalization was the 
interventionist policy pursued by Britain in Iran which had continued 
from the last century,
Britain had prevented other countries from buying oil from Iran, 
deterring tanker owners from taking advantage of the low prices offered 
by the Iranian government. This measure was understood in Iran as 
continuing British intervention in the internal affairs of the country. 
Indeed the anti-British spirit figured prominently in the demonstrations 
which deposed Qavam after only four days in office. The political 
atmosphere in Iran thus made it impossible for the Iranian Government to 
renew the contract under new terms.
In fact, the AIOC was a manifestation of the kind of relations which
then existed between Iran and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom
had such a direct control over the company which claimed that the
concession had a double character, being a concessionary contract between
the Iranian government and AIOC and a treaty or convention between
Iran and the United Kingdom.^^^ The political character of the measures,
together with lack of any indication as to an applicable law within the
contract, prevented the International Court of Justice from settling the
dispute which was fraught with political problems and tensions, many of
which went far beyond the regulating influence of international law and
international judicial procedures. Therefore, the company had created a
situation in which the measures came to be regarded as part of the
struggle for self-determination. This aspect of the Iranian oil
nationalization was expressed by the World Bank's representative who, 
___________________
105_ pord A. W., The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, op. cit., pp. 118-9. 
ic .J . Reports, 1952, p. 147.
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after failing to reach any agreement with the Iranian authorities, stated 
that the oil problem in Iran was mainly a political one/*^^
There are similar examples of major nationalizations, such as those 
in Mexico, Egypt, South America and Indonesia, in which settlement was 
not made according to the requirements of the rules applied by the 
developed countries, nor through the employment of impartial 
international judicial tribunals. It follows that, neither international law, 
nor* international tribunals, have always been or will always be able to 
reconcile nationalistic aspirations of the expropriating developing states 
against the interests of nationals and the governments of the developed 
countries. The reason for this disability is clear and simple, and lies in 
the unequal and inequitable relations which exist between the third world 
and the developed countries. That is why the the measures taken by third 
world countries have not complied with orthodox preferences, but have 
instead severely challenged, if not totally rejected, them.
The achievements which Iran was able to derive from the 
nationalization of the oil industry bear clear evidence to the existence of 
this new situation. Thus, the only tangible difference between the 
Consortium Agreement and the 1933 Agreement with AIOC had been the 
acknowledgement of Iran's ownership of the Iranian oil, which 
acknowledgement is of a more academic than practical significance. 
Therefore, in 1979 the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran passed a law which nationalized the oil industry in Iran, resulting in 
all the equity shares held by various foreign oil companies, acquired 
under joint venture and partnership agreements signed during the 1954- 
1978 period, being expropriated. The text of the Single Act reads as 
follows:
107_ \yqrld Bank and Persian Oil, The Economist, vol. 162, February 9, 1952, p. 
328.
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"All oil contracts which in the opinion of a Special Committee set up under the 
Minister of Oil are considered as contrary to 'the Nationalisation of Oil 
Industry Act of (1951) Iran' will be deemed null and void. All claims which 
may arise in connection with the conclusion or performance of such contracts 
can be settled according to decisions made by this Committee."^®*
Asserting every right to "economic sovereignty", the Iranians 
denied the jurisdiction of any international judicial or arbitral forum to 
decide the fate of those nullified contracts, and declared the various oil 
contracts made by the previous regime null and void. The Iranian 
Ministry of Oil in a letter dated 11 August 1980, communicated to 
Amoco, a United States company, that the Committee had decided to end 
the joint structure agreement concluded in 1958 between Iran and the
109company.
Therefore, the consequence of the 1951 nationalization of the oil 
industry in Iran was not recognized by the new regime in Iran. In fact, 
the expropriation of the oil industry of 1951 had not achieved its aim - 
that was to gain complete control of the oil industry. The post­
nationalization contracts with the Consortium were regarded by the new 
regime as a reward for the return of the Shah to power. Therefore, Iran 
renationalized the industry to gain complete control of the industry again.
***********
* * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * *
* * *
*
108_ Thg Single Article Act, the Law No. 1408 of February 7, 1980 (Bahman 18, 
1358).
See more in Amin S. H., Commercial Law of Iran, 1986, pp. 114-116.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE POST-REVOLUTION EXPROPRIATIONS
IN IRAN
Background;
Immediately before the 1978-79 revolution, the United States had
by far the largest share of the Iranian import market. However, after the
revolution, the new regime terminated hundreds of major contracts with
the West, particularly with the United States, and U.S. property was
expropriated.^ The measures included both large scale nationalizations
by direct legislative means and expropriations of relatively smaller
properties by the application of the general legislation and regulations.
Before any discussion of the post-revolution expropriations in Iran, it is
necessary to look at foreign investment in Iran before 1978.
The United States' massive involvement in Iranian economy of prior
2to the revolution of 1979 was the result of the 1951 oil nationalization. 
As a consequence of the role which the United States government had 
played in bringing the Shah back to power, American companies and 
investors were in a favourable and selective position to enter the Iranian 
market.3
Immediately after the coup d'etat, on 15 August, 1955, Iran and
L Amin S. H., Commercial Law of Iran, Tehran, 1986, p. 92.
See the previous chapter on nationalization of oil indystry in Iran.
3- Amin S. H., Commercial Law of Iran, op. cit., p. 83.
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the United States signed the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and
' 4Consular Rights to protect future American investments in Iran. A 
further advantage occurred for American investors when the two 
countries exchanged a note on investment guarantees according to which 
when the government of the United States guaranteed American 
investment in Iran, the government of Iran undertook obligations of 
indemnity pursuant to that guarantee. The note also provided that the 
Iranian government would recognize any transfer of title or interest from 
the investor to the government of the United States.^
The welcoming policy of the Iranian Government and the 
favourable ground for investment in Iran caused the massive foreign 
involvement in the Iranian economy. Thousands of American nationals 
and corporations entered Iran and the number and the size of the 
American claims presented to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal indicates the 
volume of the American involvement in the Iran's economy.^
4- Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights Between han and
the United States, in 284 U.N.T.S,, p. 93; persian text in Official Gazette No. 
3589, 15 Khordad, 1336 (June 5, 1957).
5- Exchange of notes between the Government of Iran and the Governement of 
the United States of America regarding the guarantee of the investments by the 
United States nationals in Iran, Official Gazette No 3642, 22 Mordad, 1336 (13 
August, 1957).
The years just before the 1979 revolution, more than 40,000 Americans were 
working in Iran, see in Brower C. N. and Davis M. D., The Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal After Seven Years: A Retrospective View From the Inside, 43 
Arbitration Journal, 1988, p. 18; about 3,000 claims for billions of dollars were 
presented to the Tribunal by the U.S. nationals and corporations.
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(SECTION ONE)
THE POST REVOLUTION EXPROPRIATION MEASURES IN
IRAN
Following the 1979 revolution in Iran the capitalist economic 
policies of the former regime were changed by the Revolutionary 
Government. The Revolutionary Council which was set up as an acting 
legislative body was responsible for the adoption of all the important 
measures for the nationalization of the different economic sectors of the 
country.
Nationalization of the Banking System was one of the earliest
7nationalization measures taken by the new revolutionary regime. 
Thirteen out of some 36 existing banks were formed through foreign 
partnership, the share of the foreign capital therein ranging from 15 to 40 
per cent.* The reason for their expropriation was, inter alia, that 
many of those banks had extended loans to industrial units and those units 
themselves had come, or were going to come, under the control of the 
government and were unable to repay the loans. Some of those loans 
were illegally expatriated and had become bad loans. Therefore, 
leaving banks in that situation would have bankmpted those banks totally. 
There was no economic justification behind the nationalization as the 
measures left the Government with many obligations which those banks 
had undertaken.
Law of Nationalization of Banks, Official Gazette No. 10012, 17 Tir 1358 
(July 8, 1979).
The Iran-Rusia Bank, as an exception, had special status and and was allowed 
to operate with 100 per cent ownership.
9- Piran H., Nationalisation of Foreign Property in International Law and Iran- 
U.S. Claims Tribunal, op. cit., p. 150.
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Meanwhile, the law of nationalization of banks recognized the 
legitimate rights of the private persons in those banks. Article 1 of the 
Law stated:
"In order to safeguard the national rights and wealth and to run the production 
wheels of the country and to guarantee the deposits and savings of people in 
banks, while accepting the principle of legitimate and conditional ownership 
and with due regard to the following:
- The way banks have earned their income and have illegally transfened the 
sums abroad,
- The fundamental role of banks in country's economy and latter's natural 
relation to the banking institutions,
- The facts that the banks are indebted to the Government and need to be 
supervised by the Government,
“ Necessity of coordination between banks’ operations and other 
organizations in the country,
- Necessity of directing those operations towards the Islamic administration 
and exploitation,
From the date of the ratification of this act, all banks are declared 
nationalized."^®
The Law did not expressly provide compensation for the
dispossessed owners, but provided for compensation according to the
legitimacy of their ownership. Accordingly, small shareholders were
protected by the law enacted one year later which permitted the payment
of compensation for their nationalized shares. According to that law,
11compensation was not to exceed the normal value of the shares.
Expropriation of the insurance and credit enterprises was the next
12measures. This was enacted on June 25, 1979.
The Law provided that:
Law of Nationalisation of Banks, Official Gazette No. 10012, dated 17 Tir,
1358 (8 July, 1979).
1L The Law of Protection of the Iranian Minor Shareholers of the Nationalized 
Banks and Credit Institutions, Official Gazette No. 10352, 16 Mordad, 1359 
(August 7, 1980).
Law of Nationalization of Insurance and Credit Enterprises, Official Gazette 
No. 10264, 1 Khordad, 1359 (May 22, 1980).
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"To protect the rights of the insured, and to expand the insurance industry in 
the country and to place it at the service of the people, from the date of this 
law, all insurance enterprises in Iran are declared nationalized with the 
acceptance of the principle of legitimate and conditional o w n e r s h i p .
Here again, the legitimacy of the ownership became a condition for 
recognition of any right in the property. The Law of Protection of the 
Iranian small Shareholders of the Nationalized Banks and Credit 
Institutions, covered the new expropriation measures, but for the Iranian 
minor shareholders. Ten years later, the Iranian Parliament permitted the 
payment of dues to the persons for the value of the nationalized insurance
14companies. American shareholders had already been compensated 
through the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.
Following the nationalization of the insurance industry, on 8 
January 1980, the Revolutionary Council renationalized the oil industry. 
The Revolutionary Government of Iran regarded the oil agreements, 
particularly those with the International Oil Consortium, made after the 
1953 coup d'etat as being in violation of the 1951 nationalization. The 
Agreement with the Consortium (1954) was considered as a reward for 
the American backing for the 1953 coup d'etat, which brought back the 
Shah to power. It was also considered as a mockery to the 1951 
nationalization of the oil industry in Iran.^^ Therefore, a special 
commission was set up to consider all oil agreements concluded by the 
previous regime and to nullify those found contrary to the 1951 Law of 
Nationalization of Oil Industry in Iran.^^ The Oil Nationalization Law 
3^- Loc. cit., Article 1 of the Law.
4^- Article 1 of the Law of the Management of the Insurance Companies, adopted 
on 15 February 1989, Official Gazette No. 12819, 7 Esfand, 1389 (February 
26, 1989).
5^- The 1954 Agreement was replaced by the 1973 Sale and Purchase Agreement 
between the same parties.
Single Article Act Concerning the Oil Agreements, Official Gazette No. 10185,
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reads as follows:
"All oil contracts which in the opinion of a Special Committee set up under the 
Minister of Oil are considered as contrary to 'the nationalization of Oil 
Industry Act of (1951) Iran' will be deemed null and void. All claims which 
may arise in connection with the conclusion or performance of such contracts 
can be settled according to decisions made by this Committee.
The law amounted to the nullification of majority of oil agreements
with foreign companies, including the agreements for gas and oil
18exploration, and even agreements in the petrochemical sector. The 
reason for their expropriation was evident, but none of the affected 
companies referred their claims to the designated Commission and instead 
sought other means of settlement. Disputes with non-American parties 
were settled by negotiations between the National Iranian Oil Company 
and those foreign companies and compensation to them mainly took the 
form of supplying them with oil. American companies, if they were 
unable to reach agreement with Iran on any terms, brought their claims 
before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.
Some other expropriations occurred in other sectors of the Iranian 
economy based on general laws and regulations adopted to deal with 
industry as a whole. The most outstanding one was the Law of Protection
19and Development of Iranian Industry of July 16, 1979. According to 
that law, an agenda was set for Iranian industry and the existing industries 
were divided into four categories. The law provided for further 
nationalizations in particular sectors. The law states:
20 Bahman, 1358 (February 9, 1980).
The Single Article Act, the Law No. 1408 of 18 Bahman, 1358 (February 7, 
1980).
Some agreements such as the Petrochemical plant in Boushehr agreed between 
Iran and Japan came to an standstill, but it was halted by the foreign 
companies.
9^- The Law of Protection and Development of Iranian Industry, Official Gazette 
No. 10031, 9 Mordad, 1358 (July 31, 1979).
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"Existing industry will be divided into four categories according to 
conditions, and each category will be dealt with in a specific manner:
(a) In addition to oil, gas, railway, electricity and fisheries which have 
already been nationalized the following industries shall be nationalized as 
well:
(a)(1) Industries manufacturing metals with great consumption in industry 
(such as steel, copper and aluminium) covering hot-roUed operations.
(a) (2) Manufacture and assembly of ships, airplanes and automobiles.
(b) Large scale industry and mines whose owners have amassed great 
wealth through illegal relations with the past regime, unlawful abuse of 
position and trampling of public rights (some of them have fled the country) 
and the Government has taken over their management by the legal Bill No. 
6738, dated 26-3-1358.^® The shares of such individuals shall be reverted 
to Government ownership. Any type of financial, technical and legal 
investigation with respect to such individuals will be in the Government's 
authority.
Note- The value of shares which according to the Imam's Decree,^^ belong 
to the Foundation for the Oppressed, after evaluation, in the event that they 
exceed debts to the Government, will be paid to the Foundation by the 
Government.
(c) Factories and institutions which have received substantial loans from 
banks for establishment or expansion, will be owned by the Government in 
the event that their total debt exceeds net assets. The remainder of their debt, 
as the Government and people's claim, will be returned in any manner 
necessary. In case, the assets of these units exceed the banks' and people's 
claims, the Government as owner of the banks and in proportion to its and 
people's claims, will share their ownership.
(d) Factories and manufacturing institutions owned by the private sector, 
whose financial and economic status is good and which are not covered by 
paragi'aph (b), based upon the acceptance of legitimate and conditional 
ownership, their ownership will be protected by law.
Note- Debts, collaterals and guarantees which owners and managers of the 
said institutions have placed with respect to bank loans, remain in force and 
will be claimed.
Èmphasis added, the date is equal to June 16,1979.
It is a referrence to the Decree of February 28, 1979, establishing the 
Foundation for the Oppressed to oversee the property confiscated from the 
former ruling family in Iran, see in Mozafar M., A Digest of Laws and 
Regulations Approved by the Islamic Revolutionary Government, Tehran, 
1979, p. 1.
Article 1 of the Law of Protection and Development of Iranian Industry,
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The most important parts of this Article are paragraphes (b) and (d) 
of that law. The Law clearly stated that large-scale industries and mines, 
whose owners have amassed great wealth through illegal relations with the 
past regime, would be confiscated. Accordingly, the BiU 6738 mentioned 
in the law had listed 51 individuals whose property was to be confiscated
23as having been earned through illegal means. A considerable number
of such properties were sharing with American interests in varying
degrees and were confiscated altogether. Paragraph (d) clarifies the basis
of the takings by declaring that those privately-owned factories which are
not covered by paragraph (b), based upon the acceptance of legitimate and
conditional ownership, would be legally recognized and protected.
Therefore, among other things, the post-revolution expropriations
in Iran comprise large number of such cases. To treat each category of
cases, the law did not provide for any detailed procedure for payment of
compensation. The issue of compensation was dealt with by the Executive
Regulations Concerning the Law of Protection and Development of
Iranian Industry which was approved by the Council of Ministers of the
2 4provisional Government on 13 August, 1979. The Executive
Regulation held that:
"Implementation of the provision of section (a) of the Law of Protection and 
Development of Iranian Industry, with regard to the nationalized industries, 
the executive shall be as follows:
1- Evaluation of the shares of factories:
The real value of each share shall be determined with the purpose of paying 
compensation to the holders of shares. Such evaluation shall be made by 
auditors to be appointed on the recommendations of the Minister of Industries 
and Mines and approval of the general meeting of The Protection and 
Development of Iranian Industries Organization. The auditors shall perform 
* their duties under the supervision of the committee as stated in Article 5 of this
Official Gazette No. 10031, op. cit.
3^- Official Gazette No. 10031,9 Mordad, 1358 (July 31,1979).
4^- Official Gazette No. 10049, 1 Shahrivar, 1358 (23 August, 1979).
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Regulation, and the evaluated shares in the manner mentioned above shall be 
the basis of payment of compensation to the shareholders.
2- The auditing institutions shall take into consideration the following points 
in their evaluation procedure:
- The financial position of the institution at the end of the fiscal year 1357 
(1978)
- The profitability of the company during the past five years.
- The ability to compete freely against foreign manufacturers without customs 
exemptions............................
Payment of compensation to the foreign shareholders shall take place after the 
» evaluation of the shares, preparation and approval of the report, and taking 
into account the previous obligations and agreements which may exist. With 
regard to the Iranian shareholders, if they are not subject to Section (b) of the 
Law of Protection and Development of Iranian Industries, up to the amount of 
five million Rials shall be paid in cash and the balance in installment payments 
in the manner to be determined by the general meeting as mentioned in Article 
7.
........................ Article 1 of the Supplement deals with the method of
valuation of shares in the nationalized industries:
The shareholders' rights aie being computed on the basis of the net value of 
the shares. The value consists of total of the registered and paid capital, free 
and dividable reserves, the balance of the profit-and-loss statement and the 
. average of the net value of shares at the end of the fiscal period ending to the 
years 1356 and 1357 (1977 and 1978) stated in the tax declarations submitted 
or the institution has not reached the stage of production, or violations are 
noticed in the operation of the institution, it shall be the responsibility of the 
general meeting of the Iranian National Industries Organization to examine the 
matter and render a decision thereon.
Note- In case the annual loss, the expenses prior to production, insurance and 
other dues are not reflected in the tax declaration submitted, the general 
meeting of the Iranian National Industries Organization shall directly examine 
all the above points and render a decision thereon. The decision of the said 
meeting on the subject shall be final"^^
The Revolutionary Government of Iran was not, as a socialist State,
to abandon private ownership, but to take the illegitimate properties and
compensate the rest. Private ownership was recognized in the new
^5- article 2 of the Executive Regulation ...., Official Gazette No. 10049, 1 
' Shahrivar, 1358 (23 August, 1979).
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Constitution of Iran. Indeed most of the expropriated properties have
recently been denationalized, and foreign investments are now 
1 A ^7welcomed.
Therefore, the recent Iranian expropriations of some foreign 
property did not comply with the strict letter of traditional rules on 
expropriation. They were not for a public purpose in the sense of the 
traditional rules. They were discriminatory and prompt compensation 
was not provided. In fact, many of the foreign nationals and companies,
particularly the Americans, left Iran and abandoned their contracts,
'properties and interests.
On the other hand, American banks were holding about 12 billion 
U.S. dollars of Iranian assets. In this way, although the deterioration of 
relations between the two countries continued after the revolution, the 
amount of the economic interests held in each of the countries forced both 
countries to make some arrangements to settle the financial disputes 
between them.
i
Article 44 of the 1979 Constitution of Iran.
Keyhan Havai (Persian Newspaper), No. 929, May 8, 1991, p. 10; and No. 
963, January 1, 1992, p. 10
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(SECTION TWO)
THE IRAN-UNITED STATES SETTLEMENT OF 
EXPROPRIATION DISPUTES
Following the detention of the United States diplomats In Teheran in
early November 1979, the already fragile relations between the two
countries reached its nadir. Iran refused to make payment of
compensation for the expropriated property and the Iranian foreign
affairs minister demanded that the United State admit that the property
and the fortune of the Shah were stolen; promise to refrain from further
28intervention in Iran's affairs; and extradite the Shah to Iran for trail.
It was declared that there could be no respect or immunity for those 
diplomats who plotted against the revolution in "a centre of espionage and 
conspiracy" and release of the detainees was made conditional upon
29handing over of the Shah and returning his property to Iran. The case 
was brought before the U.N. Security Council, but it could not rule
30against Iran as the result of the Soviet veto. The International Court of
Justice condemned the action and demanded the immediate release of the 
31detainees. However, taking into account all relevant factors. Judge 
Tazari declared that although the action was illegal under international
32law, Iran was not responsible for the action.
U.S. Dept, of State Cur. Pol. No, 179, May 1980, at 1.
^9. Keyhan, Iranian Newspaper, 18th Nov. 1979.
3®- Case Concerning the Diplomatic and Consular Staff of the United States in 
Tehran, International Court of Justice, Judgement of 24 May, 1980, Reports 
of the Judgements, 1980, p. 17.
3L Loc. cit.
3L Loc. cit.
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Before taking these measures, the United States took a number of 
economic and diplomatic measures against Iran. The United States 
imposed direct economic measures upon Iran through economic sanctions
33and froze all Iranian assets by the Executive Order No. 12170. Other
non-economic measures, such as military strikes, the seizure of a discrete
piece of Iranian territory, like an island, dropping naval mines in Iranian
34harbors or imposing a military blockade, were also being examined.
On April 24, 1980, the United States forces set out a rescue mission, 
but, because of a sand storm, the mission failed after the aircraft had
35landed in Iran. After this attempt, which was considered by Iranians 
as ’an act of war', the world community became concerned to solve the 
criris. After unsuccessful attempts at mediation by the United Nations 
Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, a United Nations' Special 
Commission, Pope John Paul II and (West) Germany, a solution to the 
crisis was finally found through the mediation of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria.^^
1 - The Algiers Accords
All the disputes between the parties, including those relating to the 
expropriation of the property of each high contracting party, were solved 
through the Algiers Accords. The so-called "Accords" consist of the
33- Dept, of State Bulletin, July 19th 1980 pp. 10, 71; Wall Street Journal, 20 
January,, 1981, p. 3.
34- Sick G., American Hostages in Iran, 1985, pp, 144-146.
35- Loc. cit., p. 156.
3 -^ Jordan H., The Last Year of the Carter Presidency; Saunders H., American 
Hostages in Iran, 1985.
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Declaration issued by the Government of Algeria on January 19, 1981, 
(hereinafter cited as General Declaration), together with the Undertakings 
of the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to the Declaration of the 
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria of 
January 19, 1981, (hereinafter cited as Undertakings), and the Declaration 
of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran of 
January 19, 1981, (hereinafter cited as Claims Settlement Declaration) and
37the Escrow Agreement, The Accords are unique in some aspects, and 
include a variety of political, economical, judicial and other issues on a 
large scale.
What is certain about the Agreements is that they were concluded 
between two States with the mediation of the Government of Algeria. 
Private persons became the subject of the Agreements, but were not party 
to them. However, it was the first agreement, after the World War II, by 
which a government agreed to sit before a court and be challenged by 
private parties. It was probably the notion of equality as between the 
Ruler and the citizens in Islamic law which convinced Iranian authorities 
to accept such terms, however far removed this might be from
38international practice. It had been the general attitude of Communist
States and developing countries that resort ought not to be had to
international adjudication, especially for the resolution of disputes
3 -^ We are concerned with the General Agreement and the claims Settlement 
Declaration; the text of the Agreements reprinted in 20 I.L.M., 1981, pp. 224- 
240.
38_ The European Court of Justice is an exception to this rule by which 
governments of the member States may be brought to the Court by individuals.
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involving expropriation of foreign property. As was also the case with 
the Iran-U.S disputes, the vast number of the claims and their complexity, 
combined with the reluctance of most States to take action provided
39further reasons for recourse to be had to lump sum settlement. But, 
this case differed from common practice in two important respects; first, 
there was the issue of hostages, and secondly the frozen assets of Iran in 
the United States. Both were used by the parties and played a major role 
in the final settlement.
However, like most investment disputes, the basic settlement was 
carried out through negotiations between the two Governments. The 
Iran-U.S. dispute had become a highly politicized State-to-State dispute 
and could not be solved otherwise, especially when American nationals 
and Iranian public assets and political pressures were involved. Had it 
been otherwise, the American government would probably not have 
become involved since it was not the practice of the U.S. to intervene 
directly in investment disputes of the U.S. nationals with foreign 
countries. For example, in the period of February 1975 to February 
1977, from 106 investment disputes 42 were settled and the U.S.
40Government intervened by negotiations in only one, Marcona.
The basic question regarding the Agreements is whether, bearing in
mind issues of the hostages and the frozen assets and the consequent duress
under which the parties found themselves, they are valid under
international law and in the light of Article 52 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. Certainly, the United States, which has
considered the Accords highly advantageous, has seen little point in
39- Remarks by Lillich on State Responsibility, Self-Help, and International Law, 
P.A.S.I.L., 1979, p. 245.
4 -^ Remarks by Gantz D. A., Dispute Settlement, P.A.S.I.L., 1979, p. 253.
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worrying about the voidness argument as a practical m atter/^ The 
raising of the question would have been very beneficial to the Iranians, 
but they have been reluctant to do so for a number of reasons. Thus, 
although Iranian officials sometimes threatened to withdraw because of 
the U.S. failure to fulfil its obligations, from the Tribunal, they did not 
want to contest the validity of the Agreements.'*^ It was equally not 
beneficial to Iran as some of Iranian assets had remained in the hands of 
the U.S. government, and had not yet been released.'*^
1- 1 - The General Declaration
As was mentioned earlier, the General Declaration as well as the 
other Agreements, are in fact international agreements concluded between 
two States. They contain the fundamental commitments of both States. 
Among the other principles of the Declaration the United States undertook 
to;
1- Restore the financial position of Iran to that which existed prior to the 
Executive Order No. 12170 of President Carter, November 14, 1979, 
and ensure the mobility and free transfer of all Iranian assets within its 
jurisdiction;'*'*
41- Remarks by Owen R. B., in P.A.SJ.L., 1981, pp. 236-7.
4 -^ Interlocutory Award in Case No. A15 (I:C) (ITL 78-A 15 (I:C)-FT) o f  12 
November 1990, in Albert Jan Van Den Berg, XVII Y.C.A., 1992, pp. 375- 
381; Iranian Autorities in different occasions have verbally complained about 
this matter.
^3. President Rafsanjani's press conferrence, in Kayhan Havai (Iranian 
newspaper). No. 1033, June 2, 1993, P. 32.
44- Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular of Algeria,
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2- Not to intervene in Iranian affairs;
3- To nullify all trade sanctions declared by the Executive Order No. 
12170, and withdraw its claims against Iran before the International Court 
of Justice and any other claims of the United States or its nationals against 
Iran in the United States courts;
4- To return the assets of the family of the shah;
5- Terminate all litigation as between the nationals of the United States 
and the government of Iran, and to bring about the settlement and 
termination of all such claims through binding arbitration. Iran made a 
similar commitment in this regard.
The provisions of the Declaration provided for restitution of the 
assets and properties of Iran held in the United States after the 52 U.S. 
nationals safely departed from Iran.'*^ But the provisions of the 
Agreement relating to the Claim Settlement Declaration, in which the 
Parties agreed to deposit some of the money in a third bank's account to 
be decided by the tribunal, made the earlier provisions fictitious. 
Moreover, Iranian Officials always have complained about non- 
observance on the part of the United States of some of the terms of the 
Agreements."*^
As far as the measures of the United States are concerned, freezing
Iranian assets is an issue different from expropriation, but detention of 
General Perinciples, Para. A, reprinted in 2 0 1.L.M, 1981, p. 224.
Point II and HI (3,4,5 and 6) of the General Declaration, see appendix II.
Points n  and III (7) of the General Declaration; in his latest interview in June 2,
1993, President Rafsanjani claimed that the United States has held billions of 
Iranian assets illegally for more than 13 years; Keyhan Havai, the Iranian 
Newspaper, No. 1033, June 2, 1993, p. 32; One of the lawers involved in 
Iran-U.S. disputes stated personally that the United States had offerred about 
$900 m for the assets of the family of shah which amount more than $11 
billion.
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property might ultimately lead to confiscation. This has sometimes been 
practiced by Western Countries, particularly by the United States, in 
order to bar trade and other financial transactions with countries that have 
undertaken broad expropriation programs and similar actions. Cuba and 
China are the other most obvious examples of States which have had their 
assets frozen, in similar circumstances by the United States."*^ The 
purpose behind such measures had been apparently a protective one rather 
than one of public utility, but in the case of the Iranian assets the purpose 
behind the measure was initially punitive, although the measure later took 
the character of economic sanctions designed to pressure the Iranian 
Government into releasing the detainees."*^ The frozen assets were also 
used as a security for payment of compensation for the claims regarding 
expropriated property and rights of American nationals and companies in 
Iran. The Agreement between the parties provided for the restoration of 
the assets in exchange for the hostages. The restoration was not to be full,
49but as it was to be, in the language of the Accord, "so far as possible". 
The possibility depended on the interpretation of the terms by the United 
States and could justify its non-implementation accordingly.
Under the United State's Sanctions Legislation enacted in 1977 
future use of blocking authority is limited to situations where there has 
been a declaration of war. United States did not use the frozen assets, but
Remarks by Lillich on State Responsibility, Self-Help, and International Law,
P.A.S.I.L., 1979, op. cit., p. 250.
Edwards jr. R. W,, Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Iranian Assets
Control Regulations, 75 A.J.I.L., 1981, p. 872.
The General Declaration, General Principles, Para. A, 20 I.L.M., 1981, p.
224.
P. L. 95-223, December 28, 1977, 91 Stat. 1625; See Determination under
Trading With the Enemy Act, House Doc. 95-380, September 11, 1978.
a '
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U.S. nationals had started litigation before United States courts. The
Court of Appeal of Paris did not recognize such claims against foreign
public funds in other countries, and declared the detention of such funds
51and assets as contrary to international law and thus illegal. However, 
ultimately, it was agreed to nullify such attachments and judgements 
obtained against the Government of Iran, but most of the funds remained 
in the United States to pay the unpaid principal of and interest on all loans 
and credits held by United States banking institutions and other disputed
52amounts owing on Iranian deposits in the U.S. banking institutions.
The freezing of Iranian assets in the United States was carried out
on the basis of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(lEEPA) which gives the President of the United States the authority to
deal with "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security,
foreign policy and economy of the United States", emanating from a
source wholly or substantially outside the United States which he deems53constitutes a national emergency. The Presidential Order was
designed, inter alia, to protect the national security of the U.S.A., the
stability of the dollar exchange control markets and the U.S. economy
generally. Where danger to the security of the country is serious, the task
of imposing limitations on foreign assets is less complicated. There is a
serious doubt as to whether it could reasonably be asserted that a third
world country could in any way endanger the security of a Super power
like the United States. It has not been practice internationally, and
Iran v. French Atomic Energy Authority and Eurodif, 65 I.L.R., 1984, pp.
' 93-99.
General Principles (B) of the General Declaration, 20 I.L.M., op. cit., p. 224; 
the Undertakings, Paras. (A), (B), 20 I.L.M., op. cit., p. 229.
D' Orazio, Constitutional Law, Executive Power Presidential Claims 
Settlement Power, 27 New York Law School Law Review, 1982, pp. 985- 
999. I
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particularly in Western States, to take or infringe the property rights of
foreigners for the stability of the currency exchange control markets and
the economy of the country without payment of compensation. While
Iran had taken a similar measures to protect its currency and its exchange
reserves in very extraordinary circumstances, the Tribunal did not accept
the contention and awarded in favour of a claimant whose nationality was
also in dispute between the two States.^"*
One of the important aspects of the freezing of Iranian assets is its
extraterritorial application. The Iranian Government had approximately
$385 m for the benefit of Central Bank of Iran and $77 m for the benefit
of the National Iranian Oil Company held in accounts in the Chase
Manhattan Bank's London branch which were working under the laws of
the host State. The United States made some amendments to the banking
regulations from time to time, among them the Amendments of
November 19, 1979 which mitigated the effects of the broad claims of
jurisdiction by allowing the Iranian authorities to withdraw deposits from
foreign branches and subsidiaries of U.S. banks that were denominated in
55currencies other than the U.S. dollar.
On November 29, 1979 the Central Bank of Iran filed suit in 
London against Chase Manhattan asking for the return of its deposits from 
the Chase Manhattan's branch in London which had obeyed the freeze 
o r d e r . F o l l o w i n g  the agreement between the two countries, the funds 
Case No. 31-157-2 (Nasser Esphahanian v. Bank Tajarat), IX Y.C.A., 1984,
p. 280.
Section 535.566 of the regulations as amended November 19, 1979. 44 Fed.
Reg. 66,832, 66,833 (1979); for further information on the restrictions and 
‘ amendments to the rules in that regard see Edwards jr. R. W., Extraterritorial 
Application of the U.S. Iranian Assets Control Regulations,op. cit., pp. 872- 
6 .
-s'
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that were the subject of Iranian Central Bank’s suits against the foreign 
branches of U.S. commercial banks were first transferred to the account 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (as fiscal agent of the United 
States) at the Bank of England on January 20, 1981, and then transferred 
by the Federal Reserve to the account at the Bank of England of Algier's 
Central Bank as escrow agent. Following the escrow agent’s payments of 
certain interest and principle on Iranian loans to commercial banks, the 
funds, which exceeded $5.5 billion, were transferred to the Central
57Bank's account with the Bank of England.
Iranian assets litigation before the courts in London and Paris raised 
fundamental problems of private international law and public 
international law, including those to determine the proper law of banking 
deposits, the place of payment and nature of Eurodollar obligations and 
the application of the Bretton Woods Agreement concerning the
58enforcement of other State exchange control regulations. There is no 
doubt that the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. banks operate under the 
banking laws of the countries in which they are established, and the
Bank Markazi Iran v. Irving Trust Co., the docket No. of the cases against 
five of the U.S. Banks in the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, 
Commercial Court are 1979-B-No. 5873, 1979-B-No. 5903, 1979-B-No.
5907, 1979-B-No. 5908, 1979-B-No. 5955, 1980-B-No. 549; see generally 
Iranian Assets Litigation Reporter(Edgemont, pa.: Andrews Publication, Inc.), 
March 7, 1980, pp. 266-316; loc. cit.. May 2, 1980, pp. 639-50; loc, cit.,
May 16, 1980, pp. 790-802; loc. cit., June 20, 1980, pp. 979-80 and 1028- 
65; loc. cit., July 3, 1980, pp. 1098-1104; loc. cit., October 3, 1980, p. 1561; 
see also Edwards jr. R. W., Extratemtorial Application of the U.S. Iranian 
Assets Control Regulations, A.J.I.L., 1981, pp. 870-902.
Loc. cit., pp. 872-3.
Carswell R., Economic Sanctions and the Iran Exprience, Foreign Affah's,
1981, p. 250; see generally McKinnon R., Money in International Exchange,
New York, 1977.
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measures adopted by President Carter put those countries in which Iran
59had deposit in U.S. banks' subsidiaries in a difficult position.
Moreover, the extraterritorial effect of the Presidential Act caused 
great controversy over several principles of international law. One of 
those principles is the territoriality principle which provides the primary 
basis for regulating economic activity of a State.^^ Although there is 
considerable dispute over the precise content of the limitations on 
extraterritorial application of national laws, it is widely acknowledged 
that international law does, in fact, place limitations on them.^^ Such 
limitations tend to foster predictability and certainty which are vital to 
international trade and investment.
The imposition of "exchange control regulations" against Iranian 
assets was intended to put pressure on Iran, rather than to protect the 
currency of the U.S.A. within the meaning of the above mentioned 
Section 2 (b) of the IMF Agreement. While, under IMF practice, the 
foreign branches of U.S. banks are residents of the countries where they 
are located and are not residents of the United States.
If the U.S. were to protect its economy it would be appropriate to
Hermann A. H., Conflicts of National Laws with International Business 
Activity: Issues of Extraterritoriality, London 1982, p. 35.
Brierly J. L., The Law of Nations, 1963, p. 162.
Brownlie L, Principles of Public International Law, op. cit., pp. 307; Brierly 
J. L., The Law of Nations, op. cit., p. 45.
The Legal Department of the IMF has taken the position that all exchange 
restrictions (including security restrictions) approved under section 2(a) are 
"exchange control regulations"; some writers believe in contrary, see generally, 
Simon, Mann F., The Legal Aspect of Money, (3rd ed. 1971), pp. 431-50; 
Nussbaum A., Money in the Law, National and International, (revised edition, 
1950), pp. 455-57.
IMF, Balance of Payments Manual, (4th ed. 1977), pp. 22-23, 146, paras. 63- 
67, 435.
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apply that restriction against all of the countries which used U.S. 
currency. Iran was not the only country which had exchange deposits and 
could deposit them, as is the general practice, in any bank and in any 
country which she wished. The security consideration mentioned in the 
regulation seems to have no relevance here, particularly when one bears 
in mind that the Iranian army had disintegrated and had lost the capacity 
even to defend its own country. Further evidence is provided by the 1981 
Agreement between the two countries which allowed the transfer of assets 
from the U.S. The economic conditions of the U.S. had neither changed 
before the release of the hostages nor thereafter. However, the U.S. 
would have lost an advantage in its attempts to achieve settlement of its 
claims against Iran if it did not freeze the Iranian assets. It would have 
become more difficult for the U.S. to solve the hostages crisis too.
Although the immediate aim of the Agreement was to solve the 
hostages crisis, the most important part of the agreement was the 
provisions on the return of the Iranian assets and settlement of U.S. 
nationals' claims.^"* The main importance was given to the Iranian assets 
which were released in exchange with the release of detainees while 
securing the payment of future claims which would be decided by an 
agreed tribunal. Accordingly, when the funds had been received, the 
Algerian Central Bank should have directed the Central Bank to transfer 
one-half of each such receipt to Iran and place the other half in a special 
interest-bearing security account in the Central Bank, until the balance in 
the security account reached the level of $1 billion.^^
Therefore, it is obvious that the detention of the U.S. nationals, as 
well as freezing of the Iranian assets, played a significant role in 
Point n  of the General Agreement, Appendix II, op. cit.
Point n  (7) of the General Declaration, Appendix H, op. cit.
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detërmining the agreed terms concerning the property and contractual 
rights of the parties and their nationals.
One of the principles which was agreed and declared was that the 
United States should not intervene in Iran's internal affairs. The principle 
of non-intervention is directly related to the principle of jurisdiction and 
to the sovereign rights of States which is a fundamental right of each 
State. Among other jurisdictional rights, it represents an exclusive right 
of jurisdiction of a State over all territory, things, and persons within its 
b o u n d a r i e s . I n  so far as independence is an inherent right of a 
sovereign State, intervention is a violation of that right and is illegal 
under international law. The principle was affirmed in the Declaration 
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations and is to the effect that no State or group of States have the right 
to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the 
internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, any form of 
intervention or attempted threats against the personality of the State or 
against its political, economic and cultural elements would be regarded as 
a violation of international law. The necessity of full respect for those 
principles was reaffirmed in the judgement of the International Court of 
Justice in the Nicaragua Case^^ Therefore, any pledge in this regard 
Stockton C. H„ Outlines of International Law, London, p. 114.
Loc. cit., p. 101.
The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations^
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,
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seems unnecessary and irrelevant.
Under the Agreement, the United States also agreed to freeze and
prohibit any transfer of property and assets in the U.S. within the control
of the estate of the former Shah or of any close relative of the former
7 0Shah claimed by Iran or the assets of the family of the Shah. 
However, such property became subject to the law of the United States, 
and it was always open to the United States' courts to exercise their 
jurisdiction so as to refuse to transfer those assets which amounted to 
billions of dollars. If the United States were to apply national law, taking 
the assets of the Shah and his family would be contrary to the terms of the 
United States' Constitution and the accepted legal principles of that 
country. The persons concerned had obtained the United States 
citizenship, and they should be paid compensation for the taking of those 
properties according to the United States' laws. The United States, on the 
one hand, accepted the obligation in response to the claims of Iran for the 
restoration of those assets. On the other hand, any taking of property of 
U.S nationals should have been compensated according to the United 
States’ law.^^ This dilemma could not be solved by the existing rules 
which had been canvassed and defended internationally.
However, any undertaking by the U.S. Government would not bar 
the United States courts from deciding against Iran, and the claims of Iran 
in this regard would be considered by the agreed tribunal on the basis of
72the U.S. laws. The provisions allowed the United States to sit in
(Nicaragua v. United states of America), International Court of Justice Order, 
may 10, 1984, I.C.J. Reports, 1984, 169.
Point IV of the Agreement, Appendix II, op. cit., p. 227.
5th amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Paragraphs 12-16 of the General Agreement, Appendix II; (20 I.L.M., pp. 
227-8).
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judgement of its own actions. At the same time they contain a 
contradiction between the responsibility of returning the assets to Iran, 
and the obligation of treating the Shah and his family as the U.S. 
nationals.
1 - 2 - The Claims Settlement Declaration
The most important part of the Agreement is the Declaration of the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
concerning the settlement of claims by the government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Priority was given to the settlement of disputes by mutual agreement
between the Parties which was to be done within six months from the date
of entry into force of the Agreement, extendible once by three months at
73the request of either party. There were a variety of controversies to 
be decided by the Tribunal, including claims and counterclaims of 
nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran 
against the United States which arose out of debts, contracts (including 
transactions which were the subject of letters of credit or bank 
guarantees), expropriations or other measures affecting property 
rights.^"*
The Tribunal was to decide who must be compensated, the legality
and the kind of property rights which had been affected and how much
Article I of the Declartion of the Government of Algeria concerning the 
Settlement of claims by Iran and U.S., in 20 I.L.M., op. cit., p. 230.
Article II, Appendix II, op. cit.; 20 I.L.M., op. cit., pp. 230-1.
Ï
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compensation should be paid to the claimants. The controversies arose 
out of the interpretation of the terms of the Declarations as to who 
actually was a national of the United States and whether Iran had the right 
to bring claims against nationals of the United States.
On November 13, 1981, Iran requested the Tribunal to decide on
75the latter issue. Article II (1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration 
provides that the Tribunal was established for the purpose of deciding 
claims of nationals of U.S. against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran 
against the U.S. and any counter claims arising out of the same contract, 
transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject matter of the 
national's claim. Iran contended that it is the stated purpose of both 
Parties to terminate all litigation between their respective Governments 
and nationals of the other, and to bring about the settlement of all such 
claims through binding arbitration. Iran was of the view that the absence 
of any relevant exclusion in the Claims Settlement Declaration, with 
respect to the other provisions of the declarations, meant that Iran had the 
right to bring claims against the U.S. nationals before the tribunal. The 
United States claimed that such claims were not referred to in either the 
General Declaration or the Claims Settlement Declaration and that 
therefore they were not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
The tribunal held by 6 votes to 3 in favour of the United States. 
The reason for the Tribunal's decision was that, in the list of claims and 
counterclaims established by the Parties, only 'the claims made by 
nationals of the U.S.’ is mentioned, and they are limited to claims made by 
citizens of one State against the other and excludes any further
77exception. On the basis of this interpretation, Iran lost the right to 
Claims Against U.S. Nationals, 62 I.L.R., 1982, p. 595.
Loc. cit., p. 596,
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bring about 2500^^ claims against the U.S. nationals
It is doubtful that Iran intended to deprive herself from of this right 
which probably amounted a huge sum of money, especially when one 
bears in mind that Iran had agreed to bear one half of the expenses of the 
Tribunal. The interpretation of the Tribunal was based on the language 
of the Declarations rather than the intentions and purpose of the Parties. 
The view of the Tribunal was that the terms of the Claims Settlement 
Declaration are so detailed and so clear that they must necessarily prevail 
over the purported intentions of the Parties, whatever they might have 
been. This was not a view which the Tribunal adopted in all cases. 
Instead, there are some cases in which Tribunal took the opposite view 
and awarded in favour of the U.S. claimant according to the intention of
the parties to the dispute and not on the basis of the language of the
^  80 contract.
By such an interpretation, the Agreement lost its apparent balance 
and became essentially an unilateral agreement. The effect of the 
Tribunal's interpretation has been so immense that it has made the 
Agreement inequitable and unacceptable to Iran. As a result, a majority 
of American companies had become unjustly rich, receiving sums of 
money without performance of their obligations and have not had any 
interest to go to the Tribunal. Moreover, the U.S. Government, for all its 
special administrative and economic structure, does not exert such wide 
and diverse control over commercial and economic activities as is
Loc. cit., Paras, (i), (ii) of the Judgement.
piran mentions some 1400 claims, Piran H., Nationalisation of Foreign 
Property in International Law and Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, op. cit., p. 179.
Brower C. N,, The Lessons of the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal: How May 
They Be Applied in the Case of Iraq?, Virg.J.LL., vol. 32:421, p. 422.
80. Nasser Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat (31-157-2), IX Y.C.A, 1984, p. 281.
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assumed by the Iranian Government, and basically lacks direct control in 
conclusion and performance of such agreements. Therefore, the U.S. 
Government would not be a person against which the Iranian nationals 
and Government would file claims to any large extent. Therefore, 
without permitting equal rights to the Iranian Government, it is 
inconceivable that a government would waive its sovereign immunity in 
such a way.
However, in cases numbers A2 and A16, the Tribunal rejected its
jurisdiction over claims by Iran against United States nationals, and left
these disputes to be solved in future through other means. It was
emphasized in case no. A16 that the Iranian Government could only bring
counterclaims against the relevant United States nationals and companies
82which had litigated against Iran in the Tribunal.
The parties to the Agreement waived some of their claims against 
each other, not all of which can be explained under international law, 
except to say that the parties had the right to agree on any terms they 
wished,*^ and they did so.
In the Accords, three categories of claims were excluded:
1- Claims as the result of the seizure of the 52 U.S. nationals, their 
subsequent detention, injury to the U.S. property or property of the U.S. 
nationals within the U.S. Embassy compound in Teheran and injury to the 
U.S. nationals or their property as the result of popular movements in the 
course of the Islamic Revolution in Iran which were not an act of the 
Government of Iran.*"*
Claims Against U.S. Nationals, 62 I.L.R., 1982, pp. 597-606.
Survey of Awards(Jurisdiction), (Cases A2, A12, A16), X Y.C.A., 1985, p. 
189.
Their agreement could obviously not be inconsistent with international law. 
Paragraph 11 of the General Agreement of 19 January 1981 and Article 11(1) of
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It is a well established principle of international law that States are 
not responsible for the injuries and damages sustained by foreigners in 
consequence of insurrection and popular movements which are out of the
85control. Thus, the first two categories of claims could be agreed under 
international law, but any agreement on the claims as the result of popular 
movements is not unnecessary to mention in such an agreement. For, the 
responsibility of States is clear if a government be the cause of the injuries 
to aliens. Injury to U.S. property and that of the detainees was excluded 
in exchange for the injuries caused by the U.S. military response to the 
detention of the U.S. nationals.
The broad terms of the Agreement did not specify the range of the 
damages caused by the popular movement for which the Government of 
Irah was considered to be not responsible. Tribunal did not give much 
weight to the role of the revolution which was the main source of all those 
disputes.
2“ Claims as the result of the actions of the U.S. in response to the 
detention of the U.S. nationals.
3- Claims arising under a binding contract between the parties specifically
providing that any disputes thereunder should be within the sole
jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts in response to the Majlis
87(Parliament) position. No reason has been given why these claims
have been excluded. Obviously they cannot be justified under traditional
rules of expropriation. They should be explained and interpreted in the
. the Settlement Agreement, Appendix II; 20 I.L.M., op. cit., pp. 227, 231.
Brownlie I., Principles of Public Intrernational Law, 1990, op. cit., pp. 465-6.
Paragraph 11 of the General Agreement of 19 January 1981 and Article 11(1) of 
the Settlement Agreement, Appendix H, Appendix II, op. cit.
Article 11(1) of the Settlement Agreement, Appendix n, op. cit.
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light of Other elements which obliged the parties to conclude the 
Agreements.
2 - Settlement of the Disputes on Agreed Terms
The Iran-U.S. Agreement included a variety of issues to be solved 
using various procedures. The different categories of claims were to be 
resolved in three different ways; by agreement between the parties to the
disputes, through binding arbitration and through the competent Iranian
, 88 courts.
Many claims were in fact settled by mutual agreement between the
89parties to the disputes. Basically, all of the disputes could be settled by 
agreement and, failing to do so within six months from the date of entry 
into force of the Algier's Agreement, they were to be submitted to the
90binding Arbitration Tribunal. This limitation of time did not bar the 
parties reach agreement at a later date and present it to the Tribunal for 
recording and reporting it to the escrow agent to be paid from the 
Security Account.
Agreements by themselves, like most of the lump sum agreements, 
do not follow any particular pattern. They usually comprise a package 
which involve various elements depending on the engagements of the 
parties. With different motives, they choose conciliation and settlement 
and usually accept reciprocal obligations. The difference of these 
Articles I and II of the Settlement Agreement, Appendix II, op. cit.
89. The examples are cases no. 5, 15, 19, 42, 79, 119, 136, 297, 387, 427, 488,
501, 807, 11875.
Article I of the Settlement Agreement, Appendix II, op. cit.
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settlements with the traditional ones is that the previous agreements were 
concluded between the governments and the recipient government 
distributed the money, if any, among the affected nationals through the 
national claims settlements. Under the Iran-United States Agreement, the 
interested parties, both persons and government, settled their claims under 
agreements which normally involved a release of all claims and 
counterclaims. But payment of any compensation to Americans would be
91through the Security Account.
Thirty-four Awards on Agreed Terms were issued in 1985, with 
something over 2,500 of the claims have been settled between the two 
governments. According to the agreed rules governing the dispute 
settlement procedures in the Iran-U.S. Tribunal, the Arbitrators do not 
play much of a role in these agreements, merely accepting, recording and 
reporting the Settlement Agreements as awards which would be final and
93binding. Proceedings in a contested case would be terminated in such 
cases.
However, settlement of this group of agreements was not without 
difficulty and there arose a series of dissents from the judges in some of 
the settlement agreements. For example, in case no. 488, the American 
Arbitrator, Howard M. Holtzmann, expressed concern that the party 
designated escrow agent did not receive instructions to return the
xhe latest of these kind of agreements is apparently the LAPCO Case (ARCO 
and SUN Cos.) by which $1,300,000,000 was claimed, but the parties agreed 
on the sum $260,000,000; reported in Jomhourie Islami (Iranian newspaper)
No. 3826, August 22, 1992, p. 2,
Brower C. N., The Lessons of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Haw 
May They Be Applied in the Case of Iraq?, Virg.J.I.L., vol. 32, 1992, p. 421.
The Tribunal rules were UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; in this regard see 
Articles 32 and 34 of the UNCITRAL Rules in UNCITRAL, The U.N, 
Commission on International Trade Law, New York, 1986, pp. 146-7.
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settlement fund to the Tribunal, but rather to the Iranian Ministry of 
Defence. If the reciprocal obligations in the settlement agreement were 
not fulfilled, any possible agreement would be plainly inconsistent with 
the treaty requirements governing procedure before the Tribunal. He 
also argued, as he did in case no, 136, that the treaty limitations on use of 
the Security Account placed a burden on the parties to establish that any 
property to be transferred in a settlement agreement is property covered 
by a claim within the framework of the Algiers Declarations. In cases no. 
15, 19, 42, 79, 119, 279, 387, 427, 488, 807 and 11875, there were 
dissenting opinions on the question of the authority of the Tribunal on 
such agreements and of the degree of confidentiality the Tribunal should
94afford to settlement agreements when requested to do so by the parties. 
Through these agreements the parties could use the funds from the 
Security Account for purposes not included in the Statement of Claim and 
not falling within the framework of the Algiers Declaration.^^ 
However, the Agreed Terms have been the best and most satisfactory way 
of settlement of disputes which have the mutual consent of the parties to 
the disputes and raise few legal questions.
3 - The Other Means of Settlement of Disputes
Under article II of the Settlement Agreement, the disputes 
mentioned in the Agreements are to be solved through the Binding 
Tribunal. One of the exceptions to this rule relates to claims arising
94_ Awards on Agreed Terms, IX Y.C.A., 1984, pp. 197-205.
Cases 80-136-1 is an example which was dissented by M. Holtzmann on 10 
October 1983; see in Y.C.A., vol. IX, 1984, pp. 201-2.
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under a binding contract between the parties which has specifically 
provided that any dispute arising thereunder should be within the sole 
jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts in response to the Iranian 
Parliament's position/** These provisions comprise a clear recognition 
of the authority of domestic laws to decide on the claims of aliens and on 
local remedies. While the United States and some of the Chambers have 
been of the view that such properties and rights should be governed by 
international law, insertion of the clause indicates that the rules on 
expropriation of alien property and rights are not strict and are very 
dependent on a series of elements which regulate the relation of those 
nationals and their governments with the host State. Otherwise, if there 
are clear international rules governing property and rights of aliens, the 
decision of any court or tribunal should be based on those rules and the 
consequences should therefore be consistent, It seems to follow that there 
is no need to make such exemptions to the jurisdiction of an International 
Tribunal.
4 - Who was to be Compensated?
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal's decisions caused more confusion 
over the question of responsibility of States for the injuries to aliens, 
when the rules were challenged in the Tribunal on the question of who
, 97were to be compensated for any damage to property or loss of interest. 
The Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide on claims made by the nationals of 
Article II of the Settlement Agreement, Appendix n, op. cit.
The rules will be discussed in the following section; dual nationality became 
one of the controvercial issues before the Tribunal.
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the United States. The Accords Agreements clearly ignored the 
responsibility of Iran towards aliens other than the U.S. nationals. In 
other words, the responsibility was recognized on the expropriated 
individuals which were U.S. nationals, and left others to seek a way, if 
any, to be indemnified. On the other hand, the Tribunal decided on the 
claims of some individuals who were Iranian subjects and had dual 
nationality. Provisions had been included to clarify who would be entitled 
to raise a claim before the Tribunal, but a dispute arose on the issue which 
engaged the attention of the Tribunal considerably.
The Agreement provides that a 'national' of Iran or of the United 
States, as the case may be, means a natural person who is a citizen of Iran
98or the United States. A number of claimants before the Tribunal 
possessed both nationalities. Therefore, the pursuit of claims by U.S. 
citizens, without regard to their rights and duties in regard to their 
Iranian nationality, caused some problems.
From the U.S. point of view, they were permissible according to the
99plain meaning of the provision and disregarding their dual nationality. 
Directly enforceable rights of the claimants before the Tribunal, the 
practice of the parties in prior agreements, modem claims settlements in
general and the language of the Article 1V(3) of the Declaration were 
other authorities invoked by the U.S.^ *^ * According to the United States, 
regard to contemporary principles of international law and relevant case
Article VIl(l) of the Claim Settlement Declaration, Appendix II, op. cit.
Memorial of the United States on the Issue of Dual Nationality, November 19,
1982, Case A/18, 23 I.L.M. 1984, pp. 493-96.
Loc. cit., p. 494; article IV(3) of the Declaration states that any awai'd which 
the Tribunal may render against either government should be enforceable 
against such government in the courts of any nation in accordance with its 
laws.
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law would remove any ambiguity in the provision/**^
Iran took the contrary position that under international law a State
could not be held responsible to its own citizens before an international
tribunal, and rejected the argument of the U.S. on the basis that the
disjunctive "or" in Article V ll(l) necessarily excluded a claimant who is a
citizen of both Iran and the United States. Further, international law of
diplomatic protection also prohibits claims of dual nationals, since
102recognizing dual nationals as included in the Declaration would violate
103the sovereign equality of States. Some traditional sources and legal
scholars support the Iranian argument that an individual holding dual
nationality may not institute action against either of the States of which he
is a national. Under customary international law, in so far as it relates to
diplomatic protection, a State which puts forward a claim before a claims
commission or other international tribunal must be in a position to show
that it (the State) has locus standi for that purpose. The principal, and
almost the exclusive, factor according to Lauterpacht, creating that locus
standi is the nationality of the claimant, and it may be stated as a general
principle that from the time of the occurrence of the injury until the
making of the award the claim must continuously and without interruption
have belonged to a person or a series of persons (a) having the nationality
of the State by whom it is put forward, and (b) not having the nationality
101_ Xhe special reference by the United States was the N o t t e b o h m  
case(Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), in which the l.CJ. Court defined real or 
dominant and effective nationality based on stronger ties between the person 
concerned and one of the States whose nationality is involved, LCJ. 1955, 
pp. 4, 22; see also Merge Case, Italian-U.S. Conciliation Commission, 14 
R.I.A.A., 1955, p. 236.
Article VII of the Declaration in Appendix H, op. cit.
Case A/18, Concerning the Question of Jurisdiction Over Claims of Persons 
' with Dual Nationality, 23 I.L.M., 1984, p. 493
I
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of the State against whom it is put forward/**"* Leigh in this regard states 
that:
"It is reasoned that if both nationalities are valid, then to permit one State to 
represent the individual against his other State would be to give greater effect 
to the nationality of the claimant State, thus denying this sovereign equality. 
Therefore, neither State of which the individual is a national may represent 
him against the other State whose nationality he possess.
Iran argued that, in the event of doubt, a clause submitting a State to 
the, jurisdiction of an international tribunal must be construed 
restrictively, and that the Claim Settlement Declaration did not depart 
from and must be interpreted consistently with the traditional rule of 
diplomatic protection which clearly prohibited claims by persons 
possessing the nationality of both the claimant and the respondent States; 
and that a contrary ruling would violate the 'reciprocal nature' of the 
Accords. Accordingly, the proper principle to be applied was a rule of 
absolute non-responsibility of States for claims brought by their own 
nationals before international t r i b u n a l s . I n  awards rendered in March 
1983, Chamber Two applied the principle of 'dominant and effective 
nationality'. As a result, two of the claimants were found to be U.S. 
nationals, and the claim of the third was dismissed because she had
107acquired U.S. nationality after the Accords had entered into force.
Under customary international law, it has been established that
diplomatic protection is the means by which a State gives effect to another
Lauterpacht H., Oppenheim’s International Law, 1955, pp. 347-48.
Leigh, Nationality and Diplomatic Protection, 2 0 1.C.L.Q., 1971, p. 460.
Case A/18, Concerning the Question of Jurisdiction Over Claims of Persons 
with Dual Nationality, 23 I.L.M., 1984, p. 492-3.
Esphahanian v. Bank Tajarat, 2 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., Mar. 29, 1983, pp. 157-8, 
discussed at 77 A.J.I.L., 1983, p. 646; Golpira v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 
op. cit., pp. 171, 178; Haroonian v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., op. cit., p.
226.
____
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State's responsibility for an act in contravention of international law
affecting the person or property of a national of the first State. The
State's right to exercise this protection seems, in turn, to follow from the
link of nationality existing between the individual and his State. Without
this connecting factor of nationality there can be no diplomatic 
108protection. Thus, Iran contended that the parties intended the Tribunal
to adjudicate claims on this basis.^ **^
Iran viewed the role of the Tribunal as one of resolving "interstate
conflicts" between Iran and the United S t a t e s a n d  saw the Declaration's
primary purpose as ending the Iran-United States international crisis
rather than as merely settling private disputes. Accordingly, Iran argued
that each government must endorse the claims of its nationals. Iran
further contended that awards rendered by the Tribunal were to be paid
to the government, rather than directly to the claimant, and that awards
which were not made on the basis of diplomatic protection could be
challenged as contrary to public international law.^ *^^
The Full Tribunal, on April 16, 1984, rejected the textual
arguments of both Iran and the U.S. and rendered an award which in fact
affirmed the principle established in the earlier decisions of Chamber 
112Two. The Tribunal applied the standard of Article 31, Paragraph 3(c)
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to which the
parties agreed on the rules governing the interpretation of the Accords.
Case A/18, Concerning the Question of Jurisdiction Over Claims of Persons 
with Dual Nationality, op. cit., p. 493
Case A/18, Concerning the Question of Jurisdiction Over Claims of Persons 
with Dual Nationality, op. cit., p. 493.
Loc. cit., p. 493.
Loc. cit.
112_ Loc. cit., pp. 496-9.
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Thè Tribunal held that the stronger factual ties between the person 
concerned and the State whose nationality is involved would determine the
113nationality of the individual. The relevant factors were considered by
the Tribunal included habitual residence, centre of interests, family ties,
participation in public life and other evidence of attachment. Chamber
Two, in the Esphahanian Case confronted the contradiction between the
principles of diplomatic protection and the non-responsibility doctrine.
The Tribunal stated that the first principle applies to "cases of espousal of
claims", and the second one to the physical presence of the dual nationals.
The Tribunal did not make it clear how a person’s claims could be
protected while he himself was not protected under international law.^ *^ "*
' There was the caveat added to the decision to the effect that the
115other nationality may remain relevant to the merits of the claim. The 
Tribunal did not make clear what the relevance of the other nationality 
actually was, nor the degree to which it would affect those nationals. 
Whatever the effect is, it is not based fully on the rules protecting 
foreigners against host States.
The question of dual nationality has certainly more than one aspect. 
One feature of the issue is when two States try to give diplomatic 
protection to a national against a third State, and the other is when a State 
diplomatically protects a national who possesses the nationality of the 
respondent State, as it is the case in the Iranian disputes. In the first 
instance, contrary to the arguments of the Parties which tried to renounce 
either of those views, there would be no contradiction between the 
Loc. cit.
Nasser Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat (31-157-2), IX Y.C.A., 1984, PP.
277-8
Loc. cit.
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principles of diplomatic protection and non-responsibility, both being
based on the principle of sovereignty rights over nationals. The same
principle precludes a State from affording diplomatic protection to one of
its nationals against a State whose nationality such person also
p o s s e s s e s . T h i s  rule which was ratified by Article 4 of the Hague
Convention of 1930, reaffirmed by Article 4 of the 1965 Resolution of
the Institute of International Law, and restated by the International Court
of Justice in its Advisory Opinion of 1949.^^^
The cases before the Second World War and thereafter^^* did not
infringe those principles as it was understood by the T r i b u n a l . I n  the
Nottebohm Case, the claimant had lost his German nationality upon
taking that of Liechtenstein, but the court declared, inter alia, that
Guatemala was under no obligation to recognize a nationality which was
not g e n u i n e . A c c o r d i n g  to the practice of States, arbitral and judicial
decisions and the opinions of writers, the legal basis of nationality is the
social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of interests and sentiments,
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. This
reciprocity of rights and duties, together with the principle of sovereign
equality, distinguishes a dual national from an alien, and excludes, as was
stated in Merge Case, diplomatic protection in the case of dual
116_ Article 4 of the Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the 
Conflicts of Nationality Laws, 179 L.N.T.S. p. 89; see also Harris, Case and 
Materials on International Law, 1979, p. 467.
Nasser Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat (31-157-2), IX Y.C.A., op. cit., p. 281. 
Panevezys-saldutiskis Case, 1939, P.C.I.J. Reports, Series A/B, No. 76; 
Nottebohm Case, I.C.J. Reports, 1955, p. 4; Flegenheimer Claim Case,
1958, 25 I.L.R. p. 91; Canevaro Case, 1912, 6 A.J.LL. 1912, p. 746; 
Salem Case, 1932, 2 R.I.A.A. 1161; Merge Claim Case, 22 I.L.R. p. 443.
Nasser Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat (31-157-2), op. cit., p. 277.
120! Nottebohm Case, I.C.J. Reports, 1955, op. cit. p. 4.
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nationality.
The importance of the issue and its effect upon Iranian
responsibility in such cases was that, the Iranian Civil Code imposed
certain restrictions on ownership of real property and investments in Iran 
122by foreigners. To prevent individuals from using the advantages of
both nationals and foreigners together, any Iranian who wanted to
abandon his nationality must, inter alia, make arrangements to transfer to
Iranian nationals all rights in real property in Iran (including that which
they may acquire by i nhe r i t ance ) . Moreover ,  the Iranian Civil Code
does not recognize the foreign nationality of Iranians which has been
gained against the Law and after 1879, except those admitted by the
Council of M i n i s t e r s . M a n y  Iranianf including the family of Shah, had
obtained U.S. citizenship and could bring claims against Iran while
according to the Accords, the United States was not only barred from
supporting their claims against Iran, but should return their properties to
Iran. It was not acceptable for Iran to be respondent to a claimant who
was Iranian and might be related to the Shah's family and who, in
consequence, so far as the Iranian government was concerned, ought to
stand trial for the crimes which they were alleged to have been
committed. Otherwise, the claimant could go freely to Iran and
administer his property or litigate in the domestic courts without any need
to get diplomatic protection from the United States. For countries like the
121_ Merge Case, 22 I.L.R., op. cit., Para. 5 of the opinion of the Commission.
See also Concurring Opinion of Judge Mosk in Case A/18, in 23 I.L.M., p.
505.
123_ Article 988 of the Civil Code of Iran.
Article 989 of the Civil Code of Iran. In the condition that it does not result to 
economic domination of Foreigners, Iranian women can hold their imovable 
properties; Article 987 (Note 2) of Civil Code of Iran.
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United States, in which ownership of real property is available to all 
persons, the question of dual nationality may not be problematic. But, in 
Iran there are a number of restrictions upon the acquisition of property 
rights by foreigners and the issue of dual nationality is therefore 
controversial. If nationals are not subject to control by domestic law, 
especially in economic and exchange control affairs, a few wealthy 
nationals could bring the country's hard currency balance to a standstill 
and, in so doing, bring the country to the verge of economic collapse. 
Moreover, it is inconceivable that the Iranian Government would of its 
own accord undertake to establish an international tribunal to settle 
disputes between itself and its own nationals.
That was why Iran reacted to the Tribunal's decision so stridently, 
threatening to boycott proceedings relating to dual national claims and 
even to leave the Tribunal completely if it continued to arbitrate those 
claims. The Iranian Arbitrators called it "a bad faith interpretation," 
"unbalanced," and "void of any credibility.
The question as to who should be compensated as alien is not limited 
to dual nationals. Americans who owned shares in non-American 
companies working in Iran also brought claims before the tribunal. The 
question that who should be compensated has become more complicated 
and needs more precise definition to end controversial claims and 
counter-claims.
125. Declaration by the Iranian Members of the Tribunal, April 6, 1984, Iianian 
Assets Litigation Reports, April 13, 1984, p. 8,264.
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(SECTION THREE)
THE ISSUE OF EXPROPRIATION BEFORE THE 
IRAN-UNITED STATED CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
Pursuant to the Iran-U.S Claims Settlement of January 1981 many
American oil companies filed claims against Iran. In their claims these
companies relied on the respective agreements concluded between them
and the pre-revolution government of Iran and alleged that NIOC and/or
Islamic Republic of Iran were in breach of the terms of these oil
agreements; and accordingly claimed an award on this basis. As was
mentioned earlier, Iran had used its sovereign right to nullify the oil
contracts, which was declared in the Khemco Case not inconsistent with
the provisions of the United Nations Resolutions on Sovereign Rights of
Nations over their Natural Resources. They were also nullified as they
were considered contrary to the 1951 nationalization Law.
Although the Iranian Civil Code does not recognize the validity of
contracts which are against law, without any obligation on the parties to
compensate the other party, the single Article Act of 1981 provided
that all claims which may arise in connection with the conclusion or
performance of the oil contracts could be settled according to decisions
127made by the Committee established by that law.
' There was disagreement on whether disputes arising from the 
nullification of the oil agreements actually fell within the jurisdiction of 
the Iran-U.S. Tribunal. Iran contended that they were subject to the sole 
jurisdiction of a Special Committee under the Iranian Minister of Oil.
126- Article 219 of the Civü Code of Iran.
127- The Single Article Act, the Law No. 1408 of 18 Bahman, 1358 (February 7,
1980).
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Further disagreement arose as to whether the phrase "in response to the 
Majlis position", agreed in the Claims Settlement Declaration, excluded 
such claims from the jurisdiction of the Iran-U.S. Tribunal.
The Iran-U.S. Tribunal accepted jurisdiction in most cases, thus 
generally rejecting Iran's argument that the proper forum for hearing 
these cases was the Special Committee established in the Ministry of Oil in 
Teheran. In a decision pronounced on 5 November 1982 the Tribunal set 
a precedent as to how it would treat objections to the Tribunal's
• • j -  1 2 8ju r is d ic t io n .
According to the Accords, claims were divided into those arising 
out of debts, contracts (including transactions which were the subject of 
letters of credit or bank guarantees), expropriations and other possible
129measures affecting property. Traditionally, as was indicated in the
previous chapters, expropriation included any interference of a
government in contractual rights and property of individuals. The
distinction between expropriation, interference in contracts and
frustration of contracts is essential and has different legal consequences,
particularly as it affects the assessment of damage to the claimants. In
expropriation, the consent of the party who is affected by expropriation
or prejudiced by it is of no relevance as to the validity of the
expropriation, nor can it have any influence whatever on its execution.
Thus, an expropriation, modifies or suppresses the legal relations between
130the party affected by takings and the expropriating State.
International judicial practice has differentiated between the cases in
which revolutionaries have been defeated and those in which they have
128- Amin S. H., Commercial Law of Iran, op. cit., 123-4.
129_ Article II of the Claim Agreement, 2 0 1.L.M., op. cit.
130- Kotzarov K., The Validity of the Act of Nationalisation in International Law,
22 M.L.R., 1959, p. 641.
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been victorious. Clearly, a government would not be responsible if the
131rebellions or revolutionaries did not succeed. If the revolutionaries 
were to succeed, the new government would be considered responsible for
132the actions of the revolutionaries which had resulted in their victory.
This contention is based on the assumption that the revolutionaries have
been representing the nation since the beginning and are bound to the
undertakings of the nation which are manifested in international contracts
and conventions. However, revolutionaries could not be held responsible
for the actions which have been necessary to attain the aims of the 
133movement. Accordingly, it was provided by the Declaration that the 
United States wiU promptly withdraw aU claims of the United States or a 
United States' nationals arising out of the events occurring before the date 
of the Declaration related to, inter alia, injury to United States' nationals 
or their property as a result of popular movements in the course of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran which were not an act of the Government of 
Iran, Non-United States nationals were also barred from taking similar 
actions in the United States.
The injuries to property and other rights of the U.S. nationals could 
have been sustained for various reasons.
First, injuries incurred during the revolution by the actions of the forces
within or without the revolutionary government's control. If the actions
were beyond control or inevitable, there is a general rule that the
government would not be responsible for injuries caused to foreigners as 
135a consequence. Therefore, Iran could not be held responsible for such
McNair and Watts, The Legal Effects of War, Cambridge 1966, p. 81.
132- Loc. cit., p. 83.
133- - Safaei S. H., Force Majeure, B.I.L.S.L.R., (Persian), No. 3, p. 134.
134_ Para. 11 of the Algeria Declaration, and Article II of the Claim Settlement 
Declaration, Appendix H, op. cit.
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injuries.
Accordingly, in Case 25-71-1, the Tribunal dismissed Mrs. 
Grimm's claim that such "property rights" were affected by the alleged 
failure to protect Mr. Grimm as being far from the natural understanding 
of the circumstances that this failure affected the life and safety of Mr. 
Grimm.
Secondly, the injury might be as a result of the success of the movement. 
If property and contractual rights of foreigners are in conflict with the 
purpose of the movement, frustration of such rights is inevitable. Some 
properties or the owner of properties may be the target of the movement. 
As was the case in the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the United States was 
the dominant power to such an extent that Iran had effectively became a 
satellites country of the United States. The number of the claimants 
indicates that the country was the subject of business invasion by U.S. 
companies. The presence of U.S. companies was not only due to the 
economic profit they saw as available, but also to the nature of the regime 
governing the country which had created a favourable climate for U.S. 
companies. Fighting against the regime would have automatically
jeopardized those advantages enjoyed by U.S. nationals by virtue of the
137dominance of their country in Iran. The revolution was based on new 
rules and principles which were demanded by the nation through 
135- Safaei S. H., Force Majeure, op. cit., pp. 134-5.
13G_ Lilian Byrdine Grimm v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 25-71-1 of 22 Feb. 1983, 
Y.C.A., vol. IX, 1984, p. 243.
137. Dominence of the U.S. started since the Second World War when American 
advisers were brought in by Iranian governmant in an attempt to stabilize the 
economy and the administration. After Pearl Harbor, American troops took 
over from the British the operation of the southern part of the railroad and the 
Persian Gulf ports; Ford A. W., The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, op. cit., pp. 
30-31.
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demonstrations and general strikes, and ratified through référendums. 
They would inevitably rule the country and affect the rights of the 
foreigners such as U.S. nationals.
It is equally a general rule accepted internationally and practiced by 
the United States courts that performance of contracts may become 
physically and legally impossible. Legally, it becomes impossible when its 
performance is against the law or what amounts to the same government
138rules. But, when the government itself is a party to contract, it must 
be proved that the legislation is not an excuse for not performing the 
contract, i.e., it should be shown that the legislation is designed for
139public purposes and reflects the general policy of the government.
This is true when there are some political changes at the head of the 
State. As was stated in the Consortium Case,^^^ the Revolutionary 
events, which culminated in the establishment of the Islamic Government, 
transformed the whole pattern of social relations in the country. In this 
process, the rights of the people to the natural resources of the country 
and, consequently, the legal regime of the country became a central issue 
of the Revolution. It was a revolution generated by the Iranian people's 
deep resentment toward Western control over their economic affairs. If 
Airierican multinationals were to remain in the country and to continue to 
implement their contracts, which had been entered into by the overthrown 
regime of the Shah, then the labour strike which brought the oil industry
138- Corbin, On Contracts, T. 6, 1962, Para. 1343. In Article 13 of the negotiated
contract between Iran and Talbot UK. in 1981-82 one of the elements which 
was defined exclusively as force majeure was State regulations (Article 13), in 
Amin S. H., Commercial Law of Iran, op. cit., pp. 95-101.
139- Safaei S. H., Force Majeure, op. cit., pp. 141-144; the Talbot Contract in,
Amin S. H., Commercial Law of Iran, op. cit., pp. 95-101.
140_ Award No, 311-74/76/81/150-3 (14 July 1987), 16 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 3, p.
42, para. 123.
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to a standstill throughout the rise of the popular movement would become 
responsible for damages to the foreign oil companies. The revolution had 
two main objectives: to combat the internal tyranny of the Shah; and to 
repel any foreign interference in the nation’s social and economic 
affairs.
The oil, as well as the other, companies were associated, in the mind 
of the nation, with the regime of the Shah, as a result of the events of 
1953 when the CIA and British intelligence service overthrew Mosadiq. 
The oil agreements which followed the American-backed coup d'etat of 
1953 were regarded as the outcome of that interference which restored 
the Shah to power.^'*^ Under the Shah's government, there was always 
the possibility of applying political pressure through the royal family and
143their associates in order to obtain more favourable terms. There was 
also much corruption when, instead of public tendering process in 
contracts, individual Iranian authorities were allowed to indulge in 
"insider dealing" by giving highly sensitive information only to selective
144applicants, which mostly were U.S. nationals.
After the revolution, the Iranian Council of Ministers, in Law No. 
51524 dated 16 Mordad 1358/1980, declared all such contracts void and 
null. Furthermore, Iranian officials who had arranged such contracts 
were made liable to criminal prosecution both under pre-revolution 
legislation and, more severely, under the post-revolution laws of Iran. 
That was why, except for U.S. nationals, the nationals of the other States 
were not affected in this way by the revolution. Any attachment of
141- Khalilian, Seyed Khalil, Contrversial Theory of frustration Before Iran-United
States Claim Tribunal, 7 Journal of International Arbitration, 1990, p. 17,
142- Lapping B., End of Empire, London, 1985, p. 221.
143- Amin, S. H., Commercial Law of Iran, op. cit., p. 85.
144- Loc. cit., p. 83.
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responsibility to such a government is a condemnation of a movement
I
which is clearly contrary to the principles of self-determination in 
international law.
Unfortunately, international law is silent as to the magnitude of the 
powerful crippling force created by a revolution, which forces the 
government to do according to the will of the nation. For example, the 
oil workers in Iran, a force of about forty thousand spread throughout the 
most vital zone of the country, were prepared to resist any manoeuvre 
favourable to American multinationals. In this respect, the workers did 
not obey the instructions of the NIOC management or the government, 
which were contrary to the aims of the movement.
1
Surprisingly, the Tribunal's awards have seldom referred to the 
factors of control, fault and foreseeability in such a situation, and, 
contrary to expectations, only a few awards have dealt with the elusive 
doctrine of changed circumstances.
Thirdly, as a result of the changed circumstances, sometimes aliens are 
not interested in continuing contracts with the new regime. Before the
revolution Iran enjoyed friendly relations with the United States. The
United States through its companies, was ready to sign contracts with Iran
under the Shah, especially in military and strategic fields, in order to
strengthen that regime. Accordingly, major political issues created kinds
of contracts which are not usual between less friendly States. For
example, contracts for the sale of oil and arm?were different from general
commercial contracts and involved major legal and political issues.^"^  ^ In
the post-revolution era, the United States was not interested to continue
those strategic and non-strategic contracts with Iran. This attitude was
145_ Tribunal Document No. 347, pp. 15-18.
146- Amin S. H., Commercial Law of Iran, op. cit., p. 79.
-’I
' : ï ï
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manifested in the Presidential Executive Order of 14 November 1979 
which prohibited commercial transactions with Iran and froze all Iranian 
assets subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or within the 
pos^session or control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States/'*^ What is known as "the Iran-Contra Affair" was in fact the 
performance of contracts signed by Americans with the Shah's regime; 
and Iran, then at war with Iraq insisted on delivery of the military 
equipment. Such an action under the previous regime would have been 
simply considered as fulfilling contractual obligations. Because of a 
different attitude toward the new regime, it was changed to a political 
scandal.
Therefore, disputes between the parties were not limited to the 
contracts breached or properties taken by Iran. There were many cases in 
which the U.S. parties pleaded the revolution as an obstacle to 
performance of the contracts. In some cases the Tribunal dismissed the
148claims against Iran for the injury to the claimants. So, essentially,
there is the question as to who was fully responsible for the injuries to the
U.S. nationals and their property, and what constituted taking of
property? As far as performance of the contracts was concerned, it was
necessary to determine whether the withdrawal of U.S. nationals from
contracts was a reaction to the revolution, or whether the revolution was,
to some extent, a reaction to the presence and behaviour of the U.S.
government and companies. It may be difficult to prove that the U.S.
companies were individually responsible for any illegal action which
147_ Presidential Orders 12170, November 14,1979 and 12211, April 17,1980; 20 
I.L.M., 1981, pp. 282-3.
148_ The claims which were rejected against Iran were. Loss of Bee Colonies: 
Hoffland Honey Co. v. National Iranian Oil Co.,2 Iran-U.S.C.T.R, January 
26, 1983, p. 41; The Frustration Lease: Queens Office Twoer Associates v.
Iran National Airlines Cofp., 2 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., p. 247.
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aggravated the situation in Iran. Their collective role seems more 
relevant, and when they are associated with the U.S. government, their 
position would change dramatically.
That was the reason that after the revolution, the new regime 
terminated hundreds of major contracts with the United States and began
149to withdraw the assets of Iran from the United States.
In ôrdef to determine whether Iran was responsible for the injuries 
to aliens, it is not be enough to find out whether or not the acts of the new 
regime had broken the chain of causation set in motion by the Shah's 
regime, thus relieving or imposing liability on the new regime. The new 
regime did not represent a continuation of the previous legal, economical 
and political system, but was instead a rebellion against it. What had been 
transferred to the new revolutionary regime of Iran was not transferred 
by means of a peaceful political transfer of power, but rather by means of 
a popular uprising which cost about seventy thousand lives; and the 
consequent conquest was not against an external enemy alone, but against 
an internal enemy which was supported by foreigners. Therefore, any 
application of the traditional rules of expropriation to these takings is 
against the cardinal principles of international law on the right to self- 
determination, which naturally would affect the ruling class of the 
country and their supporters. That this is so is more evident when one 
bears in mind that the West in general and the United States in particular, 
have been holding themselves out, as defenders of democratic values 
throughout the world. This makes it extremely difficult to determine 
whether the Iranian measures were unlawful under international law. It is 
sometimes difficult to find evidence of comprehensive rules of State
Loss of Bee Colonies: Hoffland Honey Co. v. National Iranian Oil Co.,2 
. Iran-U.S.C.T.R, op. cit., p. 92.
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responsibility for expropriating aliens property by relying on Western 
legal s o u r c e s T h e y  have mostly tried to rely on the evident causes for 
the injuries, rather than the basic problems which developing countries 
have been facing.
However, as was evident in the Agreement, the post-revolution 
expropriations in Iran did not take place in the course of a "classical" or 
post-colonial nationalization programme, although they had some of the 
characteristics of those types of nationalizations. The measures were 
carried out to exclude the economic and political influence of some States, 
in particular of the United States. They were designed to reorganize the 
economy of the country and to place it on a new basis. As a consequence, 
as it is evident from the Tribunal's decisions, there were many 
expropriations which were individual expropriations; and a number of 
others formed part of a scheme to take over complete sectors of the 
economy. This equivocal aspect of the measures caused quite a lot of 
confusion with regard to their legal character and the rules which should 
apply to them. This feature of the expropriations qualifies them for 
exceptional treatment in regard to the conditions of expropriation.
> Through the Claims Settlement Declaration, Iran and the United 
States agreed to settle the claims and counterclaims arising inter alia out
151of expropriations or other measures affecting property rights. The 
language of the agreement indicates a distinction between the claims 
arising out of the expropriations and other claims, and the Tribunal 
sometimes has decided on this basis.
Although some of the expropriation cases have been weU argued,
the difficulty arises that the Chambers of the Tribunal have not adopted a
See more about the dependence and partiality of international judges in 
P.A.S.I.L., 1989, pp. 508-529.
151. Article H of the Claims Settlement Agreement, Appendix II, op. cit.
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unified approach to the issues decided by them, and the question of 
expropriation is no exception. The decisions of the Chambers on the 
responsibility of Iran as the host State towards U.S. nationals' property 
and contractual rights are based on different legal grounds, including 
private law on breach of contracts and public law on the sovereignty 
rights to take the property and terminate the contracts concluded between 
the parties to the disputes. Some claims were excluded from the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal or were left to the mercy of the local
152authorities. Those claims decided by the Tribunal followed various 
procedures and, not surprisingly, different results were often reached.
The restriction upon the jurisdiction of the Tribunal indicates that 
treating aliens under municipal law is not against international law. 
The reason for this is that choice of forum clauses are common in trans­
national contracts including those of pre-revolutionary Iran. Therefore, 
the construction of Article II (1) may have widespread i m p o r t a n c e . I n  
1982 the full Tribunal heard nine cases involving 19 different forum 
clauses as "test cases". The United States argued that the term "binding" 
in Article 11(1), read in light of its negotiating history, obliged the 
Tribunal to determine whether such clauses in particular contracts were 
enforceable. The United States contended that they were not, both 
because the Iranian legal system had changed fundamentally, and because 
U.S. claimants could not receive fair treatment in the Iranian courts. The
152_ Para. H of the General Declaration and Article 11(1) of the Dispute Settlement 
Agreement, Appendix II.
163. Article 53 of the Viena Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that, a 
treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory 
norm of general international law.
154_ For a more examined 'choice of forum clauses' see Stein, Jurisprudence and 
Jurist's Prudence: The Iranian-Forum Clause Decisions of the Iran- 
U.S.Claims Tribunal, 78 A.J.I.L., 1984, p. 1.
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Tribunal rejected the U.S. arguments. It held that the word "binding" was 
redundant and did not authorised consideration of the enforceability of 
particular forum c l a u s e s . S o m e  commentators characterized the 
critical element of the Tribunal's analysis as "a presumption of 
incompetence"; the presumption is to the effect that it is not generally the 
task of this Tribunal, or of any arbitral tribunal, to determine the 
enforceability of choice of forum clauses in contracts. The Tribunal was 
reluctant to assume such a task in the absence of a clear mandate to do so 
in the Algiers D e c l a r a t i o n . A s  usual, the Tribunal did not cite any 
authority to support this principle.
There were some expropriation claims which were rejected by the 
Tribunal and distinguished on the basis of a contractual claim for 
damages. In Mobil Oil Iran, the claimants alleged, inter alia, that Iran 
had repudiated a 1973 agreement with a consortium of oil companies for 
the sale and purchase of Iranian oil and, in so doing, had expropriated 
valuable contract rights. The Tribunal rejected this claim, finding instead 
that the parties had agreed to terminate the 1973 agreement and to 
negotiate compensation as a consequence of the termination. Hence, there 
was no expropriation claim, but only a contract claim for damages under
157the new agreement terminating the old one.
In Houston Contracting Co. v. National Iranian Oil Co., the
Tribunal again rejected a large expropriation claim where the claimant
had left valuable equipment in Iran. The Tribunal decided that some of it
had been expropriated, but it dismissed the entire expropriation claim for
Halliburton Co. v. Doreenllmco, 1 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1981-82, pp. 242, 245.
Loc. cit., p. 12.
157- I.A.L.R., July 24, 1987, at 14, 534, 14,554, para. 2.
158- Award 378-173-3,1.A.L.R., August 26, 1988, at 16,176.
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failure to identify the particular equipment that had been expropriated. In 
Motorola, Inc, v, Iran National Airlines Corp., Chamber Three found 
that interference by Iranian officials in the relationship between the 
claimant and its Iranian subsidiary was not factually sufficient to 
constitute a taking; Arbitrator Brower accused the Tribunal of misreading 
the documentary evidence in the record and ignoring the reality of Iran's
159involvem ent. Again in the case Eastman Kodak Co. v. Iran, the
Tribunal concluded, on the basis of the factual situation, that no
expropriation had occurred.^^^
One of the exceptional cases decided by the Tribunal was Amoco
International Finance Corp. v. Islamic. Republic o f Iran, in which
Chamber Three declared that government entities are different from
governments and the contractual obligations undertaken by them do not
bind their governments. Therefore, Iran could expropriate or terminate
the contract without being restricted by the obligations of NPC, as a
government entity toward Amoco. This view was stated despite the
knowledge that NPC had acted as an instrument of the Iranian
Govemment.^^^ The award of the Tribunal was considerably distinctive
in other aspects of the issue too.
The simple individual expropriations of businesses were not
referred to as nationalizations generally, or at least they do not seem to
have been regarded as such. They seem to have been treated as simple
expropriations of an individual nature which were justified because they
were for a public purpose. There were cases, such as takings in the oil
industries, in which the takings resulted from or were part of the takeover
159- Award 373-481-3,1.A.L.R., July 29, 1988, at 16,043, 16,050.
160. Award 329-227/12384-3,1.A.L.R., Dec. 11, 1987, at 15,156.
16L AMOCO International Finance Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award 
310-56-3, 15 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1987 II, p. 189.
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by Iran of entire industries in the course of implementing State control 
over different areas of the economy. However, that was not the sole 
purpose of the takings. The U.S. nationals’ property was expropriated, 
because they were privileged as the result of the U.S. domination in Iran. 
But, the measures were also for public purpose.
(SECTION FOUR)
THE APPLICABLE LAW BEFORE THE IRAN-UNITED 
STATES CLAIMS SETTLEMENT TRIBUNAL
The parties to the Agreement determined that the Tribunal should 
conduct its proceedings in accordance with the arbitration rules of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 
except to the extent modified by the parties or by the Tribunal to ensure 
that the agreement could be carried out.^^^ The UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules are divided into four sections corresponding to the main stages of 
arbitral proceedings.
Section 1 contains, inter alia, provisions dealing with the scope of the 
application of Rules, the method for calculating periods of time under the 
Rules and the contents of the notice of arbitration which marks the 
commencement of the arbitral proceedings.
Section 2 regulates the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal and the
162_ Article 111(2) of the Claims Settlement Agreement,, Appendix II, op. cit.
163_ Articles 1-4 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, The U.N. 
Commission on International Trade Law, op, cit., pp. 137-8.
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number of Arbitrators/^^
Section 3 is concerned with the conduct of the arbitral proceedings/^^ 
Section 4 deals with technical matters concerning the Award, as well as 
with the costs of arbitration/^^
According to Article 33, the law applicable to the merits of the case 
should be clearly distinguished from the law applicable to the arbitral 
proceedings. The law applicable to the arbitration proceedings should be 
the arbitral procedural law of the place of arbitration, unless the parties 
choose another law to be applied.
The UNCITRAL Rules are acceptable in countries with different 
legal, social and economic backgrounds, and provide international 
uniform ity . They are not subject to nationalistic labels and are 
considered as a bridge between the arbitration systems of the common law 
and civil law countries. At the time when the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal was created, the UNCITRAL Rules were new and untested. It is 
said that, by incorporating the UNCITRAL Rules by reference, it has "put 
some meat on the bones".***
164_ Articles 5-14 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, The U.N.
Commission on International Trade Law, op. cit., pp. 138-141.
165_ Articles 15-30 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, The U.N. 
' Commission on International Trade Law, op. cit., pp. 141-5.
166. Articles 31-41 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, The U.N.
Commission on International Trade Law, op. cit., pp. 146-9.
167. McClelenand, International Arbitration, 17 Virg.J.I.L., 1977, p. 729; Bellet
P., Forward, 16 L.p.I.B,, 1984, pp. 671-2.
168- Bellet P., Forward, 16 L.P.I.B., op. cit.
169- Owen R. B., The U.S.-Iranian Hostage Settlement, 75 P.A.S.I.L., 1981, p.
237.
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1 - The Procedural Rules
‘ The Rules of Procedure applied are of prime importance when 
assessing the operation of the tribunal. This work is not concerned with 
the procedural rules of such institutions. However, the rules and 
modifications to UNCITRAL Rules, are related to the way of resolving 
the disputes between the parties and ought to be considered briefly.
One of the rules which might affect the parties to the disputes is any 
party aggrieved by a decision of the tribunal might seek nullification in 
the Dutch courts. Iran attempted to do this in some cases, but withdrew 
the request. This issue gave rise to a controversy as to whether the 
Tribunal's awards were international or Dutch, and what the legal status 
of the Tribunal actually was. The point is fundamental. If the tribunal 
was a creature of Dutch law, the validity of its proceedings and awards 
would have to be determined under Dutch law. Otherwise, the awards 
would take their force from the treaty establishing the Tribunal and the 
Tribunal's actions would be governed by Dutch law only to the limited 
extent that any international organization is subject to the law of the 
country that hosts it. Either procedure would have practical importance 
in determining the extent to which the Tribunal's proceedings might be 
governed by the Dutch rules and, possibly, the manner in which its 
awards might be e n f o r c e d . T h e  considerations supporting the 
applicability of the Dutch Code to the Tribunal's awards are not 
inconsiderable. The tribunal is an arbitral court, and the two countries 
specified The Hague as the place of arbitration in the Claims Settlement
171Declaration.
170- See the comprehensive discusion in this regard in Lake and Dana, Judicial 
Review of Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Are the 
Tribunal Awards Dutch?, 16 L.P.I.B., 1984, pp. 755-812.
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The subject matter of the private claims over which the Tribunal 
has jurisdiction - principally contract and expropriation - are the same as 
those of claims heard by many ad hoc commercial arbitral panels that act 
under national arbitral laws. The difference is that it is not an entity 
called into life by a commercial contract, but is instead an international 
arbitration tribunal established by two States through an international
172treaty. If the Accords specified the Hague only to provide a neutral 
place for the Tribunal’s deliberations, it would be a defect in the 
Agreement which would then have left the parties without any support in 
the event that one of them was justly dissatisfied with the work of the 
Tribunal, However, Iran and the United States had no apparent reason to 
make the Dutch courts the final arbiters of their disputes, particularly 
when they stressed repeatedly that they intend Tribunal awards to be
173final. However, if the Hague District Court had chosen to exercise 
jurisdiction, the challenges filed by Iran would have created serious 
obstacles on the merits.
The tribunal was also to decide on Small Claims, which amounted to 
less than £250,000 and which comprised about 2,795 claims. The
claimants in these cases were not given an equal right to present their
claims to the Tribunal.*^'* The Tribunal made little progress in resolving
these claims and ultimately all of them were settled between the two States
171_ The Accords refer to the Tribunal as an "arbitral” body and to its proceedings 
as "arbitration”. Articles I, 11(1) and VI(1) of the Claims Settlement 
Declaration Appendix H, op. cit.
172- In the Esphahanian Case it was stated that the Claims Settlement Declaiation
and the General Declaration together constitute a treaty under international 
law, 2 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., p. 160.
173- Articles I, IV(1) of the Claims Settlement Agreement; Para. B, Article VII(2) of
the General Declaration; there are similar provisions in the Statute of the 
I.C.J., Articles 23(1), 34(1).
7^4_ Article 3(4) of the Claims Settlement Agreement, Appendix II, op. cit.
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in 1990. In this connection Iran paid a lump-sum amount of $50 million
175to the United States to be distributed among the claimants.
2 - The Governing Law Applied by the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal:
The Claims Settlement Declaration permitted the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal to look to a wide range of sources in order to enable it 
determine the appropriate law to apply. The same provisions were 
accepted as a modification to UNCITRAL Rules to be applied by the 
Tribunal. Article V of the Declaration and the modified rules provide 
that:
"The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, applying 
such choice of law rules and principles of commerce and international law as 
the Tribunal deteimines to be applicable, taking into account relevant usages 
of the trade, contract provisions and changed c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  "^ 76
These provisions appear to have been taken from Article 15 of the
1899 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disiputes which defines the object of international arbitration to be "the
settlement of differences between States by judges of their own choice and
177on the basis of respect for law." The Tribunal has quite a large choice 
of law. As was stated by Bellet, the Tribunal adopted its own procedures 
for determining the appropriate law as to choice of law principles on the 
view that international arbitrators need no longer be bound by strict rules
175- Award No. 483- claims of less than $250,000/86/B38/B76/B77-FT; see Piran
H., Nationalisation of foreign Propert in International Law and Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal, op. cit, p. 178; Tewart D. P., The Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal...., 16 L.P.I.B., 1984, p. 685.
176- UNICTRAL Rules modified by the parties, Y.C.A., vol. VIII, 1983, p. 251.
177- Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899,
U.K.T.S., 1901, No. 9 (Cmd. 798).
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178of conflicts of law. The Tribunal also retained a wide discretion as to 
which rules of law apply to any given issue and this view is supported by 
the reference to "changed circumstances" and the loose terminology 
requiring decisions "on the basis of respect for law". The importance of 
the effects of Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration is that an 
international tribunal which, due to its nature, must apply principles of 
public international law is not barred from applying municipal law or
179resorting to any mechanism found in private international law.
Recourse by an international tribunal to municipal laws and rules of 
private international law is rather common and, sometimes, even 
indispensable. This is so, not because private international law is 
desirable from the point of view of governments, but is a result of the 
defects and inadequacy of public international law. International tribunals 
refer to pertinent rules of municipal law to settle preliminary or 
incidental issues such as the nationality of natural persons, the status of 
heirs, or the conditions of validity of a contract, as well as other 
formalities which must be resolved at an early stage. However, it seems 
that the function of an international tribunal applying municipal law in 
regard to an international issue is different from that of a municipal 
court.
The main issue which an international tribunal is called upon to 
decide is whether the respondent State has complied with its international 
obligations, which question must be settled in light of the principles of 
international law. However, expressions as to the supremacy of 
international law over municipal law in international tribunals should not 
Bellet P., Forward, 16 L.P.I.B., op. cit, pp. 667-74.
Jones D. L., The Iran-U.S. Tribunal: Private Rights and States Responsibility,
24 Virg J.LL. 4, 1984, pp. 259-60.
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be taken to mean that the provisions of domestic legislation are either
irrelevant or unnecessary. The role of domestic rules might be vital to
the working of the international legal machine, and that is one of the ways
to understand and discover a State's legal position on a topic to 
180international law. The necessity for examining the relevant municipal
law was indicated in the Serbian and the Brazilian Loans cases, by the
181Permanent Court of International Justice in 1929. In those cases, the
Court was faced with the problem whether, in its application of municipal
law, it should consider itself bound by, or free to disregard, the decisions
of the national courts in those cases.
The Court stated that:
"Any contract which is not a contract between States in their capacity as 
subjects of international law is based on the municipal law of some 
country"
Moreover, the Court in its decision referred to rules of private
international law and municipal statutes of the Serbian and Brazilian States
as evidence in its judgement.
Similarly, a majority of the claims before the Iran-U.S. Tribunal
have been decided entirely or substantially on the basis of the parties'
contracts. Where there was no contract, or where it did not provide a
sufficient basis for decision, the Tribunal applied other rules. Therefore,
the provisions of Article V of the Agreement do not depart materially
from the usual practice of international courts. The provisions to the
effect that cases should be decided on the basis of respect for law were not
essentially new. They were in fact based upon both Article 37 of the
Hague Convention of October 18, 1907 on the Pacific Settlement of
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., I.C.J. Reports, 1952, p. 93; the position of Iran 
on the question of dual-nationaUty indicates the relevance of municipal laws.
181- P.C.I.J. Sers, A, Nos. 20, 21, pp. 16-49, 101-126.
182- Loc. cit., p. 41.
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International Disputes, by which international arbitration had for its 
object the settlement of disputes between States by judges of their own 
choice and on the basis of respect for law.
Because of practical and political necessity, Iran and the United 
States introduced some broad and imprecise standards to the tribunal 
through the Agreements. When the Claims Settlement Declaration was 
negotiated in 1980-81, the parties to the Agreement could not have agreed 
on any legal system of law or of conflict of laws to govern the claims. 
The task of identifying applicable law, a subject of great complexity and 
importance, was regulated in a single sentence and was left within the
183discretion of the tribunal. The ordinary meaning of the text allowed 
the Tribunal to determine which substantive law be applied without 
reference to any choice of law rules. Under the provisions of the 
International Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
Between States and Nationals of Other States of 1965, an ICSID tribunal 
must decide a dispute in accordance with rules of law agreed upon by the 
parties. If there were no such agreement, the tribunal was to apply the 
law of the contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the 
conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as might be 
applicable. Arbitration under the ICSID or the European Convention is
184authorised by treaty and rests on public law foundations. The rules of 
both ICC Court of Arbitration**^ and UNCITRAL*** have followed the
183_ Owen R, B., The Final Negotiation and Release in Algiers, in American 
Hostages in Iran, (Kreisberg ed.), 1985, p. 297; Crook J. R., Applicable 
Law in International Arbitration: The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Exprience, 
83 A.J.I.L., 1989, pp. 280-81.
184_ ICSID Convention, 575 U.N.T.S., p. 159; 17 U.S.T., p. 1270; European 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, April 21, 1961, 484 
U.N.T.S., p. 364.
185- Article 13(3), 28 I.L.M., 1989, p. 231.
Î
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European Convention approach, allowing broad discretion to the parties.
However, the Tribunal has typically avoided any decision upon the 
actual basis for the application of national rules, even in cases where the 
parties might arguably have agreed on them as the basis of decision. The 
Tribunal has regularly applied non-national principles derived from the 
parties' contracts, general principles of law or public international law. 
To avoid applying particular national law rules, the Tribunal sometimes 
disregarded the principle of party selection of applicable law which is 
fundamental to the ICC and UNCITRAL.
C. M. I. International, Inc, v. Iran involved a claim for breach of
contract arising out of equipment purchase orders that incorporated the
laws of the state of Idaho. The Tribunal decided that it was not bound by
party's choice of law. The Tribunal held:
"It is difficult to conceive of a choice of law provision that would give the 
Tribunal greater freedom in determining, case by case, the law relevant to the 
issues before it. Such freedom is consistent with, and perhaps almost 
essential to, the scope of the tasks confronting the Tribunal, which include not 
only claims of a commercial nature, such as the one involved in the present 
case, but also claims involving alleged expropriations or other public acts, 
claims between the two Governments, certain claims between banking 
institutions, and issues of interpretation and implementation of the Algiers 
Declarations. Thus, the Tribunal may often find it necessary to interpret and 
apply treaties, customary international law, general principles of law and 
national laws, "taking into account relevant usages of the bade, contract 
provisions and changed circumstances", as Article V d i r e c t s " .
The case was subject to the laws of the state of Idaho and, although
the application of the law of that state would have led to the same result in
determining damages, the Tribunal preferred to analyse the damages
188questions in accordance with general principles of law. The Tribunal
IBGj 15 I.L.M., 1976, p. 701; 24 I.L.M., 1985, p. 1302.
187- Award No. 99-245-2, 4 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1983 III, pp. 267-8.
188- Loc. cit., p. 268; see also Bellet, Forward, 16 L.P.I.B., op. cit., p. 674.
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considered that its task was to determine what losses had actually been 
suffered by the claimant and to award compensation on the basis of the 
somewhat nebulous principles of "justice and equity" under customary 
international law, while it did not give detailed analyses or explanations of
189its choices of law. Equally in Craig v. Ministry o f Energy, the 
Tribunal rejected the application of rules of domestic law, stating that
190such a law is not binding on an international tribunal.
However, there are cases in which Tribunal applied national
191laws. Where the Tribunal applied the rules stated in the terms of the 
contracts, application of domestic law as the proper law of the contracts 
was inevitable. In Economy Forms Corp. v. Iran, the Tribunal's award 
was based entirely on national law. The Tribunal held United States law 
governed the contract and its formation, since "the centre of gravity of 
these business dealings was in the United States, that being the test under
192general principles of conflicts of law." A similar analysis was applied 
in Harnischfeger Corp. v. Ministry o f Roads and Transportation which 
involved cranes manufactured and delivered F.O.B. in Iowa. The 
Tribunal Stated:
"The agreement makes no reference to governing law; however, under
general choice of law principles, the law of the United States, the jurisdiction 
with the most significant connection with the transaction and the parties, must 
be taken to govern in this specific case...........
The United States law applicable to this commercial transaction is the Unifonn 
Commercial Code "^ 93
189- Award No. 99-245-2, 4 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., op. cit., pp. 263, 267-68.
190- Award No. 71-346-3; see also Stewart D. P., The Iran-U.S. Claim Tribunal: A
Review of Development 1983-84, 16 L.P.I.B., 1984, p. 713.
191-' Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Iran, 6 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1984 II, p. 149.
192- Economy Forms Corp. v. Iran,3 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1983 II, pp. 42, 48.
193- Harnischfeger Corp. v. Ministry o f Roads and Transportation,! Iran- 
U.S.C.T.R., 1984 III, pp. 90,99.
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3 - Iran-United States Treaty of Amity; Its Application to the
Expropriation Cases Before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
Immediately after the coup d'etat, on 15 August, 1955, Iran and 
the United States signed the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and
194Consular Rights to protect the future of American investments in Iran.
The Treaty dealt, inter alia, with the protection of investment and the
standard of compensation in the event of the expropriation of properties.
The Treaty, among other things, provided that:
" 1- Each High Contracting Party at all times accord fair and equitable 
treatment for nationals and companies of the other High Contracting Party, 
and to their property and enterprises, and shall refrain from applying 
unreasonable or discriminatory measures that would impair their legally 
acquired rights and interests, and shall assure that their lawful contractual 
rights are afforded effective means of enforcement, in conformity with the 
applicable laws.
. 2- Property of nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party, 
including interests in property, shall receive the most constant protection and 
security within the territories of the other High Contracting Party, in no case 
less than that required by international law. Such property shall not be taken 
except for a public purpose, nor shall it be taken without the prompt payment 
of just compensation. Such compensation shall be in an effectively realizable 
form and shall represent the full equivalent of the property taken, and 
adequate provision shall have been made at or prior to the time of taking for 
the determination and payment of t h e r e o f . "^ 95
The position of the Tribunal under the Treaty of Amity varied in
different cases, and the interpretation of the treaty was self-contradictory.
In some cases, the Treaty was considered as valid, prevailing over general
rules,*** while in some others it was considered null and void.
194_ Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights Between Iran and 
the United States, in 284 U.N.T.S., 93; persian text in Official Gazette No.
3589, June 5, 1957 (15 Khordad, 1336).
195- Article IV of the Treaty of Amity, op. cit.
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In the Phelps Dodge case, the Tribunal expressly declared that
Article IV-2 of the Treaty of Amity was clearly applicable at the time the
claim arose and, whether or not the Treaty was still in force, it was a
relevant source of law on which the Tribunal would be justified in relying
197upon in reaching its decisions. Equally in INA Carp, v. Iran, the 
Tribunal took a firm stance and based its decision on the quantum of 
compensation payable to the dispossessed owner entirely on the provisions
of the Treaty in this respect. The Tribunal argued that:
"The continued validity and effect of the Treaty have not been contested by the
Respondent in any of the written pleadings in this case Nor did the
parties invoke any 'changed circumstances' or principles of international law, 
capable of invalidating, suspending or modifying the Treaty, which the 
Tribunal is bound to take into account or apply in all eases according to the
provisions of Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration...................
The Tribunal must therefore assume that for the purpose of the present case 
the Treaty remains binding as it is drafted."
However, the Tribunal did not consider the provisions of the Treaty 
as an extension of the scope of either State’s international responsibility 
beyond those categories of acts already recognized by international law as
199giving rise to liability for taking. Applying the provisions of the
Treaty of Amity, the Tribunal's Chambers, on different occasions, have
produced different interpretations.
Iran denied that the Treaty had any effect with regard to the events
INA Corp. V. The Government of the Islamic Republic o f Iran, Case No. 
184-161-1, 8 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1985 I, pp. 373, 378-79; see also in XI 
Y.C.A., 1986, p. 313.
197- Phelps Dodge Corporation and Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) V. Iran, Award No. 217-99-2, March 19, 1986, 10 Iran- 
U.S.C.T.R., p. 132.
198- Emphasis added, Loc. cit.
199- Loc. cit.
200_ pqj. example see Separate Opinion of Judge Lagergren, the Chairman to 
Chamber 1 on 15 August 1985,
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of 1978-1980. Iran argued that the Treaty terminated on the grounds that
circumstances had changed and that the United States Government had
breached the Treaty by imposing economic sanction against Iran, blocking
Iranian deposits and assets, and intervening to rescue the American
nationals held in Iran in 1980. In other words, Iran considered the Treaty
201terminated by implication. The American claimants, on the other
hand, regarded the Treaty as valid and applicable to the legal relations of
202the parties before the Tribunal,
The Tribunal sometimes avoided reaching a decision solely on the 
basis of the Treaty, referring instead to customary international law as the
203source of applicable standards. For example, in the Sea-Land case,
the Tribunal did not apply the Treaty and stated:
"Aside from any conclusion as to the continued validity or effect of the Treaty
 there is nothing in either Article II or Article IV of the Treaty which
extends the scope of State's international responsibility beyond those 
categories acts alreac^ recognized by international law as giving rise to 
liability for taking.
In some other cases, the Tribunal did not even mention the Treaty
205and based its decisions on customary international law. In yet others,
201- Phelps Dodge Corporation and Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC) V. Iran, Iran-U.S.C.T.R., op. cit., p. 130.
202. jjjg pleadings in the Khemco case, op. cit.. Claimants' Brief of August 2,
1982; see also Memorandum of the Department of State   in Lillich R.
B., Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law, vol. 4, op. cit., 
p. 207.
203- Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA, 6 Iran-U.S.C.T.R.,
1984 II, pp. 219, 225; American In f I Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 4 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1983 III, pp. 96, 105, 109; Starrett Hous. Corp.
V. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., op. cit., pp. 122, 157.
204- Sea land Sevices Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran and Ports and Shipping
Organization o f Iran., Award No. 135-33-1, June 22, 1984, 6 Iran- 
U.S.C.T.R., p. 168.
205- Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton, v. The Islamic Republic o f Iran, 
Award No. 141-7-2, June 29, 1984, 6 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., p. 219.
ÏV" l !
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the Tribunal appeared doubtful whether the Treaty was relevant or 
206applicable at all.
Therefore in some cases, the Tribunal applied the Treaty of Amity 
and its "just compensation" standard, which was sometime interpreted as 
"full",^®^ and at other times as "partial"^^^ compensation. Chamber One S?of the Tribunal applied the Treaty as lex specialis, requiring full
■icompensation equal to the "fair market" value of the expropriated209property. The "fair market" value admitted under the Amity Treaty
was suggested by Lagergren to be not equal to the traditional rule of 
"prompt, adequate and effective" compensation, although modified so as 
to allow partial compensation where a government has nationalized I
-I;
property in the implementation of fundamental and large-scale economic 
reform. : |
‘ However, the legal position of the Treaty of Amity, Economic
Relations and Consular Rights between Iran and United States under the I
Shah's regime clearly should not be defended as a treaty between the two
nations, since it was in fact a reward for the U.S. support and action in
1953 Coup d'etat. Moreover, the fact that the revolution was a popular
one demonstrated that the Shah's regime was not a democratic regime
representative of the Iranian people. Its legitimacy was doubtful, at least
206- American Inf I Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S.C.T.R.,
p. 105. I
207_ Crook J. R., Applicable Law in International Arbitration: The Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal Exprience, 83 A.J.I.L., 1989, p. 301; Separate Opinion of 
Judge Holtzmann, 8 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1985 I, p. 391.
208- Separate Opinion of Judge Lagergren, 8 Iran-U.S.C.T.R,, op. cit., p. 385;
■ Ameli joined in Lagergren's opinion, loc. cit.
209- 8 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1985 I, pp. 378-79; see the summerized in 80 A.J.I.L.,
1986, p. 181.
2^0- Loc. cit. I
a
s
iSi
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since the 1953 Coup d'etat, which brought Shah back to the power.
Therefore, any treaty and contract with such a regime would have been in
violation of the principles of international law.
This uncertainty was indirectly recognized by some Chambers of
the Tribunal by not invoking the Treaty in their judgements. Chamber
Two in the cases of Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-
212A F  F A , A m e r i c a n  Int'l Group, Inc. v. Iran, Starrett Hous.
213Group. V. Iran, did not rely on the Treaty of Amity between the two 
countries as a source of law, but referred to customary international law 
and general principles of law to decide on compensation rights of the 
claimants.
Therefore, with respect to the events in Iran, and the involvement 
of the United States in the country, it seems inequitable to apply the 
provisions of the treaty as a basis for amity and friendly relations between 
Iran and the United States. Any reference to that Treaty as a source of 
international law governing the relations of the parties would be one-sided 
and unacceptable.
4 - A pplication of the C ontracts Rules:
A large majority of the cases, in which there was held to be
jurisdiction, have been decided on the primary or exclusive basis of the
terms of the parties' contracts, without substantial reference to any other
system of law. In this sense, the Tribunal has frequently given the parties
211- Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton, v. The Islamic Republic o f Iran, 
Award No. 141-7-2, June 29, 1984, 6 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1984 II, pp. 219,
225.
American Inf I Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,4 Iran-U.S.C.T.R.,
1983 III, pp. 105, 109.
213- Loc. cit., pp. 122, 157.
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the controlling voice in determining the applicable law. The fundamental 
role assigned to contract has been construed to be the most important 
reason for the limited use of choice-of-law analysis in the Tribunal's 
jurisprudence.^^"*
Contracts do not exist in a vacuum and some systems of law regulate 
their formation, interpretation and implementation. However, the 
Tribunal addressed them in terms of general principles of commercial law 
or public international law. In the Mobil Case, it was declared that the 
Tribunal does not consider it appropriate that such an Agreement be 
governed by the law of one Party. The Tribunal concluded that the 
contract, which was a sale and purchase agreement between a consortium
of Western oil companies and Iran, was governed for most purposes by
215the general principles of commercial and international law.
In the claims involving simple demands for payment in sale 
transactions, choice of law issues rarely arose. The Tribunal was 
generally required to determine simply whether the goods were shipped, 
services performed or payment made. AU legal systems require payment 
for goods and services sold; thus, if default was found, the contract 
standard was applied to establish d a m a g e s . I n  Iran Naf l  Airlines v.
Crook, Applicable Law in International Arbitration: The Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal Exprience, 83 A.J.I.L., 1989, p. 288.
215. Mobil Oil Iran, Inc. v. Iran, I.A.L.R., M y 24, 1987, at 14,543.
216- Endo Laboratories v. Iran, 325-366-3,1.A.L.R., Nov. 13, 1987, at 14,999; 
Exxon Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 322-154-3, I.A.L.R., Nov. 13,
1987, at 15,011; Parguin Private Joint Stock Co. v. United States, 13 Iran- 
U.S.C.T.R., 1986 IV, p. 261; Oil Field of Texas, Inc. v. Iran, 12 Iran- 
U.S.C.T.R., 1986 III, p. 308; McLaughlin Enter., Ltd. v. Iran, 12 Iran- 
U.S.C.T.R., op. cit., p. 146; Litton Sys., Inc. v. Iran, 12 Iran- 
U.S.C.T.R., op. cit., p. 126; Columbia Univ. v. Iran, 10 Iran-U.S.C.T.R.,
1986 I, p. 319; Lischem Corp. v. Atomic Energy Org., 1 Iran-U.S.C.T.R.,
1984 III, pp. 18, 22-23; R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Iran, 1 Iran- 
U.S.C.T.R., op. cit., pp. 181, 190-91; Ram Int,l Indus., Inc. V. Iranian Air
..m
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United S t a t e s , Tribunal explicitly rejected the parties' calls to refer to
national law in analysing simple transactions, The Tribunal stated:
"the Tribunal decides that all questions may be resolved by reference to the 
practice of the Parties and the relevant provisions of the contract"
Similarly in Dames and Moore v. Iran, Chamber Three applied the
term of the contract and stated:
"It is a well established general principle in various legal systems that in 
commercial relationships one party may be obligated to pay another party, 
with which it has been doing business, a sum specified in an invoice if it 
receives the invoice but does not object to it within a certain period of
Some other cases were complex and involved long-term contracts 
whose performance was interrupted in 1978 and 1979. Disputes over 
these contracts were complicated and the Tribunal looked to the terms of 
the contracts in order to determine the parties' legal rights and
219obligations. In Charles T. Main International, Inc. v. K. W. P. A.
220and Richard D. Harza v. Iran cases, the Tribunal had to determine 
whether the companies’ works satisfied the contract standard of good 
engineering practice by referring the cases to engineering experts.
General principles also have been applied to deny effect to contract 
provisions. In Harnischfeger Corp. v. M inistry o f Roads and 
Transportation, Chamber Three found that it is a generally accepted 
principle in various legal systems that an essential error regarding the 
conditions upon which a party has entered into a contract may relieve that
Force, 3 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1983 II, pp. 203, 206; and Intrend Int'l Inc. v. 
Iranian Air Force, 3 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., op. cit., p. 110.
2 1 7 : Nat'l Airlines v. United States, 336-B-12-2, I.A.L.R., Dec. 11, 1987, 
pp. 15, 137, 15, 139.
Dames and Moore v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1983 III, pp. 212, 221.
219_ Charles T. Main International, Inc. v. K. W. P. A., 11 Iran-U.S.C.T.R.,
1986 II, p. 259.
220- Richard D. Harza v. Iran, 11 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1986 II, op. cit., p. 76.
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party from liability, at least where the other party knew or should have
221known about the error.
5 - The Principles of International Law:
The principles of international law which constitute the Tribunal’s
third significant source of law were accepted by the parties as governing
the disputes between the two countries. It has also been inserted in the
provisions of the ICC, ICSID (Article 42), and other institutions, and was
applied by most tribunals as the law governing trans-national contracts.
Examples are the cases of Agip Company v. Popular Republic o f the 
222Co ngo  and Benvenuti et Bonfant v. People's Republic o f the
' 223Congo where the contract did not stipulate a governing law and the 
tribunal applied the principles of international law as well as Congolese 
law. A similar result was reached in the case of Saudi Arabia v. Arabian
224American Oil Company in which the concession contract did not 
specify a governing law and it was provided that the Tribunal should 
decide the dispute in accordance with Saudi Arabian law insofar as 
matters within the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia were concerned, and 
decide in accordance with the law deemed by the Arbitration Tribunal to 
be applicable, insofar as matters beyond the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia
225were concerned. In that case, the Tribunal applied principles of
221- Harnischfeger Corp. v. Ministry of roads and Trasportation, 8 Iran- 
■ U.S.C.T.R., 1985 I, pp. 119, 133.
222_ ^gip Company v. Popular Republic of the Congo, 2 1 1.L.M., 1982, p. 726.
223- Benvenuti et Bonfant v. People's Republic of the Congo, op. cit., p. 752.
224- Saudi Arabia v. ARAM C0,211.L.R.pp. 117, 154.
225- Loc. cit., pp. 168, 194, 212.
Post-Revolution Expropriations 3  4  7
customary international law. Similarly, in the Aminoil Case, the 
Arbitration Tribunal applied public international law, even though the 
Arbitration Agreement did not specify that international law should be
1, J 226appjlied.
The principles of international law are created through the sources 
of international law which themselves are dependent on common consent.
227As was stated in Lotus Case, States are not bound without their
consent, which may be expressed either directly by an express declaration
or conclusion of a treaty stipulating certain rules for the future
international conduct of the parties, or indirectly by conduct which
implies customary submission to certain rules of international conduct.
Reference to principles of international law requires "common consent" as
the binding force and the main source and evidence of international law.
Therefore, the "principles of international law" in the Algiers Agreement
bears the same meaning as that in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. The principles of international law, as
228stated by Dupuy in the Texaco v. Libya, include general principles
of law with elements of international custom and practice which are
accepted by the law of nations. The Permanent Court of International
Justice in the Lotus Case defined the principles of international law to
mean international law as it is applied between all nations belonging to the
community of States.
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal is undoubtedly entitled to apply
international law, as was agreed by the parties to the Agreement. The
Tribunal in cases No. 2 and 7 based their decisions on international law
226_ Aminoil Case,66 I.L.R., pp. 561, 587, 591.
Lotus Case, P.C.I.J.,1927, No. 10, Ser. A, P. 16.
228- Texaco v. Libya, 53 I.L.R., 1977, p. 452.
229- Lotus Case, op. cit., P.C.I.J.
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230and customary international law. In Oil Field o f Texas, Inc. v. Iran, 
the Tribunal stated that the controlling rules had to be derived from 
principles of international law applicable in analogous circumstances or
231from general principles of law. It was added:
" The development of international law has always been a process of applying 
such established legal principles to circumstances not previously 
encountered.
In  Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton  v, TAMS-AFFA,
233American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Iran, and Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Iran., 
the Tribunal referred to customary international law as the source of 
applicable law in assessing the required compensation.
The role of public international law reflects the Tribunal's unique 
mixed jurisdiction, embracing both inter-State disputes governed by this 
body of rules, and Iranian or U.S. nationals' claims against the other 
Government arising out of debts, contracts, expropriations or other 
measures affecting property rights.^^"*
In practice, the Tribunal has comfortably applied both public 
international law and private law (and often the two together). Iran has 
contended that U.S. nationals' claims come before the Tribunal only
235through diplomatic espousal by the United States. According to Iran,
the Tribunal's jurisdiction was limited to claims arising under public
230- See survey of Awards in X Y.C.A., 1985, p. 192.
231. Oil Field of Texas, Inc. v. Iran, 1 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1981-82, pp. 347, 361.
232- Oil Field of Texas, Inc. v. Iran, 1 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., op. cit., pp. 347, 361.
233- Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA, 6 Iran-U.S.C.T.R.,
1984 II, pp. 219, 225; American Int'l Group, Inc. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S.C.T.R,,
. 1983 III, pp. 96, 105, 109; Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Iran, 4 Iran- 
U.S.C.T.R., op. cit., pp. 122, 157,
234- Article 11(1) of the Claims Settlement Agreement, op. cit.
235_ Dessenting Opinion of Member M. Kashani regarding Order of 15 Decmber 
1982, 1 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1981-81, pp, 455, 463, 465.
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international law and the Tribunal itself was subject to rules applicable to 
diplomatic protection and espousal. The Tribunal did not agree.
In the Case of Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic o f 
Iran, Ports and Shipping Organization o f Iran, the Tribunal considered 
an argument in which the claimant corporation invoked rights under 
customary and conventional international law of which it asserted it was 
the beneficiary. The Tribunal ruled that, on the facts of the case, no 
expropriation had taken place which contravened the concepts and 
standards of customary international law or those of the Treaty of Amity, 
Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States and
237Iran. Bockstiegel, the Chairman of the Tribunal, stated that no
information or comments had been received to the effect that a choice of
law clause in the contract which governs public international law on the
contractual relationship should not be respected. He continues that:
"In fact arbitration practice, especially with regard to investment contracts, 
shows that arbitrators have accepted such a choice and decided on that 
, basis.
All these cases and international practice indicates that there is 
general agreement that international law should be applied to 
expropriations of aliens property, but still it does not solve the problem of 
the norms by which international law can be asserted. The expressions 
are general without saying how they reached that conclusion. A general 
observation concerning the Iran-U.S. Tribunal's decisions indicates that, 
in applying customary international law, each Chamber has adopted quite
239different approaches. Meanwhile, the effects and results of
236_ jj-(m United States, Case A 21, 14 fran-U.S.C.T.R., 1987 I, pp. 324, 330.
237_ Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Iran, 6 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., p. 149; 25 I.L.M., 1986, 
pp. 619-629.
238. Bockstiegel K., Arbitration and State Enterprises, 1984, p. 33.
239. Crook, Applicable Law in International Arbitration: The Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal Exprience, 83 A.J.I.L., p. 302.
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international judicial and State practice are varied and confusing.
6 - Principles of Commercial Law:
It is not clear, that by inserting "principles of commercial" law as 
the rule to be applied by the Tribunal, whether the parties intended to 
apply international commercial law or domestic commercial law. The 
increasing expansion of modem international trade and its complexity 
have made co-operation at an international level not only desirable but 
essential to the free flow of trade among nations. Much has been achieved 
by the establishment of free trading associations such as the EEC or 
BETA, and by the harmonization of trade law by international 
conventions and agreements such as GATT, and by model codes produced 
by international organizations such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC). However, there are many different opinions as to the 
existence and character of the law of international trade. But it is 
believed that the concept of lex Mercatoria comprises the rules which 
have been developed to regulate and facilitate intemational trade relations 
and the customs and practices which have been achieved universal, or at 
least very extensive, recognition in intemational trade. Some of these 
mles are general, others relate to specific areas of commerce.^"*^ 
Accordingly, it was for to the arbitrators to decide which law is common 
to most of the States and includes all legal systems.
Some writers believe that the attraction of the notion is the personal 
views of an arbitrator which is unknown to the parties at the time when
240- Lew J. D., Applicable Law in Interantional Commercial Arbitration, 1978, p.
436.
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the contract is made.^"*  ^ The impartiality of intemational arbitrators is 
under serious doubt. The least that can be said is that an arbitrator, as an 
individual, inevitably belongs to a legal system and presumably and
242naturally favours one legal system more than others. Therefore, the
result of arbitrations could be different from what the parties to the 
agreement intended to achieve.
Numerous sources have been mentioned for modem lex mercatoria 
which cover nearly all area of private and public intemational law, and
, 243they are:
1. Public intemational law;
2. Uniform laws, such as the Uniform Law on the Sale of Goods of 
1964,^ "*"* or the Convention on Contracts for the Intemational Sale of 
Goods of 1980;
3. The general principles of law which have been adopted by nations and 
trading customs.
4. The laws of intemational organizations such as the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, or the Organization of Economic 
Co-operation and development (OECD).
5. Custom and usage of intemational commerce such as intemationally 
used commercial terms.
6. Standard form contracts such as general conditions for the supply of 
plant and machinery for export.^"*^
241- Mustill M. J. and Boyd C., The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in
England, 1982, p. 611.
242- The Difference of the judgements in the Libyan expropriation cases is a good
example.
243- Lew J. D., Applicable Law in Interantional Commercial Arbitration, op. cit., p.
442.
244- Loc. cit., p. 443.
245- Lew J. D., Applicable Law in Interantional Commercial Arbitration, op. cit., p.
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7. Arbitration awards.
Under these sources of law, an arbitrator would have a wide range of 
choices and could apply more flexible rules of law. However, these rules 
have developed in the area of trade and commerce. How can one use 
them as applicable to the law of expropriation?
Moreover, the conflicts between these sources has remained 
unsolved, and there is not a unified position on this rule. In English law, 
doubts have been expressed as to whether a lex mercatoria even exists, in 
the sense of an intemational commercial law, divorced from any other 
law; or at least there are doubts as to whether it exists in any sense useful 
for the solving of commercial disputes.^ "***
There is a further confusion over the acceptance of the principle by 
the disputing parties, Iran and the United States. Iranian business law 
prior to the 1978-79 revolution was fundamentally a Western code. In 
addition to the Civil Code of 1927-32, there were several other codes and 
statutes covering the various aspects of commercial law operating in Iran 
prior to the revolution 1979 which were derived from the ’Code 
Napeleon' and other European, i.e. German, codes. The Westernization
247of law meant the adoption of European models. That process of law
had encouraged nationals of the Western countries, particularly of the
United States, to invest in Iran.
, After the revolution of 1979, there was a major restructuring of the
entire legal system, which affected all aspects of public and private law,
including commercial law. Whatever changes they brought to the legal
248system of Iran, except the explicit terms mentioned in the Agreement, 
456.
246- Mustill M. J. and Boyd C., The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in 
England, op. cit., p. 611.
247_ Amin S, H., Commercial Law of Iran, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
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it was not applied by some Chambers of the tribunal.
One of the significant principles which the Tribunal resorted to was 
that of "unjust enrichment". The principle was cited in Ultrasystems Inc, 
V. Iran Case, in which Ultrasystems claimed for work performed at 
Iran's request. The parties disputed whether it fell within the scope of 
their contract. The Tribunal held that "the request for work, and the 
performance provided pursuant to that request, rendered Isiran 
[Information Systems Iran] liable at least in quantum meruit, without
249regard to the contract." The principle was further explored in Isaiah
250V. Bank Mellat. Isaiah claimed that Bank Mellat had been unjustly 
enriched by receiving his funds in exchange for a dishonored cheque. 
The Tribunal, citing a comparative law study of unjust enrichment, the 
Iranian Civil Code, Whiteman's Digest and a treatise on public 
international law, determined that unjust enrichment was a general 
principle of law and, it could thus be applied. The Tribunal added that 
there was no reason to believe the result would be different if only
251Iranian law were applied. Similarly, in the case Sea-Land Service, 
Inc. V. Iran, the Tribunal found that unjust enrichment had been codified 
or judicially recognized in the great majority of municipal legal systems 
of the world, and was widely accepted as having been assimilated into the 
catalogue of general principles of law to be applied by intemational 
Tribunals.
, However, there were cases in which the Tribunal rejected claims
248- Article II of the Claims Settlement Agreement, op. cit.
249. Ultrasystems Inc. v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S.C.T.R, 1983 I, pp. 100, 111.
250- Isaiah v. Bank Mellat, 2 Iran-U.S.C.T.R, 1983 I, op, cit., p. 232.
251- Loc. cit., p. 237.
252- Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Iran, 6 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1984 II, pp. 149, 168; X
Y.C.A., 1985, p. 250.
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based upon the principle of unjust enrichment. For example, in the recent
253case of Lockheed Corp. v. Iran, the Tribunal held that prudent 
businessmen would not have continued to provide benefits in the 
circumstances involved.
7 - The Principle of Force M ajeure:
As was expected in the aftermath of the revolution, many contract
claims involving pleas of excuse for non-performance. The pleas have
come from both sides, from contractors wishing to be excused for not
having completed their contracts, and from Iran as an excuse for not
making payments in accordance with contractual provisions, and for
ending contracts which was found not in its interest. In most of the cases
the excuse pleaded was that of force majeure, and the Tribunal has found
the principle of force majeure and changed circumstances to be general
principles of law applicable even to contracts that did not contain clauses
providing for them.^^"*
However, beyond the findings as to what constitutes fo r c e
m a jeu re  conditions', the Tribunal's awards have varied in their
determination of the consequences of these conditions for the contract.
Lockheed Corp. v. Iran, 367-829-2,1.A.L.R., June 24, 1988, at 15,887.
254_ Mobil Oil Iran Inc. and Mobil Sales ans Supply Corporation v. The 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the National Oil Co. Award 
, No. 311-74/76/81/150-3, July 14, 1987, 16 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 1987III, p. 3; 
Anaconda-Iran Inc. v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
the National Iranian Copper Industries Company, 13 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 1986 
IV, PP. 199, 211; see also Crook, Applicable Law in International 
Arbitration: The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Exprience, 83 A.J.I.L., op. cit., 
pp. 278, 293.
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What has been described as an "expansive view" of the existence and
255consequences of force majeure was taken in Gould Marketing Case.
In that case the Tribunal held Ûmt force majeure conditions prevailing in 
Iran during 1978-79 justified non-performance by both parties. This 
view was stated by the Tribunal, although the claimant and the respondent 
each denied the existence of force majeure conditions excusing the 
other's performance. The Tribunal also observed that a suspension of the 
parties' obligations could not continue indefinitely and found that by mid- 
1979 neither party could realistically hope for resumption of the other’s 
performance. Accordingly, the Chamber Two concluded that the 
continued existence of force majeure conditions had, by mid-1979, 
ripened into a termination of the contract.
Revolution as force majeure was recognized in numerous cases 
where the Tribunal, dealing with the question of remedy, decided that, 
"the loss must lie where it falls, i.e. unless the contract itself provides 
otherwise, the losses should be allocated equitably between the parties in 
proportion to the amount of performance completed to the date of 
termination
On the question whether an event had occurred, or circumstances
had changed, which gave rise to an excuse for non-performance, the
Tribunal has repeatedly declared that the revolutionary conditions that
255. Gould Marketing Inc. v. Ministry of National Defence of Iran, 3 Iran 
U.S.C.TR. 1983 n, p. 147 and 6 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 1984 II, p. 272; see also 
the summerised text in 77 A.J.I.L., 1983, pp. 893-95.
256- Loc. cit.
257- Gould Marketing Inc. v Ministry of National Defence o f Iran, 3 Iran- 
U.S.C.T.R., 1983 II, p. 154; Cumputer Science Corp. v. The Government
. of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1986 I, p. 289; 
International Schools Services, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 14 
Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1987 I, p. 75; see more in Westberg J. A., Contract 
Excuse in Intemational Business Transactions: Awards of the Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal, ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, p. 222.
s
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existed in Iran in late 1978 and early 1979 amounted to force majeure. 
The drawing of an analogy between the revolution and mob violence and 
the paying of scant regard to the cause and the aims of the revolution on 
the part of the Tribunal resulted in findings to the effect that those 
conditions existed only for a limited period of time. In the G ould
258Marketing Case which involved a contract for the supply of radios 
and related services to the Iranian Ministry of Defence, Chamber Two 
rejected the parties' reciprocal claims of breach and instead concluded that 
the force majeure conditions in Iran had broad consequences. The 
Tribunal applied a general principle that it found in the laws of the United 
States, the United Kingdom and France, and decided that pervasive and 
long-lasting force majeure conditions obtained in Iran and had rendered
259performance impossible. Consequently, the Tribunal found that the 
contract was ended by mid-1979 because of fmstration or impossibility of 
performance. The Tribunal, offering a definition of force majeure in 
the context of a revolution, found that such conditions existed in the major 
cities of Iran as of December 1978. By force majeure the Tribunal 
meant:
" social and economic forces beyond the power of the state to control
through the exercise of due diligence. Injuries caused by the operation at such 
forces are therefore not attributable to the state for purposes of its responding 
for damages. Similarly, as between private parties, one party cannot claim 
against the other for injuries suffered as a result of delays in or cessation of 
performance during the time force majeure conditions prevail, unless the 
existence of the conditions is attributable to the fault of the respondent 
party.
258- Gould Marketing Inc. v. Ministry of National Defence of Iran, 3 Iran- 
U.S.C.T.R., op. cit., pp. 152-3,
259- Gould Marketing Inc. v. Ministry of National Defence of Iran, 6 Iran- 
U.S.C.T.R., p. 274.
260- Loc. cit.
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Similarly in the General Dynamics Telephone case a contract 
with the Ministry of Defence to install military communications 
equipment at remote air force bases in Iran was found to have been 
interrupted by force majeure conditions in Iran, which existed from 
"November 1978 to mid-1980," preventing the return of American 
personnel to Iran. When the claimants in this case terminated for force  
majeure pursuant to a clause in the contract, the Ministry of Defence 
argued that no force majeure conditions existed at the remote sites where 
the contract work was to be performed. The Tribunal rejected the 
Ministry's argument.^^^
The question was not as simple as the Tribunal considered it to be. 
It was not only force majeure which had compelled the parties to cease 
performance, but also frustration of purpose. The United States, as a 
major supporter of the deposed Shah, was no longer willing to strengthen 
the new regime by performance of some contracts, especially those in the 
military sector. Equally the U.S. was no longer considered a friend of 
Iran which ought to be trusted to have access to military secrets of the 
country. One of the most evident cases is Touche Ross, in which the 
force majeure question arose in the context of a contract between an 
American accounting firm and the Iranian Air Force under which the 
accounting firm had contracted to furnish auditing services for the IBEX 
project, a major undertaking of the Shah's government intended to
263modernize the Air Force's electronic intelligence gathering system.
261- General Dynamic Telephone Systems Center, Inc. and General Dynamics 
International Corp. v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 
Telecommunications Co. of Iran and Bank Melli Iran, 9 Iran-U.S.C.T.R.
1985 II, p. 153.
262. Loc. cit., pp. 159-60.
263_ pouche Ross <Sc Co. v. The Islamic Republic Of Iran, 9 Iran-U.S.C.T.R.,
. 1985 II, p. 284.
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Almost all of the contractors services were to have been performed not in
Iran but in the United States using information supplied by the several
IBEX contractors that Touche Ross was auditing. Therefore, any plea to
force majeure as the main reason of frustration of the contract would
have been incompatible with the concept as used in municipal and
intemational laws.
In International Schools Services, Inc, v. National Iranian Copper
Industries Co., the Tribunal found on its own motion ûmi force majeure
conditions in the vicinity of the Sar-Cheshmeh copper mine fmstrated a
contract to operate a school there. As a result, the Tribunal found that
both sides were excused from further contract performance, and that
losses incurred after termination remained where they fell.^^^
There are other cases in which a different view of force majeure
was taken. In Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v. Iran, the Tribunal
emphasized that force majeure defences "must always be analysed in the
context of the circumstances causing force majeure, taking into account
the- particular party affected by those circumstances and the specific
obligations that party is prevented from performing."
While in many cases, and in the cases heard before the Tribunal in
particular, governments have been held responsible for the actions of the
entities or even companies controlled by them, in Blount Bros. Corp. v.
Iran, the Tribunal applied/crce majeure when a State-controlled entity
was prevented from contract performance by the government's actions.
Starting with a premise that the separation between a State and its
controlled enterprises should be respected, the Tribunal held that acts of a
264_ International Schools Services, Inc. v. National Iranian copper Industries Co.,
9 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1985 II, p. 272.
265_ Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic o f Iran, 8 Iran- 
. U.S.C.T.R., 1985 I, pp. 298, 309.
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State’s Other public authorities may constitute force majeure shielding the 
State's enterprise.
In different judgements of the Tribunal, one reality was not taken 
into account and that is that, in most of the contracts concluded between 
Iran and U.S. companies, either party, or sometimes both parties, had no 
will to continue with the contract. That was the natural result of the 
attitude of both parties towards each other. This missing element played a 
significant role in termination of the contracts, but it was given no weight 
by Tribunal.
8 - Usage of Trade and Contracts:
The further norms which were taken into account by the Agreement
267were usages of the trade and contract provisions. These norms are 
common to almost all legal systems. They appeared in Article 33(3) of 
UNCITRAL Rules, in Article VII of 1961 European Convention and 
Article 13(5) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration. Equally important as a 
source of contractual obligations in commercial contracts are the 
unwritten customs and usages of merchants in particular trades. It is this 
feature of contract terms which distinguishes commercial contracts from 
other contracts. Oppenheim distinguishes between custom and usage 
which are used synonymously but have different m e a n i n g s . C o n t r a r y  
to the meaning of 'custom', usage is a habit of doing certain actions, 
without the existence of a conviction that these actions are, according to
Blount Bros. Corp. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 Iran-U.S.C.T.R.,
1986 I, pp. 56, 75.
267. Article V of the Claims Settlement Agreement, op. cit.
268- Lauterpacht, Oppenheim, International Law, op. cit., p. 26.
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international law, obligatory or right. Trade usages constitute an 
important aspect of intemational custom and thus of the law merchant. 
Professor Schmitthoff defines trade usages as a part of intemational
269custom, and Professor Goldman refers to it as the "essential element of 
270lex mercatoria " According to Professor Goode, trade usages are of 
cardinal importance. In his opinion, the impact of unwritten customs and 
usages of merchants on the content and interpretation of contract terms 
cannot be overstated. It is perhaps this feature which distinguishes
271commercial contracts from other contracts.
' However, there are writers who have rejected both 'trade usage' and
272'commercial custom' as a legal source in a technical sense. As 
international trade has two sources, intemational legislation and 
intemational trade usages, there has been the attempt to describe the latter 
as an 'autonomous law' which functions independently of municipal law 
and encompasses mles which have been accepted by businessmen engaged
273in the practice of intemational commercial trade. Goldstajn points out 
that this autonomous commercial law is a body of mles not made by 
legislators but arising out of business practices within the framework set 
up by municipal law.^ "^*
269- Cheng Chia-Jui, Clive M. Schmitthoff s Select Essays on Interantional Trade
Law, London, 1988, pp. 206, 220.
270- Goldman B., "Lex Mercatoria" in Forum Int., London, 1983, pp. 3-6.
271- Goode R. M., Commercial Law, (Harmonsworth), 1982, pp. 36, 40.
272- Horn N., "Uniformity and Diversity in the Law of International Commercial
Contracts" in N. Horn and C. M. Schmitthoff, (eds.). The Transnational Law 
of International Commercial Transactions, Deventer, 1982, p. 15.
273- Goldstajn A., Reflections on the Structure of the Modern Law of International
Trade, in P. Sarcevic, International Contracts and Conflicts of Laws, 
London, 1990, pp. 14-22.
274- Loc. cit., p. 18,
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Thus, while the application of an intemational convention which has 
been incorporated into municipal law may depend on the will of the 
parties, and while the parties have extensive freedom of contract, the 
usage of trade becomes increasingly controversial in the changing 
intemational commercial law and practice. Moreover, there is not a 
unified usage of trade practiced in intemational commercial relations, 
which is in some degree manifested in the GATT and practiced in 
countertrade transactions. The traditional law and usages have not always 
been the same as the living law which focuses on those legal norms which 
are part of the social life of the community and can be enforced in
275practice.
‘ However, the Iran-U.S. Tribunal has relied on trade usage and 
practice on a few occasions. In the case of American Bell International 
V. Iran the Tribunal held that the parties should consider providing 
material, including evidence of custom and usage, to assist the Tribunal in 
making a determination.^^^
In the case of Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat the Tribunal applied the 
usage of trade and concluded that under the law of New York, "a bank 
that draws a cheque is responsible to ensure that sufficient funds are 
available in the bank on which the cheque is written to cover the cheque". 
Application of such a usage to the post-revolutionary situation of Iran is 
questionable. The Tribunal is right that trade usage which is based on
277cu&tomary intemational law obliges a bank to be sure that there are
275- Schmitthoff C. M„ Commercial Law in a Changing Economic Climate, 2nd 
edition., London, 1981, p. 15 
276_ American Bell International v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 6 Iran- 
U.S.C.T.R., 1984, p. 97.
277_ Nasser Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat, 2 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1983, p. 168; see 
also Geneva Convention on Bill of Exchange of 1932, Uniform Law on
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sufficient funds available to cover the cheque, but such a bank is 
functioning under the normal condition of a bank in New York, and not 
amid the mayhem and disorder of post-revolutionary Iran, The same 
banks under the laws of New York had already acted against that law and 
the U.S. Constitution, when they froze the Iranian Assets without any
. r  278payment of compensation.
The practice and the attitude of revolutionary Iran is manifested in 
the post-revolution contracts. For example, in the case of Talbot U.K. it 
was agreed that both the procedural and governing law of the contract be 
the relative law of Iran, and the place of the arbitration would be in 
Teheran, More importantly, the umpire (the third arbitrator) might not 
be a national who bears the nationality of either Iran or the United 
Kingdom. Nor could he be a national of the British Commonwealth 
countries; nor a national of a member State of the European Economic 
Community; or a national of the United States of America. The other 
proposal was that the disputes be settled by way of resorting to Public
279Courts in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
9 - The Impact of Changed Circumstances:
By inserting the provisions "changed circumstances", the parties to 
the Agreement followed quite different aims. For the United States, it 
was added specifically to authorize the Tribunal to disregard Iranian Law 
‘ Cheques, Art. 12.
278. Iranian Assets were not admitted to be used by Iran while they were not 
compensated.
279. Amin S. R , Commercial Law of Iran, op. cit., pp. 100-101.
; :43:
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280that might give effect to an Iranian forum clause. For Iran, it meant a
change of responsibility toward the claims which arose against it.
One of the main elements involved in nullification or frustration of
the contracts between Iran and the U.S. companies was the changed
cirçumstances created by the 1979 revolution in Iran. It is a fundamental
principle, which most of the developed legal systems have provided in
some measure, for relief from contractual obligations whose strict
enforcement appears impossible or unjust in light of a fundamental change
281in circumstances. The rules of particular legal systems vary in
approach with regard to this question. In English law, it is titled as
frustration and the United States Uniform Commercial Code has
addressed the question as "commercial impracticability". In French law,
it is based on the doctrine of 'imprecision' and in international law the
282concept is known as rebus sic stantibus,
"Frustration" or "implied conditions" in common law countries or 
the theory of the "foundation of the contract" in German and Swiss law
283are examples of the operation of the concept. All these rules provide
that in limited circumstances, relief from the literal purport of contractual
obligations may be afforded in case of a fundamental change of
circumstances. There is a similar concept in the Iranian Civil Code when
the performance or the commercial aims which the parties had in mind at
the time of the conclusion of the contract are defeated through no fault of
280. Crook J. R., Applicable Law in International Arbitration: The Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal Exprience, 83 A.J.I.L., p. 282,
281- Smit H., Frustration of Contract, A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation, 58 
Columbia Law Review, 1958, p. 287; Treitel G. H., An Outline of the Law 
of Contract, 4th ed., 1989, pp. 298-311.
282. See generally Cattan H., The Law of Oil Concessions in the Middle East and 
‘ North Africa, 1967, p. 74.
283- Treitel G., An Outline of the Law of Contract, op. cit., p. 298.
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284their own, but by force of supervening events and circumstances.
There is no doubt that the situation at the time of the conclusion of 
contracts was changed fundamentally by the revolution in Iran so that 
Western companies in general and U.S. companies in particular were no 
longer encouraged to make contracts with Iran. Performance of the 
contracts became impossible and a new condition was implied. It seems 
generally acceptable that the unforeseen termination or prevention of a 
contract by reason of the destruction of the subject-matter or other 
common ground forming the basis of the agreement would frustrate that 
contract. There were many contracts between Iran and U.S. nationals 
which were unforeseen for the parties to the agreements at the times of 
the conclusion. As was also stated in Doherty v. Mornoe Eckstein
285Brewing Co, the principal purpose of contracts was completely 
frustrated by the revolution and that frustration was almost total.
In Starrett Housing Corporation v. The Government o f the Islamic 
Republic o f Iran^^^ the corporation and two of its wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, Starrett Systems Inc., and Starrett Housing Intemational Inc, 
assorted claims on their own behalf and on behalf of foreign corporations 
controlled by them against the respondents for damages alleged to have 
been suffered due to events which occurred in the course of the 
development of a large housing project in Iran. In this regard, the 
Tribunal stated that, the claimants assert that the effects of what is 
referred to as "virulent anti-American and other policies and actions of 
the Revolutionary Group and Islamic Republic" both before and after the
284. Ai'tlcle 229 of the Civil Code of Iran.
285. 198 App. Div., 708, 191 N.Y.S. 59 (ist Dept. 1921).
286_ Starrett Housing Corporation et. al. v. The Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran et. al. Award No. ITL 32-24-1, December 19, 1983, in 4 
Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1983, p. 122.
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establishment of the new Government rendered it impossible for Starrett 
to continue operation at the project, and that this amounted to an unlawful 
expropriation under general principles of international law and under the 
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the 
United States of America and Iran of 15 August 1955. Thus, the 
claimant's argument was that they were deprived of the effective use, 
control and benefits of their property rights in the project much earlier 
than by the end of January 1980. The Court stated that, there was no 
reason to doubt that events in Iran prior to January 1980, to which the 
Claimants referred, seriously hampered their possibilities to proceed with 
the construction work and eventually paralysed the project. Nevertheless, 
investors in Iran, like investors in aU other countries, had to assume a risk 
that the country might experience strikes, lockouts, disturbances, changes 
of the economic and political system and even revolution. That any of 
these risks materialized did not necessarily mean that property rights 
affected by these events could be deemed to have been taken. According 
to the Tribunal, a revolution as such did not entitle investors to 
compensation under international law. Considering the events prior to 
January 1980, the Tribunal did not find that any of those events 
individually or taken together could be said to amount to a taking of the
287claimant's contractual right and shares. The Tribunal accepted that the 
revolutionary conditions in Iran created frustration, and the Iranian 
government was held not to be responsible for the aims of the revolution 
expressed through the revolutionary process, but for the acts of the 
popular movement and insurgent people in the course of the revolution in 
Iranwhich was tantamount to force majeure. Accordingly, it is 
irrelevant that victorious rebel movements are responsible for illegal acts 
Starrett Hous. Corp. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, op. cit., pp. 155-6.
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or omission by their forces occurring during the course of the conflict.
More irrelevant still is their responsibility for the illegalities of the
288previous government. The concept of changed circumstances 
introduced in Article V of the Claims Settlement Agreement is important, 
particularly in light of the period of revolution in Iran.
There is no definition of "changed circumstances" in the declaration 
to indicate whether the concept is used as an international principle or as 
principle common, to civilized nations. It must be judged by the 
Tribunal according to law ' which is vague and controversial. The 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties do not seem
289be applicable to contracts other than those between the two States. 
Those contracts in dispute between Iran and the U.S. nationals were not 
international treaties. They were the subject of the Treaty of Amity 
concluded by Iran and the United States. However, it is clear that the 
principle of "changed circumstances" in both fields of law, private and 
international, lead to the termination or withdrawal from a treaty or 
contract.
290As was stated in Fisheries Jurisdiction case, a fundamental
change in the circumstances which induced the parties to accept a treaty, if
it resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations
imposed by that treaty, might, under certain conditions, afford the party
affected a ground for invoking the termination or suspension of the
treaty. Moreover the Court stated that the traditional view is that the
change of circumstances to be effective must be regarded as fundamental
288_ Brownlie L, Principles of Public International Law, op. cit., pp. 446, 451,
453.
289- Article 61 "imposibility of performance" and Article 62 "change of 
circumstances" of the Viena Convention on the Law of Treaties,
290- Fisheries Jurisdiction case, I.C.J. Reports, 1973, pp. 19-20.
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or vital, and, according to the provisions of the Vienna Convention, the 
doctrine may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing 
from a treaty if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the
2 9 1party invoking it. The Court ruled out the responsibility that change 
in the law may under certain conditions constitute valid grounds for
2 9 2invoking a change of circumstances affecting the duration of treaty. It 
should be noted that, when a treaty is not terminated under the doctrine, 
that treaty will still be interpreted by the tribunal in the light of changes 
in international law itself. This is a basic mle of treaty interpretation that 
is well established, as reflected in the work of the Institute de Droit 
International, in the provisions of the Vienna Convention of the Law of
2 9 3Treaties and in decisions of the International Court of Justice.
Moreover in Tyrer Case the European Court of Human Rights 
stated:
"The Court must also recall that the Convention (i. e. the European 
Convention on Human Rights) is a living instrument which, as the 
Commission rightly stressed, must be interpreted in the light of present day
c o n d i t i o n s " . ^ 9 4
Schwarzenberger, criticizing the view of the International Court of 
Justice that the Vienna Convention may be relied upon in that case in so 
far as they reflect customary international law, stated that:
291- Loc. cit., p. 33; Article 62(2) of the Viena Convention on the Law of Treaties.
292- Loc. cit., p. 32.
293- Article 31(3)(c) of the Viena Convention; 1 Annuaire de l’institut de Droit
International, 1975, p. 537; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case,l.CJ.,
1978, p. 33, the International Court of Justice stated that, "The Court is of the 
' opinion that the expression in reservation(d) "dispute relating to the territorial 
status of Greece must be interpreted in accordance with the rules of 
international law as they exist today not as they existed in 1931".
294. Tyrer Case, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement of 25th April 
1973, p. 18.
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"In a swiftly changing world, the dynamic principle underlying the "Causula" 
has much to recommend itself, yet, in the absence of an automatic decision by 
an impartial organ on all the issues involved, the "Causula" is open to abuse 
as a handmaid of evading compliance with burdensome treaty obligations. 
Although the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties has not made 
. provision for any such decision with binding force, it has tried to discourage 
abuse by formulating the "Causula" rule in negative terms and laying down a 
procedure for its invocation (Articles 62 . 63 and 66)"^95
The changes in Iran, contrary to the contention of the Court in the
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case^^^ did not increase the burden of the
obligations to be fulfilled, in comparison with those originally undertaken
by the parties, but made the performance of the Treaty and the contracts
practically impossible.
In the case of Questech Inc. v. Iran, the claim arose out of a
contract that was part of a project to modernize and expand Iran's
electronic intelligence gathering system. The claimant asserted ûidX force
m ajeure  conditions arising out of the Islamic Revolution in Iran
prevented it from fulfilling its contractual obligations. The Tribunal held
that in fact the Iranian Government had made a deliberate policy decision
not to continue with the American contractors in a project that related to
secret military intelligence operations. The Tribunal admitted that Iran
had a right to terminate the contract under the doctrine of changed
circumstances, but concluded that the consequence of the termination of
the contract was that the respondent would be obliged to compensate the
297claimant who had suffered from such a termination. With regard to a
contract which related to a highly secret intelligence system and a highly
sensitive military field, neither of the parties would be able to continue
295. Schwarzenberger and Brown, A Manual of International Law, 1976, p. 139.
296_ Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, I.C.J. Reports, 1973, op. cit., p. 21.
297- Questech Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 9 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1985, p.
123.
Halliburton Company case, 1 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1981-82, p. 242, 244.
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their undertakings and termination of these kind of contracts would be the 
most natural consequence of the new situation resulting from the 
revolution.
' The Halliburton Company was another case in which change of 
circumstance was referred to. The U.S. claimant argued that, under the 
provisions in Article II of the Declaration where the contract had 
contained a choice of forum clause which provided for the jurisdiction of 
the "competent Iranian courts", the clause should be regarded as void 
because of changed circumstances. The argument was that the 
fundamental changes in the Iranian legal system after the revolution 
created a different situation than that which had obtained when the
298contract was concluded. The claimant argued that, in view of changed 
conditions in Iran, there was no longer any binding contract which 
excluded the Tribunal's jurisdiction under the provisions of the Claims 
Settlement Declaration. The claimant was correct in contending that the
'changed circumstances frustrated the contract, but the new Treaty
concluded between the two Governments in fact revalidated such forum
clauses, giving Iranian courts jurisdiction to decide those cases. The
Iranian Government rejected the American argument on the basis that
Article II of the Claims Settlement Declaration excluded from the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal claims "arising under a binding contract
between the parties specifically providing that any disputes there under
shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian court." The
Tribunal tried to avoid the controversy over the issue by holding that the
parties did not wish the Tribunal to determine the enforceability of
contract clauses which specifically provided for the sole jurisdiction of 
y ,2 9 9Iranian courts.
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As was mentioned earlier, the revolutionary government of Iran 
was not the successor to the Shah's regime, that is, it did not represent a 
continuation of that regime, but was in fact a total replacement for the 
previous regime which was thereby extinguished. Succession in this sense 
would limit application of the principle of "State responsibility" and 
brings in the principle of "changed circumstances". This was the 
argument used by the former Soviet Union in 1922.^®^
In the context of treaty law, the doctrine was stated by the 'Harvard 
Research into International Law' to be that, a treaty becomes legally void 
in case there occurs a change in the state of facts which existed at the time 
of the parties entered into the treaty. It is generally admitted that not 
every change in those facts terminates the binding force of a treaty. Many 
writers affirm that a change in the state of facts terminates the binding 
force of a treaty only when the parties entered into the treaty with 
reference to that state of facts and envisaged its continuance unchanged as
a determining factor which moved them to undertake the obligations
1 , 301stipulated.
The doctrine of "changed circumstances" has been used by both Iran 
and the United States, and its use by the parties could be useful in some 
cases and inconvenience in the others.
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the tribunal has treated 
numerous doctrines as general principles, usually without detailed 
explanations of their bases. Most are simple and familiar to international 
commerce and to many legal systems. Nevertheless, the Tribunal's 
299. Loc. cit., p. 245.
300_ Revolution, Treaties and State Succession, 762 Yale Law Journal, 1967, pp.
1669-1687; see also Korvin E. A., Soviet Treaties and International Law, 22
A.J.I.L., 1928, pp. 753-763.
301- Bishop W., International Law, Cases and Materials, Third ed., 1953, P. 218.
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jurisprudence also shows the temptations that general principles can offer 
to arbitrators facing difficulties and sensitive issues. The general 
principles of law run the risk of being exploited as an ideological cloak 
for self-interest. Therefore, it is essential that their scope and substance
302be clearly defined and understood.
(SECTION FIVE)
CONDITIONS FULFILLED IN THE POST-REVOLUTION 
EXPROPRIATIONS IN IRAN
1 - Public U tility:
It can be said that all the takings in Iran's post-revolution era have 
been for public purpose. However, there was not a designed policy made 
by the government of Iran for every single expropriation. The 
inspiration of the revolution was that such properties would be taken. 
Some companies, particularly from the U.S., found that they were no 
longer welcomed and left their property behind, or their contracts 
unperformed. In such cases, the Government had to take the control of 
the properties in order to preserve them.
However, the purpose of the expropriations in Iran have been 
generally to:
1- re-order Iranian industry which was in a chaotic state before and
302- See more on the Issue in Cheng B., General Principles of Law as Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals, 1953, p. xiv.
■'i
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during the revolution.
2- redistribute wealth and ameliorate the harsher aspects of the capitalist 
system.
3033- remove dependence on foreign capital, and end to the influence of 
the foreign countries which was enforced through their companies.
In INA Corp. v. Iran, the Tribunal declared that the case
represented a formal and systematic nationalization by decree of an entire
category of commercial enterprises considered of fundamental importance
to the Iranian economy and was, therefore, subject to customary
international law. This principle was recognized in other cases too. The
Court declared that:
"It has long been acknowledged that expropriation for a public purpose and 
subject to conditions provided for by law - notably the category which can be 
characterized as nationalizations - are not per se unlawful.
In the Khemco case, the discretionary power of the State to
determine the public purpose of its action was emphasized. The claimant
had alleged that the main motive for the expropriation of Khemco was
simply to free NPC from the obligations created by the Khemco
Agreement and, particularly, from the obligation to share the profits of
the venture. The Tribunal held that:
"A precise definition of the public purpose for which an expropriation may be 
lawfully decided has neither been agreed upon in international law nor even
303_ Brower and Olson, Learning from the Iranian Experience: Doing Business in 
High-risk Countries, 1980, p. 274.
304- /jVA Corporation v. The Government of the Islamic Republic o f Iran, Award 
No. 184-161-1, August 12, 1985, 8 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., pp. 373, 378.
305_ Amoco International Finance Corporation v. The Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, National Iranian Oil Company, National Petrochemical 
Company, and Kharg Chemical Company Limited, Award No. 310-56-3, 
July 14, 1987, in 15 Iran-U.S.C.T.R, p. 233; the Claimant in this case 
' argued that the expropriation of its interests by the Government of Iran had 
been unlawful for a number of reasons including the fact that the action was 
not for a public purpose but for pure financial gain.
Post-Revolution Expropriations 3  7  3
suggested. It is clear that, as a result of the modem acceptance of the right to 
nationalize, this term is probably interpreted, and that States, in practice, are 
granted extensive d i s c r e t i o n .  " 3 0 6
The Tribunal also declared that:
"In recent practice and mostly in oil industry States have admitted expressly in 
a certain number of cases, that they were nationalizing foreign properties 
primarily in order to obtain a greater share, or the exploitation of a natural 
resources which, according to them, should accrue to the development of the 
country. Such a purpose has not generally been denounced as unlawful and 
illegitimate."^®^
The Tribunal's decision acknowledged that, first, as the authorities 
quoted made clear, the judgement as to the public purpose of an action 
rests with the State, and States are entrusted with great discretionary 
power in this respect. Secondly, in the case of nationalization, the public 
purpose test does not seem to be necessary since nationalization, by 
definition, is for a public purpose.
2 - Non-discrimination;
' The post-revolution Iranian expropriations were as a result of a
general policy which the revolution established. This general policy in its
nature was discriminatory against the West in general and against the
United States in particular. The measures were discriminatory in order to
remove the discriminatory position in Iran of U.S. companies. The
Tribunal called these discriminatory expropriation cases "individual
expropriations", and refrained from declaring them illegal.
The Tribunal’s position on this issue indicates that, although the
Iranian expropriations of U.S. nationals’ property was discriminatory in
3®^ - Loc. cit.
30 -^ Loc, cit.
Post-Revolution Expropriations  3  7 4
one sense, it was nevertheless legitimate under the special circumstances
and purposes of the revolution. It was this same implicit meaning which
was used by Bremen Court in regard to the Indonesian expropriation of
308the Dutch nationals property. Therefore, the principle should be 
considered in the light of the other conditions which ultimately would 
affect the amount of compensation payable to U.S. nationals.
In the Khemco Award, which is the most authoritative and 
articulated decision of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal on the subject of the 
non-discrimination rule, the claimant, as in the Aminoil case, proposed 
that the Iranian Government's measures in expropriating Amoco's interest 
in the Khemco petrochemical complex was discriminatory, since another 
joint venture in the same sector, namely the Iran-Japan Petrochemical 
Company, was not expropriated. The Tribunal, almost exactly in line
with the decision of Aminoil T r i b u n a l h e l d  that:
"The Tribunal finds it difficult, in the absence of any other evidence, to draw 
the conclusion that the expropriation of a concern was discriminatory only 
from the fact that another concern in the same economic branch was not 
expropriated. Reasons specific to the non-expropriated enterprise, or to the 
expropriated one, or both may justify such a difference of treatment.
Citing the Aminoil Award, the Tribunal declared:
"A coherent policy of nationalization can reasonably be operated gradually in 
successive stages. In the present case, the peculiarities discussed by the 
, parties can explain why UPC was not treated in the same manner as 
Khemco.
Therefore, the "discriminatory" measures against U.S. nationals
308_ 2 u . 159/1959; see also Domke M., Indonesian N. Measures Before Foreign 
Courts, 54 A.J.I.L., 1960, pp. 3, 5.
309- Aminoil Case, 21 I.L.M., 1982, p. 967.
310_ Khemco International Finance Corporation v. The Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, National Iranian Oil Company, National Petrochemical 
Company, and Kharg Chemical Company Limited, Award No. 310-56-3, 
July 14, 1987, in 15 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., p. 232.
311- Loc. cit.
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were not considered as illegal by the Tribunal.
3 - Standard of Compensation Applied by the Iran-U.S. 
Tribunal:
In expropriating foreign property, Iran never denied the duty to
pay compensation to the legitimate owners. This feature of the measures
312was clearly stated in the laws expropriating those properties. Thus, 
not all the oil companies, despite their very large claims, brought actions 
against Iran before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, because they were 
negotiating with Iran over the amount of compensation; and the amount of 
compensation for non-American was settled in such negotiations.
313Therefore, as some writers have suggested, Iran is not in an entirely 
antagonistic environment, but, in the one in which one party demands full 
compensation for the expropriated property and Iran offers on the basis 
of the legitimacy of the property.
The biggest difficulty in relation to the Tribunal's work has been 
that each of the three chambers of the Tribunal renders its decision 
independently and does not necessarily follow the others' precedents.
314Moreover, substitutions among the neutral arbitrators has caused 
different approaches to the questions before each chamber. This has 
caused serious confusion over the standard of compensation payable to
312- See the early pages of this chapter.
313_ piran H., Nationalisation of Foreign Property in International Law and Iran- 
U.S. Claims Tribunal, op. cit., p. 356.
314- The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal's Chambers are each composed of three judges; 
one from Iran, one from the United States, and the third one is a neutral judge 
chosen by the two States.
A
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dispossessed individuals or companies. The first awards of the Tribunal
related to the expropriated insurance companies which had been
nationalized after the revolution by the Iranian Revolutionary Council on 
31525 June 1979. This nationalization included all Iranian private 
companies and related foreign businesses in Iran. The law nationalizing 
the insurance industry did not mention the valuation and the payment of 
compensation procedure.
Subsequently, American and other foreign insurance companies 
brought actions against Iran claiming damages for uncompensated 
nationalizations. The disputes between Iran and United States centre 
mostly, not on the legality of the taking, but on valuation, the 
determination of the compensation owed through translation of the 
property loss into monetary terms. Because of this, the Tribunal declined 
to hold that the nationalization was unlawful.
In the American International Group, Inc., and American Life 
Insurance Company v, Islamic Republic o f Iran and Central Insurance o f 
Iran, American claimants asserted that Iran was obliged to pay "prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation" under international law and also the 
Treaty of Amity between the two countries, and its failure to do so 
violated customary international law. Iran denied that the standard of 
compensation invoked by the claimant was a norm of international law. 
Therefore, it denied that either the nationalization or the failure to 
provide immediate compensation violated international law. Defending 
the unchallenged right to nationalization, Iran admitted that there was a
315- American International Group Inc. and American Life Insurance Company v.
The Islamic Republic of Iran and Central Insurance of Iran, Award No. 93- 
2-3, December 19, 1983, in 4 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., p. 96,
316- American International Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, (93-2-3), 7 Iranian
Assets Litigation Rep., p. 747.
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duty to compensate the former owners of nationalized property, but it 
denied that the standard of "prompt" compensation was a norm of 
customary international law. The approach of Iran toward the question 
was that:
• "Instead  the international legal duty to pay compensation requires only
an early indication of an intention to compensate and compensation paid
even during forthcoming years still come within the reasonable time permitted 
by the Standard.
On the standard of compensation Iran further argued:
"Even assuming. Arguendo , that Iran violated principles of customary 
international law in the course of nationalizing the insurance industry, there is 
no international legal entitlement to compensation equal to the 'full value' of 
the property nationalized. The suggestion of full compensation derives from 
the traditionally asserted standard of 'prompt, adequate and effective' 
compensation which has been repudiated by modern developments in 
international law; instead, a standard of 'partial compensation' should be 
applied, based on reference contained in resolutions of United Nations organs
and from post-war settlement practice.
The claimants argument that Iran's failure to provide prompt 
compensation violated the provisions of the Treaty of Amity was rejected 
by Iran on various grounds, including that the Treaty was no longer in
r 319 force.
Therefore, Iran did not reject a duty to compensate A I G for the
320nationalization of its property. However, the Tribunal refused to 
discuss or pronounce upon the view that, in certain circumstances of 
expropriation, less than full compensation would meet the requirements of
321customary international law.
317- Loc. cit. pp. 747-48.
318- Loc. cit.
319- See Iran's position on the Treaty in this chapter.
320- American International Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran (93-2-3), Iranian
Assets Litigation Rep., op. cit., p. 749.
321- Judge Mosk, the American judge, in a concurring opinion, rejected the view
that less than full compensation could be appropriate compensation in 
customary international law; see 4 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1983, pp. 105-6.
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In INA Corp. v. Iran, the Tribunal held that the Treaty of Amity, 
which was equivalent to customary international law, was applicable. 
Under either law, what was payable was "compensation equal to the fair
322market value of the investment" which, by implication, in the opinion 
of the Tribunal, meant full compensation. But, in the Philips Petroleum 
Company o f Iran, the Tribunal made a distinction between the standard 
of compensation embodied in the Treaty of Amity and that of customary 
international law, holding that the former was strict, whatever the latter 
was, and required just compensation representing the full equivalent of
323the property taken.
In American International Group case, the Tribunal judged the
Iranian measures in the light of the traditional rules by declaring that
there is not sufficient evidence before the Tribunal to show that the
nationalization was not carried out for a public purpose as part of a large
reform program or was discriminatory.^^'* After recognizing the legality
of the nationalizations, the Tribunal declared that even in case of lawful
nationalization the former owner of the nationalized property is normally
325entitled to compensation for the value of the property taken.
The parties to the dispute disagreed as to the method of valuation. 
The claimants maintained that the American company should be valued as 
a going concern, including such elements as good will and prospects of 
future profit. Iran contended that the assessment should be made 
exclusively on the basis of the 'net book* or 'break up' value of the
326company.
322./jvA Corp. V. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 8 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1985, p. 
373.
323- Philips Petroleum Company of Iran case,21 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1989, p. 79.
324- Loc. cit., p. 105.
325- Loc. cit.
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Calculating the amount of compensation, the Tribunal applied the 
standard of full compensation, including an element of lost profit which is 
deemed to be applied in unlawful expropriations. The Tribunal declared 
in this regard:
"The most important element of the compensation claimed by the Claimants 
for the taking of their shares in Iran America is the loss of prospective 
earnings. When making its own assessment of the maiket value to be given to 
these shares, the Tribunal will therefore have to conclude, inter alia , which 
assumption could reasonably be made, with a sufficient degree of certainty, in 
July 1979 regarding the future life and profitability of the company in view of
, the relevant conditions then existing in Iran The Tribunal holds that the
appropriate method is to value the company as a going concern, taking into 
account not only the net book value of its assets but such elements as good 
will and likely future profitability, had the company been allowed to continue 
its business under its former management.
It is not clear how the Tribunal reached this conclusion, when this 
method of valuation has not even been used in cases which were 
considered as unlawful.^^^ The Tribunal did not made it clear what 
might be the consequence were the nationalization measures to be held 
unlawful. The Tribunal apparently utilized the statement of Judge 
Arechaga concerning the forms of reparation for breach of an
329international obligation which is an illegal act. As was mentioned in
earlier chapters, the majority of writers in the field and judicial decisions
have drawn a distinction between legal and illegal expropriations and have
declared that different rules and obligations are applicable to these two
cases. Disregarding the other facts, which were ignored in this case, the
legal value of this award seems rather small when one bears in mind that
326- American International Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran (93-2-3), X 
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, 1985, p. 212.
327. Loc. cit.
328- In this regard see generally Chorzow Factory and Libyan cases, op. cit.
329. American International Group case, op. cit.
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even the American Arbitrator had been reluctant to confirm this 
judgement by declaring that he joined the other arbitrators in order to 
make it possible that some award could be issued. Otherwise, this case,
330which took one year to decide would have remained undecided.
In INA Corp. Case, the standard of 'market value' or 'fair market
value' was applied, but the concept was use in a quite different way. The
Tribunal stated that 'fair market value’ meant the amount which a willing
buyer would have paid a willing seller, disregarding any diminution of
value due to the nationalization itself or the anticipation thereof, and
excluding consideration of events thereafter that might have increased or
331decreased the value of the shares. The Tribunal did not explain how it 
was possible to evaluate the compensation on the basis of market value 
while certain events had affected the business and any buyer had to take 
them into account. Moreover, market value takes no account of any 
conflict between the private and public interest when such a conflict is the 
very reason for the nationalization. This was particularly so when 
investors had gained preferential rights and m ight obtain a 
disproportionate amount of profit at the expense of the domestic
332economy. Compensation based on the present value of future revenues 
in such circumstances implies that Iran would have had to pay in advance 
for future advantageous gains to the owners that it considered to be 
against the public interest. In other words, the expropriations would be 
rendered meaningless and uneconomic, while the Revolution had created 
circumstances which had left no choice to the Government but that of
330- Separate Opinion of Richard Mosk, AIG Award, X Y.C.A., 1985, op. c it, p.
215.
331-7AA Coî'p. V, Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 184-161-1, in XI Y.C.A., op. 
cit., pp. 314-15.
332_ joffe G., and Stevens P., Nationalisation of Foreign-owned Property for a 
Public Purpose   55 M.L.R., 1992, p. 362.
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taking control of those properties. Compensation on such a basis
enormously benefited the companies which had exercised normal
prudence in undertaking the risk of the advantageous activities in a
developing country like Iran, and might have expected to bear the
consequence of their judgement and measures which had been calculated
according to the economic as well as political conditions and stability of
the host State. Accordingly, they had planed to take as much profit as
they could as early as possible. However, in INA Corp., the Tribunal
admitted that the case presented a classic example of a formal and
systematic nationalization by decree of an entire category of commercial
enterprises considered of fundamental importance to the nation's economy
and in "the event of such large-scale nationalizations of a lawful character,
international law has undergone a general reappraisal, the effect of which
may be undermine the doctrinal value of any "full" or "adequate"(when
used as identical to "full") compensation standard as proposed in this
case"^^^ The Tribunal held that;
"However, the Tribunal is of the opinion that in case such as the present, 
involving an investment of rather small amount shortly before the 
nationalization, international law admits compensation in an amount equal to 
the fair market value of the investment.
The Tribunal did not explain the doctrinal basis of this judgement 
nor the relationship between the amount of the investment and the 
compensation which should be paid. Moreover, the Tribunal considered 
the controversial Treaty of Amity as valid, and prevailing over general 
rules, while the Chambers had normally tried to circumvent the 
question of the Treaty and base their decisions on other grounds.
333-/7/A Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, XI Y.C.A., op. cit., pp. 314-5; 8 
Iran-U.S.C.T.R., op. cit., p. 378.
334- /jVA Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 8 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., p. 378.
335- Loc. cit.
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However the Tribunal declared:
"In view of the circumstances in this case the Tribunal holds that the words 
'the full equivalent of the property taken' entitles the Claimant to be granted 
compensation equal to the fair market value of its shares in Bimeh Shargh, 
assessed as of the date of nationalization.
Judge Lagergren in his separate opinion argued that although "full 
compensation" has been awarded in cases of unlawful expropriations and 
had been specifically adopted in many bilateral treaties, it was not
mandatory by international law. Relying on statements of international
337 338law scholars, and a U.N. General Assembly resolution, Lagergren
suggested that the traditional rule of "prompt, adequate and effective"
compensation should be modified to allow partial compensation when a
government nationalizes property in the implementation of fundamental
and large-scale economic reform. He added that the appropriate and most
regularly applied modem standard of compensation has been a flexible
339one of "just," "appropriate" or "partial" compensation. Drawing a
distinction between a lawful measure of expropriation and an unlawful
one, and their consequences, he concluded that:
"It is generally accepted that some types of expropriations are inherently
unlawful Here it is well settled that the measure of compensation ought
to be such as to approximate as closely as possible in monetary terms to the 
principle of restitution in integrum - a remedy which is itself for practical 
reasons usually impossible of achievement. It is in such cases that the concept 
of 'full compensation' finds its clearest modern application .... The Hull 
standard [prompt, adequate and effective compensation] though built on 
relatively little express arbitral practice, long enjoyed widespread support in 
legal writings. However, as long ago as 1955, in the eighth edition of 
Oppenheim's International Law , Sir Hersch Lauterpacht suggested that
336- Loc. cit, p. 379.
337- Lauterpacht H., Oppenheim International Law, op. cit., p. 352; Dolzer, New
Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property, 75 A.J.I.L., 
. 1981, pp. 553, 557.
338. G. A. Res. 1803(XVII) of 1962 of the U.N.
339_ Corp. V.  Islamic Republic of Iran, 8 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., op. cit., p. 378.
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traditional rules of compensation must be subject to modification .... in cases 
in which fundamental changes in the political system and economic structure 
of the State or far-reaching social reforms entail interference on a large scale 
with private property. In such cases, neither the principle of absolute respect 
for alien private property nor rigid equality with the dispossessed nationals 
offer a satisfactory solution to the difficulty. It is probable that, consistently 
with legal principle, such solution must be sought in the granting of partial 
compensation."^ '*®
He was right to say that, discounting often will be greater in a
situation where the investor has enjoyed the profits of his capital outlay
over a large period of time, but less, or none, in the case of a recent
investor, such as Then, he concluded that:
"an application of current principles of international law as encapsulated in the 
'appropriate compensation' formula, would in a case of lawful large-scale 
nationalization in a state undergoing a process of radical economic 
restructuring normally require the 'fair market value' standard to be 
discounted in taking account of all circumstances. However, such discount 
may, of course, never be such as to bring the compensation below a point 
which would lead to 'unjust enrichment' of the expropriating state.
As in the AIG and ALICO cases, the Tribunal argued that, for 
purposes of determining the just amount of compensation, the company's 
value must be measured as a going concern amounting to $111, 470,000 
(U.S.), which included such elements as future business prospects and 
good will. The claimants also contended that the valuation of their own 
interest in company must disregard any action of the Government of Iran 
prior to nationalization which might have had the effect of artificially 
depressing the value of the company and any event which followed the 
nationalization which might have negatively affected the company's future 
business prospects. All of the measures ought to be accounted as the risk 
which the claimant would have undertaken. Such a liability has not been
340. Loc. cit., 386.
341- Loc. cit., p. 390.
342- Loc. cit.
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asserted even in theory by international scholars. For example, 
Oppenheim admits partial compensation when the act is as the result of 
fundamental changes in the political system and economic structure of a 
State or far-reaching social reform. '^*^
The claimant's assertion should not be regarded as appropriate, for 
the reason that the future could never be known with certainty and any 
discounted cash flow necessarily would be based on assumptions. This 
becomes more clear when one considers that there is no more market for 
the expropriated properties, and that the expropriating government cannot 
freely bargain to accept or reject the others' assumptions about the future 
revenues and risks. In addition to these considerations, the Tribunal 
should have taken into account the actual return which the claimant had 
obtained on its investment up to the time of the expropriation. If the 
actual rate of return earned by the company up to the time of the 
expropriation had been high, perhaps an unjustifiably large amount, the 
actual compensation award could also be reduced accordingly.
The Tribunal awarded $10m as compensation, based on 'going 
concern value'. Going concern value includes the good will and future 
interest and is a substitute for restitutio in integrum. This principle is 
usually used when an expropriation is unlawful and confiscatory. Even in 
this situation, some believed that, for practical reasons, the achievement of 
such a result is impossible. '^*'*
Going concern value has been invoked by the parties to disputes and 
by the Tribunal, but the results of their respective valuations have been 
completely different. For example in American International Group, the 
method of analysis employed by the claimant's two experts was
343- Lauterpacht H., Oppenheim International Law , op. cit, p. 352.
344- Separate Opinion of Gunnar Lagergren of 15 August 1985, in XI Y.C.A., op.
cit., p. 315.
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undoubtedly consistent with modem techniques of valuation of insurance 
companies, but was not acceptable to the Tribunal.^'*^
The reason given by the Tribunal was that between the autumn of 
1978 and June 1979 some changes in general social and economic 
conditions of Iran had taken place. The Chamber did not mention the 
political reality which prevented the restoration of relations between the 
two countries and consequently changed the company's economic and 
financial position. This fact was mentioned as an economic consideration, 
that many Iranian nationals belonging to the wealthier part of the 
population left the c o u n t r y I n  fact, this was not the main reason for 
the declining of the share prices of the U.S. companies in Iran; the reason 
was the political climate which was created during and after the 
revolution, as a result of which nobody wanted or had the courage to buy 
shares belonging to U.S. nationals in Iran. This reality was stated in the 
concurring opinion of Aldrich to the award in ITT Industries, Inc. v. 
Iran, that:
"That Iran might experience revolution was a risk assumed by investors in
Iran, as in any country, and any reduction in value of investments as a
result of revolution cannot be ignored by the Tribunal. Thus, the Islamic 
Revolution was not a wrong for which claimant was entitled to compensation 
under international law; and in computing compensation, the Tribunal's task 
was not to ascertain the real value at the amount of taking, "^ 47
The Tribunal based its decision on market value and rejected both 
the AIG's proposed 'going concern value' and projected future profits of 
the company. The value was made as an 'approximation taking into
348account all the relevant circumstances in the case'.
345- American International Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran (93-2-3), Iranian 
Assets Litigation Rep., op. cit., p. 749.
346. Loc.cit., p. 750.
347. ITT Industries, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran. AWD 47-156-2 of May 26,
1983, summerised in 77 A.J.I.L., 1983, p. 893.
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The reason given by the Tribunal for choosing going concern value 
was in the perspective of finance theory, that when a shareholder buys 
stock, normally he does not anticipate corporate liquidation which is based 
on book value. Rather, he is purchasing the right to a stream of dividends, 
so that, in the case of a going concern, the theoretical value of a share is 
the present value of all dividends per share. It added that the discounted 
present value of anticipated future earnings would be a reasonable 
estimate of current share value.^"*  ^ However, from the perspective of 
international law, the decision's soundness and significance are not clear. 
There is no analysis of the relevant legal issues in the opinion, and some 
of the observations of the Tribunal are virtually without any evidential
350foundation. The Tribunal needed to use more substantial facts, such as 
the privileged position of the company, for the calculation of 
compensation.
Although the Tribunal stated that it was adopting the going concern 
value, it declined to choose between the standards of ’prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation' and 'partial' compensation. Some
351commentators have asserted that the award is based upon an orthodox
348. American International Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran (93-2-3), Iranian
Assets Litigation Reports, op. cit., pp. 750-51.
349. Loc. cit., p. 750.
350_ The statement that many Iranian nationals belonging to tlie wealthier part of the 
population left Iran, and the reference to the effects of 'certain Iranian Taxes' 
on the company's future profitability was without foundation; see more in 
American International Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran (93-2-3), Iranian 
. Assets Litigation Reports, op. cit., pp. 750, 757 (Mosk, concurring); Article 
31 of the^^ANCITRAL rules determines that the abitrators "must" state the 
reasons upon which their award is based, and Article 33 of those rules the law 
applicable to the mirits of the case should be clearly distinguished from the 
law applicable to the arbitral proceedings.
351- Clagett B, M., The Expropriation Issue Before the Iran-U.S. Claim 
Tribunal   16 L.P.I.B., 1984, p. 820; 25 Harv.I.L.J., 1984, p. 491.
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compensation standard, but the small size of the award, together with the 
reasoning, appears to support a standard of partial compensation. The 
award not only did not use the opportunity to clarify a confusing area of 
international law, but it increased the ambiguity and uncertainty on the 
valuation of the nationalized property in similar situations.
Therefore, it would be correct to say that international law in 
regard to compensation for expropriation of alien properties is not
352clear. The literature and the cases have mostly been dominated by the 
competing principles of "prompt, adequate and effective" and "partial" 
compensation, and in some cases, such as Liamco, it was declared that 
"clearly there is no conclusive evidence of the existence of community in
353principles" of domestic and international law. The international 
community has practiced different rules and different amounts of 
compensations have been paid for the nationalized properties. American 
International Group is one of the cases which indicates those principles. 
By avoiding the competing principles of 'prompt', 'full', and 'partial' 
compensation and focusing on the issue of valuation, the Tribunal, in the 
American International Group Case, achieved a fair compromise 
between the interests of the company and Iran. This compromise was 
achieved by adopting the going concern standard, apparently to satisfy the 
American parties, and also taking into account the conditions existed in 
Iran to create an equitable and economicaUy-sound result.
In applying the law, including the Treaty of Amity and customary
352- Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) XVIII
Tenth Draft, No, 4, 1983). Cf. Banco National, 658 F. 2d, pp. 887-91;
states that it "is difficult to state in black or even Gray letter what is the
international law now as regards compensation for expropriated alien 
properties."; Liamco case, 20 I.L.M., 1981, pp. 75-6.
353- Liamco case, 20 I.L.M., op. cit., p. 76.
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international law on liability and compensation, each Chamber has 
adopted quite different approaches or frameworks.
Chamber One, in its August 1987 decision in Starrett Housing?^^ 
adopted an essentially economic methodology in applying Article IV of 
the Treaty of Amity, and permitted application of the discounted cash 
flow method of valuation. It construed the Treaty as requiring payment 
of fair market value-in this case the market value of going concern. The 
Tribunal determined going concern value through an economic analysis, 
and adopted a discounted cash flow valuation which had been developed 
by a Tribunal-appointed expert. The main feature of this award is that
355lost profits were included as compensation to the claimant. This award 
was rendered while Starrett had assigned the Agreement to an Iranian 
subsidiary, Shah Goli Apartment Corporation, and the property in this 
case had not been taken directly by the Iranian Government. In fact, as a 
result of the Revolution, the non-Iranian managers and workforce had 
left Iran and the constmction came to a halt. To prevent the project from 
total destruction, the Iranian Government had taken charge of the 
abandoned projects in order to complete them. In its interlocutory 
award of December 19, 1983, the tribunal found that the Government of
A
a
Iran, by appointing a temporary manager for Shah Goli Company, had 
indirectly expropriated the company. According to the Tribunal, the 
expropriation comprised not only the physical assets of the company, but
357also the right to manage and complete the project. The Tribunal
354_ Starrett Housing Corporation et. al. v. The Government o f the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Award No. 314-24-1, 14 August, 1987, in 16 Iran- 
U.S.C.T.R., p. 112, para. 18.
355. See Concurring Opinion of Judge Holtzmann, in 16 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., p. 241.
356. Starrett Housing Corporation et. al. v. The Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran et. al. Award No. ITL 32-24-1, December 19, 1983, in 4
■ Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1983, p. 122-147.
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deferred the award on the issue of compensation until after a Tribunal- 
appointed expert examined the issue and gave his opinion as to the value
358of property in question. The Tribunal deciding on the standard of 
compensation in 1987, based its finding entirely on the provisions of the 
Article IV-2 of the treaty of Amity and declared that Starrett was entitled
359to the full value of its property expropriated by Iran.
In Sola Tiles Case, Chamber One likewise assessed market value, 
but on the basis of a less detailed factual record and with a 
correspondingly less sophisticated economic analysis.^^*  ^ The reason was 
probably that this case involved simple individual expropriation of a 
business. Full compensation in this case was generally understood to 
mean the full value of the property taken, which could include, in 
appropriate circumstances, an element for profitability. The awards 
mentioned totally frustrated the purposes of expropriations, which had 
been undertaken in the interest of the public, and implied a confiscatory 
aspect to those takings, although, the Tribunal accepted that they were 
lawful expropriations. Such an award means that the benefit of the 
takings for a developing country like Iran is to pay in advance and buy 
futùre risks of the expropriated businesses. This is an approach to the 
issue of expropriation for loss suffered by the expropriated parties which 
takes no account of the public interest as a further legitimate 
consideration. Such an approach, which is based on the principle of 
"unjust enrichment" was challenged in the oft-mentioned case of
357- Loc. cit., p. 155.
358- Loc. cit., p. 157.
359- Starrett Housing Corporation et. al. v. The Government o f the Islamic 
Republic of Iran et. al., 16 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1987, p. 195.
360- Sola Tiles Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of I ran,14 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1987 I,
p. 223.
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Aminoi ly^^^  and also in some awards of the Iran-U.S. Claim 
Tribnnal/^^
Chamber Two's decisions indicate that the Treaty of Amity was less 
applied to expropriation matters. In Phelps Dodge^^^ and P ayn e
364cases, the Tribunal decided that the expropriated entities were not 
going concerns.
Chamber Three's decisions are also somewhat different. In Amoco 
Iran Oil the Tribunal decided that the claimant's interest in a
joint venture chemical enterprise had been lawfully expropriated and that 
the Treaty established the standard of compensation. The majority then 
construed the Treaty standard in the light of the principles of public 
international law applied in the Permanent Court of International Justice’s 
celebrated Chorzow Factory J u d g e m e n t . D e s p i t e  applying the 
Chorzow Factory principles, the Tribunal considered the expropriation 
lawful. Contrary to Chamber One in Starrett Housing, in this case, 
Chamber Three concluded that the Treaty and general principles of 
international law did not permit application of the discounted cash flow 
method of valuation in order to determine damages for a lawful 
expropriation. The Tribunal considered the issue of the public interest as
a crucial balancing principle in the determination of appropriate
compensation.^^^ It was stated that a clear distinction must be made
between lawful and unlawful expropriations, since the rules applicable to
3G1- Kuwait V. Aminoil, 66 1982, para. 144.
362. International Finance Corp. v. Iran, and AIFC v. Iran, op. cit.
3G3- Phelps Dodge case, 10 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1986 I, p. 121.
364- Payne cases,12 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1986 III, p. 3.
365- Amoco Iran Oil C o.,15 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 1987 H, p. 189,
366- Chorzow Factory case, P.C.I.J., 1928, Ser. A, No. 17,(Judgement of Sept.
13).
- Amoco Iran Oil Co. case, 15 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., pp. 258-65.
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the compensation to be paid by the expropriating State differ according to
the legal characterization of the taking. By this statement, the Tribunal
meant restitutio in integrum for unlawful expropriation, and the full
"value of undertaking at the moment of dispossession, i.e, 'the just price
of what was expropriated', for lawful expropriation.^^* However, some
awards have accepted lost profits as an element of full value, or have
found lost profits to be a component of compensation only where the
taking was unlawful.^^^ In the Aminoil case, emphasis was placed upon
the importance of a "balanced indemnification" and of an award based on
a "reasonable rate of return", as contrasted with one based upon
"speculative profits." The balance made by the Tribunal was in regard to
" an enquiry into all the circumstances relevant to the particular concrete 
370case". Whatever the actual method used to calculate compensation, the 
'balance' and concrete approach allowed nothing for the loss of profit 
during the remaining thirty years of the Aminoil concession. The other 
difference was the rejection of the "discounted cash flow" method of 
valuation which was based on the Chorzow Factory case. Contrary to 
this case, in Starrett Housing, Chamber One made no distinction on the 
basis of lawfulness of the expropriation, and its substantial award of the 
"full value" of the expropriated enterprise included compensation for lost 
profits. Chamber One's adoption of the "discounted cash flow" method 
makes the contradictions between the decisions of the Chambers more 
complicated.
In some other cases, such as Sedco, Inc. v. Iran, t h e s e
368- See the summerised text in 82 A.J.I.L., 1988, p. 360.
369- American International Group, Inc., 4 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., op. cit., pp. 109-10,
and Payne v. Iran, Awars 245-335-2, August 8, 1986, 2 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., 
op. cit., (expropriation was declared lawful, but lost profits awarded).
370- Aminoil case, 66 I.L.M., op. cit.
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contradictions existed even in the argument and the decision of the
Tribunal, since the claimant argued that Iran should pay full compensation
on the basis of the Treaty of Amity, while Tran rejected the standard of
371full compensation as a rule of international law. The Tribunal first 
held that no matter whether the Treaty of Amity was still in force, Article 
V-II of the Treaty of Amity was applicable. Despite this conclusion, the 
Tribunal examined customary international law and the standard of 
compensation thereunder. The Tribunal referred to the post-war lump­
sum agreements, investment treaties and the U.N. Resolutions on 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural resources. The Tribunal believed 
that Resolution No. 1803 (XVII) of the United Nations has altered the law
372in t;his field. Therefore, the Tribunal found that current international
law required appropriate compensation for expropriation of foreign
property. Meanwhile, the Tribunal in applying the law to the case in
hand, made a distinction between measures of large-scale nationalization
and an ad hoc expropriation, and held that in case of an expropriation of
a single item of property, which is not within a general programme of
expropriation, international law still required full compensation.
Surprisingly, the Tribunal considered the Sedco expropriation as a
"discrete expropriation" and entitled the claimant to receive full
compensation, "whether viewed as an application of the Treaty of Amity
or, independently, of customary international law, and regardless of
371- Sedco Inc, v. National Iranian Oil Company and the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Award No. ITL 59-129-3, March 27, 1986, in 10 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., p. 259.
372_ Loc. cit., p. 186; the Tribunal cited the following authorities as evidence; 
Topco case v. Libya, in 17 I.L.M., 1978, p. 1; Aminoil case, in 21 I.L.M.,
1982, p. 973; Chilean Copper case, in 12 I.L.M., 1973, p. 251; IN A case,
8 Iran-U.S.C.T.R,, op. cit.; Brownlie I., Principles of Public International 
Law, 3rd ed. 1979; Dolzer R., Eigentum, Enteignung und Entschadigung, in 
Geltenden Volkerrecht, 1985, p. 53.
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373whether or not the expropriation was otherwise lawful." The Tribunal
adopted the same kind of approach in the INA case. Moreover, the
decision of the Tribunal that full compensation was required for a
"discrete expropriation" and that, in large scale nationalizations, less than
full compensation had evolved to comprise the rule of international law, is
in conflict with the AIG  Award. Indeed, the same Chamber of the
Tribunal in the AIG  case did not observe this rule. As was stated earlier,
in the AIG  case, Iran had nationalized the entire insurance industry, and
the expropriation of the A IG  thus was only part of a large scale
nationalization. Yet, it was held that:
"it is a general principle of international law that even in case of lawful 
nationalization the former owner of the nationalized property is normally 
entitled to compensation for the value of the property taken.
In that case, the Tribunal awarded full compensation to the AIG,
with lost profits included. It is difficult to explain the inconsistency of
approach between these two cases. In particular, the statement made by
the Tribunal to the effect that the expropriation of Sedco was the taking
375of a single item of property is not at all convincing, since the political 
atmosphere in 1979 in Iran demanded a radical economic restructuring.
The illegality of individual takings was disputed in other cases, such 
as Khemco case. In the Khemco case, the claimants demanded full
expropriation based on going concern value of the property to be 
calculated in a 'discounted cash flow' method.^^^ The Tribunal rejected 
the demand on the basis that restitution in integrum only applied to
373- Sedco Inc, v. National Iranian Oil Company and the Islamic Republic of Iran,
10 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., op. cit., pp. 183, 187.
374- American International Group, Inc., 4 Iran-U.S.C.T.R., op. cit., p. 105.
375- As it was mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Title to Sediran, Subsidery of 
Sedco, was transfered to the Government of Iran pursuant to the "Law for the 
Protection and Development of Iranian Industries."
376_ Khemco case, op. cit.. Paras. 210, 227.
Post-Revolution Expropriations 3  9 4
unlawful expropriations. The Tribunal referring to the C ho r zo w
Factory case, made a careful analysis of the distinction between a lawful
and an unlawful expropriation, and discussed the effect of such distinction
on the standard of compensation. The Tribunal held:
"a clear distinction must be made between lawful and unlawful expropriation, 
since the rules applicable to the compensation to be paid by the expropriating 
State differ according to the legal characterization of the taking, ...... an
obligation of reparation of all damages sustained by the owner of expropriated
property aiises from an unlawful expropriation in case of a lawful
expropriation .!... the compensation to be paid is limited to the value of the 
undertaking at the moment of the dispossession, i. e. the just price of what
was expropriated Obviously the value of an enterprise does not vary
according to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the taking. This value cannot 
. depend on the legal characterization of fact totally foreign to the economic 
constituents of the undertaking, namely the conduct of the expropriating State.
 The difference is that if the taking is lawful the value of undertaking at
the time of dispossession is the measure and limit of the compensation, while 
if it is unlawful, this value is, or may be, only a part of the reparation to be 
paid. In any event, even in case of unlawful expropriation the damage actually 
sustained is the measure of reparation and there is no indication that punitive 
damages could be considered.
However, in the Sola Tiles Inc, case, decided by Chamber One, the 
approach was different. The claimant demanded compensation on the 
basis of general principles of international law, referring particularly to
378the Chorzow Factory case. No reference was made to the Treaty of 
Amity by the parties to the dispute, but the Tribunal decided that it could 
not ignore the Treaty even though it had not been argued by the parties. 
However, the Tribunal first examined the customary international law and 
found that the standard of "appropriate compensation" was the standard 
which had been used in recent years and, elaborating on the term 
"appropriate compensation", the Tribunal found that the standard was
Khemco case, op. cit.. Paras. 192-193, 196-197.
378_ gola Tiles Inc. v. The Government of the Islamic Republic o f Iran, Award 
No. 298-317-1, April 22, 1987, in 14 han-U.S.C.T.R., p. 234.
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broad enough to embrace the different standards to be applied in each
individual case. The Tribunal held:
"That term [appropriate] necessarily contemplates that all relevant 
circumstances will be assessed in any given case. Both the term itself and the 
elasticity it implies have by now achieved a solid basis in arbitral practice and
writings. "379
Although, the impression is that the Tribunal applied full 
compensation in the context of the 'appropriate compensation', the 
standard of compensation was not explicitly declared. Therefore, the 
findings of the Tribunal in regard to the standard of compensation are 
confusing.
The Award of the Tribunal in AIFC v, Iran, once again displays a 
difference in approach. The Tribunal made a partial award and held that 
a nationalization cannot be equated to a normal business investment or to a 
transaction in a free market, not because the expropriated owner is not 
usually a willing seller, but because the expropriating State acts for a 
public purpose. Commercial motivations are rarely paramount in 
decisions to nationalize, and may even be lacking altogether. Political 
considerations and considerations of economic policy or general national 
interest are usually more decisive.
With regard to expropriations such as those in Iran after the 
revolution, the way must be opened for a more rational and economically 
equitable consideration of the broader issues and long-term and excessive 
gains and losses of both parties. This becomes particularly important 
when one bears in mind that the major purpose of the nationalizations 
were to remove what has been claimed to be the unreasonable 
monopolistic position of the U.S. companies which were held responsible 
for the major social and political problems in Iran.
379- Loc. cit., p. 235,
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Political issues and a large number of economic considerations 
affecting both parties must be taken into account in order to establish an 
equitable balance between the legitimate interests of the parties. Such an 
approach would entail a deeper consideration of the economic aspects of 
the problem and a different framework for analysing not only the 
respective positions of the parties but also the methods of valuation of 
compensation.
The difficulty of this latter aspect of valuation becomes apparent 
when one bears in mind that these are more than one incontrovertible 
value of any asset, depending not only on the purpose and the procedure 
but also on the circumstances under which they are valued and also the 
points of view of buyer or seller, public or private entities, insurance 
appraiser, economist or accountant and judges. Moreover, the 
calculations of Value’ from any given point of view, although using the 
sanie methods, can diverge widely, depending on the assumptions on
380which they are based. Therefore, it is not surprising that there have 
been different approaches to the valuation of nationalized properties by 
the Chambers of the Tribunal.
Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that, in determining the 
appropriate compensation for the Iranian expropriations, the entire 
history and background of the investment project be examined as weU as 
aU other relevant economic, political and social circumstances. Under the 
post-revolutionary situation in Iran, there could be no market for U.S. 
companies. By having regard to all these considerations the Tribunal's 
Chambers could have taken both the private and public interests into 
account. As some of the Chambers' decisions indicated, the privileged 
position of the U.S. companies in Iran had created a market value which
380- Joffe G., and Stevens P., Nationalisation of Foreign-owned Property for a
Public Purpose   55 M.L.R., 1992, p. 359,
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was much greater than the value of the enterprise from a public or social- 
economic point of view and which thus unduly favoured the private 
owners.
In sum, Iran directly or indirectly expropriated American national's 
property in Iran, but some of the disputes were as a result of non­
performance of the contracts by the U.S. nationals. While the Iran-U.S. 
Claims Agreement should have been given weight, the special 
circumstances existing between Iran and United States reduced its 
importance as a source of international norms. The Agreement provided 
different solutions to the disputes; procedures inside and outside the 
Tribunal were at the option of the parties, and some of them were agreed 
to be decided by the Iranian Courts.
The Tribunal have has many opportunities to apply different kind of 
rules which were not a common practice between States. Some of the 
disputes were decided according to the laws of contracts, some others 
were based on the Treaty of Amity and international law. However, the 
authorities and references used by the Tribunal were not uniform and 
consistent. There were quite a lot of differences between the approaches 
of the parties. Indeed, these were as various as the decisions of the 
Tribunal itself. The approach of the Tribunal was more consistent with 
regard to the determination of the rights of the U.S. nationals in relation 
to their properties and contracts and with regard to the compensation 
rules applicable to them. However, the Tribunal ignored the 
discriminatory character of some of the takings against U.S. nationals, and 
there was no serious challenge to the purposes of the takings.
381Therefore, in contrast to Brower's somewhat sanguine
381- Brower C. N., The Lessons of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: How May They 
be Applied in the Case of Iraq, Virg.J.LL., vol. 32:421, p. 421.
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description of the results of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal as a "miracle", 
from the point of international law, they were, in fact, collectively a mess 
which has only brought more confusion to the international rules on the 
question of expropriation. It might have been a miracle for the U.S. 
claimants in a short time, but has never become satisfactory to the Iranian 
government. The rules applied by the Tribunal are unlikely to become 
the legal conscious of international society and be appreciated and 
accepted.
While the arbitrations are inter-State and could have particular 
value, the Tribunal's statements might be said to be as gratuitous and 
obiter. The decisions of the Tribunal may be criticised, particularly on 
the ground that the compensation rules applied by the Tribunal have not 
been reasoned enough, based as they are largely on a misinterpretation of 
international law and international authorities, in particular the I.C.J case. 
Consequently, their views on the rules and the nature of the settlement 
agreements cannot be regarded as having any special force by virtue of 
their having been expressed by this tribunal.
The uncertainty of the international law on expropriation is also 
obvious from a consideration of the rules which were applied in the Iran- 
United Stated disputes.
The Tribunal and the arbitrators attempted to avoid controversy by 
applying such standards as "appropriate" and "just" compensation in 
dealing with expropriation cases. Sometimes, they clearly interpreted 
these terms to mean "full" or "market value" compensation, but this has 
not been a rigid position applied in all cases. In some of the cases, the 
Tribunal's Chambers have tried to create a balance by having regard to 
the "merits" or circumstances relevant to those cases which had the effect 
of reducing the amount of the compensation payable dramatically. This
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approach has not been limited to Iran-U.S. disputes. In cases, such as 
Aminoil, the Tribunal considered that the determination of the amount of 
an award of 'appropriate' compensation was better carried out by means 
of an "enquiry into all the circumstances relevant to the particular 
concrete case," as was emphasized in Article 2(c) of the Charter of the
382Economic Rights and Duties of States. The Tribunal clearly failed to 
have regard to all the elements involved in the Iranian expropriations and 
which had created a new set of circumstances.
In some cases the Tribunal became more conservative, by applying 
the international minimum standard rules, than the leading capitalist 
countries of the world like the United States. According to the 1987 
formulation of the American Restatement of the Law, in the absence of a 
special circumstances, what is required by international law is "just 
compensation where the property of an alien has been taken by the
383State. The Tribunal in some cases did not even recognize the Iranian 
revolution as a special circumstance, and did not consider what effect if 
any that event ought to have on the compensation amounts payable to the 
claimants. The Tribunal applied the rules which were not even accepted 
by the U.S. Federal Court of Appeal in Banco National de Cuba v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank in which the Court rejected "the going concern
1 „ 384value .
One of the other defects of the Tribunal was its uncertainty whether 
to use the Treaty of Amity between Iran and the United States. Some 
cases were decided on the basis of customary international law, although it
382- Aminoil Case, 2 1 1.L.M., 1982, p. 976.
383- Restatement of the Law: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
1987, Section 712(1), pp. 196-209.
384- Banco National de Cuba v. Chase Manharran Bank, 658 Federal Reporter .2d
875 (2d Cir. 1981).
■ ig :
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had also been held that the Treaty standard and the customary standard 
were similar, In others, the treaty was regarded as distinct from 
customary international law. In some other cases, the treaty was rejected 
as the applicable law by the Tribunal.
The contradictions which existed in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal's 
decisions are important, because they have been awarded by a single 
Tribunal and relate to the expropriation measures taken by one country; 
and sometimes this contradiction could be seen in the statements and 
approach of even one of the Chambers of the Tribunal. For example, 
that restitutio in integrum is not a remedy for a lawful expropriation was 
evidently accepted by the Tribunal, in so far as it did not even 
contemplate or discuss the remedy even where it was offered by the 
respondent, Iran.^*^
As far as this work is concerned, the contention is that in post­
revolution Iranian expropriations, there are many elements which ought 
to have been taken into account by the Tribunal, which nevertheless were 
ignored by the Tribunal.
The decisions of the Tribunal are mostly short, unreasoned, and 
without a careful analysis of the law and the facts. They were mostly 
based on the Treaty of Amity, and contribute little to the law of 
expropriation.
Iran never denied the duty to pay compensation for the 
expropriations, and the law of Iran is very clear in this regard, providing 
that in the case of illegal takings even damage should be paid. However,
385- Sola Tiles Inc. Case is of those cases which contains self-contradiction.
386- Khan R., The Iran-United States Claim Tribunal: Controversies, Cases and
Contribution, Dordrecht, 1990, p. 248; the Starrett Housing Corp., 16 Iran- 
U.S.C.T.R., 1987, p. 112.
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under Iranian law, the property and the contractual rights obtained must 
be legitimate, based on the law in a real competitive way and without the 
aim to dominate politically or exploit the society economically. 
Moreover, the parties to the contracts and agreements must adhere to 
certain conditions to create a legal entity which would be recognized by 
Iranian laws. There are four conditions which require to be satisfied. In 
respect to the U.S. nationals' property, three of the four conditions were 
lacking. As was explained in the previous chapter on oil nationalizations, 
in some of them such as the oil contracts, they even lack the fourth 
condition.
One of the most important conditions is the legal capacity of the 
parties to the contracts. The Shah, like the rulers in many of the 
developing countries, was not an elected person and was ruling the 
country autocratically. His power was gained, at least since 1953, through 
the CIA coup d'etat. As the revolution indicated, he was not the 
representative of the people of Iran and his authority was not derived 
from the will of people to enter into agreements with other countries on 
behalf of the nation. Moreover, the contracts with the U.S. nationals were 
privileged as a reward to the support of their government to the Shah's 
regime. Therefore, private contracts with American nationals and the 
Treaty of Amity should be considered in this regard.
The behaviour of the United States in Iran was contrary to the aims 
of the United Nations to establish conditions, based on the equal rights of 
nations large and small to self-determination, under which justice and 
respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of 
international law could be maintained. Therefore, in the interest of the 
principles of international law, the rights to self-determination, human 
rights, the Tribunal should have renounced such a treaty and the
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contracts. In doing so, it might have discouraged other States from 
ignoring the rights of other nations to self-determination, and in 
consequence, dictators might loose the courage and opportunity to deprive 
their peoples of democracy and freedom.
' Therefore, Iranian Government has been ready to pay full 
compensation for the taking of any property in so far as the property had 
been originally gained legitimately. Is the taking of the U.S. property, if 
not a total, then a partial vindication of the privileges granted to U.S. 
nationals by the Shah's regime. The less controversial settlement of the 
takings of the property of nationals of the other countries might be seen to 
provide evidence for this conclusion.
There are a great many defects in the work and the decisions of the
387Tribunal, and they have been the subject of criticism internationally. 
Indeed, some commentators have called the Tribunal's treatment of the 
issues presented to it as so laconic, uninformative and unexplained that it 
forces one to consider the limits on the role of law in the Tribunal's 
decisions.^**
Consequently, there is little of conclusive value that can be gleaned 
from the Tribunal's decisions to support a particular standard, and the 
decisions of the Tribunal on compensation in large scale nationalization 
cases are nothing more than a mockery of the principles of international 
law on political and economic self-determination.
387_ Amerasinghe is one of them. See in Isues of Compensation for the Taking of 
Alien Property in the Light of Recent Cases and Practice, op. cit., pp. 22-65. 
388- Gray C. D., Judicial Remedies in International Law, Oxford, 1987, p. 183; 
Stein T. L., Jurisprudence and jurists' Prudence: The Iranian Forum Clause 
Decisions of the Iran-U.S.C.T., 78 A.J.I.L., 1984, p. 2; see also Piran H„ 
‘ Nationalisation of Foreign Property in International Law and Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal, op. cit., chapter 7.
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CONCLUSION
Expropriation existed long in history and will continue to do so as 
long as property and property laws exist. Expropriation occurs whenever 
there is a conviction in a society that a certain class of property should not 
be owned by private ownership. This conviction could emerge, as it has, 
in all kinds of societies.
The common feature in this branch of international law, namely the 
responsibility of States for injuries to property of aliens, is, and always 
has been, that, in most cases, there are no common grounds on which 
everyj)ody agrees and expropriations in developing countries have given 
rise to more controversy than in the other States. There is no historical 
evidence that there has been any rule on expropriation universally 
acceptable to all States, and differences of opinion are still the rule in this 
area of international law. The oldest restrictions upon the power of 
taking property emerged on the basis of "justa causa". These restrictions, 
which were developed during the Middle Ages, included the concepts of 
public utility and payment of compensation, and found expression in the 
domestic context within charters, decrees and constitutions. The rules 
varied as between different States and did not follow any constant course 
even within the one State.
Up until the Second World War, few expropriations actually took 
place and those few tended to be of an individual nature. The changes in 
the world economic order, particularly in the period immediately after 
1945, resulted in the emergence of a new form of taking, according to
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which most of the developing States asserted the right to exercise their 
political and economic independence. That was a clear departure from 
the traditional rules which were asserted by developed States and 
differences between developed and developing States on the issue clearly 
emerged.
Before the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions during the 
1960s and 1970s, the history of expropriation indicates that no time at 
which the question of the State’s responsibility towards aliens for the 
expropriation of their property is settled. In the Hague Codification 
Conference of 1930, the difference among the participants regarding the 
two standards of "national treatment" and "international minimum 
standard" was the main reason for the failure of that conference. The two 
main theories, the international minimum standard and the national 
treatment standard, thus reflect two completely different points of view 
based on different economic and political systems. Both have been 
developed with regard to the particular legal circumstances prevailing in 
certain States and, accordingly, neither of them can be implemented 
universally so as to provide a safeguard for the interests of all of the 
members of the international community and their nationals. Indeed, 
neither theory would alone be sufficient to bring justice and prosperity to 
the international community; nor, moreover, has either been incorporated 
into international law so as to have direct effect within the domestic 
spliere. The lack of a uniform approach is further demonstrated by the 
fact that, in some legal systems, the inviolable character of private 
property is affirmed, while in others the concept of private property is 
considered an undesirable and ought not to be countenanced.
Overriding each theory in favour of the other would not solve the 
problem which exist in the international society. The international
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minimum standard rules developed among the Western countries and have 
been practiced to some extent by those States. However, they could not be 
acceptable to developing States which comprise the majority of members 
of the international community, and are usually politically deprived, 
economically backward and have had no role in the creation and 
development of those rules. Therefore, the view expressed to the effect 
that the issue of the State's international obligation towards aliens was 
fully settled before World War II, cannot be correct and it is submitted 
that it was during the 1960s and 1970s that a concordance of opinions 
emerged among the international community of nations regarding the 
subject.
For the reasons presented in this thesis, the theory of acquired 
rights also cannot provide a reliable legal basis for the determination of 
the duties of States, particularly developing States, in their dealings with 
the property of aliens.
One theory common to all States, however, is the theory of unjust 
enrichment. Despite the slight differences which might exist over this 
concept in the municipal laws of States, it is arguable that the equitable 
character of the principle is capable of providing a proper legal 
foundation upon which the duty of States towards aliens' property might 
be based and of preventing aliens from exploiting the resources of the 
host State. Human rights theory provides the most acceptable rules of 
international law in this regard and might be useful in resolving 
controversies over the rules of expropriation. To establish a creative, 
equitable and effective balance between the demand for socio-economic 
reforms and private interests. States have to reach an agreement on the 
basis of these principles and consider the rights and duties of both foreign 
investors and the host States in that regard. Otherwise, States would have
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different interpretations of these principles which would cause 
controversies between States. Thus, developed States might so interpret 
the right to ownership, for example, as implying payment of full 
compensation for the expropriation of the property of their nationals, 
while developing States might interpret it so as to prevent aliens from any 
further exploitation of their natural resources. The difference in 
approach is not mainly caused by defects of the rules, but by the kind of 
relations which exist between States. Therefore, to protect the rights of 
aliens and host States equally, particularly in developing countries, the 
behaviour;^ of the aliens and their governments in those countries should 
also be taken into account.
The controversy which exists over the international principles and 
rules of expropriation between different groups of States has been 
manifested in the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on sovereignty over natural resources. Despite all efforts of the 
United Nations to create a balance between the interests of different 
groups of States, States remain divided over the principles and rules 
which ought to govern their rights and duties towards aliens within this 
sphere. The success apparently achieved in those resolutions was that the 
concept of the permanent and inalienable sovereignty of States over their 
their natural resources became a universally accepted principle of 
international law. But, other principles raised in those Resolutions, such 
as the issue of compensation were rendered largely nugatory by the 
interpretations placed upon them by the States of the terms inserted in 
those resolutions. To achieve unanimity in the United Nations, these rules 
would require to be founded on the very basic principles of international 
law such as human rights, equity, justice, self-determination and so on.
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acceptable to all States. By application of those principles, the Resolutions 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations on sovereignty over 
natural resources would become more practical at a universal level. 
Accordingly, the legal consequences of those rules would vary 
considerably in different groups of States without doing any injustice to 
either interested party. That is the only possible way to establish the rules 
contained in the United Nations' Resolutions as universal rules.
As has been indicated, the confusion and disagreement increases in 
respect of expropriation of contractual rights and the sanctity of contracts. 
There is no doubt that contracts and treaties play a major role in 
international economic relations between States. In fact, they constitute 
the backbone of those relations and make the international flow of goods 
and services possible. In the absence of any truly international law of 
contract. State contracts are usually guaranteed explicitly or implicitly 
through international treaties between States to treat the alien investors 
according to certain standards. Developed States' guarantees, if any, are 
part of their ordinary practice in their societies. But, such guarantees by 
developing countries are usually for different reasons and controversy has 
arisen over contracts betweèn^hose States and aliens. Developed States, 
for the reasons mentioned, do not usually find it necessary to amend their 
contracts with aliens. However, where amendments to contractual terms 
have been required, it has not been a problem for them to do that and 
those States have had always full control over those contracts. But, the 
legal character of such contracts in developing States is quite different 
from those in developed States and there are various reasons which force 
developing States to end their contracts with some of aliens.
Moreover, there is, as yet, no clear-cut principle by means of which 
it may be determined whether a measure taken by a State in fact
C o n c l u s i o n  4 0 8
constitutes a lawful expropriation or whether it ought more probably to 
be considered an illegal breach of contract. It has been more problematic 
where States ended the privileged terms of contracts with aliens. In such 
cases, aliens were reluctant to relinquish privileges which they had 
hitherto taken for granted. Investor countries have sometimes prevented 
developing States from dealing with the takings as a rightful exercise of 
sovereignty but, instead, they have usually resorted to characterizing the 
taking as breach of contract. The different legal consequences of lawful 
expropriation from illegal breach of contract makes it necessary to make 
a clear distinction between the two concepts. Thus, for example, with 
regard to the expropriation of the contractual rights of individuals, 
treating a mere breach of contract as an international wrong would have 
been both confusing and unnecessary, particularly when breaching the 
contract in force between a State and aliens has become the practice even 
of some developed States, as the act of a responsible government towards 
the nation. Therefore, any plea of breach of contract in this regard would 
represent a deviation from the rules of the sovereign right of 
expropriation.
As was indicated earlier, judicial decisions have not only failed to 
solve this problem, but have increased the confusion over what is a 
rightful exercise of expropriation rights and what is an illegal breach of a 
contract.
In order finally to resolve this controversy, some factors would 
require to be taken into account. For instance, it is clear that 
'establishment treaties' have not always been respected by developing 
countries, and they have been problematic where imposed on the weak or 
dependent States to safeguard the interests of alien investors.
However, the treaties concluded between States have not followed a
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single pattern, and some of them have been violated by the host States, 
There is no serious defect in the treaties between developed States and 
consequently they have almost without exception remained intact. It is 
likely that the traditional rules of expropriation could be followed even 
without the existence of such treaties between those countries. Most of the 
establishment treaties have been concluded between developed and 
developing States, the very conclusion of which indicates that the rules on 
expropriation of foreign property have not yet been established 
universally,
■ Apart from bilateral establishment treaties, there is no other rule of 
State contract in international society, and the contracts governed by those 
treaties have been left to the test of the strength of the parties to those 
contracts. While clever and powerful investors choose countries for 
investment carefully in order to reduce their investment risks and secure 
their future interests, developing countries are unable to act quite so 
prudently. Therefore, to gain privileged contracts, the investors 
invariably choose so-called ’friendly countries' which are almost 
invariably dependent countries under the direct influence of the investors' 
countries. Iran has concluded such contracts since the beginning of this 
century. It was for this reason that the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran ended the privileged contracts with aliens, particularly 
those concluded with United States nationals. It was argued that contracts 
concluded between aliens or their governments and dependent countries 
lacked the requisite element of free will and consent and, consequently, 
could not be considered as legitimate. It would seem to follow from this 
that the very capacity of such governments to enter international 
obligations is questionable.
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Meanwhile, treaties between States, whatever their content, do not 
provide evidence for the conclusion that aliens have become in any way 
the subject of public international law, and any analogy between 
international treaties and State contracts which might be drawn in this 
respect would be irrelevant.
Moreover, although the international practice of States is often 
thought to be based upon the sovereign equality of States in accordance 
with the U.N, Charter, the reality is that developing countries do not 
enjoy such equality. While doubtless aware of this, international judges, 
nevertheless, for reasons better known to themselves, ignore this reality. 
Developing countries are not ready to accept that such a practice might 
become a custom in international relations and try to strike back at any 
suitable time.
Therefore, it might be concluded that the sanctity of contracts as a 
preventive element for nationalization of the property of aliens is 
becoming increasingly less important and any attempt to internationalize 
their sanctity, applicable to all States, seems without any legal foundation. 
To end this confusion and ambiguity over State contracts, it is necessary 
to reach agreement upon definite principles and rules of expropriation of 
State contracts by means of a multilateral treaty.
Therefore, under international law, one could not assert that all 
States should respect aliens' property in accordance with certain 
standards. The principles asserted by developed States are not without 
legal foundation, but they are applicable only to the same group of 
countries which comprise the sponsors of those principles. If those States 
expropriate aliens' property and contractual rights in a discriminatory 
fashion, not for public purposes and in the absence of compensation, 
contrary to the principles of their liberal economy, they could be held
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liable for those measures. Controversy has frequently arisen from 
attempts by the sponsors of the principles of the international minimum 
standard to extend those principles to developing States, because under 
colonial type relations between developed and developing countries, aliens 
enjoyed maximum privileges in developing States. To bring an end to 
what they saw as a discriminatory position of aliens, developing States 
dispossessed those aliens. In such a discriminatory situation, any non- 
discriminatory measures taken by developing States would themselves 
constitute illegitimate discrimination against the non-privileged ones. 
Therefore, it has not been appropriate for developing States to act 
according to the international minimum standard rules of non­
discrimination, Essentially, the dispute over this principle was raised 
when a regime had changed in a country somewhat violently and the 
discriminatory measures against aliens have been taken intentionally.
It might be argued therefore, that an expropriation measure ought 
not to be condemned, particularly in developing States, on the grounds of 
its discriminatory nature. The practice of developing States in this regard 
should not be considered as an exception, but as the rule which 
characteristically applies to this group of countries. For, it would be 
based on those same cardinal principles as is the rule of non­
discrimination in developed States.
Judicial decisions regarding the issue of the illegality of 
discrimination as against aliens are far from clear and consistent. What is 
certain, however, is that ’equal States' must be treated equally and that the 
different treatment of 'unequal States' is admissible. The concept of non­
discrimination has been used internationally to prevent any injustice to 
aliens. However, its application in developing States is arguably contrary 
to its purpose. It has been for this reason that many States have ignored
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the principle when they have expropriated aliens' property. What has 
been regarded as illegal under international law is racial discrimination 
and any discrimination which violates human rights expressed through 
international conventions.
. The principle of public utility has been less controversial. 
However, the serious blow to the principle is that the sole judge of the 
measures is the expropriating State itself. While international law is 
indifferent in application of the principle of public utility, there is no 
international authority to question the legitimacy of an expropriation on 
this basis.
The approaches of the various States to the issue of payment of 
compensation are very controversial, being not frequently diametrically 
opposed to one another. The reason is that each group of States has 
mostly tried to apply the rules derived from certain conditions which are 
appropriate for certain groups of States to all expropriation cases equally. 
Thç traditional approach to the question of compensation initially 
developed in the free economic system of the West. All legal systems 
have accepted that, in principle, the enrichment of one party at the 
expense of another party is broadly unacceptable. This principle is one of 
the appropriate means of assessing the issue of compensation provided that 
the rule is applied to both expropriating and expropriated parties and not 
against one party in favour of the other interested party. There are few 
cases, if any, in which the behaviour of aliens in developing States have 
been considered and the responsibility of the expropriating States decided 
accordingly.
Therefore, the differences of opinion and diversity of international 
awards, together with the variety of different agreements on the issue of
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compensation are indicative of the impracticability of the existing rules on 
expropriation applicable to all States. Therefore, it is inevitable to 
classify expropriation cases according to different groups of States. Such 
a classification, would not only require to be based upon the measures 
taken by expropriating States but would also require to take account of the 
behaviour of the investors and their governments within developing 
States. Accordingly, expropriation cases might be classified into three 
broad categories;
1 - Cases in which the parties are in an equal bargaining and negotiation 
position, or where the expropriating State has the upper hand in taking the 
measures. Expropriation in developed States falls within this category of 
cases. It is expected from developed States, and it has been mostly the 
practice of those States, to compensate fully aliens for the taking of their 
property. The practice of those States has been demanded by their own 
economic system, and they are expected to do so, because any contrary 
action would result in gross injustice to the expropriated individuals. It is 
not justifiable for those States to do otherwise while they are in full 
control of their economy and have a number of options for foreign 
investments, and foreign investments, if any, enter those States under their 
full authority.
2 - Expropriation cases which have usually arisen when States obtained 
their independence from colonial powers. Expropriation in these 
countries was considered as revindication of their natural resources and 
national wealth. These countries usually resisted any condition to be 
fulfilled for taking of property of colonial States and their nationals. 
Therefore, it is difficult to impose any condition as legal obligation on 
this group of cases of expropriation.
3 - Developing States are apparently independent but they often do not
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have the superiority in expropriating aliens' property. The obligations of 
developing States should be reduced accordingly as changes in relations 
increasingly favour the aliens. Developing States generally find 
themselves acting under either direct or indirect duress in concluding 
contracts or admitting foreign investments into their country. Further, 
their economic needs are a direct pressure upon them, and the inefficient 
and dependent governments of those States are a further burden upon 
those nations. This has been, in the main, the reason which has so 
frequently obliged developing States to accept the conditions imposed by 
foreign investors to submit to economic domination by the more 
developed States. Payment of compensation to alien investors by 
developing countries should be considered in the light of these realities. 
Therefore, when these countries develop politically and economically they 
are not prepared to continue their previous economic relations with 
aliens. When they find an opportunity, they expropriate^' alien property, 
the latter being seen by them as an obstacle to their development; and they 
resist the demand for payment of compensation in respect of that the 
taking of which they consider as merely revindication of their inalienable 
rights. In reality, of course, alien investors usually take account of such 
risks, and often manage to gain very high revenue to redeem their 
investments within a relatively short space of time. Moreover, an 
investor will often demand compensation for such investments on the basis 
of their value as a going concern prior to expropriation. But, it is 
obvious that compensating such investments causes injustice to developing 
countries.
In fact, application of different rules for expropriation in 
developing States should be considered as an indemnity for the lack of 
sovereignty which developing States ought to have been accorded. The
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extent of the problem posed by failure to accord proper sovereignty 
becomes apparent from an examination of the Resolutions of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on Sovereignty of States over Natural 
Resources. The very approval of those resolutions indicates that, up to 
1952, the sovereignty of States over natural resources, as a component of 
the right to self-determination was not accorded to all States. That is 
clear evidence that application of the traditional rules in developing 
countries has been without any legal foundation.
The contradictory positions of developed and developing States in 
the resolutions of the United Nations' General Assembly on Sovereignty 
of States over Natural Resources respectively were compromised by 
insertion of terms such as "appropriate" for payment of compensation 
which in fact did not solve any problem. For, what has been appropriate 
for developing States has been inappropriate for developed countries, and 
vice versa and might have had vital consequences for both groups of 
States. Therefore, the responsibility of each group of States needs to be 
formulated so as to satisfy the interests of all parties involved in 
expropriation of aliens' property.
States have tried somehow to safeguard their interests through 
settlement agreements. But those agreements have not followed any one 
pattern, for, in the conclusion of those agreements many different 
elements have been taken into account. Each party to the agreement, by 
accepting some obligations, usually obtain some rights. However, the 
agreements between developed States indicate that they have applied the 
rules nearly to international minimum standards. They are distinctly 
different from those agreements concluded between developed and 
developing States. In such agreements, the parties usually do not mention
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the factors which have been taken into account and the difficulty of 
agreeing upon the elements involved in those agreements and identifying 
the exact responsibility of States towards expropriated aliens remains. 
Although many of the agreements between developing and developed 
States were not concluded as a result of some strongly held conviction on 
the part of the expropriating States, nevertheless a comparison between 
the claims of alien investors and the terms they agreed on with developing 
States are enough to conclude that, similar to GATT agreements, some 
privileges have been granted to developing States. Thus, it is necessary to 
classify the rules with regard to expropriations of aliens' property in 
accordance with the conditions of each group of States,
The same conclusion could also be reached from the case study of 
expropriation of aliens' property. The investments from developed 
States, particularly those from dominating States, have been treated 
differently by developing States. They have refused to comply with the 
traditional rules, and their rebellion against international minimum 
standards has been, for the most part, fully justified. While 
expropriations in developed States are usually undertaken with a view to 
the benefit of the public, in developing States, they are undertaken with 
the additional motives of preventing any more economic exploitation and 
gaining increased political independence.
That was the case with regard to the Iranian expropriations when 
Iran expropriated the AlOC and aliens' property in the post-1979 period. 
The expropriation of the oil industry in 1952 was a part of the struggle to 
gain control over the industry and to reduce the influence of the company 
and its government on the country. Despite the fact that Iran had clearly 
indicated her willingness to compensate the company, a coup d' etat was 
managed with the help of the CIA, in order to regain the privileged
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position of the company within Iran. The post-Revolution expropriations 
of property, particularly United States nationals' property, was then a 
response to that coup d' etat, which ended in the domination of the United 
States over Iran, and put U.S. nationals in a privileged position in the 
country.
The judicial authorities issued contradictory judgements over the oil 
nationalization in Iran. Their approaches and the conclusions provide 
probably the clearest evidence in support of our argument that there is not 
as yet any universal rule on expropriation of aliens’ property. They also 
indicate that the rules asserted in Western countries are not applicable to 
countries such as Iran. The nationalization measures were not challenged 
by international authorities or the neutral courts in Tokyo and Rome. 
Later events indicated that the dispute between Iran and the AIOC  was 
not over the amount of compensation to be paid for legal or illegal taking 
of the property of the AIOC, but that the company was not satisfied with 
less than restoring its previous position disregard to the Iranian sovereign 
rights to nationalize the company. Generally, as a result of the quasi­
colonial relations which existed between Iran and Britain on the one hand 
and Iran and the United States on the other hand, their nationals were 
rewarded for their support for the Shah by privileged contracts. The 
admission of other investors and the conclusion of the Treaty of Amity 
between Iran and the United States were a part of that reward for U.S. 
support. The privileged position of those aliens had created a distinctive 
condition which was not common in developed States. Iran nationalized 
the AIO C, but the result was not much different. For, the measures 
were enforced again by a coup d' etat regime which did not manifest the 
riglit to the self-determination of the people. As a consequence, after the 
1979 revolution, Iran, in fact, renationalized the oil industry and
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implicitly rejected the legitimacy of the contractual rights of U.S. 
nationals.
A diversity of rules on expropriation of alien property can be seen 
in the agreements between Iran and the United States and in the decisions 
of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. The Tribunal was given the option to 
apply many various kinds of rules which were not common practice of 
States. Some of the disputes were decided by the Tribunal on the basis of 
the law of contracts, some others were decided upon the basis of the treaty 
of Amity and international law, and the authorities and references used by 
the Tribunal were not uniform and consistent. The Tribunal was 
uncertain whether to use or omit the Treaty of Amity between the two 
countries. In some cases it was held that the Treaty standard and the 
customary standard are similar. In others, the Treaty was distinguished 
from customary international law, and in some other cases it was rejected 
by the Tribunal as representing the applicable law.
The Tribunal largely ignored the clearly discriminatory character 
of some of the expropriation of property belonging to U.S. nationals, and 
never seriously questioned the appropriateness of the purposes for which 
expropriations had been undertaken. As a result, the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal has really only been productive of greatly increased confusion 
with regard to the international rules on the question of expropriation.
There are numerous defects in both the procedures and decisions of 
the Tribunal, and they have, of course, been criticised internationally.^ 
In particular, the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal in their application of 
the compensation rules appears, at times, highly questionable proceeding 
occasionally upon a clear misrepresentation of international authorities
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such as the decisions of the I.C J, The Tribunal attempted to avoid 
controversy by applying such a standard as "appropriate" or "just" 
compensation payable for the expropriated property and in so doing, 
admittedly, avoided the adoption of a rigid position in all cases. Indeed, 
in some of the cases, the Tribunal clearly sought to create a balance 
between the interests of the parties by taking account of the "merits" or 
particular circumstances relative to each case, which had the effect of 
reducing dramatically the amount of the compensation payable. The 
Tribunal clearly failed to take account of all the elements which were 
relevant to the Iranian expropriations. They, for example, failed to take 
into account the privileges which had been enjoyed by the United States’ 
nationals in Iran, in order to protect the rights and interests of a 
developing country like Iran and thereby to challenge the attitudes of 
developed States towards developing ones. The Tribunal was even 
reluctant to recognize the 1979 revolution in Iran as a special 
circumstance. In some cases, the Tribunal, applying the international 
minimum standard rules, demonstrated an attitude more markedly 
conservative than the leading capitalist States like the United States. As a 
consequence, the decisions of the Tribunal became self-contradictory and 
irreconcilable. The importance of the contradictions in the decisions of 
the Tribunal is that they were awarded by a single tribunal and relate to 
the expropriation measures taken by one State and, at times, 
contradictions in awards could be seen in the statements and approaches of 
even one of the chambers of the Tribunal. Moreover, the decisions of the 
Tribunal are usually short, unreasoned and lacking in any detailed analysis 
of the law or indeed, the facts. Therefore, it is not always helpful to try 
to provide support for the application of a particular standard by
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reference to the decisions of the Tribunal.
Iran, a party to the Tribunal, has not been happy with the outputs of 
the Tribunal and is unlikely to participate in any repeat of such an 
experience again. The reason for the adoption of this attitude is that Iran 
considers the taking of the U.S. nationals' property, if not a total, then a 
partial vindication of the privileges granted to U.S. nationals by the Shah's 
regime and nothing more than that. The less controversial settlement of 
disputes over the taking of property between the nationals of other 
countries and Iran are further evidence of such a conclusion.
Therefore, resort to the traditional rules of expropriation was 
irrelevant and improper, and without taking account of some important 
factors it is difficult to establish the responsibility of Iran towards 
American investors. It is, perhaps,unfortunate that the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal has paid little attention to the arguably irresponsible measures of 
the United States government on supporting an undemocratic regime in 
Iran while in many cases the Tribunal declared the Treaty of Amity 
binding on Iran. All these elements together has created a hostile 
relationship between the two countries which, according to the United 
Nations Charter, should have been avoided.
In fact, the work of the Tribunal has not in the main proved helpful 
in developing international law, having instead increased the confusion 
already existing with regard to the rules appropriate to govern this area 
of international law. The Tribunal, despite possessing a unique 
opportunity, was not successful in producing a corpus of precedent 
worthy of its being followed in other disputes. The Tribunal's decisions 
on the State's responsibility for injuries to aliens fell short of being the 
kind of scholarly decisions which many observers would hoped to. 
Arguably, its only positive contribution to international law has been the
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fact that it has highlighted the need for different formulations of 
expropriation rules in developed and developing States. However, it 
should be praised that the Tribunal is fairly a symbol of the peaceful 
settlement of disputes between two nations with different legal structure 
and antagonistic political systems.
It might, therefore, be argued that the rules governing 
expropriation, at least in so far as they relate to the nationals of countries 
with a bargaining power equal to that of the expropriating country, 
regardless of the degree of economic development of those countries, 
could be, to some extent, those of the international minimum standard. In 
such cases, there is no reason to expropriate the property of aliens without 
public need, but to deprive them from their property. Any discrimination 
towards such owners would be productive of a very unjust and 
unacceptable situation which can neither be seen as necessary nor 
desirable from the point of view of either domestic legal systems or 
international society.
Similar rules would be applicable in respect of the question of 
compensation. The practice and arguments indicate that there is less 
contest on the payment of compensation when the parties begin from an 
equal bargaining position and have less political and economic influence 
on each other. The protests are mostly against those expropriations which 
do not have such characteristics, such as those undertaken in Iran and 
other developing countries, where the property expropriated belonged to 
aliens from more powerful countries which had political and economical 
influence within the expropriating country.
Therefore, to deal with the question of expropriation and its most 
important aspect, that is, compensation, it is not impossible to propose a 
specific and definite standard which would apply to all instances.
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However, the proposed rules are required to comprise different contents 
to enable a judge, for example, to render an equitable judgement in a 
specific case. To do so, in a certain case some elements should be taken 
into account. The payments on agreed terms which are a result of the 
compromise of the parties somehow reflect the influence of those 
elements. They are remarkably helpful where investors are looking for 
compensation as a remedy for damage and demand for future profits, and 
countries like Iran attempt to prevent any more exploitation of their 
resources.
Therefore, in order to create a com prehensive rule for 
expropriation of aliens' property acceptable to all States, the following 
formula is suggested to establish the responsibility of States on a just and 
equitable basis and one presumably satisfactory to the parties affected by 
the expropriation.
Thus, the responsibility of States for expropriation of aliens 
property might be based upon the application of that most 
incontrovertible of principles, namely, that nobody should suffer loss as a 
result of the fault of another, to both the expropriated parties and to the 
expropriating States. Therefore, it is submitted, in assessing the 
responsibility of developing States towards aliens account should be taken 
of the following elements:
1 - The legality of the contracts between aliens and the host State and 
related treaties, and the presence of the aliens' property in the light of the 
conditions as those which were mentioned in the Iranian expropriations. 
To become certain of the legality of investment contracts and treaties 
between States and aliens on the one hand, and between States on the other 
hand, some criteria ought to be introduced in order to enable
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consideration of the existing contracts and hence provide guidance for 
both States and aliens with regard to their future investments.
2 - The degree of bargaining power of the host country with the investors 
and their govemment/s. This is to be considered with regard to all 
economic, political and other aspects of the issue.
3 - The risk which the business might involve and which the investors 
usually take into account when investing in another country which 
include, inter alia, the political risk.
4 - The political influence of the investors and their govemment/s on the 
regime of the host State, which has created encouraging conditions for a 
group of investors to invest in those States which enables those investors 
to gain a lot of profit. From this point of view, not only must the 
responsibility of the host States be considered, but also the behaviour of 
the investors. This aspect of the issue was of the greatest importance in 
the assessment of the Iranian expropriations.
5 - The right to development and the balance of payments situation of the 
expropriating country. This is not a legitimate reason for non-payment of 
compensation, but it could be taken into account in respect of the other 
elements. For example, the degree to which the presence of aliens' 
investments have used the hard currency of that country. This, of course, 
would affect the manner of payment of compensation by the country, and 
might oblige that country not to expropriate a section of the economy 
which would make it impossible to pay compensation in hard currencies. 
The host State might be obliged to expropriate only a small portion of its 
economy and consequently, the expropriations become discriminatory, 
and compensation be paid with delay.
6 - The legal ability of the host State, as well as the level of market and 
technical information of that country. These are the advantages of
-fi
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developed States while developing States usually lack such abilities.
7 - The amount of profit (excess profit), and losses of the investment 
which is important to the developing countries. This could be partially or 
totally a result of the above mentioned abilities.
8 - The privileged position of the investors and the effects of their 
presence on the rights of the people for economic and political self- 
determination. This is one of the more important considerations and 
ought not to be ignored. Giving weight to this consideration would 
discourage the practice whereby both aliens and their governments use 
their political influence to gain privileged contracts, and they would avoid 
supporting undemocratic regimes for this purpose. It would help to 
spread democracy throughout the world and strengthen international 
peace and security.
By taking into account the above mentioned elements and principles, 
it would not be difficult to indicate the responsibility of States towards 
aliens' property. It would at least facilitate the search for rules on the 
basis of which it might be judged whether an expropriating State had 
taken an illegal measure or not. Conversely, taking such elements into 
consideration might also allow a judge in a particular case to decide that 
discriminatory measures directed against individual businesses are in fact, 
lawful. He might decide that any payment of compensation to the investor 
would result in his unjust enrichment, thus effectively barring claims for 
compensation whether in full or in part. In this way treaties with 
undemocratic regimes might equally be declared null and void. On the 
other hand, the same judge might decide, given a particular case which 
lacked any of the above elements, that the expropriating State had a 
responsibility to compensate fully the aliens for their expropriated 
property or investments. This does not mean to discriminate between the
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developed and developing countries, but it is to strike a balance between 
the interest of the parties to prevent any unjust enrichment of one party at 
the expense of the other. The contradictions apparent in the judgements 
of the judicial bodies including those of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal can 
not be explained except upon the basis that some of the Chambers, have 
taken into account some of the above mentioned elements, while others 
have not.
It follows that it is necessary to differentiate lawful measures of 
expropriation from illegal breaches of contract and confiscatory acts. 
The different consequences of each should be precisely determined in 
order to prevent any more confusion in dealing with such measures. To 
do so, it is necessary for international organizations to sponsor such rules 
in order to protect the interests of all States. Any agreement however 
limited in extent, which might achieved in this regard would represent a 
great success for the international community. Otherwise, the question of 
expropriation, as a right of States to organize their economies, would be 
misused and the gains of developing States in expropriating aliens’ 
investments would be limited to the risks of those businesses. The rules of 
expropriation created on the basis of these suggested elements would 
enable people to exercise their rights to economic self-determination 
recognized by international law. Thus, dictators might find it more 
difficult to deprive their nations of the right to self-determination, with 
the consequence that the bloody cycle of revolutions and coups d'etat 
might at last, come to an end. The result might be a more stable and 
peaceful international society, something which would benefit every body, 
including the investors who require stability and low risks to encourage 
them to invest.
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However, all this will only be possible when the international 
society manages to come to some sort of agreement, as they did to a 
certain extent on "the law of treaty" and to a lesser degree on the "sale of 
goods", which would regulate the rules on the rights and responsibilities 
of all States with regard to aliens and their property. There seems to be 
no reason why they could not reach an agreement similar to the GATT 
one or even a more radical agreement which might satisfy all groups of 
the countries. Without such an agreement or convention, however, the 
confusion surrounding the rules of expropriation will continue so that 
those rules expressed by arbitrators, courts and lawyers will be seen as 
little more than reflections of particular systems of thought and State 
interests and thus having no binding status as universal rules of 
international law.
* * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * *
* * *
*
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APPENDIX I
TEXTS OF THE LAWS NATIONALIZING THE OIL INDUSTRY IN
IRAN, 1951 
The Single article Law of March 20, 1951
For the Happiness and Prosperity of the Iranian Nation and for the purpose of 
securing world peace, it is hereby resolved that the oil industry throughout all parts of the 
country, without exception, be nationalized; that is to say, all operations of exploration, 
extraction and exploitation shall be carried out by the Government,
passed by the Majlis on March 15, 1951, and by the Senate on march 20, 1951.
Signed and promulgated by the Shah May 1,1951.
Source o f text: Ford A. W., The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, op. cit., Appendix
IV, p. 268.
Law regulating Nationalization of the oil Industry
1) For the purpose of regulating the execution of the Law of 20th March which 
nationalizes the Oil industry throughout the country, a Mixed Board shall be formed.This 
Board shall be consist of five members of the senate and five deputies of the Majlis to be 
elected by each of these two bodies, the minister of Finance in office or his deputy, and 
one other person to be selected by the Government.
2) Under the supervision of the Mixed board the Government is charged to remove 
forthwith the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company from control of the Oil industry of the 
country; should the Company make its claim for compensation an excuse to forestall 
prompt delivery, the Government may deposit up to 25% of the current income, less cost 
of production, in the Bank Melli or any bank acceptable to both parties to secure the 
claim.
3) Under supervision of the Mixed Board the Government is charged to investigate 
the lawful and rightful claims of the Government as well as those of the Company, to 
report its views therein to the two House of Parliament and upon ratification to give effect 
thereto.
4) From Esfand 20th 1329 [March 20,1951] when the Bill for the nationalization of 
the oil industry received the ratification of the Senate, the Iranian nation being lawfully 
and unquestionably entitled to the entire earning derived from Oil and Oil Products, the 
Government, under the supervision of the Mixed Board, is charged to investigate and 
check the accounts of the Company; similarly, the Mixed Board must meticulously 
supervise the exploitation of the Oil resources fi'om the date this Law went into effect until 
the appointment of a board of management.
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5) As soon as possible, the Mixed Board shall prepare the Charter of the national 
Oil Company including therein provision for the appointment of a Board of management 
and a Board of Technical experts; such Charter shall be submitted to the House for their 
ratification.
6) For the purpose of gradually replacing foreign technicians, the Mixed Board is 
charged to draw up regulations for the annual selection through competitive examinations 
of students to be sent abroad for education, training and experience in the various 
branches of the Oil industry; these regulations after being ratified by the two House shall 
be put into effect by the ministry of Education. The cost of education of these students 
shall be paid out of the oil earnings.
7) Purchasers of the products of the oil fields from which the former Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company has been removed can hereafter purchase annually at the current world 
market prices the same quantities purchased by them during the period commencing from 
the beginning of 1948 up to 29th Esfand 1329 [March 20, 1951] ; for any additional 
quantities they shall also enjoy priority, other conditions being equal.
8) All proposals of the Mixed Board shall be delivered to the Majlis and if approved 
by the Oil Commission the latter shall submit a report thereon to the Majlis for ratification.
9) The Mixed Board must complete its work within three months of the ratification 
of the Law and submit a report of its action to the Majlis in accordance with Article 8. 
Should the Board need a longer period of time it may ask for an extension giving adequate 
reasons therefore.
Passed by the majlis on April 30,1951 and by the Senate on May 1,1951. Signed 
and promulgated by the Shah on May 2, 1951.
Source of text: Ford A. W., The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, op. cit.. Appendix 
IV, p. 269.
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APPENDIX n
DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND 
POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA
The government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, having been 
requested by the Governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Unites States of 
America to serve as an intermediary in seeking a mutually acceptable resolution of the 
crisis in their relations arising out of the detention of the 52 Unites States nationals in 
Iran, has consulted extensively with the two governments as to the commitments which 
each is willing to make in order to resolve the crisis within the framework of the four 
points stated in the resolution of November 2, 1980, of the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly of Iran. On the basis of formal adherence received from Iran and the United 
States, the Government of Algeria now declares that the following interdependent 
commitments have been made by the two governments:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The undertakings reflected in this Declaration are based on the following general 
principles:
A) Within the framework of and pursuant to the provisions of the two Declarations 
of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the United States 
will restore the financial position of Iran, in so far as possible, to that which existed prior 
to November 14, 1979. In this context, the United States commits itself to insure the 
mobility and free transfer of all Iranian assets within its jurisdiction, as set forth in 
paragraphs 4-9.
B) It is the purpose of both parties, within the framework of and pursuant to the 
provisions of the two Declarations of the Government of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria, to terminate all litigation as between the Government of each party 
and the nationals of the other, and to bring about the settlement and termination of all such 
claims through binding arbitration. Through the procedures provided in the Declaration, 
relating to the Claims Settlement Agreement, the United States agrees to terminate aU legal 
proceedings in the United States courts involving claims of the United States persons and 
institutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judgements 
obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to bring about 
the termination of such claims through binding arbitration.
Point I: Non-intervention in Iranian Affairs
1- The United States pledges that it is and from now on will be the policy of the 
United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran's 
internal affairs.
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Point II and HI: Return of Iranian Assets and Settlement of U.S. claims
2- Iran and the United States (hereinafter "the parties" will immediately select a 
mutually agreeable central bank (hereinafter "the Central Bank") to act, under the 
instructions of the Government of Algeria and the Central Bank of Algeria (hereinafter 
"The Algerian Central Bank") as depository of the escrow and security funds hereinafter 
prescribed and will promptly enter into depository arrangements with the Central Bank in 
accordance with the terms of this declaration. All funds placed in escrow with the Central 
Bank pursuant to this declaration shall be held in an account in the name of the Algerian 
Central Bank. Certain procedures for implementing the obligations set forth in this 
Declaration and in the Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
concerning the settlement of claims by the Government of the United States and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter "the Claims Settlement 
Agreement") are separately set forth in certain undertakings of the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect 
to the Declaration of the Democratic Popular Republic of Algeria.
3- The depository managements shall provide that, in the event that the Government 
of Algeria certifies to the Algerian Central Bank that the 52 U.S. nationals have safely 
departed from Iran, the Algerian Central Bank will thereupon instruct the Central Bank to 
transfer immediately all monies or other assets in escrow with the Central Bank pursuant 
to this declaration, provided that at any time prior to the making of such certification by 
the Government of Algeria, each of the two parties, Iran and the United States, shall have 
the right on seventy-two hours notice to terminate its commitments under this declaration.
If such notice is given by the united States and the foregoing certification is made by 
the government of Algeria within the seventy-two hour period of notice, the Algerian 
Central Bank will thereupon instruct the central Bank to transfer such monies and assets. 
If the seventy-two hour period of notice by the United States expires without such a 
certification having been made, or if the notice of termination is delivered by Iran, the 
Algerian Central Bank will thereupon instruct the central Bank to return all such monies 
and assets to the United States, and thereafter the commitments reflected in this 
declaration shall be of no further force and effect.
ASSETS IN THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
4- Commencing upon completion of the requisite escrow arrangements with the 
Central Bank, the United States will bring about the transfer to the Central Bank of all 
gold bullion which is owned by Iran and which is in the custody of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, together with all other Iranian assets (or the cash equivalent thereof) 
in the custody of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to be held by the Central Bank 
in escrow until such time as their transfer or return is required by paragraph 3 above.
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ASSETS IN FOREIGN BRANCHES OF U.S. BANKS
5- Commencing upon the completion of the requisite escrow arrangements with the 
Central Bank, the Unites States will bring about the transfer to the central Bank, to the 
account of the Algerian Central Bank, of all Iranian deposits and securities which on or 
after November 14, 1979, stood upon the books of overseas banking offices of U.S. 
banks together with interest thereon through December 31, 1980, to be held by the 
Central Bank, to the account of the Algerian Central Bank, in escrow until such time as 
their transfer or return is required in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Declaration.
ASSETS IN U.S. BRANCHES OF U.S. BANKS
6- Commencing with the adherence by Iran and the United States to this declaration 
and the claims settlement agreement attached hereto, and following the conclusion of 
arrangements with the Central Bank for the establishment of the interest-bearing security 
account specified in that agreement and paragraph 7 below, which arrangements will be 
concluded within 30 days from the date of this Declaration, the united States will act to 
bring about the transfer to the Central Bank, within six months from such date, of all 
Iranian deposits and securities in U.S. banking institutions in the United States, together 
with interest thereon, to be held by the Central Bank in escrow until such time as their 
transfer or return is required by paragraph 3.
7“ As funds aie received by the Central Bank pursuant to paragraph 6 above, the 
Algerian Central Bank shall direct the Central Bank to (1) transfer one-half of each such 
receipt to Iran and (2) place the other half in a special interest-bearing security account in 
the Central Bank, until the balance in the security account has reached the level of $1 
billion. After the $1 billion balance has been achieved, the algerian Central Bank shall 
direct all funds received pursuant to paragraph 6 to be transferred to Iran. All funds in the 
security account are to be used for the sole purpose of securing the payment of, and 
paying, claims against Iran in accordance with the claims settlement agreement. Whenever 
the Central Bank shall thereafter notify Iran that the balance in the security account has 
fallen below $500 million, Iran shall promptly make new deposits sufficient to maintain a 
minimum balance of $500 million in the account. The account shall be so maintained until 
the President of Arbitral Tribunal established pursuant to the claims settlement agreement 
has certified to the Central Bank of Algeria that all arbitral awards against Iran have been 
satisfied in accordance with the claims settlement agreement, at which point any amount 
remaining in tlie security account shall be transferred to Iran.
OTHER ASSETS IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD
8- Commencing with the adherence of Iran and the United States to this declaration 
and the attached claims settlement agreement and the conclusion of arrangements for the 
establishment of the security account, which arrangements will be concluded within 30
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days from the date of this Declaration, the united States will act to bring about the transfer 
to the Central Bank of all Iranian financial assets (meaning funds or securities) which are 
located in the United States and abroad, apart fro those assets referred to in paragraph 5 
and 6 above, to be held by the Central Bank in escrow will until their transfer or return is 
required by paragraph 3 above.
9- Commencing with the adherence by Iran and the United States to this declaration 
and the attached claims settlement agreement and the making by the Government of 
Algeria of the certification described in paragraph 3 above, the United States will arrange, 
subject to the provisions of U.S. law applicable prior to November 14, 1979, for the 
transfer to Iran of all Iranian properties which are located in the United states and abroad 
and which are not within the scope of the preceding paragraphs.
NULLIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AND CLAIMS
10" Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification described in 
paragraph 3 above, the United States will revoke all trade sanctions which were directed 
against Iran in the period November 4,1979, to date.
11- Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification described in 
paragraph 3 above, the United states will promptly withdraw all claims now pending 
against Iran before the International Court of Justice and will thereafter bar and preclude 
the prosecution against Iran of any pending or future claims of the United States or a 
United States national arising out of events occurring before the date of this declaration 
related to (A) the seizure of 52 United states nationals of November 4, 1979, (B) their 
subsequent detention, (C) injury to United States property or property of the United States 
nationals within the United States Embassy compound in Teheran after November 3, 
1979, and (D) injury to the United States nationals or their property as a result of popular 
movements in the course of the Islamic Revolution in Iran which were not an act of the 
Government of Iran. The United States will also bar and preclude the prosecution against 
Iran in the courts of the United States of any pending or future claims asserted by persons 
other than the United States nationals arising out of the events specified in the preceding 
sentence.
Point IV: Return of the Assets of the Family of the former Shah
12- Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification described in 
paragraph 3 above, the United States all freeze, and prohibit any transfer of, property and 
assets of the United States within the control of the estate of the former Shah or of any 
close relative of the former Shah served a defendant in U.S. litigation brought by Iran to 
recover Shah property and assets as belonging to Iran. As to any such defendant, 
including the estate of the former Shah, the freeze order will remain in effect until such 
litigation is finally terminated. Violation of the freeze order shall be subject to the civil and 
criminal penalties prescribed by U.S. law.
13- Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification described in
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paragraph 3 above, the United States will order all persons within U.S. jurisdiction to 
report to the U.S. Treasury within 30 days, for transmission to Iran, all information 
known to them, as of November 3, 1979, and as of the date of the order, with respect to 
the property and assets referred to in paragraph 12. Violation of the requirement will be 
subject to the civil and criminal penalties prescribed by U.S. law.
14- Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification described in 
paragraph 3 above, the United States will make known, to all appropriate U.S. courts, that 
in any litigation of the kind described in paragraph 12 above, the claims of Iran should not 
be considered legally barred either by sovereign immunity principles or by the act of state 
doctrine and that Iranian decrees and judgements relating to such assets should be enforced 
by such courts in accordance with United States law.
15- as to any judgement of a U.S. court which calls for the transfer of any property 
or assets to Iran, the United States hereby guarantees the enforcement of the final 
judgement to the extent that the property or assets exist within the United States.
16- If any dispute arises between the parties as to whether the United States has 
fulfilled any obligation imposed upon it by paragraphs 12-15, inclusive, Iran may submit 
the dispute to binding arbitration by the tribunal established by, and in accordance with the 
provisions of, the claims settlement agreement. If the tribunal determines that Iran has 
suffered a loss as a result of a failure by the United States to fulfil such obligation, it shall 
make an appropriate award in favour of Iran which may be enforced by Iran in the courts 
of any nation in accordance with its law.
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
17- If any other dispute arises between the parties as to the interpretation or 
performance of any provision of this declaration, either party may submit the dispute to 
binding arbitiation by the tribunal established by, and in accordance with the provisions 
of, the claims settlement agreement. Any decision of the tribunal with respect to such 
dispute, including any award of damages to compensate for a loss resulting from a breach 
of this declaration or the claims settlement agreement, may be enforced by the prevailing 
party in the courts of any Initiated on January 19,1981 
by 
Warren M. Christopher 
Deputy Secretary of State 
of the Government of the United states 
By virtue of the powers vested in him by his Government 
as deposited with the Government of Algeria
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UNDERTAKINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
OF IRAN WITH RESPECT OF THE DECLARATION OF THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF
ALGERIA
1- At such time as the Algerian Central bank notifies the Governments of Algeria, 
ban, and the United States that it has been notified by the Central bank that the Central 
bank has received for deposit in dollar, gold bullion, and securities account in the name of 
the Algerian Central Bank, as escrow agent, cash and other funds, 1,632,917.779 ounces 
of gold (valued by the parties for this purpose at $0.9397 billion), and securities (at face 
value) in the aggregate amount of $7,955 billion, Iran shall immediately bring about the 
safe departure of the 52 U.S. nationals detained in Iran. Upon the making by the 
Government of Algeria of the certification described in paragraph 3 of the Declaration, the 
Algerian Central Bank will issue the instructions required by the following paragraph.
2- Iran having affirmed its intention to pay all its debts and those of its controlled 
institutions, the Algerian Central Bank acting pursuant to paragraph 1 above will issue the 
following instructions to the central Bank:
(A) To transfer $3,667 billion to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to pay 
unpaid principle of and interest through December 31, 1980 on (1) all loans and credits 
made by a syndicate of banking institutions, of which a U.S. banking institution is a 
member, to the Government of Iran, its agencies, instrumentalities or controlled entities, 
and (2) all loans and credits made by such a syndicate which are guaranteed by the 
Government of Iran or any of its agencies, instrumentalities or controlled entities.
(B) To retain $1,418 billion in the escrow account for the purpose of paying the 
unpaid principle of the interest owing, if any, on the loans and credits referred to in 
par agraph (A) after application of the $3,667 billion and on all other indebtedness held by 
United States banking institutions of, or guaranteed by, the government of Iran, its 
agencies, instrumentalities or controlled entities not previously paid and for the purpose of 
paying disputed amounts of deposits, assets, and interests, if any, owing on Iranian 
deposits in U.S. banking institutions. Bank Markazi and the appropriate United States 
banking institutions shall promptly meet in an effort to agree upon the amounts owing.
In the event of such agreement, the Bank Markazi and the appropriate banking 
institution shall certify the amount owing to the Central Bank of Algeria which shall 
instruct the Bank of England to credit such amount to the account to the account, as 
appropriate, of the Bank Markazi or of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in order to 
permit payment to the appropriate banking institution. In the event that within 30 days any 
U.S. banking institution and the Bank Markazi are unable to agree upon the amounts 
owed, either party may refer such dispute to binding arbitration by such international 
arbitration panel as the parties may agree, or failing such agreement within 30 additional 
days after such reference, by the Iran-Unites States Claims Tribunal. The presiding officer
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of such panel or tribunal shall certify to the Central Bank of Algeria the amount, if any, 
determined by it to be owed, whereupon the Central Bank of Algeria shall instruct the 
Bank of England to credit such amount to the account of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York in order to permit payment to the appropriate banking institution. After aU disputes 
are resolved either by agreement or by arbitration award and appropriate payment has been 
made, the balance of the funds referred to in this paragraph (B) shall be paid to Bank 
Markazi.
(C) To transfer immediately to, or upon the order of, the Bank Markazi all assets in 
the escrow account in excess of the amount referred to in paragraph (A) and (B). Initialled 
on January 19, 1981
by-------------------------------------------------
Warren M. Christopher 
Deputy Secretary of State 
of the Government of the United States 
By virtue of the powers vested in him by his Government 
as deposited with the Government of Algeria
DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND 
POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT 
OF CLAIMS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
IRAN
The Government of the Democratic and popular Republic of Algeria, on the basis of 
formal notice of adherence received from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and the Government of the United States of America, now declares that Iran and the 
United States have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
Iran and the United States will promote the settlement of the claims described in 
Article II by the parties directly concerned. Any such claims not settled within six months 
from the date of entry into force of this agreement shall be submitted to binding third-party 
arbitration in accordance with the terms of this agreement. The aforementioned six 
months' period may be extended once by three months at the request of either party.
ARTICLE n
1- An International Arbitral Tribunal (the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal) is
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hereby established for the purpose of deciding claims of nationals of the United States 
against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the United States, and any counterclaim 
which arises out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject 
matter of that national's claim, if such claims and counterclaims are outstanding on the date 
of this agreement, whether or not filed with any court, and arise out of debts, counteracts 
(including transactions which, are the subject of letters of credit or bank guarantees), 
expropriations or other measures affecting property rights, excluding claims described in 
paragraph 11 of the Declaration of the Government of Algeria of January 19,1981, and 
claims arising out of the actions of the United States in response to the conduct described 
in such paragraph, and excluding claims arising under a binding contract between the 
parties specifically providing that any disputes thereunder shall be within the sole 
jurisdiction of the competent iranian courts in response to the Majlis position.
2- The tribunal shall also have jurisdiction over official claims of the united States 
and Iran against each other arising out of the contractual arrangements between them for 
the purchase and sale of goods and services.
3- The Tribunal shall jurisdiction, as specified in paragraph 16-17 of declaration of 
the government of Algeria of January 19,1981, over any dispute as to the interpretation or 
performance of any precision of that declaration.
AETlCLE.ffl
1- The Tribunal shall consist of nine members or such larger multiple of three as Ii'an 
and the United States may may agree are necessary to conduct its business expeditiously. 
Within ninety days after the entry into force of this agreement, each government shall 
appoint one-third of the members. Within thirty days after their appointment, the members 
so appointed shall by mutual agreement select the remaining third of the members and 
appoint one of the remaining third president of the Tribunal. Claims may be decided by the 
full Tribunal or by a panel of three members of the Tribunal as the president shall 
determine. Each such panel shall be composed by the president and shall consist of one 
member appointed by each of by the three methods set forth above.
2- Members of the Tribunal shall be appointed and the Tribunal shall conduct its 
business in accordance with the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) except to the extend modified by the paities or by 
the Tribunal to ensure that this agreement can be carried out. The UNCITRAL rules for 
appointing members of three-member Tribunals shall apply mutatis mutandis to the 
appointment of the Tribunal.
3- Claims of nationals of the United States and Iran that are within the scope of this 
agreement shall be presented to the Tribunal either by claimants themselves, or, in the case 
of claims of less than $250'000, by the Government of such national.
4- No claim may be filed with the Tribunal more than one year after the entry into 
force of this agreement or six months after the date the president is appointed, whichever 
is later. These deadlines do not apply to the procedures contemplated by paragraphs 16
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and 17 of the Declaration of the Government of Algeria of January 19,1981.
ARTICLE IV
1- All decisions and awards of the Tribunal shall be final and binding.
2- The president of the Tribunal shall certify, as prescribed in paragraph 7 of the 
Declaration of the Government of Algeria of January 19, 1981, when all arbitral awards 
under this agreement have been satisfied.
3- Any award which the Tribunal may render against either government shall be 
enforceable against such government in the courts of any nation in accordance with its 
laws.
ARTICLE V
The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, applying such 
choice of law rules and principles of commercial and international law as the Tribunal 
determines to be applicable, taking into account relevant usages of the trade, contract 
provisions and changed circumstances.
ARTICLE VI
1- The seat of the Tribunal shall be The Hague, The Netherlands, or any otiier place 
agreed by Iran and the United States.
2- Each government shall designate an agent at the seat of the Tribunal to represent it 
to the Tribunal and to receive notices or other communications directed to it or to its 
nationals, agencies, instrumentalities, or entities in connection with proceedings before the 
Tribunal.
3- The expense of the Tribunal shall be born equally by the two governments.
4" Any question concerning the interpretation or application of this agreement shall 
be decided by the Tribunal upon the request of either Iran or the United States.
ARTICLE Vn
For the purposes of this agreement:
1- A "national" of Iran or of the United States, as the case may be, means (a) a 
natural person who is a citizen of Iran or the United States; and (b) a corporation or other 
legal entity which is organized under the laws of Iran or the United States or any of its 
states or territories, the District of Columbia or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, if, 
collectively, natural persons who are citizens of such country hold, directly or indirectly, 
an interest in such corporation or entity equivalent to fifty per cent or more of its capital 
stock.
2- "Claims of nationals" of Iran or the United States, as the case may be, means 
claims owned continuously, from the date on which the claim arose to the date on which 
this agreement enters into force, by nationals of that state, including claims that are owned 
indirectly by such nationals through ownership of capital stock or other proprietary in 
juridical persons, provided that the ownership interests of such nationals, collectively, 
were sufficient at the time the claim arose to control the corporation or other entity, and
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provided, further, that the corporation or other entity is not itself entitled to bring a claim 
under the terms of this agreement. Claims referred to the Arbitral Tribunal shall, as of the 
date of filling of such claims with the Tribunal, be considered excluded from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of Iran, or of the United States, or of any other court.
3- "Iran" means the Government of Iran, any political subdivision of Iran, and any 
agency, instrumentality, or entity controlled by the Government of Iran or any political 
subdivision thereof.
4- The "United States" means the Government of the United States, any political 
subdivision of the United States, any agency, instrumentality or entity controlled by the 
Government of the United States or any political subdivision thereof.
ARTICLE Vm
This agreement shall enter into force when the Government of Algeria has received 
from both Iran and the United States a notification of adherence to the agreement.
Initialled on January 19,1981
by---------------------------------------
Warren M. Christopher 
Deputy Secretary of State 
of the Government of the United States 
By virtue of the powers vested in him by his Government 
as deposited with the Government of Algeria
Source of text: 20 International Legal Materials, 1981, pp. 224-233.
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